

A STUDY REGARDING THE BEHAVIOR OF FRENCH, GERMAN, AND RUSSIAN SOCIETIES. THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

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Abstract: In this paper there is presented the influence of geography upon national character of three important nations: the French, the Germans, and the Russians. It could be observed that some geographical peculiarities, such as geographical location of those nations, brought some specific events upon them, which have repeated during history; and this marked in a visible manner their national character and the way they behave as societies. It is a guide regarding the connection between geography, history and culture.

Keywords: *geography, history, culture, national behavior, compromise*

„What is it that cannot quite be seen but follows us around
constantly? The answer is culture”¹

For the beginning, the key-word which must always be kept in mind is *culture*. It is an imprecise word, a dim word, being illustrated by a large panel of definitions: one study remarks 164 definitions for culture². The culture has strong affective resonances; it brings sentiments of social solidarity, promotes creativity, originality, and spontaneity³. Cultures are conservative and have the mission of protecting identities⁴.

Culture is always psychologically and socially distributed in a group⁵. As such the individuals which emanates from such a group would probably develop similar ways of behavior. Cultures are belief-systems, which pushed forward by peculiar values would develop into attitudes and would define mentalities; they have historical and traditional lineage, are subjective and hardly transferable⁶.

People who form a nation, and which have a common heritage, and share similar beliefs tend to behave in a similar manner. And for this reason the study

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¹ Guy-Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin, (eds.), *Culture and Negotiation*, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage, 1993, p. xi.

² A.L. Kroeber, Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, Greenwood Press, 2001, p. 76.

³ Mircea Malița, *Zece mii de culturi, o singură civilizație. Spre geomodernitatea secolului XXI*, București, Editura Nemira, 1998, p. 37.

⁴ *ibidem*, p. 37.

⁵ Kevin Avruch, *Culture and Conflict Resolution*, Washington DC, USIP Press, 2004, p. 5.

⁶ Mircea Malița, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

of culture and its impact upon behavior is a very important one. This affirmation is enforced once more by the care which recently is given by a leading research think-tank to country-specific studies and functional studies (USIP). States (and societies) do not behave similarly in similar situations, and the influence of social and economic structure, and of domestic politics have their weight on behavior. There are important factors such as state's geographical position, its traditions and history, its national style⁷, which influence the behavioral style of people from those different states.

Culture's effect on human interaction process is subtle; this doesn't mean that the culture's importance is reduced, but only makes it less visible⁸. The distinctive effects of culture can be related to the key components of a negotiation, such as actors, structure, strategies, process, and outcome⁹. With their strategies and proposals, negotiators bring to the table a set of beliefs, instincts, and expectations that grow out of their political culture.

The *geographical location* of one nation (and state) influences the national style of that nation, because a specific location means peculiar facts which have repeated during history in that specific area; and these facts have influenced the tradition, and as such, we are placed immediately in the cultural area.

RUSSIA

Let's see the Russian case. The Russian behavioral style is deep rooted in Russia's complex history, in which violence and authoritarianism have coexisted with scientific sophistication and Russia's yearning to be accepted as an equal by the West¹⁰. There are specific influences which bears weight with Russian behavior: the Soviet legacy, which reflects and reinforces traits that for centuries characterized a distinctly Russian outlook: mistrust and jealousy of the outside world; ambivalence toward the West reflecting in a sense of moral superiority and material inferiority; deep-seated insecurity and – its antidote – willing acceptance of an all-controlling leader (*vozhda*); respect for power and certainty of goals; distaste for compromise and readiness to threaten the use of force.

Numerous invasions from all direction marked Russian history, which have made to perceive themselves as the victims of foreign penetration and domination – the oppressed, not the aggressors. For centuries, Russians have behaved burdened by a besieged mentality that perceives the opposing side to be an enemy and expects a zero-sum outcome from the negotiating encounter. Centuries of turbulent, violent history have left indelible marks on Russian psyche, deeply coloring attitudes toward individual and national survival in a hostile, hierarchical environment. And these reflexes were reinforced by Soviet political culture.

The tradition of despotic rule, heritage from Tatar invasion in 13-th century could easily be identified in tsarist control and in Soviet totalitarianism, and these profoundly affected attitudes toward *power* and *authority*. The central and significant reality of Russian politics and behavior has been its predominantly

⁷ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 21.

⁸ Guy-Olivier Faure, „International Negotiation: The Cultural Dimension”, in Viktor A. Kremenyuk (ed.), *International Negotiation. Analysis, Approaches, Issues*, 2-nd edition, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass 2002, p. 403.

⁹ *ibidem*, p. 403.

¹⁰ Jerrold L. Schecter, *Russian Negotiating Behavior. Continuity and Transition*, Washington DC, USIP Press, 1998, p. 3.

autocratic character¹¹. The overthrow of the Tatar yoke give rise to an assertive and dominant autocracy; property and people were the possession of the state, personalized by the autocrat; control over society – including the control of Church by the State – through census mechanism adapted centuries ahead of any corresponding European device, was reminiscent of Oriental *despotism* and in fact was derived directly from that historical experience¹².

The Soviets brought new elements into Russian behavior. Marxist-Leninist ideology has greatly influenced Russian behavior; with dialectical materialism influencing both strategic and tactical decisions, Russians were animated by a readiness to attack. While Marxist theory was imported from the West, Marxism in practice, as a system of government, acquired in Russia a uniquely despotic character, due to its connection to Oriental culture. As a consequence, in Western countries, Marxism evolved into the democratic welfare state like France, while in Russia it produced a highly developed totalitarian regime.

*They believed in the constancy and the historical necessity of conflict*¹³, being ready even to falsify reality and to employ violence. The role of authority, the avoidance of risk – which is linked to the information' disclosure, and to toleration of uncertainties¹⁴ – and the necessity for control are the most important components to understand Russian behavior. The painful experience of centuries of invasion has affected the Russian psyche, resulting in an obsession with the security, which in turn induces an extreme habit of secrecy regarding defense matters and a belligerent attitude toward foreign countries¹⁵. The secrecy nowadays even extends to subjects who have not direct connection with military, but covers information regarding Russian society¹⁶.

There is a duality in the Russian personality: one reflects the spiritual, generous and nature-loving Russian; one is the cynical, cruel Russian who distrusts his neighbor and could betray friendship for survival and personal gain. They are sensitive to friendship and especially to the merits of Russian culture, and their biggest love is their "Mother Russia"¹⁷. The outstanding peculiarity of Russian personality is its contradictoriness – its ambivalence. There is the rush to swallow things and to swallow them whole, the need for quick gratification, the spells of manic omnipotence, and on the other side is suspicion, the anxious and sullen submissiveness, the grudging idealization of a strong, arbitrary authority which is thought of as the only safeguard against the excess of Russian nature¹⁸.

¹¹ Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "Soviet Politics: From the Future to the Past?", in Paul Cocks, Robert V. Daniels, and Nancy Whittier Heer (eds.), *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics*, Cambridge Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1976, p. 337.

¹² Karl A. Wittfogel, "Russia and the East: A Comparison and Contrast", in *Slavic Review*, December 1963, p. 640.

¹³ Jerrold L. Schecter, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁴ Jeswald W. Salacuse, *The Global Negotiator. Making, Managing, and Mending Deals Around the World in the Twenty-First Century*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 108.

¹⁵ Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, "The Soviet Union, the Pursuit of Power and Influence through Negotiation", in Hans Binnendijk (ed.), *National Negotiating Styles*, Washington DC, Foreign Service Institute, US Department of State, 1987, p. 19.

¹⁶ Edward Lukas, *The New Cold War. Putin's Russia and the Threat to the West*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 57-86.

¹⁷ Mircea Malița, *Jocuri pe scena lumii. Conflicte, negocieri, diplomație*, București, Editura C. H. Beck, 2007, p. 198.

¹⁸ Henry V. Dicks, "Observations on Contemporary Russian Behavior", in *Human Relations*, 5, No. 2, April 1952, p. 134.

Russian national identity and its peoples' negotiating style comprises a complex set of contradictory impulses and attitudes, which owes very much to geography and history¹⁹, generating a behavioral pattern of accepting, then rejecting, of agreeing, then demanding more²⁰, and in this framework the Orthodox Church, by offering confession and absolution, induces and makes tolerable the greatest psychological stresses²¹.

Another aspect the Russians behavior regards their yielding to adhere to top-down decision making, in a system that lacks adequate provisions for consensus building and the checks and balances of a legal system. With repeated attacks from all directions, the Russians have relied on government for security, not for justice²². They preferred to trade freedom for security. And as a historical fact, when in Russia there could be identified some liberties, as those promoted by Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the Russian state was weakening; while there was in Moscow an autocratic ruler, Russia was a weightier piece in the international arena.

And as a consequence of weakness, of a sense of inferiority, there appears with high probability the using of deceive tactics; this is a compensation for weakness. "As a nation, we cannot deal with others equally. Either we are more powerful or they are. And if they are, and we feel it, we compensate by deceiving them. It is a very important feature of our national character"²³.

GERMANY

Das Land der Mitte. This is Germany – the land in the middle. And Germany's location frames German behavior and diplomacy, and it compels it toward diplomacy and toward negotiations²⁴. They must make constant adjustments toward their neighbors. This geographical location means that during history German people have fought off the Romans, the Huns, the Mongols, the French, the Swedes, the Russians, and others. They have more neighbors on their vicinity than any other European state, having in the same time only one easily defensible land frontier – the Alps. Any other part of this area creates opportunities for land or sea attack in both directions. Geography compels Germany to look constantly in at least two directions: East and West, and it condemn them not only to think of their neighbors but to try to imagine how their neighbors see them²⁵. Germany must have relations with many states, having a myriad – and often conflicting – interests and policies, and it must take account of its neighbors' interests.

Although Germany is the land in the middle, it is a late state, Germans in the late 19-th century often calling themselves the delayed nation (*die verspatete Nation*). Germany was the last important European nation which created a united and independent government. And German history has influenced the most German national consciousness, German policy, and German behavior, than any other single factor. The German people have been at the center of

¹⁹ Jerrold L. Schecter, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

²⁰ *ibidem*, p. 24

²¹ Geoffrey Groer and John Richman, *The People of Great Russia*, London, Cresset Press, 1949, pp. 152-153.

²² Jerrold L. Schecter, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

²³ Hedrick Smith, *The Russians*, New York, Quadrangle, 1976, p. 17, quoted in Jerrold L. Schecter, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

²⁴ William R. Smyser, *How Germans Negotiate. Logical Goals, Practical Solutions*, Washington DC, USIP Press, 2003, p. 12.

²⁵ *ibidem*, pp. 12-13.

Europe for more than a millennium, but they did form a nation-state only in 1871 (six centuries after England, and four centuries after France and Spain). Until then, the Germans which constructed their identity in the same time with French lived in distinct communities: cities, ports, leagues, regimes, ducats, counties, in number of three hundred²⁶. During Middle Ages and even in the modern era the German nation formed the most important part of the Holy Roman Empire, but in during this period “Germany” represented only a geographical and ethnic expression, but not a state (or a separate government)²⁷. In this puzzle of aristocratic and ecclesial possessions, the authority was precisely delineated, and each ruler had obligations toward others and toward citizens and each ruler had to take care of its interests. They could not count on the Holy Roman Empire to protect them and as such they needed to make sure that they could protect their own territories against potential enemies on *all sides*. As a result, they engaged in *continuous diplomatic activity* to keep themselves and their people safe²⁸. They practiced diplomatic immersion and a continuous dialogue with the important ones. *Constant communication and contact became a cornerstone* ingredient among German rulers²⁹.

Furthermore, during the existence of Holy Roman Empire, Germans functioned within a *multiplicity* of associations, which connected states and ecclesiastical realms, and associations which brought together different professions. Every profession had had its association. And all these associations were connected to others, having its own sphere of membership, action, and responsibility³⁰. Under the umbrella of those associations, people found the equivalent of personal autonomy. As a result, more importance was attached to unwritten consensus, than to decisions reached in such formal structures. *The search for consensus and social peace* permitted convergence among so different nationalities and faiths, becoming an important element of German culture³¹. But this connection underscored another thing: German awareness of hierarchy. Each knew where he or she stood and belonged.

To this, there was added the great influence of Hegel. Hegelian philosophy where all things were both related and opposite, reinforced the federalist thrust of the German experience in the Holy Roman Empire and in the German Confederation. All people in it could remain distinct and separate individuals while being part of a common political logic that sanctioned distinctiveness and community alike. The nine hundred years of German existence within the Holy Roman Empire and the legacy of *dialectic logic* reinforced each other, strongly marking the German unconsciousness and the culture of German diplomacy and behavior. This way of thinking could easily be identified at the end of any negotiation with Germans: in that point, they want to see all issues and all relationships settled and definitive. They want everything to be in its proper place and with an agreed-upon set of instructions³²; they even have a saying for this: they say in the moment in which this point is attained that “All is in order”³³.

²⁶ Mircea Malița, *Jocuri pe scena lumii*, pp. 188-189.

²⁷ William R. Smyser, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

²⁸ *ibidem*, pp. 15-16.

²⁹ *ibidem*, pp. 17.

³⁰ *ibidem*, pp. 17.

³¹ Peter H. Wilson, *The Holy Roman Empire*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1999, p. 23.

³² William R. Smyser, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

³³ *ibidem*, p. 132.

German people were accustomed to leave in a multitude of contradictions: they have moment of peace, but quite often they were cough up in the internal and external struggles of the Holy Roman Empire and the surrounding states, whether they wanted or not; the Germans became tough, didn't surrender quickly, in war or in diplomacy. They have the reputation of tenacious negotiators. They are purposeful, determined, assertive, haughty, and unbending³⁴.

Before the creation of *Zollverein* the German states and cities created an important and efficacious bureaucracy, public service attracting some distinguished philosophers (as von Goethe), and establishing the base for a relatively honest, dedicated, and incorruptible civil service, generating the framework for the development of bureaucratic rules governing many aspects of civic life. As a consequence, in time, the Germans tried to find some real focus, some centre of gravity, which impelled Germans to regard the conception of "unity", as expressed by the state, as something mystical and almost religious. It has led them to find in physical unity, and therefore in physical power, that sense of solidarity which they lack as individuals³⁵. It could be easy observed this trait in the German art: the German thought, literature and art are massive, heavy and thick³⁶. The rapid German growth was a triumph of organization, its core point being the construction of German national economy during the first part of 19-th century. And Germans thought in terms on national economy and less in terms of political economy³⁷.

FRANCE

France – the land of command. Having natural borders on all sides but in the north-east, it was caught between strong and threatening enemies; the French state was the first which came off the confusing puzzle of Europe which mixed sedentary with migratory people, bringing to life again old roman institutions, and offering a religion which could unify the French society³⁸. In order to survive among those strong neighbors, the Franks undertook the *centralization* of their state, which in time put an end to feudal scatterings. There were created the instruments which provided the defense and expansions capacities: military and diplomacy. In French society the *state* has a special meaning: "the State in its constitutive organs is the incarnation of the nation: it is the ensemble of institutions by which French society functions"³⁹. The forefront idea of state is liked to a special role given to a diplomatic principle: the interest of the state; the importance attached to this principle and its positioning before an exclusively cultural matter – the religion – by Francis I⁴⁰, which allied with Ottomans, and by Richelieu which allied with the protestant and against the Catholic powers, mean for diplomacy and international practices a focalization on rational and practical analysis, and a little importance attached to religion. France couldn't survive among her neighbors if she wouldn't have centralized the state. It was Cardinal Richelieu who "left behind a doctrine of the

³⁴ *ibidem*, p. 19.

³⁵ Harold Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 2-nd edition, London, Oxford University Press, 1955, p. 145.

³⁶ Marcel Rouff, *La vie et la passion de Dodin-Bauffant, gourmet*, Paris, Stock, 1984, pp. 18-19.

³⁷ Halford J. Mackinder, *Democratic Ideals and reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction*, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1942, pp. 140-141.

³⁸ Mircea Malița, *Jocuri pe scena lumii*, p. 185.

³⁹ Roselyne Chenu, *Paul Delouvier ou la passion d'agir*, Paris, Seuil, 1994, p. 126.

⁴⁰ Fernand Braudel, *Mediterana și lumea mediteraneană în epoca lui Filip al II-lea*, vol. V, București, Editura Meridiane, 1986, pp. 10-14.

State, and to fulfill it, an administration, an organization, a battle-hardened army, and experienced generals”⁴¹.

The French State is personalized – by a well-endowed Marianne – and *deified* to a degree unequalled elsewhere in the contemporary Western world⁴². This backs up coherence and an easy realization of collective actions; and state, as a corporate structure, achieves this through centralization⁴³. Centralization involves hierarchical decision-making⁴⁴ and France is first and foremost an administration. It is a republic, not a democracy. The republic is a *pyramidal* decision structure; it is hierarchical. In France there is the rule, and how it is applied. France is a normative country. This stems from “two main elements: the long history of the administration; and the rationalist method of thinking”⁴⁵. And these give France great weight in political realm: “France is politically stronger than Germany for historical reasons and will remain so”⁴⁶.

For almost eight centuries France has striven to acquire natural borders and to expand its territory through the means of *war*. As such, the State had existed for a thousand years; France concluded its victories by imposing draconian but ultimately self-defeating settlements on its conquered foes⁴⁷. First there was conquest, then there was an administration, justice, bridges and roadways, postal service, finance. The state was above everything. It could not be done away with. The Revolution made the nation, but the state remained; the French state has also survived every convulsion in France’s history, including the Revolution, which developed in part as a reaction to the authority of the state but which sought to *transform* it, not to abolish it. The Jacobins – leading revolutionary party – aimed to strengthen the centralization in France⁴⁸.

This particular history has given birth to a particular political culture in France, which is characterized by both “limited authoritarianism” and “potential insurrection against authority”, and the French oscillate between a normal servility towards authority and sporadic rebellions against it, France being a “profoundly conservative country which dreams of revolution but rejects reform”⁴⁹. This is linked to the reflex of revolt developed by France, which is linked to the formalistic and hierarchical style inherited from “divine right” monarchy, maintained by a statist and bureaucratic centralization, which has invaded from top to bottom the institutions, the army, *education*, business and which has impregnated all social relations down to couples and families. It has resulted from this a *latent anarchism*, a dialectic of *order* and *subversion* which is at the base of France’s political and intellectual history.

This convulsions and conquering wars during almost a millennium and the imposition by force which followed these events has left traces in way the

⁴¹ Jacques Bainville, *Histoire de France*, Vol. I, Paris, Plon, 1933, p. 212.

⁴² Charles Cogan, *French Negotiating Behavior. Dealing with La Grande Nation*, Washington DC, USIP Press, 2003, p. 26.

⁴³ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 119.

⁴⁴ *ibidem*, pp. 119-220.

⁴⁵ Charles Cogan, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112.

⁴⁶ Daniel Vernet, „Hubert Vedrine celebre Madeleine Albright, Joschka Fischer vante la France”, in *Le Monde*, January 13, 2001, p. 1, quoted in Charles Cogan, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁴⁷ Charles Cogan, *op. cit.*, pp. 67.

⁴⁸ Peter J. Hugill, *Global Communications since 1844. Geopolitics and Technology*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999, pp. 5-9.

⁴⁹ Andrew Knapp and Vincent Wright, *The Government and Politics of France*, 4-th ed., London, Routledge, 2001, pp. 202-203.

French behave; the French hardly accept to listen to others and refuse to communicate with them. The origins of this attitude can be found in the “culture of war, translated into vindictive ironic, and Voltairian speech, [which] is reflected in the intellectual debates which France so fancies and which remain marked by a Gallic taste for confrontation and exclusivity”⁵⁰. The French are “a quarrelsome and individualistic people”⁵¹.

But history marks fallings for France position, too. Being located among Spanish possessions and centralizing the state, France achieved a very important status in European affairs; during *le grand siècle* France was the hegemon power of Europe. The Revolution pushed it in the forefront of political and philosophical plan in international arena. But the desire to conquer and control as much as it could in Europe, brought together other powers which merged in order to check France’s influence. And these coalitions pushed back France. The French live with two simultaneous sentiments, being caught between the tradition of *la Grande nation*, and the culture of the *underdog*; and they alternate between “the fear of decline and the hope of redressment”. They move “from an inferiority complex that is denied” by their “unquestionable successes, to a superiority complex that sometimes” makes them unbearable to their partners. They go “back and forth between moroseness and self-importance”⁵².

Another peculiar element of French behavior is her desire to struggle against empires, which was for France the cornerstone for her survival and emergence as a nation. “Kingdom or Republic, France was built in opposition to the idea of empire. She owes her existence to having allied with the weak power against the strong power of the moment”⁵³. From this struggle against the dominant power in Europe or elsewhere – be that Austria, England, Germany, or United States – France has engendered a long-standing “culture of opposition to the dominant norms,” which views France as an underdog fighting against the odds to defend herself and her values against the tyranny of the moment⁵⁴.

As I said earlier, for the French, the State has a profound meaning. It is deified in their conscience. This is due to French educational system, which reflects in its own way the “vertical” nature of French society, and which develop a combative spirit in the students. But it brings in them the acuteness of observation and a lucid persuasiveness. The French are honorable and precise, yet they lack tolerance⁵⁵. Their passion for logic, the legal temper of their minds, their extreme realism, often blind them to the motives, the feelings and often the thoughts of other nations⁵⁶.

At its core, French society has a strong rural heritage; although France is no longer a “peasant country”, the “peasant nostalgia” remains powerful, and that for French have a fierceness in the defense of national interest which contrasts with the greater flexibility of maritime (or commercial) nations⁵⁷.

Furthermore, France is a Catholic country, church which has a very well structured hierarchy, which in turn is an element which sustained the creation

⁵⁰ Charles Cogan, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

⁵¹ *ibidem*, p. 68

⁵² Interview with Rene Remond, in *Le Monde*, January 9, 2001, section *Horizons*, quoted in Charles Cogan, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁵³ Regis Debray, *Contretemps: Eloges des ideaux perdus*, Paris, Gallimard, 1985, p. 97.

⁵⁴ Charles Cogan, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

⁵⁵ Harold Nicolson, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁵⁶ *ibidem*, p. 151.

⁵⁷ Charles Cogan, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

of a centralized state and a hierarchical (vertical) social structure. The great divide in Europe is between Anglo-Saxon and Germanic Northern Europe (with *colder* climate), predominantly Protestant, and Latin Southern Europe (with *warmer* climate), predominantly Catholic. France is generally speaking a Latin country with a Catholic tradition. But in France there could be distinguished a traditional cultural divide between North and South – a line between St. Malo and Geneva – below which Latin temperament is more manifest⁵⁸. They are opposed to the idea of unrestricted capitalism, which is due both to peasant roots of population and to Catholic religion, too. Remaining a Catholic country, France lacks the *profit* ethic specific to individualistic cultures which have at their base the Protestant religion, with its concept of predestination. This individualistic religion (and culture) sustains social and geographical mobility, and supports a greater *flexibility and openness*⁵⁹ in dealing with other people (which could be from another cultures), and it contrasts with communal cultures which have at their base a rural society, empowered by stratified forms of social and religious organizations⁶⁰.

As a conclusion, we can easily observe that *compromise* is a thing easier accepted by Germans, which, due to geographic location of the German lands and their history had to learn to look to the context in which they operated, and tried to adapt to it, while French for geographical and historical reasons, too, are reluctant to compromise, while for Russians this world meaning that they are compromised, trying hardly to avoid it. For this reason, when Germans are isolated they get anxious and try to avoid this situation by making compromises, while for the French an isolated position only proves themselves that they are right, making them to avoid compromises. For Russians any concession which could bring a concession from the other side (resulting in a compromise) is a sign of weakness which would be exploited by the opponent. That for the Russians do very reluctantly accept compromise.

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⁵⁸ *ibidem*, pp. 43-44.

⁵⁹ Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating across Cultures. International Communication in an Interdependent World*, revised edition, Washington DC, USIP Press, 2002, pp. 29-31.

⁶⁰ *ibidem*, p. 30.

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