THE CHANGING INTERPRETATION OF BORDER FUNCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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Abstract: Boundary studies are still in the process of development and their theorisation as well as practical meaning for states is emphasised by researches. This paper represents an international relations (IR) theoretical approach to borders. It attempts to identify the underlying linkages between the classical figures in boundary studies, mainly represented by Victor Prescott and Julian Minghi and factors influencing the contemporary international environment, such as globalisation, transnational processes, and deteritorialisation/ reteritorialisation. Types of border, based on paradigms of international relations, do not need to be tangible in the present or past.

Key words: border, international relations, border roles, border functions

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INTRODUCTION

Borders are as dynamic as international relations are. The turbulences of the world politics (international relations) either stabilises or destabilises international borders. The state and its borders remains an important actor in international relations.

Boundary studies are still in the process of development and their theorisation as well as practical meaning for states is emphasised by researches. In the professional literature new approaches have been appeared since ever because the border is a continually transforming category from a purely geographic one to interdisciplinary one. The recent interesting categorisations of border studies are suggested by Anssi Paasi¹, Vladimir Kolossov², or Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly³ and many others. There are attempts at generalisation of border as a dynamic geographic category or a review of the different dominant approaches

and methods of border studies present in literature since the 19th century. However, Brunet-Jailly underlines that “each border is unique and no taxonomy of border is conceptually feasible because there are too many types of borders”.

This paper represents an international relations (IR) theoretical approach to borders. It attempts to identify the underlying linkages between the classical figures in boundary studies, mainly represented by Victor Prescott and Julian Minghi and factors influencing the contemporary international environment, such as globalisation, transnational processes, and deteritorialisation/reteritorialisation.

Like Prescott, the author of this paper perceives the state to manage its borders as a fundamental role of making peace and order in its inner and outer environment and the border to make the limits of state sovereignty. At the same time Minghi’s concepts concerning functional evolution of borders is taken into consideration. It is the state that usually adapts its border functions to its foreign policy optimum and political regime. Border crossing process maybe more or less controlled by the state.

Malcolm Anderson also considers the border as a dynamic element of the state. He emphasizes the multiple features of border maintenance, attributing to them three dimensions. First they are an instrument of state policy when governments change the place and function of the borders for specific benefits to the state, citizens or their own. Second, the policies and actions of state authorities are determined by the degree of control they exercise over a particular border: for the state to strive to be the exclusive source of power and influence is possible only when state borders are impermeable – closed to external penetration. Finally borders are determinants of national identity – associated with people’s sense of unity and with the myth about the natural cohesion of territory, which can be transformed as a result of wars, revolutions or political turbulence in the territory of a state.

For a leading French authority of geographical trends in international relations, Aymeric Chauprade, ‘global space is a map of states ... while the border is the goal and stakes of their rivalry’. The state border is similarly perceived by Michael Foucher who takes into account its fundamental function – that of a barrier and defines borders as sites of division of space and time, where a synthesis of political, economic, and military relations and ideology takes place. This perspective of the border indicates its importance and its subsequent significance in analysing international relations. In studying the roles of borders and how they functions at a given moment it is possible to determine the degree of tensions or détente in relations between states.

Most international relations scholars see borders as objects through or across which international relations occur. When defining the scope of research on international relations Daniel Colard takes into account relations of war and peace, the influence of transnational forces and any activity of subjects that goes

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4 Ibid., p.12.
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beyond state borders.\(^{10}\) Similarly, Philippe Braillard writes that IR are border-crossing and politically dimensioned relations obtaining between communities.\(^{11}\) Hence, borders are invaluable for the proper functioning of international relations.

Taking a systemic approach to define the border it is one of the constituents of the state as a system, determining its territory and the scope of sovereignty, and a set of entrances into and exits from the system that enables its functioning in the international environment. The number of entrances and exits and the extent of their control by the state defines the degree of permeability of a given border.

However it is necessary to keep in mind the assumption that ‘the meaning of what constitutes a border for one is not always compatible for another, with the disciplinary semantics and terminologies.’\(^{12}\)

The aim of this article is threefold, firstly to indicate the role of the border within the different paradigms of international relations, secondly to indicate how governments influence border functions and thirdly to identify a process of border functional transition. It is a theoretical analysis of different ways that a governments manage a state borders. The author assumes that a functional transition of borders depends on the diverse perception and importance of the border for different actors of IR. At the same time scholars supporting different paradigms in international relations perceive the significance of borders differently. Like Minghi, the author suggests the functional analysis of boundaries as a dynamic study of different levels of separation and contact between states, also taking into consideration the influence of non-state subjects of IR. Still, one has to keep in mind Mathias Albert’s assumption that functional boundaries always have territorial expressions, but not necessarily connected with the process of demarcation.\(^{13}\)

**TRANSITIONS OF BORDER FUNCTIONS.**

Many present-day states, when entering into interactions with other states, integrative blocs, international organisations and transnational subjects, handover some sovereignty to joint institutions. As a result of these actions, their state border functions change. There are also spatial (but not in the territorial sense of the word) changes of border functions. Processes of integrative groups enlargement (especially concerning the European Union) and the membership of new states in some international organisations (for example in the World Trade Organisation) shift the functionally defined border according to a group or organisation interests. One also witnesses a change in the perception of borders, as Anderson contends: from a line to a zone, from a physical border to an intangible cultural intersection, one perceived spatially to one viewed functionally, from impermeable to permeable\(^{14}\) or the other way round. Along with the transition of borders the sovereignty of the state may transform.


\(^{14}\) Anderson, M., (note 3) p.190.
As the international environment is dynamic and its turbulences usually change a states interests and sometimes roles, the process of border functional transition is not linear but circular. At the same time an authority in the face of threat to its territory or nation may restore the fundamental function of border to that of a barrier. Such a process is noticed at the present American – Canadian border after 9/11. Another example: after 1989 Polish eastern border has changed its functions many times being permeable at the beginning and getting more difficult when Poland joined the EU in 2004. It may also concern the roles of border-crossing procedures and entering visa regime between states that citizens used to be travelled without.

Sometimes a bilateral agreement of neighbouring states may appear to focus on peace and friendship but infrastructure and administrative procedures at borders remain strict and tight, at the same time. The most vivid example was Poland’s border with the Soviet Union. At first agreements confirmed ever lasting friendship, but there was a well developed infrastructure that interfered with crossing the Soviet border especially at the beginning of the 1950s and then during some uprisings such as in 1968 in Czechoslovakia (so called ‘The Spring of Prague’) or events in the coastal cities in 1970 and during the martial law in Poland in 1981.

The transformation of border functions may be studied from the standpoint of individual paradigms in international relations. A leading theoretician of I.R. Torbjørn. L. Knutsen distinguished three main paradigms: realistic, transnational, and global. These are different ways of perceiving the major actors in international relations, interrelationships between them and motives for their actions. According to him, in the realistic paradigm the state as the most important subject, apart from governments and international organizations, functions between strategic alliances and conflicts as well as protects the inviolability of its sovereignty and national interest.

As Jon E. Dougherty, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff or Bjørn Ramberg state the transnational paradigm devotes considerable attention, apart from states, to non-state (non-territorial) actors and assumes comprehensive interdependence of all subjects. These actors act in such a way as to eliminate conflicts in order to create conditions conducive to the rise of a stable international order. Following the assumptions of the scholars of the global paradigm, however, assumes the growing number of actors and the rise and functioning of transnational networks which act as interconnections between subjects of international relations. The level of formalization of the world decreases for the creation of global management system.

Chauprade gives two main principles used for investigation of causative forces in geopolitics. Firstly that states choose the principle of stability to establish a favourable spatial configuration and reach balance. Secondly the under the principle of a geopolitical optimum, the territory is formed according to one’s own determinants (or one’s own optimum). Every sovereign government decides on this optimum. As Newman states ‘most border studies

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16 Ibid.
18 Chauprade, A., (note 4) p.304.
have focused on the government imposed status of the border and its associated management mechanisms. This is partly because of the control function which is attributed to state territoriality, a function which can only be implemented through government practices when there are clearly defined borders which determine the parameters within which policies of control are shaped.19 The state, entering interactions with its outer environment, both moulds it and can be influenced by it.

States as territorial actors in international relations are present in each of the paradigms depicted in table 1, they function in the environment separated by state borders. Table 1 compares the role and place of state borders according to the aforementioned paradigms. Firstly, their perception, secondly, their importance for the state, and thirdly the actions taken to implement the rules of the paradigm relating to the border.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paradigm</th>
<th>Realistic</th>
<th>Transnational</th>
<th>Global</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Border Perception</td>
<td>dividing line, determinant of nationality and separation</td>
<td>porous line, an element of system enabling states’ penetration</td>
<td>virtual line, a demarcating line seen only at the map, no states borders in favour of market borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Border importance</td>
<td>very important, as a barrier against threats, sovereignty guarding, profitable element of a system, disintegrative function</td>
<td>less important as a bridge between states and non-territorial actors, fragmentive function</td>
<td>not important, as a not functioning barrier for international flows, integrative function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action at border</td>
<td>infrastructure building, securitization of border, when a conflict appears – militarisation of border</td>
<td>gradual abolition of infrastructure, opening of channels for flows of goods, people, money, information</td>
<td>no infrastructure or not important, making heterogenous market system and legal system</td>
</tr>
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The three border functions: disintegrative, fragmentive and integrative, presented in table 1 and defined according to the criterion of international relations, reflect the behaviour of international actors in choosing favourable spatial configurations and geopolitical optimum in the international environment. A state can open its border to a certain to people, goods, capital and ideas coming from a distant country or close it through imposition of specific sanctions or embargo against any country. The state can therefore lay down the rules of the disintegrative border operating against its neighbors if it expects that it will benefit more or lose less from such a strategy. On the other hand it can be partly open to contact or conclude agreements on free flow of factors across its borders from a concrete direction. Then again, transnational systems may force, the state to maintain a status quo in its relations with other IR actors. Such a policy may be consistent with the state’s geopolitical optimum, when it is voluntary, or in conflict with it, when it is imposed. Different actors with diverse roles in each paradigm represent not necessarily a coherent perception and action to states’ borders. Interests of states and transnational or (existed) global actors are usually discrepant.

According to Chauprade, the state can decide to apply the stability rule and move towards adopting a specific paradigm.20 A conservative elite will strive to retain the essential functions of borders and close the state to intensive

20 Chauprade, A. (note 4).
transfer of flow factors. However, a change of government or governing policies may transform political decisions and their implementation observed on the border. Usually turbulences of the international environment change the policy of the government. The most vivid example is the transformation of the border crossing procedures in the USA after the events of 9/11 to make them more strict, implemented by the same elite that has promoted free flow of goods and persons within NAFTA before. After the last frustrated attempts of terrorist attacks in British planes flying to the USA, the American government has been even thinking entering a visa regime for the European Union citizens over. It shows, the citizen of an allied state does not have to be an ally any more.

Under a liberal elite the border may become more permeable, because it sees an opportunity for the state’s development in it. In its policies, the liberal elite interacts not only with states but also non-state and transnational actors, and they form structures of transborder cooperation. This option may last without going beyond the limitations on border permeability strictly defined by the elite or develop towards loss of control over border permeability or voluntary acceptance of such reality, and may lead to the transformation of the transnational paradigm adopted in politics into the global one as a new geopolitical optimum. In the two last paradigms the significance of non-state actors is essential, since their optimum might be coherent or not with states’ one, in the vision of borders’ ‘openness’ but direct actions still belong to the government.

**BORDER PERCEPTION IN DIFFERENT PARADIGMES OF IR**

As Newman notices perceptions of borders may differ according to different images by people and a position in hierarchy or place of living – that of government in the centre or borderland citizens. ‘Perceptions which emphasize notions of difference, mutual fear and threat are, more often than not, socially constructed from the centre, with walls and fences constituting the mechanism through which difference is perpetuated’.21

Taking into consideration the perception of state border according to particular paradigms one can see the gradation of its permeability from the line of division into the inner and outer environment, to a porous line, where the border is perceived as an element of the system with a set of numerous entrances and exits. Eventually the border becomes a virtual line, which does not mean its disappearance but a high degree of permeability, due to the occurrence of phenomena and factors, which cannot be controled without difficulty.

According to the realistic paradigm border is emphasized as a line dividing ‘us’ from ‘them.’ It is based on the traditional geographic border discourses and the sociological categorisation of binary distinctions between two different entities.22 It also links with Prescott’s state-centric approach to boundary management. The key political and social categories such: state, territory, nation, identity and ethnicity are crucial for the governing elite. This policy (usually of both countries) may increase nationalism and even separatism. The source of such nationalism might be different political or economic systems, religion or a long-lasting territorial conflict. Such principle of separation represents Palestinian–Israeli border or the contemporary Polish–Belorussian border perceived, especialy by Belorusian elite (the president – Alexander

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Lukasenko), as a barrier of different systems and ideology. It has translated into a tense bilateral relations, particularly when Poland joined the European Union (EU) in 2004. From the realistic paradigm there are territorial borders of states and/or superimposed lines of separation between people.

The liberal school of thinking assumes, as Andrew Dumala notices, ‘relatively free movement of transnational subjects over state borders, which do not constitute a sufficient obstacle to them.’ The border is still perceived as an important element of a state but within the decision-making process its role becomes less crucial in demarcating ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Borders are opened with a few restrictions and the development of trans-boundary cooperation of local and central government is possible. More freedom over a border can broaden state influences beyond its border. When the border still matters for the government, it is more opened for international cooperation with states and non-state actors if only benefits are worth it. Non-state actors (as international organisations, integrating groupings, etc.) are promoters of perceiving borders as bridges than barriers. The example of such a border may be Polish – German border. These two countries belong to the EU but even before Poland has joined this integration group their common border was not perceived as a barrier. There were many multilevel contacts and flows across the border and they are getting more and more intense since 2004. One has to keep in mind there is still border crossing points and a regular border control since Poland is queuing to be a member of the Schengen zone.

Under the global paradigm, state borders are perceived more as international markets, (e.g. from the standpoint of currency zones or integrative groupings), rather than national states. The border is still connected with a territory but it changes its functions. It may divide one zone (e.g. economic, monetary, political) from another, but it is not related to a nation-state per se but to a market. Manuel Castells states that ‘space of flows’ appeared instead of ‘space of places.’ Nations within such a ‘global system of borders’ are more cosmopolitan. These are Scandinavian countries or the European Union that may present such type of borders. Even though Norway did not belong to the EU and was a member of NATO (when Sweden and Finland were not) or Sweden did not introduce a monetary union as Finland or Denmark did, borders between these countries are seen as bridges and they are characterized by intense flows and contacts. The state might be still in a position of power but it is perceived from the wider and more homogeneous (under some criteria: economic, political, cultural, religious, GDP, etc) area. Since the borders between these areas are sources of benefits and losses for different actors in international relations, the notion of borderless world is not applicable even to global paradigm.

**BORDER IMPORTANCE IN DIFFERENT PARADIGMS OF IR**

In the interpretation of individual paradigms, the significance of state borders also changes. In the realistic paradigm, the state is the most important actor in IR. With all the attributes it possesses, it is the border that is of essential

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significance for the protection of material values such as the territory, raw materials, capital, and population, as well as intangibles such as values, culture, language, state sovereignty and cohesion. The border remains very important for the conservative elite, because it protects state sovereignty and territory and the values and goods within it. The disintegrative function of the border has the objective of protecting state security. The conservative political elite strives to isolate and increase the symbolic value of its territory, stresses the importance of the border and its fundamental functions, that of the barrier. The only acceptable instrument that slightly changes the functioning of state borders in international relations is the bilateral agreement. For example, the Israeli – Palestinian border is very important for governments of these countries and peoples and not stable because these two nations value the territory and places of religion cult very much. The conflict is much more complicated and it may be observed through a long-lasting tense bilateral relations of these countries. The realistic paradigm refers to traditional approach to border seen as the physical and static outcome of a political decision-making process\textsuperscript{25}, characteristic at the first half of the twentieth century. However, as Newman states, the fear of the neighbour that is different in religion, economic status or social group, etc. is timeless, and makes the desire to protect oneself from the threat in the same sense as to protect the state territorial integrity and sovereignty.\textsuperscript{26}

Proponents of the transnational paradigm still view the border as a significant element of the state and perceives its role as a bridge rather than a barrier. The system becomes more susceptible of and sensitive to influence and events, such as a downturn in the economy of a major state or financial problems of some megacorporation, occurring outside its borders. Such actions influence the decision-making process inside the state. The circulation of internal and external policies thus takes place, while the behaviour of the state will depend inter alia on the kind of adjustment it will adopt in a given situation. The border starts to perform a function, which the author calls fragmentative\textsuperscript{27}, denoting the intersection of integrative and disintegrative processes, open to some factors and maintaining impermeable to others. The number of fundamental border functions are reduced to a stage preferred by a ruling elite. Due to a higher permeability of the border, the state expands its influence to other actors of international relations in order to control their influence to itself. For example, some European Union countries have ‘opened’ their borders for various type of flow of factors for the new member states since 2004, but some of them reduce its openness as a labour markets for workers from these countries. It also concerns those countries that did not introduce a monetary union instead of being in the EU.

For globalists, the significance of the border is only symbolic. It fulfils a demarcative function and is thus a line on the world’s political map. It does not constitute a barrier in any dimension. The freedom of flow of goods, capital, information and people increases, but it must be emphasized that most often such borders relate to some specified territory, because, as has been said above,


\textsuperscript{26} Ibid, pp.177-178.

\textsuperscript{27} The name adopted after J. Rosenau, who employed this term to describe phenomena characteristic of integration processes and accompanying opposing ones; for more see: J. Rosenau, ‘Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier’, Cambridge 1997.
market borders emerge. These are borders between states with different levels of development and there is an asymmetry in the participation of different subjects in global processes. Newman states that globalization ‘has served to change the nature of power relations and their respective interest in determining who benefits from the maintenance and institutionalization of the bordering process, and conversely, who benefits from the removal and opening of borders.’

Border functions shrink and are transferred into other zones of cooperation. However, within specific structures, the border starts to perform an integrative function, linking individual states with common interests, interrelationships, and values. While it is spoken about deterritorialization of certain phenomena such as threats, globalization processes also activate reterritorialization that lead to the emergence of not only virtual but physically existing ethnic or religious borders that prevent the homogeneity of the world. Thus a new quality of international relation develops, not within states but within civilization, international organizations, organized crime groups or terrorist group. So again a different kind of border function – separated from political borders – may become important and create dividing lines. They do not match up with a map but they impede flows not between states but between zones. Some inner borders of the European Union are permeable and they are in an integrative function when comparing to the external border of the EU, behind which other countries are excluded. The borderlands of some member states have become the ‘dynamic spaces of interaction, subject to continual processes of negotiation involving diverse groups of people who are active agents in the everyday politics of border life’. The similar level of economic development or political and social standards let the process of border transformation proceed smoothly. The most interested in border transition to integrative function are transnational/transboundary/non-territorial actors that perceive their self-defined benefits in border ‘openness’.

**ACTION AT BORDER IN DIFFERENT PARADIGMS OF IR**

The last category analyzed in table 1 is the action taken by the elite to implement either the disintegrative, or fragmentive or integrative function of the state border. An elite representing the realist paradigm assumes the construction or retention of infrastructure on the border, including even its militarization in the event of conflict. The process of well done demarcation is very important. The management procedures at borders are more rigid and barrier oriented. If over a definite period bilateral relations have become normalized enough to lift structures on border-crossing procedures, and at a certain moment a sharp conflict between states arises, the border can be militarized and re-closed or even built in a wall. Thanks to its infrastructure the border can perform the functions for which it was originally intended, to protect against the influx of factors that pose a threat to the state and its attributes. Thus administrative procedures are very strict. Usually people need passports, visas, vouchers or special fees to cross the border. In the face of a serious threat to the state special cross-border procedures may be implemented. Moreover less people are willing to cross the border when there are tensions in bilateral

relations. Security respect prevails over economic benefits coming from transboundary cooperation. In the past the best example was the border between Western Germany and Eastern Germany implemented by the Berlin Wall, that divided two different political and economic systems. At the same time borders between soviet countries were militarized and the infrastructure at the crossing points were extended. Nowadays Indian-Pakistan border with the wall dividing these two countries, is the example of border reclosing. Moreover the action of the US government after events of 9/11 aiming more rigid control and securitisation of borders, depicts the transition of border openness to its closure.

Under the transnational paradigm, states coming into interactions with non-state actors, decide in favour of greater openness the border and gradual abolition its function as a barrier. Transborder regions are established, and there is a dynamic development of local cooperation of border towns and villages. Border infrastructure does not disappear but the number of border-crossing points increases, and border-crossing facilities are introduced: transit roads, abolition of customs tariffs and other fees, only random passport checks or abolition of them, uniformization of border-crossing standards all may appear. At the same time the state is aware that some decisions, (those of transnational corporations or integrative structures), are taken outside its territory while their implementation is effected inside the state. Borders are therefore meant only to filter the flow of factors because the gradual concentration and centralization of capital lead to excessive accumulation, and reached the point where further development requires going beyond national borders\(^{30}\). The liberal approach to borders was represented by most borders of the regional integrating groups in the nineties of the 20th century, among them some more and some less permeable. Most borders of the European Union present this stage of borders functional transition. Unfortunately, threats of terrorist attacks appeared in different parts of the world have turned around the process of greater openness into more strict border-crossing procedures.

Proponents of the global paradigm support the total abolition of border infrastructure and wide freedom of border crossing by all flow factors. Usually these proponents are non-territorial subjects of IR and they take most advantages from borders openness. In some cases the existence of infrastructure on the border does not constitute a barrier. The process of deteritorialisation may be linked with the global paradigm, when some attributes and duties of the state go beyond its border or when amorphous but dangerous threats cross it easily. When the state furthers the process of economic integration, standardizes legal norms and rules of functioning of the market through participation in international organizations and community structures the number of duties and threats mentioned above increases. It should be stressed at this point that if the government decides for the integrative function between states it has to be those states whose level of development is comparable and poses no threat in any dimension. That is why there is asymmetry of globalization process or benefits and losses resulting from it for individual states. It is no point to look for a type of border representing the global paradigm. Some will say there is no such one, others that, for example ‘global terrorists’ (these known since the 9/11) have taken advantages of open borders to reach what they have desired. From the

point of cyber space they exist, from the point of territory there is no such existence.

CONCLUSION

Types of border, based on paradigms of international relations, do not need to be tangible in the present or past. As it was assumed at the beginning of the paper, the border is a dynamic phenomenon, to be perceived more as a process than as a static element of the state. The process of border transition through desintegrative – fragmentive – integrative functions circulates and some state’s borders are more susceptible to international environment turbulences and hence their functional transition. It is the ruling elite that enforces different border policies on different countries, and consequently chooses higher or lower openness of the border with individual actors of international relations, thus reaching a geopolitical optimum, and therefore moulding relations according to its own determinants and determinants of the current condition of international relations.

Transition of border functions usually runs parallel to a continually transforming sovereignty and the territorial state still remains the only container of it. Regardless to the type of border functions (represented by each paradigm), neighbouring countries have to enter common interactions and cannot remain in total separation. In the face of a border re-closing process against contemporary threats in some countries, border as a bridging process rather than a separating one is still desired to keep the inner and outer environment of the state stable facing these threats.

When looking at undemarcated borders – the virtual lines one (of culture, civilisation, religion, progress, liberty stage, and others) they have been dividing the world since ever.

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