# Revista Română de Geografie Politică

TUINITVIEIRSITTATIEA IDIIN OIRAIDIEA

# Anul XIII nr. 2 2011



Editura Universității din Oradea



### **REVISTA ROMÂNĂ DE GEOGRAFIE POLITICĂ**

**Romanian Review on Political Geography** 

Year XIII, no. 2, November 2011

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#### The review is issued under the aegis and with the support of the University of Oradea, The Territorial Studies and Analyses Centre and the IGU - Commission on Political Geography

The Journal is issued with financial support of the research contracts (partially): PN II, ID\_751/2007 and CAPACITĂŢI 112/2008

#### ISSN 1454-2749 + E-ISSN 2065-1619

#### CONTENTS

STAKES IN CONTENTION AND MUTATIONS IN THE ORGANISATION OF THE URBAN AND PERIURBAN SPACE OF TIMIŞOARA
Nicolae POPA (Art#132101-232)
ACCESSING THE CONCEPTUAL "GOODNESS" OF GEOGRAPHIC MENTAL MAPS FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS Luis DA VINHA (Art#132102-228)
EUROPEAN UNION: DESTINATION AND TRANZIT AREA FOR COCAINE
TRAFFICKING         Irina CAUNIC, Florin Bogdan SUCIU, Ionel MUNTELE         (Art#132103-222)         149
CLASHING GEOPOLITICAL VISIONS: IRAQ FROM THE FIRST WORLD WAR TO THE 1958 REVOLUTION Sören SCHOLVIN
(Art#132104-227)
Paul-Răzvan ŞERBAN, Dragoş BAROIU (Art#132105-225)
THE ROLE OF URBAN TRANSPORT IN THE POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS HUNGARIAN ASPECTS Ágnes Kecskésné VŐLGYI
(Art#132106-224)
ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR OF EUROPEAN ELECTORS IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS (1979-2009) Ionel BOAMFĂ (Art#132107-230)
THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROAD TRANSPORT NETWORK IN MOLDAVIA – FROM GEOGRAPHICAL COHERENCE TO PERIPHERAL DEPENDENCE Ionel MUNTELE, Gabriel CIMPOESU-HAISUC
(Art#132108-223)
(Art#132109-224)
Alexandru ILIEŞ, Dorina Camelia ILIEŞ, Cezar MORAR, Marin ILIEŞ (Art#132110-233)
ASPECTS OF A 'BRILLIANT ASSERTION IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE WORLD'. THE THIRD WORLD IN SOCIALIST ROMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY Emanuel COPILAS
(Art#132111-230)
OPPORTUNITIES IN TERRITORIAL CROSS BORDER COOPERATION AT THE EU EXTERNAL BORDERS. CASE OF ROMANIA Vasile GRAMA
(Art#132112-234)
Silviu COSTACHIE (Art#132113-235)

ISSN 1454-2749, E-ISSN 2065-1619

Revista Română de Geografie Politică Year XIII, no. 2, November 2011, pp. 109-276 http://rrgp.uoradea.ro, rrgp.uoradea@yahoo.com

> Review accredited by C.N.C.S.I.S. "B+" Category (since 2007) http://vechi.cncsis.ro/cenaposs/2008/Arhiva/reviste\_cat\_B+\_08.pdf

The Romanian Review on Political Geography is indexed in:

#### **INDEX COPERNICUS**

IC Value: 3.00 (2008), 3.48 (2009), 3.99 (2010)

http://journals.indexcopernicus.com/karta.php?action=masterlist&id=3944

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ISSN 1454-2749. E-ISSN 2065-1619

#### STAKES IN CONTENTION AND MUTATIONS IN THE ORGANISATION OF THE URBAN AND PERIURBAN SPACE OF TIMISOARA

#### Nicolae POPA

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Abstract: The concept of growth poles and one of its spatial effects, the urban sprawl, are realities that characterise today's cities of Romania. Since 1990, the city of Timişoara has shown considerable ability both in production and in the appropriation of space both within its bounds and beyond. This has strengthened its urban quality and integrated it more securely in its local area and region. Although from a demographic point of view it has stagnated, Timisoara has succeeded in developing relationships with other European cities and has won itself a place among those urban centres in Romania that are best integrated in Central Europe's network of communication and exchange. However, the urban renewal and suburban development of Timisoara, involving the re-forging of territorial links and the redefinition of the city's regional roles, is not taking place without problems. Will Timişoara's new national status (granted in 2008) of designated 'growth pole' be sufficient to solve these problems and kick-start the effective longterm development of the city and its zone of influence?

Key words: urban renewal, urban sprawl, regional development, growth pole, Timisoara.

#### **INTRODUCTION**

The urban phenomenon is one of the geographical categories that have been most fiercely debated in the last fifty years, on account of its growing structural and spatial extension and the major impact towns and cities have on the balance of nature, on social and economic life and on the way geographical space is organised. The *city* is the space within which the human phenomenon manifests itself in the most complex and advanced ways. It is here that the greatest number of the values acquired by the human race throughout history are preserved, and here too that what we are accustomed to term the future of the world is gestated and constructed.

It is therefore natural that geographical reflection, along with that of specialists in other fields (urban analysts, sociologists, economists, historians, architects, anthropologists etc.), should concern itself with territorial assessment

and should attempt to predict the large-scale spatial developments that the various components of the urban phenomenon are experiencing. The dynamic territorial ripple effect of the urban and the structural and functional changes this brings - changes which occur in different ways in different places - have led to the employment in the specialist literature of a series of concepts such as urbanisation, suburbanisation, periurbanisation, urban influence, rural urbanisation and urban sprawl (*étalement urbain*). These have been introduced to meet the need to better understand territorial variations in the expansion of towns and of the urban lifestyle.

These ideas have been introduced in a gradual way by major players in the domains involved in reflecting on the phenomenon of the urban. Under the influence of the French and German schools of geographical thinking, questions of urban geography began to exercise the minds of Romanian geographers such as V. Mihăilescu, N. A. Rădulescu, Gh. Năstase, V. Tufescu etc. as early as the first decade of the twentieth century (Ungureanu and Țurcănaşu, 2008, p. 33). Then, in the period after the World Wars, urban geographical thinking in Romania was taken further by the geographers I. Şandru (1975), V. Cucu (1970), A. Ungureanu (1980), I. Ianoş (1987) etc., following the trends set in the specialist literature of the USSR and France in particular and later of the Anglo-Saxon world.<sup>1</sup>

The influence and territorial extension of towns in Romania were the subject of systematic research especially from the sixties of the twentieth century onwards, with V. Cucu (1970), I. Iordan (1973), N. Caloianu and collaborators (1976), I. Ianoş (1987) and others writing on this theme, and more recently it has been studied by I. Nicolae (2002), P. Cocean (2007) among others.

Thus there was a gradual move from the definition of the ideas of the *supply zones* of towns/cities and *pre-town zones* to those of *zones of influence*, *suburban zones* and *periurban zones*, and in recent years to the precise scientific definition of phenomena that go beyond the expression of the links between towns and their immediate neighbourhoods, so as to be able to deal with the transformations experienced by these neighbourhoods, or by more distant areas, under the impact of the urban – a process involving notions such as those of *rural urbanisation* and *urban sprawl*. These new ways of using and filling space are generated by complex phenomena involving the spatial redistribution of population and activities between the urban and the rural environments, including most obviously *exurbanisation* and *contraurbanisation*. And they are also fed by the endogenous development of the rural in the direction of modernisation; this is stimulated by *the effect of demonstration*, whose impact is made greater by the increased mobility of the population and by modern means of communication, especially the mass media.

The geography of the city of Timişoara and its territorial relationships has been the subject of a number of applied investigations. This process too began in the sixties of the twentieth century (V. Ardelean, S. Truți, 1966, 1970) and continued after 1990 with works dealing in particular with the way in which the city was transformed in the period of transition from a centrally planned economy to a free market one (Popa and Junie, 2000, Voiculescu, 2004, Bioteau

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Among authors who have had the greatest influence on the study of urban geography in Romania we may mention P. Geddes (1915), R. Blanchard (1922), W. Christaller (1933), G. Chabot (1933), Chauncy Harris (1943), P. George (1961), J. Gottman (1961), J. Beaujeu-Garnier and G. Chabot (1963), V. M. Haritonov (1983), S. Sassen (2001) etc.

and Popa, 2004, Popa and Veschambre, 2008 etc.). A series of applied studies have been undertaken by the Faculty of Human Geography of the West University of Timişoara with the aim of providing a firm foundation for the development strategies put into place in the first decade of the twenty-first century for the Timişoara Zone (2000) and the Timişoara Growth Pole (2009-2010). All these, together with research undertaken by historians, anthropologists, urban scientists, economists etc., make possible a more accurate assessment of the dynamics of making use of Timişoara's urban and periurban space and of its future development trends.

The present study starts out from the premise that the city of Timişoara has developed with the spatial anchorage that it has under the influence of a complex of historical, geographical, economic and cultural factors that have given it a strong individual identity. Its resulting and appropriated space, the way it is perceived and the use made of it, are layer by layer rewriting the symbolic history, practical exploitation and geographical organisation of this urban ensemble, with the process being subject to two constraints: that resulting from the inherited patrimony, and that stemming from what is predicted/expected from development projects. The direction and magnitude of these transformations depends on local decision-makers, on their vision and their ability to juggle the use of space and the allocation of resources. Equally important are the closeness and nature of the relationships that they maintain with decision-makers at higher (national and European) levels and their skill in making the most of opportunities and developing regional links.

The urban is winning over the rural, engulfing peripheries and occupying larger and larger areas of space. At the same time, it is constantly working upon itself, restructuring itself, undergoing morphological and functional transformation and changing its relationships with its territory and the world, at a pace and in ways that are hard to plan for or control. In the quest of the ideal, the result is not always the one that was looked for, and Timişoara, like many other cities, is tending to stay within the 'rut' of its existing identity while attempting to leave it behind.

#### TIMIŞOARA IN ITS 'ANCHORAGE'

Timişoara, the largest urban centre in the west of Romania, experienced functional evolution and a rise in population during the twentieth century and enjoyed significant inward investment both from within Romania and from abroad. It was characterised by predominantly endodynamic population movement. Up until 1918, the city was at the receiving end of colonising activity or attracted a workforce from various provinces belonging to the Hapsburg monarchy and to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and its neighbouring territories. Germans were the predominant ethnic group, but large numbers of Hungarians, Romanians, Serbs, Jews, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, French people and others also made their homes there. During the events that led to the union of Transylvania and Banat with Romania, Timişoara lost a small proportion of its population, most of them members of the Hungarian administration who preferred to move to Hungary proper.

After 1920, Timişoara became one of the leading cities (economically speaking) in the Kingdom of Romania. Both in the inter-war period and in the first two decades of the Communist regime, the central government relied on the economic power of the few centres where industry was flourishing in order to be able to embark upon the development of the country as a whole. As a consequence, the dynamics of the investments made in the city meant that Timişoara continued to attract a workforce, this time from Banat and from the traditionally rural provinces of Romania, especially Oltenia, Bessarabia, Moldova, Maramureş and the Apuseni region.

Table 1.	Changes in the	population o	of Timişoara	analysed	by ethnic	origin (1	900-2002)
(Source: Census figures)							

Nationality	1900	1930	1966	1992	2002
Total Population	60,551	102,390	174,243	334,115	317,660
Romanian (%)	10.4	24.6	62.6	82.2	85.5
German (%)	51.0	32.4	14.4	4.0	2.3
Hungarian (%)	31.6	31.0	17.8	9.5	7.6
Serb (%)	4.5	2.2	2.4	2.3	2.0
Others (%)	2.5	9.8	2.8	2.0	2.6



Figure 1. Regional position of Timişoara city

Main cities: regional pole (1); subregional pole (2); departamental or local pole (3); natural parks (4); natural reservs (5); mountainous area (6); basic polar network (7); other important axes (8); international airport (9); limits of the DKMT Euroregion (10); national border (11); main rivers (12); population of the cities, in thousand (13): a) 80; b) 110; c) 250; d) 320.

Inward investment and demographic growth were also aided by the administrative and political status accorded to Timişoara in the inter-war period and again in the 1950s and 1960s. Each time regional levels of administration existed in Romania, Timişoara was the administrative centre of its region, irrespective of its geographical extent or name: the Timişoara ministerial directorate (1929-31), the Timiş County/*Tinutul Timi*ş (1938-40), the Timişoara Region (three successive patterns of organisation between 1950 and 1960), the Banat region (1960-68). Timişoara's position of responsibility for its region attracted socio-economic development and led to a significant increase in the number of people living in the city, which drew well ahead of the other urban centres in the west of the country. For example, whereas in 1912 Timişoara was only 1.14 times the size of Arad, situated 60 km to the north, by the end of the inter-war period the ratio had grown to 1.26. The gap in population between the two cities continued to widen – to 1.38 in 1966, to 1.75 in 1992 and 1.87 in 2010.

As we can see (Figure 2), the time when Timişoara was drawing away from Arad at the fastest rate in terms of population was after the abolition of the regions and the setting-up of the counties (1968), when Timişoara's administrative status became the same as that of any county town in the country, that of Arad not excepted. This can be explained by the inertial effect of the concentration of population created by earlier investment, by the permanent establishment in Timişoara of certain devolved State institutions that had regional responsibility, and also by the increased attraction the city could exert on the workforce once its status as the fourth most important university centre in Romania had been established.



These changes obviously exerted pressure upon the physical site of the municipality of Timişoara, thus leading to periodic restructuring of land use within the city limits and to new relationships between the city and its periurban zone.

#### CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE LAYOUT OF TIMIŞOARA'S URBAN SPACE

Timişoara belongs to that small category of large settlements in Central Europe that retain nothing of their medieval urban morphostructure. It was entirely transformed from an urban layout point of view and reconstructed in accordance with plans drawn up by architects belonging to the Imperial court at Vienna.

The chief concern of the House of Hapsburg was to turn Timişoara into one of their most powerful defensive strongholds against Ottoman pressure. A

secondary aim was to provide its inhabitants with a style of life that reflected the town-planning genius of the Imperial architects.

The particular nature of the site of Timişoara, placed as it had been by its founders on the low-lying plain of the River Timiş and in the centre of an extensive tract of marshes fed by the interlacing watercourses of the Timiş and Bega rivers, forced the Imperial designers to draw up a number of plans, some of them in succession, that matched the precise purpose intended for the Citadel and for each of the historic neighbourhoods that were to form the nuclei of the new Timişoara. The city was thus multi-nuclear in its first stages, being composed of at least two urban neighbourhoods (Fabric and Josefin) and two other rural-urban ones (Elisabetin and Mehala), all gravitating around Timişoara Citadel, from which they were separated, both by natural causes and for strategic reasons, by extensive waste areas that included marshland, lakes and tracts of water (see the 1769-1772 Josefin map, the Timişoara city plan showing the works begun in 1849<sup>2</sup>, etc).

At the end of the nineteenth century, the nuclei of Timişoara, situated in its eastern (Fabric), southern and south-western (Elisabetin and Josefin) and western (Mehala) parts, were still separate from the Citadel, which became a true urban neighbourhood only after the demolition of its fortifications (this took place in several stages between 1891 and 1910). After this, Timişoara developed rapidly, both at its outer limits and internally. In less than three decades, the wilderness areas between the Citadel and the other neighbourhoods were filled in with residential buildings, industrial and transport-related development, city parks etc. Throughout this period the city grew towards the south, the east and the west, while its northern section remained an area of wasteland, a reminder of the old glacis or *circum valatio* that had played a strategic role in the defence of the Citadel.

This space, long used for military training and as a market area, gradually filled up with industrial plants and storage facilities that were laid out along both sides of the railway that linked today's North and East stations. This section of the railway was brought into use after 1880, at the height of the period when classic industries were developing in Timişoara (Opriş, 1987). The railway and the industrial-commercial areas situated along it were to be a major obstacle in the way of the city's northward expansion. As a result, it was only from the '70s of the twentieth century onwards that the city's northern neighbourhoods (Lipovei, Aradului, Torontalului, Dacia, Circumvalațiunii etc.) were built, thus completing the ring of residential areas that together with the historic ones among which they lie make up contemporary Timişoara (Figure 3).

The welding-together of Timişoara's various urban nuclei is not complete even today, although the majority of the pieces of land that in former times separated the Citadel from the outlying neighbourhoods are now completely built over. However, new building land has become available in the form of the sites of old industrial areas and isolated plants that were constructed archipelago-like within the city limits in the period between 1880 and 1965, precisely for the reason that until the middle of the twentieth century the main way the city grew was inwards. It is these vacant spaces, which today occupy positions around the centre and are in the throes of a process of practically oriented urban renewal,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Plan der Königlichen Freistadt und Festung Temesvar mit Benützung der im Jahre 1849, statt gefundenen Angriffs-Arbeiten gegen die Festung (Beilage zu Preyers Monografie), Pest, 1853.

that future urban development schemes will be competing for. A series of urban development proposals and studies (Massimo Tadi et al., 2007) have been carried out with a view to making use of these spaces in a modern, functional way and to improving communication between the different neighbourhoods of Timişoara, especially between those in the south and those in the north, a task made difficult by the twin obstacles of the River Bega and the railway.



Figure 3. Geographical development of the city of Timişoara, 1892-1998 (Source: Timişoara City Hall, 2000)

The general layout of the city today still preserves the main lines of the building works carried out in the Imperial period, although these now only make up the historical nuclei of Timişoara. The principal radial-concentric street network, which encloses the different zones of the city within a grid-type street plan, is echoed in the new neighbourhoods, whose main axes are extensions of the old radial streets that traditionally linked Timişoara with the other strategic regional hubs (Petrovaradin/Novi Sad, Lugoj-Caransebeş, Szeged, Arad, Belgrad etc.) that were recognised as early as the beginning of the modern age.

#### THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE USE OF TIMIŞOARA'S PERIURBAN SPACE

The surroundings of Timişoara in their turn have experienced a series of changes over time that have left their mark on the present-day arrangement of this network of settlements, on their particular morphostructure, and also on the ethno-cultural content and socio-economic use of this space.

The network of towns and villages was reconstructed in its entirety after 1716 as the process of colonisation advanced. Systematic efforts on the colonists' part to drain the marshes and regulate the flow of the two main rivers, the Timiş and the Bega,<sup>3</sup> also contributed to the reshaping of the local landscape by increasing the density of habitation and improving the economic potential of the land.

The goal of the process of colonisation was to increase the scope for human action upon a territory which had great development potential but whose human resources had been gravely affected by a series of confrontations between the Ottoman and Austrian armies that had taken place on the territory of Banat, their greatest intensity being between 1696 and 1716. There was also a wish to settle Catholic communities, made up as far as possible of ethnic Germans potentially loyal to the Court of Vienna, in the centre of Banat, a frontier province that was as yet fragile economically, politically and in terms of cultural identity, and that bordered on the powerful Ottoman Empire.

Consequently, the villages of colonists were placed strategically along the main communication routes that had trans-regional importance, so that they would form first lines of defence of the approach routes and 'gates' leading to the fortress of Timişoara. Thus on the Petrovaradin road we find the German communities of Săcălaz, Cărpiniş, Jimbolia etc., on the road leading to the fortress of Belgrade there are those at Şag, Ciacova, Deta etc., along the routes towards Transylvania and Arad there are the German villages of Giarmata, Pişchia and Sânandrei, and along the road leading towards Hungary there are those of Dudeştii Noi (Beşenova Nouă), Becicherecu Mic, Biled etc.. Later 'implanting' action in the nineteenth century led to the presence along these axes of Hungarian communities as well, for example those at Dumbrăvița to the north-east of the city and Ciarda and Moşnița Nouă to the south and south-east.

The ethnic structure of the villages around Timişoara was often a complex one, with several communities coexisting in the same village. As a general rule, Germans were predominant in the area north-west of Timişoara and Romanians in the land to the south and east of the city. The proportion of Hungarians

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The embankment of the river Bega began in 1726 and continued in stages along various stretches until 1754. Later, maintenance and modernisation work was carried out in successive operations until 1916, when construction of the five locks on the canal was complete. Timişoara was the principal beneficiary of these works, since the risk of flooding was reduced, supply of raw materials to the city was made easier and above all the marshes surrounding the city dried out.

increases as one approaches the present-day Hungarian border and that of Serbs towards the modern border with Serbia, although other local anchoring centres do exist. Other ethnic communities were present too, such as Bulgarians at Vinga and Beşenova Veche (Dudeştii Vechi), where they still live in large numbers today; there were also Ukrainians, Slovaks, Czechs, etc., generally in villages situated at considerable distances from Timişoara.

The ethno-cultural composition of the population of the settlements around Timisoara was important in defining the main lines of the rural landscape and the way the land was used. The German communities brought to Banat a new concept of village layout in which the houses were more closely grouped together, and this was further encouraged by the preference of the government in Vienna for planned settlements that mirrored geometrical shapes and structures (rectangular, on rare occasions circular, as at Charlottenburg). This preference found concrete expression from the moment (11<sup>th</sup> January 1772) when the Imperial authorities adopted the set of town planning regulations known as Impopulationis Haupt Instruction (Munteanu & Munteanu, 1998, p. 121). In accordance with these regulations, small, scattered villages were consolidated, with houses being 'brought into line' and placed directly on the road and on both sides of each road in a rectangular street plan. It was the old villages of the indigenous population (Romanians, Serbs etc.) in particular that were remodelled to comply with these regulations; the villages of colonists were conceived in this spirit from the outset. Each settlement was designed to have a civic centre that contained the principal buildings, institutions and public services (the church, the school, the Town Hall, the market etc.). Land occupied by buildings was clearly marked off from farmland, which consisted of a circular area around the village devoted to the grazing of small domestic animals and an area for crops, grown on the open field system, that occupied the remainder of the village land.

A series of water- and drainage-related works were carried out, especially in the low-lying Timiş plain, in order to reduce the extent of the marshes, stabilise the courses of the Timiş and Bega rivers, and reduce the frequency of flooding under surge conditions, the aim being to create a salubrious natural environment that would facilitate the secure development of local rural and urban communities.

This combination of administrative measures and natural circumstances led to the development over time of a network of *christallerian-type* settlements, remarkably uniform in nature: villages with definite geometric contours, usually large in size so that the people living in them could exploit their land effectively. They were situated a considerable distance apart, in consequence of not entirely ideal natural conditions and limited demographic resources. These villages gravitated around a network of towns that formed a hierarchy with the fortress of Timisoara at its centre. A degree of rigidity imposed by the town-planning regulations we have mentioned meant that the network of settlements did not change significantly in later times (the planting of new settlements to fill in the gaps, or expansion via the spreading-out of each settlement to occupy a larger area). Another reason for this was the steady natural decline in the population. This was a consequence of the Banat style of demographic model as inspired by the Swabian communities who, for economic reasons, practised a strict system of family planning (eine Familie, ein Kind) in order to prevent landed property from being broken up by being left to more than one heir.

After the division of Banat according to national lines and the incorporation of most of it into Romania, the inter-war period was too short for significant structural changes to take place in the local settlement pattern. Later, the coming to power of the Communist régime, which completely overturned the legal basis of all Romania's social and economic structures, only accentuated the clear dichotomy between built-up and agricultural areas, without affecting the organisation of the network of settlements in any other way. Strict control of financial resources and the priority given to agricultural exploitation meant that land within the village bounds and the hearts of the villages continued to be clearly demarcated and that outward expansion of these areas was discouraged. Instead, legally constituted building land had to be used to the maximum.

In consequence, in spite of massive immigration from other parts of Romania – aiming in particular for urban environments, but also for some of the prosperous villages in Timis County - the rural settlements of Banat stagnated in population terms, those close to large towns not excluded (Table 5). This tendency also owed something to the slow drain over the border of some of Banat's traditional communities, in particular the Swabians.<sup>4</sup> Deprived of the principal anchor that kept them in Banat for centuries - their ownership of the land and of other means of production, all of which passed into Socialist state hands after 1947 – the Swabians, like the Jews before them, preferred to return to their ancestors' native land, which in the interim had established itself as the most prosperous country in Europe (the German Federal Republic). This process of emigration intensified at the end of the 1970s after the signing in Bucharest in January 1978 of an agreement between the President of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, and the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, regarding the annual emigration of contingents of ethnic Germans to West Germany: 11,000 per year initially, a number that later rose (Final Report, 2007, p.362).

Administrative	Popul	Population		
community	1956	1992		
Becicherecu Mic	2564	2316		
Dumbrăvița	1439	2400		
Ghiroda	2558	3537		
Giarmata	4604	4228		
Giroc	1933	2122		
Moşnița Nouă	1412	1146		
Remetea Mare	1220	1124		
Sânandrei	2702	2482		
Sânmihaiu Român	2044	1581		
Săcălaz	3511	3567		
Şag	2174	2586		
Total	26,161	27,089		

Table 2. Population change in Timişoara's suburban communities, 1956-1992(Source: Censuses of population and dwellings, 1956, 1992)

Constant demographic flux, seen in the replacement of some of the traditional inhabitants of Banat villages with Romanians from other provinces, whose cultural backgrounds and views of civilised behaviour were not entirely

118

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> According to a report published on 30<sup>th</sup> May 1980, there were 97,811 Romanian citizens of German ethnicity in Timiş county, 28,075 of them in the municipality of Timişoara and 69,737 in other towns and villages (ACNSAS national statistical archive, folder no. 13.381, vol. 19, f. 23). Of these, 37,802 had requested permanent emigration by March 1980 (S. Moldovan, 2009, p.451)

the same, has over time left its mark on the appearance of villages in Timiş county. On the one hand, the building stock has experienced a process of gradual deterioration, as has the civic appearance of these places. The rate at which new homes have been constructed has slowed down as an effect of the surplus of houses caused by the departure of the Swabians. On the other hand, the economic power of the rural part of Timiş has fallen, since it has been adversely affected by the break-up of rural communities and the difficulty of regrouping people into functioning social units in a situation in which the population stock is fluid and diverse and contains newcomers who lack local experience.

In the hinterland of the city of Timişoara, the result of three decades of socio-economic change (1960-1990) was the preservation of a rural environment that was too little touched by the processes of structural consolidation and the development of a more civilised way of life. The urbanising influence of the big city did not make itself felt; the 'country feel' of villages in its immediate vicinity was in no way different from that of other villages a long way away from the city. Thus Timişoara did not succeed in becoming an urban agglomeration but rather imposed itself as a relatively isolated macrostructure surrounded by an inert rural area whose functions were predominantly agricultural, apart from its role as a dormitory for a workforce that commuted to work in the factories of Timişoara.

In these circumstances, the liberalisation of the socio-spatial behaviour of population and economic agents that came after 1989 has led to significant changes in the urban landscape of Timişoara and above all in its relations with its adjacent space: the city is tending to become a true urban agglomeration, affected both by the dynamism and the frustration that are characteristic of new beginnings.

## TIMIŞOARA: CHANGES IN URBAN PLANNING AND IN THE CITY'S MODE OF RELATING TO SURROUNDING AREAS

Timişoara's post-1989 urban-planning development shows the effects of multiple internal restructurings that have taken place particularly at the level of the private functional cells that make up the city: a significant degree of renovation of private homes, improvements in the transport infrastructure, changes of use of some industrial and service zones, the reconstitution of green spaces, the building of new residential areas and areas designed for other uses, etc. Despite this, not one of the fundamental problems regarding the use of urban space that have been facing Timişoara for decades has been resolved; the city continues to develop within the limitations imposed by these same constraints – some internal and some related to its local neighbourhood – that are the consequence of its development over history.

The most severe of these problems relate to the difficulty of moving around within the city, especially between its southern and northern neighbourhoods, because of two major obstacles: the Bega Canal, which forms the southern boundary of the central area (Citadel), and the railway between the North Station and the East Station, which forms the northern boundary of this central area. Timişoara is thus traversed in a roughly east-west direction by two elements of urban discontinuity, between which lie the historic centre of the city and its main traffic hubs. Whereas for the 8 km length of the Bega river that flows through the built-up part of the city there are eight road bridges (one per kilometre, which is in any case too few), the railway can only be crossed at five flyover/tunnel points, plus two gate-controlled level crossings. All schemes for moving the railway outside the city have come to nothing for lack of funds, and those for increasing the number of bridges over the Bega have fallen foul of town-planning or technical problems or have failed for lack of political consensus.

There are other factors too that hamper traffic flow within the city. These include the incompleteness of some of the major concentric arteries, which are blocked by the railway (again) and by the old industrial areas around it. Another is the way the main hypermarkets (Iulius Mall, Real, Selgros, Kaufland, Billa, Praktiker) are concentrated in the northern part of the city; this leads to heavy road traffic congestion along the arteries leading to them.

Traffic problems are also made worse by the lack of a ring road to keep through traffic outside the city. December 2009 saw the opening of a 12.6 km section linking the northern and eastern (Arad and Lugoj) routes, but this represents only a quarter of the length (approximately 50 km) of the projected Timişoara ring road.

Despite these problems, Timişoara has experienced a series of changes for the better that have given it a new profile and improved its economic functioning, besides emphasising more clearly its personality as a city and changing the way it relates to its surroundings. These changes are preparing it for future developments.

The renovation of buildings and the regeneration of parts of the city whose traditional use no longer matched present-day needs are in full swing. These processes are taking account of population distribution and density in different areas, of the location of places where people congregate and to which they gravitate, of the need to change the use of some areas of the city, of criteria of economic efficiency and of modern trends in urban regeneration.

The *renovation of buildings*, a complicated and costly process, began with work on private homes at the initiative of the middle class, whose perseverance in carrying out improvements became visible in the urban landscape only at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Gradually, the proportion of houses that had been renovated grew, as did the number of new villa-type buildings inserted into the urban fabric in neighbourhoods of houses in Elisabetin, Odobescu, Iosefin, Ion Ionescu de la Brad, Ronat, Mehala etc. Then came the renovation of blocks of flats, which benefited from a government programme to provide homes with thermal insulation (56 blocks had been insulated by March 2011, a figure that falls far short of the level of need – around 400 – expressed by associations of owners, according to data from Timişoara City Hall).

A major preoccupation is the conservation and rehabilitation of the architectural heritage in the historic centre of the city. This, the largest in the buildings, mainly located in country. comprises around 14,500 the neighbourhoods of Citadel, Iosefin and Fabric. In these three large neighbourhoods that are home to half of the city's population, 50% of the historic buildings are in an advanced or very advanced state of structural decay, one-third of the roofs and two-thirds of the facades of historic buildings are in a bad or very bad state of repair, and 85% of buildings are affected to a considerable or significant degree by rising damp. Four-fifths of the total usable floorspace is devoted to residential uses, and 70% of the residents own the apartments they occupy (2004 data). All the same, fewer than 10% of historic

buildings have been fully or partially renovated, a fact that may be partly explained by the high proportion of residents who have low incomes; according to a study carried out by Timişoara City Hall and GTZ and published in Timişoara City Hall Monitor no. 27 in February 2005, over 70% of these households have average monthly incomes of below 250 euros.

A number of projects have been initiated with the aim of remedying this situation. These include the *Wise Renovation and Economic Revitalisation of Timişoara's Historic Neighbourhoods* Romanian-German co-operation project, which was initiated in 2006 and has accomplished the renovation of six buildings. The year 2010 saw the beginnings of the renovation of the Theresia Bastion Complex, part of Timişoara's old fortifications, with central government, local and European funding (PHARE 2004-2006). Documentation has also been drawn up for a number of renovation projects to be financed from European structural funds through the 2007-2013 Regional Operational Programme, Priority axis 1: Supporting the sustainable development of cities – urban growth hubs. Success in obtaining funding for these projects would lead to the renovation of the Banks of the Bega Canal landscape and architectural ensemble, of the Piața Victoriei Corso inter-war urban ensemble, and hopefully in due course of the central part of Citadel neighbourhood, the ensemble around Piața Unirii (Timişoara City Hall, 2011).

One of the main options for urban regeneration is a change of use for some of Timişoara's old industrial and warehousing areas. This process began spontaneously back in the 1990s as a result of cutbacks at and the closing of many industrial plants in the Buziaş industrial area, UMT, Solventul etc.. From this point of view, the main axis under discussion for town planning intervention consists of the industrial, commercial and transport area along the length of the railway from Ronat via the North Station to the East Station. This area, which takes the form of a corridor running WSW to ENE, has been the subject of many architectural and town planning studies. One of these, that carried out in 2005 under the direction of the Italian architect Massimo Tadi, a professor at Milan Polytechnic University, proposed a unitary vision, futuristic in places but capable of being realised: the moving of the railway line outside the city and the transformation of the space thus made available into an urban artery capable of carrying a great weight of traffic, flanked by modern residential, commercial and cultural buildings separated by green spaces and leisure facilities (Figure 4).

However, the change of use of this space actually began long ago with the closure of a large number of industrial concerns (the bakery, the dairy, the *Fructus* jam factory etc.) and the demolition of some old warehouses, which have gradually been replaced by modern commercial concerns and service and business centres. The most successful ensemble is that of Timişoara City Business Centre, consisting of five modern buildings that provide 35,000 square metres of office space, close to which we may also find the Fructus Tower (under construction), the Alcatel ensemble, other administrative buildings (the headquarters of Timiş County Public Finances) and modern commercial buildings (Kaufland, Billa, etc.).

A similar type of initiative would be *the regeneration of the public squares and showcase boulevards* that still epitomise what makes Timişoara the city that it is. We are thinking of the central squares of the historic neighbourhoods (Piața Unirii, Piața Libertății, Piața Traian, Piața Maria, Piața Josefin) which display buildings dating from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, chiefly in Baroque style but with occasional occurrences of Art Nouveau. These areas have undergone planned improvements including renewal of surface paving, flower beds in public squares, floral features and street furniture, the erection of monuments, and in some places renewal of the facades of buildings. The civic centre (today Piata Victoriei), which took shape in the first half of the twentieth century – flanked by buildings in an eclectic mix of styles and dominated by its two representative examples of Romanian-inspired architecture, the National Opera with its neo-Brâncovanesque pediment and balcony and the Orthodox Metropolitan Cathedral in a Gothic-influenced neo-Byzantine style typical of northern Moldova - has been embellished with monuments commemorating the 1989 Revolution and is earmarked for comprehensive renovation. This square is still regarded by Timisoara people as the true centre of their city, containing as it does the most important symbols of the identity of the Romanians of Timisoara. Then come other showcase squares and boulevards with their commercial, cultural and administrative roles, such as, for example, Piata Sfântu Gheorghe, Piata Crucii, Piata Nicolae Bălcescu, Piata Romanilor, Piata Consiliului Europei, Strada Alba Iulia, Bulevardul Revolutiei, Strada Dacilor.



Figure 4. Case study for the change of use of Timişoara's northern railway corridor (Source: Massimo Tadi, 2007)

However, in recent years there has been a strong challenge to the cultural and enlivening role of the old showcase squares and boulevards from some new commercial and entertainment areas, above all Iulius Mall, to the north of the Citadel neighbourhood, and the Student Complex, to the south of Citadel. These areas with their many clubs, restaurants, takeaways and shops of all kinds are exerting a particular pull on young people, to the detriment of the commercial role of the central area of the city. In an attempt to counterbalance the undue concentration of high-spending life in commercial hubs outside the historic centre, the development department of Timişoara City Hall, in conjunction with the two major universities (the West University and the Polytechnic), has made plans to set up a new university campus to be sited in Oituz Street on the northern edge of the Citadel neighbourhood, so that young people will move between the two campuses (the existing Student Complex one and the new one) over an area that will take in most of the historic centre. Thus the centre will benefit from the invigorating effect of the presence of young people. This move would also cause some prestige shops and places of entertainment to maintain their role within the fabric of the city and would encourage the historic centre of Timisoara to take on new life. We would then see the city becoming increasingly upmarket - something that is felt to be vital for the healthy development of 'Greater Timişoara'.

Over the past two decades, it is in *the renewal of the transport infrastructure and public utilities* that Timişoara City Hall has invested most heavily. This investment, despite being less visible in the urban landscape than some other changes, was judged to be essential to the proper functioning of urban life. The City Hall therefore opted to renew the equivalent of 40 km of tram track, using funds from the European Investment Bank, the Romanian government and Timişoara local council. The work was carried out between 2000 and 2006. There has also been a decision to extend the tram and trolleybus lines to suburban settlements. The first destinations envisaged under the Integrated Urban Development Plan are Moşniţa Nouă - Albina (south-west), Ghiroda (east) and Dumbrăviţa (north-east), with work to be completed by 2013; a later stage will see lines running to Giroc and Şag (south) and potentially to Sânmihaiu Român and Săcălaz (west).

#### THE TIMIŞOARA GROWTH POLE

The setting up of the Timişoara Growth Pole as a co-operative structure at local level was preceded by a number of attempts to develop co-operation between different communities regarding the planning of the social and economic development of the city and its environs. Thus 1999-2000 saw the first step towards bringing the policies of the different local authorities into line by means of a partnership between the municipality of Timişoara and six suburban communities (Dumbrăvița, Ghiroda, Giroc, Moşnița Nouă, Săcălaz and Sânmihaiu Român). The result of this collaborative action was the drawing-up of the *Strategic Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Timişoara Area* in the medium and longer term (2000-2010). In 2004 a decision of Timiş County Council led to the formation of the first Timişoara Area Metropolitan Consultative Council<sup>5</sup>. Its purpose was to co-ordinate local policies regarding the improvement of the area and urban development.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The Timişoara Zone Metropolitan Consultative Council is formed of 13 administrative units, the Municipality of Timişoara and 12 periurban communities: Dumbrăvița, Ghiroda, Moşnița Nouă, Giroc, Sînmihaiu Romăn, Săcălaz, Sânandrei, Giarmata, Orțişoara, Remetea Mare, Şag and Parța.

In accordance with Romanian government decisions numbers 998, 1149 and 1513, taken in the period September-November 2008, which set up seven urban growth poles for the whole country, among them the Timişoara Growth Pole (Popa, 2010), Timişoara was constituted a growth pole (composed of a municipality and 15 administrative communities<sup>6</sup>) by Timişoara local council decision number 387/2008. Since the community of Sânandrei did not join this association, February 2009 witnessed the founding of the *Timişoara Growth Pole Inter-Communal Development Association*, the founding members being one municipality (Timişoara), 14 administrative communities and Timiş County Council.

The Timişoara growth pole<sup>7</sup> is the sixth largest urban agglomeration in Romania, after Bucharest, Galați-Brăila, Constanța, Brașov and Iași. It has a population of 375,000 (82.9% of whom live in the municipality of Timişoara – figures for 1st January 2010), and a surface area of 1172.7 square kilometres (thus occupying approximately 3.5% of the Western Development Region and 12.7% of the total surface area of Timiş county), of which 130.04 sq. km. (11%) is occupied by the municipality. On this territory around the city of Timişoara there are 38 villages, giving an average density of 3.6 rural settlements per 100 sq. km., below the national average of 5.7 villages per 100 sq. km. of rural space. However, the average population of a village is 1685 inhabitants, significantly above the national average of 745 inhabitants per village.

The low density of settlements, made up for by a higher average population in each, gives us a population density in the periurban area of only 61.5 people per sq. km., well below the usual population density of periurban areas in Central and Western Europe but above the average for rural areas of Romania (around 46 inhabitants per sq. km.). This characteristic of Timişoara's periurban area, shared in fact by the majority of periurban areas in Romania, is in the course of changing. In recent years, the population of these 15 periurban communities of which 14 are members of the Association has been growing steadily. This phenomenon was most clearly seen in the period between 2005 and 2010, during which the population grew by 17.8% to reach 64,048 (Table 3).

Through the many and various functions that it fulfils, the urban centre of Timişoara is the focal point of a much wider area, since it is the largest economic, cultural and academic centre in Romania's Western Development Region. It is here that over 30% of the industrial production and around 35% of the commercial activity of the Western Region are concentrated, as well as a large number of higher education establishments that between them cater for 61% of the region's students. The Timişoara growth hub thus represents an extremely important centre of economic dynamism in Romania, second only to Bucharest. It has an essential role in the building of long-term relationships to facilitate the integration of Romania into EU structures and the expression of Romanian values in the European Economic Area (EEA) (Planul integrat... – PIDU, Timişoara, 2010).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The geographical extent of the Timişoara Growth Pole was established on the basis of a consultancy report drawn up by the Centre for Regional Development, Cross-Border Studies and Optimal Land Use Structural Planning (CDR-START) of the Department of Geography of the West University of Timişoara and includes the communities of Becicherecu Mic, Bucovăţ, Dudeştii Noi, Dumbrăviţa, Ghiroda, Giarmata, Giroc, Moşniţa Nouă, Orţişoara, Pişchia, Remetea Mare, Săcălaz, Sânandrei, Sânmihaiu Român and Şag.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> I have included the community of Sânandrei (made up of three villages) in the analysis that follows, because even though it did not join the Timişoara Growth Pole Association it belongs to Timişoara's zone of influence.

Community	2005	2009	2010	2010/2005 (%)
Becicherecu Mic	2,453	2,712	2,747	111.99
Bucovăț*	-	1,423	1,455	112.26
Dudeștii Noi	2,313	2,696	2,779	120.15
Dumbrăvița	2,612	3,866	4,452	170.44
Ghiroda	4,726	5,262	5,357	113.35
Giarmata	5,583	6,099	6,202	111.09
Giroc	4,194	5,302	5,758	137.29
Moşnița Nouă	3,874	4,600	4,796	123.80
Orțișoara	3,931	4,152	4,182	106.38
Pişchia	2,813	2,847	2,896	102.95
Remetea Mare*	3,107	1,999	2,033	112.26
Sânandrei**	5,382	5,924	5,974	111.00
Săcălaz	6,394	7,037	7,316	114.42
Sânmihaiu Român	4,322	5,002	5,274	122.03
Şag	2,689	2,832	2,863	106.47
Periurban total	54,393	61,753	64,048	117.81
Municipality of Timişoara	303,908	311,586	311,440	102.48
Total for the pole	358,301	373,339	375,488	104.79

**Table 3.** Changes in the population of Timişoara and the administrative communitiesthat are members of the Timişoara Growth Pole Association, 2005-2010(Source: after INSSE primary data, 2011)

\* For 2005, the population of the community of Bucovāț is included under Remetea Mare. \*\* The community of Sânandrei did not join the Timişoara Growth Pole Association.

**Table 4**. Changes in the number of dwellings in Timişoaraand the member communities of the Timişoara Growth Pole Association, 2005-2010(Source: after INSSE primary data, 2011)

Community	2005	2008	2010	2010/2005 %
Becicherecu Mic	823	831	833	101.2
Bucovăț*	-	437	444	104.1
Dudeștii Noi	788	798	817	103.7
Dumbrăvița	1,215	2,047	2,341	192.7
Ghiroda	1,770	1,969	2,011	113.6
Giarmata	1,643	1,674	1,694	103.1
Giroc	1,571	2,258	2,574	163.8
Moşnița Nouă	1,494	1,698	1,829	122.4
Orțișoara	1,577	1,590	1,604	101.7
Pişchia	1,141	1,139	1,151	100.9
Remetea Mare*	1,463	1,077	1,079	104.1
Sânandrei**	1,718	1,847	1,891	110.1
Săcălaz	2,060	2,206	2,261	109.8
Sânmihaiu Român	1,472	1,903	1,997	135.6
Şag	869	960	1,007	115.9
Periurban total	20,126	22,428	23,533	116.9
Municipality of Timişoara	127,579	128,998	129,545	101.5
Total for the pole	147,705	151,426	153,078	103.6

\* For 2005, dwellings in the community of Bucovăț are included under Remetea Mare. \*\* The community of Sânandrei did not join the Timişoara Growth Pole Association.

The structural and functional regeneration of the area around the Timişoara growth hub can be clearly seen (as well as in other ways) in a *building boom*, especially in places in the immediate vicinity of the municipality. However, as may be observed if we make a comparative analysis of the data given in tables 6 and 7, the rate of increase in the housing stock in Timişoara's zone of influence is slightly lower than the rate of demographic increase. This is a consequence of the reciprocal interaction between a number of specifically local

geographical phenomena and processes, for example the proliferation of second home ownership and the time lag between the completion of dwellings and their finding buyers on the one hand, and the preponderance of young couples with children in this zone of influence on the other. This time lag increased in 2009-2011 because of the economic and financial crisis and the slowing-down in the rate of construction of new dwellings.

These demographic and housing-stock dynamics are a reflection of the economic changes taking place in the relationships between the urban and periurban parts of the Timişoara growth hub. From this point of view, a local *redistribution of economic functions* can be seen to be occurring, in the sense that industrial and service activities that require large areas of land are being taken over by suburban villages. The city is tending to devote itself to high-added-value activities and to those which occupy only a small surface area, since land values within Timişoara city limits increased greatly up to 2008, ranging between 120 euros per square metre towards the outskirts of the city and 800-1000 euros per square metre in the central zone. After that date, land values within the city limits fell by 20-30% (figures arrived at by analysing the websites of Timişoara real estate agencies).

All these factors have led to a redefining of the main options regarding *the use of space and best utilisation of the territory* belonging to the Timişoara growth hub. One tendency that illustrates this new vision is that of the removal from designated agricultural land of areas that are now judged to be more valuable for other purposes. In consequence, the area of agricultural land of the Timişoara hub fell by 7% between 2000 and 2008, a reduction of 7,070 hectares, equivalent to the total land area of a medium-sized community on the plain (Table 8). This cutting-back of agricultural land has occurred chiefly in order to extend the amount of built-up land, either in the area of small villa-style housing, or in that of industrial and service activity, or for the development of access and transport infrastructure.

Administrative unit	Area of agric	Change	
Administrative unit	2000	2008	2008/2000 (%)
Becicherecu Mic	4,315	4,302	99.7
Dudeştii Noi	5,023	4,986	99.2
Dumbrăvița	1,659	1,217	73.3
Ghiroda	2,898	2,734	94.3
Giarmata	6,634	6,556	98.8
Giroc	4,501	4,314	95.8
Moşnița Nouă	5,727	5,166	90.2
Orțișoara	13,795	13,768	99.8
Pişchia	9,754	9,664	99.1
Remetea Mare*	8,897	8,851	99.5
Sânandrei**	8,557	8,178	95.6
Săcălaz	10,949	10,738	98.1
Sânmihaiu Român	6,852	6,851	100.0
Şag	2,998	2,887	96.3
Periurban total	92,559	85,910	92.8
Municipality of Timişoara	8,181	7,760	94.8
Total for the pole	100,740	93,670	93.0

**Table 5.** Reduction in agricultural land within the area of the Timişoara growth pole(Source: after INSSE primary data, 2011)

\*Figures for the community of Bucovăț are included under Remetea Mare \*\*The village of Sânandrei did not join the Timişoara Growth Hub Association.

Thus a number of dispersed areas devoted to concentrations of mainly villastyle housing have taken shape, the most significant being those to the north-east of the city (Dumbrăvita -Covaci) and to the south-east (Moșnita Nouă -Giroc). There is also a distinct tendency for these areas to be separate from those devoted to new industrial and service industries, which prefer to be close to the main transport axes - the extension of Calea Sagului (towards Moravita-Belgrade), Calea Torontalului (towards Sânnicolau Mare-Szeged), Calea Lugojului and Calea Buziaşului (both towards Lugoj-Bucharest). The exit roads in the directions of Belgrade and Buzias are host to mainly private businesses, whereas the routes toward Sânnicolau Mare and Lugoj and the older Freidorf industrial area are sought both by private enterprises and by publicly-funded projects for the construction of industrial and technical parks (Timisoara ITP) and intermodal logistical areas (the Timişoara-Remetea Mare Intermodal Centre). Timişoara Airport Park is also being extended. This - the result of private initiative - is a logistical centre located to the north-east of the city, with access to the ring road. When completed it will cover an area of around 260,000 square metres.



Figure 5. Changes in urban planning and in the Timisoara's mode of relating to surrounding areas
1 - Solventul industrial zone; 2 - Buziasului industrial zone; 3 - UMT/Continental industrial zone; 4 - North industrial zone; 5 - Calea Lugojului industrial zone; 6 - Industrial park Freidorf; 7 - Industrial and technological park of Timisoara; 8 - Monlandys industrial park; 9 - Incontro industrial park; 10 - Timisoara Airport Park; 11 - Dunca Spedition; 12 - Edy Spedition; 13,14 - Remetea Mare logistical parks.

Looking to the future, the completion of the Nădlac – Arad – Timişoara – Deva – Sibiu – Piteşti, motorway, part of European Corridor 4, will have a major impact. However, the local authorities view the projected route of the motorway as unhelpful for Timisoara, since it does not come close enough to the main populated area (the distance is around 12 km) and only one access road from the city has been planned, whereas in the case of Arad four such access roads are being provided (for the reason that the route of the motorway forms a tangent with the south-western edge of the city). The Timisoara residential area really requires three such access points: one to the north, towards Arad, another in the north-east, towards Lipova, and a third to the east, towards Lugoj. However, given the route the motorway follows across the local area and the relatively large distance between it and the city, an increase in the number of access roads is harder to provide but not impossible to make a case for. The motorway also passes a relatively long way (5 km) from the city's best piece of transport infrastructure, Timişoara International Airport, the third largest airport in the country in terms of numbers of passengers (1.134 million in 2010), surpassed only by Bucharest Otopeni and Bucharest Băneasa. As long as the number of access points can increase to a minimum of two, the distance between the motorway and the city will not necessarily represent a handicap, provided that there are more access points in the periurban area. If we take into account the way a motorway can pose an obstacle to the development of relationships between parts of a local area, the buffer zone to the north-east of the city reserved for the extension of various functions of the urban agglomeration, the site of Timisoara's most important infrastructural means of communication with the rest of Romania and with Europe (its international airport, the intermodal logistical centre, the ring road etc.), could instead become a magnet for investors and a stimulus to general socio-economic development. However, the difficulty of co-ordinating decisions taken by the public authorities in Timisoara and in its neighbouring communities (Dumbravita, Remetea Mare) is tending to deprive this part of the hub of a clear vision of how to make the most of its territory; worst of all, chaotic decision-making is imperilling the opportunity to preserve particular areas and access corridors for installations that could have strategic importance for the future of Timişoara.

In fact, Timişoara generally has very poor transport infrastructure and services linking it with the rest of Romania and with neighbouring countries. The railway system of Banat, once the best in the country – at least in terms of density of network and quality of provision for local communities<sup>8</sup> – is today on the verge of collapse. A drastic reduction in the number of users, caused by a decline in classic economic activity and the coming-of-age of road passenger transport, has led to a dramatic increase in losses on maintenance and operating costs. As a result, the infrastructure has deteriorated, and the slowness of the trains is making rail travel ever less attractive. On the main lines (to Bucharest, Sibiu, Cluj-Napoca and Oradea) the average commercial speed of the fastest passenger train ranges from 48 km an hour on the Sibiu line to 64 km an hour on the Bucharest line (figures from the 2011 passenger timetable). In addition, there are no direct rail links between Timişoara and the capitals of the neighbouring countries, Belgrade and Budapest.

The road traffic infrastructure, likewise, is far from providing swift connections with the principal traffic arteries in this part of Europe. Throughout

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Timiş County still has the greatest concentration of rail track in Romania – 91.4 km per 1,000 square km, compared with the national average of 45.2 km per 1,000 square km.

Banat, the European highways have only one carriageway in each direction, the same as the national roads. In addition, the renewal of the main routes has dragged on so badly over the past 20 years that the city of Timişoara was left almost cut off, particularly from the capital and the Balkans (Sofia, Istanbul), with the roadworks needed to renew the E70 having a serious effect on traffic flow for almost seven years (2003-2010). At present, the main transport axes in Banat are in better shape, but the majority of the county and minor roads are still unsatisfactory.

The area in which Timişoara is weakest is its provision for leisure activities - something that has become indispensable to the social life of large cities, affected as they are by overcrowding, pollution and stress. The Timisoara growth hub has up to now lacked a clear perspective on the provision and appropriate development of areas for relaxation and leisure. Apart from its city parks, Timisoara has not a single European-standard area suitable for periurban and weekend tourism. Within a radius of 40 km around the city there are only a few hotel or guesthouse type places to stay or eat that are situated in interesting and potentially attractive areas, and what these have to offer tourists in addition to the basics is very limited. If we make an exception of the possibilities in those periurban areas that are practically integrated into the city (Dumbrăvița, Ghiroda, Giroc), visiting which is not regarded as a real weekend outing, since they are merely extensions of the urban space, we are left with few places to visit and those with little to make the tourist wish to extend his stay. Most of them are hotels and guesthouses (at Remetea Mare, Bazos, Săcălaz, Altringen, Sandra etc.) that are in demand for short stays, sometimes of a *teambuilding* nature, but lack broad-appeal facilities capable of providing relaxation and entertainment possibilities for a large number of people (water parks, amusement parks, etc.).

Opportunities for improvement do exist, linked with the presence nearby of forests (the Green Forest, Bistra Woods, Giroc Woods, the Bazos Dendrological Park, the Pişchia hunting reserve etc.) and vine-growing areas (Recaş), the proximity of the Timis valley with its potential for being developed for summer tourist activities (Sag, Albina) and the existence of thermal (Timisoara, Sânmihaiul German, Calacea, Lovrin) and mineral (Buzias) springs, of some lakes, etc. However, in order for these to be systematically exploited, we are still waiting for the working out of an action plan at the level of the hub, with specific improvement projects that would increase the chances of attracting significant investment. There is a high demand for facilities of this kind, as evidenced by the fact that a very large number of people from Timisoara and other parts of Western Romania regularly make use of the modern recreational and leisure facilities to be found in neighbouring countries, particularly in Hungary, as a consequence of the lack of suitable in-country attractions. This high level of demand would surely lead to full use of such facilities and would guarantee a good return on money thus invested.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The changes that have taken place in the city of Timişoara and its neighbourhood during the past two decades point to a set of quantitative and qualitative gains which still leave the city lagging behind the present-day urban systems of Central Europe. This lag is historical in nature but also reflects recent dysfunctionalities that have caused the lag to persist and in some sectors even to widen. At a national level, the perception is that Banat and above all Timişoara are some of the most developed areas in Romania, and this perception is confirmed by some economic and quality-of-life indicators. The majority of those who live in Timişoara clearly take pride in the city – a pride nourished in an inertial way by its historical inheritance, but also based on the striking progress that took place in the period from 1995 to 2005, during which numerous large foreign companies opened operating centres in Timişoara, thus contributing to the development of the city and to a rise in the income of its population and that of nearby villages. This pride is only expressed in relation to what the rest of Romania is like; when comparisons with other countries are under discussion, a realistic view prevails, made easier by the greater frequency with which Timişoara people come into contact with foreigners (the effect of proximity), whether within Banat or in countries in Central and Southern Europe (Austria, Hungary, Germany, Italy etc).

Opinion polls carried out in Timişoara show up this dichotomy, a natural one if we consider the socio-economic realities of Central and South-Eastern Europe (Timisoara City Hall Monitor no. 98, 2011). However, these studies also reveal a certain degree of inertia and a triumphalist perception of the state of affairs locally, even though in recent years Timisoara has lost some of the dynamism that characterised it in the 1990s as it has competed with other cities in Romania that are similar in size and function, most especially Cluj-Napoca. For example, even though 7.5% of direct foreign investment in Romania is in Timisoara (as a consequence of what it built up during the 1995-2006 period), the dynamic of direct foreign investment in Timisoara fell significantly after the middle of the first decade of the present century. In the past few years, including in those in which there was strong economic growth in Romania as a whole, Timisoara has not succeeded in attracting a single well-known investor or any large-scale investment that could have contributed to refreshing its image as an innovative hub with much to offer the business world. Thus, for example, in 2007 the Finnish firm Nokia chose to develop a site near Cluj-Napoca, and in 2008 Mercedes-Benz, a division of the German company Daimler AG, opted for the city of Kecskemet in Hungary, although both firms, in their quest for attractive centres for delocalising or green field investment, had also carried out surveys to gauge the potential offered by the Timişoara area.

In the sphere of cross-border links, too, in the competition between the four major hubs in the DKMT Euroregion (Timişoara, Novi Sad, Arad and Szeged), Timişoara is showing a relatively limited capacity to initiate cross-border co-operation projects and influence the socio-economic and cultural life of the Euroregion. Rivalry between the four hubs is a prevalent feature of the situation, a rivalry which in some domains (infrastructure and logistical services, research and innovation, tourism, promotion etc.) is leading to the wasting of resources, the weakening of local social cohesion and a reduction in the region's potential for social development.

The city is lacking in a number of aspects of social and urban quality and cultural breadth whose attainment would require a change in its paradigm of approach. Its claim to be in the same league as the regional metropolises of Central and Western Europe, matched within Romania by a vision based on narrow local rivalries, can scarcely these days ensure the healthy progress of a regional hub. As such, Timişoara's growth strategy should be based on the principle of excellence and also on that of socio-territorial cohesion. It has the identity-related basis it requires. All the city needs to do is to emerge from its monadic state and surround itself with a dense network of infrastructural and relational links with its territory and with local communities. It is in partnership with these and with regard to their immediate advantage that the use of Timişoara's periurban space needs to be planned.

Because of the city's limited territorial resources, its functional reach and impact are coming to depend more and more on the prosperity of the periurban zone that supports it. Development of this zone would then feed into the strength of the entire urban area and contribute to the growth of the prestige of its nucleus, the city, whose positive external projection would have repercussions in the growing ability of the Timişoara area to attract and retain the resources it needs for its development. In this way the Timişoara Growth Pole would also have an increased ability to fulfil the objectives for which it was granted this status, namely to provide co-ordinated planning and the diffusion of socio-economic development in the Western Region of Romania.

#### Acknowledgements

The expenses of research and of the publication of this article have been met from funding received under the Romanian National Plan for Research, Development and Innovation 2007-2013 (PN II), project theme "Advanced Research into the Dynamic of Identity-Based Structures and Socio-Economic Disparities in the Western Region of Romania and its Cross-Border Area", project code ID\_1067, financed via CNCSIS, contract number 1020 /19.01.2009.

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Submitted:	Revised:	Accepted:	Published online:
June 19, 2011	June 21, 2011	August 8, 2011	November 30, 2011

## ACCESSING THE CONCEPTUAL "GOODNESS" OF GEOGRAPHIC MENTAL MAPS FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

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Abstract: Geographic mental maps have been called on numerous times in explaining foreign policy decisions. However, mental maps lack a serious conceptualising endeavour in order to be useful to scientific inquiry. Before we can use mental maps to understand and compare foreign policy making processes we must define mental maps and frame them in their wider intellectual context. In this paper we develop geographic mental maps as an analytical concept and access their conceptual "goodness" so they can contribute to enriching the scope of the foreign policy analysis toolbox.

**Key words**: cognition, concept formation, foreign policy analysis, geographic mental maps

#### INTRODUCING GEOGRAPHIC MENTAL MAPS IN FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

It has long been understood that the way individuals perceive their geographic environment is important to foreign policy decision-making and policymaking. Halford Mackinder, the pater familias of modern geopolitics, recognized almost a century ago that each era has its own particular geographic perspective:

The influence of geographical conditions upon human activities has depended, however, not merely on the realities as we know them to be and to have been, but in even greater degree on what men imagined in regard to them. (Mackinder, 1996: 21)

This view was perpetuated throughout numerous geographic treatises in the following decades. The perceptions of geographic configurations and geographic patterns of history assumed a heightened relevance for geographers in explaining the interaction between states:

It is clear that although each individual, each generation, and each government develops its own particular view of the world, as a result of geographical location and historical tradition, there are a number of major perceptions which have persisted over long periods and exercised great influence upon strategic thinking and political behaviour. Sometimes it has

been a map constructed on a particular projection that has served generations of statesmen as the basis of political and military planning. Sometimes it has been a compelling theory of spatial relationships and historical causation that has moulded the viewpoint and action of political leaders. (Kirk, quoted in Sloan 1988: 15)

Despite the continued clamour of the importance of the role of geographic cognition on policy-making throughout the 20th century, very little theoretical development and empirical evidence has been presented to endorse such claims. With the exception of a few ground-breaking studies treating foreign policy issues, the study of geographic cognition evolved along very different trajectories, leaving explanations of inter-state relations for others theorists to explain. It was only in the 1980s that a systematic effort to "operationalise" the concept of geographic mental maps<sup>1</sup> in foreign policy analysis (FPA) was undertaken, beginning with Alan Henrikson's (1980) essay *The Geographical "Mental Maps" of American Foreign Policy Makers* (see Criekmans, 2009; da Vinha, 2010; O'Loughlin and Grant, 1990).

The last decades have tenuously furthered this line of investigation. Predictably, most of those who have adopted this approach have naturally been geographers. International Relations (IR) theorists have occasionally dallied with geographic mental maps but without contributing significantly to the theoretical development of the concept. While some studies dedicated to geographic cognition have been published in recent years (see Akçali, 2010; Bilgin, 2004; Glassman, 2005; Latham, 2001; Le Rider, 2008; Scheffler, 2003; Walker, 2000), most have tended to focus on regional perspectives. Other works, while more global in scope (see Bialasiewicz et al., 2007; Lewis and Wigen, 1997; Sloan, 1988), have not focused directly on the way that geographic mental maps inform the decision-making processes, rather concentrating on the way geographic constructions justify foreign policy decisions.

In fact, some of the epistemological propositions stressed by the earlier studies on mental maps have come under criticism from critical geopolitics. Klaus Dodds (1994) has questioned the geographic practice of representing the political world, specifically calling on critical and post-structuralist theories to point out that "geography" (or 'IR') as a technology or an academic discipline is not simply about 'geographing' or 'earth-writing', i.e., a practice whereby geographers simply record the already legible surfaces of the earth" (Dodds, 1994: 187). According to Dodds, discourses of geographic representations are frequently central to the legitimisation of foreign policies which fix the boundaries between "Us" and "Others".

Critical geopolitics has thus focused on exploring how foreign policy professionals represent political space according to their position in the world<sup>2</sup>. This differs from previous research according to Dodds (1994: 197) who criticizes

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The term "cognitive maps" has also been applied to describe geographic cognitive constructions. However, the term "mental map" will be used in this research proposal in order to avoid confusion with the concept of "cognitive map" as applied by Robert Axelrod (1976) and which refers to a mathematical model of a person's belief system, illustrated by a pictorial representation of the causal assertion of a person as a graph of points and arrows.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> However, more recent research labelled critical geopolitics has centred its attention on "geopolitical cultures" and their commonsensical expression in television, films, novels, and newspapers, as well as in the formal education system and the customary politics of ordinary nationalism (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000).

Henrikson's work on mental maps for having "little recognition that the observer might be implicated within these observations or that it might be reasonably problematic in assuming one could (re)present the activities of others". Consequently, scholars committed to critical geopolitics have developed much of the work on geographic representations in foreign policy. Relying on discourse analysis and similar methods, the central assertion of critical geopolitics is "that geography is a social and historical discourse which is always bound up with questions of politics and ideology" (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1998: 79). More specifically:

Fundamental to this process is the power of certain national security elites to represent the nature and defining dilemmas of international politics in particular ways. From a geographical perspective this can be described as their power to write international political space by constituting, defining and describing security, threats and perceived enemies in regularized ways. These representational practices of national security intellectuals generate particular "scripts" in international politics concerning places, people and issues. Such scripts then become part of the means by which hegemony (in the Gramscian sense) is exercised in the international system. (Ó Tuathail, 1992: 438)

However, more recently, some research has re-turned to analysing the mental maps of particular decision-makers, or decision-making groups, revealing their world-views and the way these ultimately affect their foreign policy decisions (Casey and Wright, 2008; 2011; Henrikson, 2008). It is precisely in this context that the current paper is framed. With its focus on the discourses and representations of geographic space, critical geopolitics undeniably treads common ground with the mental map research program. Both highlight the representational dimensions of geographic phenomena in foreign policy, emphasizing the subjective and plastic nature of geographic knowledge. However, rather than focus on the discursive practices that decision-makers employ to justify and legitimatise particular policies<sup>3</sup>, my interest is on how geographic representations influence the decision-making process. In the end, we are much more concerned with how a foreign policy decision was achieved than with the resulting policy.

Consequently, several issues need to be addressed beforehand. Despite the various efforts to clarify and explain the conceptual framework underlying the geographic mental map research agenda, there still persists a good deal of theoretical bewilderment. The concept of geographic mental map has diverged considerably in its definition and numerous methodological approaches have been undertaken. A scholarly compromise has yet to be established. The mental map lacks a serious conceptualisaing effort. Accordingly, the geographic mental map, as an analytical concept, needs to be clarified in order to be useful to scientific inquiry. Furthermore, geographic mental maps must be distinguished from other cognitive approaches so that they are not understood as just another name for an already existing concept.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> It is worth stating that much of the work done under the rubric of critical geopolitics has lost some of this character. According to Dalby (2010: 281) the recent proliferation of scholarly research has implied that "the focus on critique, deconstruction and strategic discourses... has been diluted and stretched as the label critical geopolitics has been applied to numerous matters of war, politics, culture, representation, identity, economy, resources, resistance, gender, development, fear, emotional geographies and related matters".

In the following pages we will look to examine some of these issues. To begin with, the geographic mental map will be defined as an analytical concept. This implies clarifying some of the conceptual misunderstandings which have accompanied mental maps in the last decades and make it difficult to distinguish them from other similar concepts – e.g., "cognitive geopolitics" (Criekemans, 2009), "geopolitical codes" (Dijkink, 1998), "geopolitical images" (O'Loughlin and Grant, 1990), "geopolitical imaginary" (Latham, 2001), "geopolitical imagination" (Agnew, 2003), "geopolitical scripts" (Ó Tuathail, 2002), "imaginative geographies" (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007), "metageographies" (Lewis and Wigen, 1997), and "role concept" (Maull, 2000).

Subsequently, we will try to place mental maps in an appropriate research program. In accordance with its main attributes and characteristics, geographic mental maps will be framed in the cognitive research agenda for they share many of the fundamental postulations that permeate other cognitive approaches. Nevertheless, geographic mental maps have geography as their particular distinguishing quality. Accordingly, the third section of this paper analyses how the different geographic attributes distinguish mental maps from other analytical concepts. Finally, we will access the "goodness" of the conceptualisation of the mental map developed throughout this paper. More precisely, we will evaluate if geographic mental maps possess the attributes identified by Gerring (1999) and which contribute to a high-quality concept.

#### **DEFINING GEOGRAPHIC MENTAL MAPS**

Despite Henrikson's (1980) initial conceptualising effort, very little research has since been devoted to developing geographic mental maps as an analytical concept. While it is relatively effortless to encounter numerous references to mental maps throughout the foreign policy literature, they are rarely developed in any theoretical detail. In an effort to broaden its range of application, mental maps have become subject to an exercise of "conceptual stretching" which reveals no analytical precision whatsoever (see Sartori, 1970). As stated elsewhere, "the geographic 'mental map' is still used as a catch-all term with only very vague notions of its conceptual underpinnings" (da Vinha, 2010: 61). While I am certainly not against some explanatory leeway, a concept which is too inclusive presents a serious predicament for scientific enquiry. As Moscovici (2000: 30) has hinted, "by attempting to include too much, one grasps little".

Concepts are fundamental elements for the development of the social sciences. Yet many scholarly endeavours have overlooked the need for proper conceptualisation and advanced to determining measurements and causal inferences (Goertz, 2005; Munck and Verkuilen, 2002). The search to uncover the "what is" question has often been superseded by the determination to discover the "how much" character of a phenomenon. This, however, has not aided in developing and promoting the research on mental maps in any way. We must recall that we can never measure or compare anything satisfactorily without first knowing exactly what it is we are measuring or comparing (Goertz, 2005; Sartori, 1970). As a result, we should proceed to conceptualise geographic mental maps in a way which can comprise the following essential aspects of concept formation (Gerring, 1999): 1) the events or phenomena to be defined (i.e., the extension, denotation, or definiendum); 2) the defining properties or attributes (i.e., intension, connotation, definiens, or definitions); and 3) a label encompassing the preceding two aspects.

136

This does not imply that we should discard previous scholarly endeavours. On the contrary, much gratitude is due to those who have already contributed extensive scholarly labour in developing the mental map concept for application to international politics, in particular to FPA. For instance, the Sprout's (Sprout and Sprout, 1957; 1960; 1965) work is undeniably a major contribution to the scholarship on mental maps. The Sprouts parted with the traditional realist perspective centred on the acceptance of the existence of "real world" to which decision-makers reacted. On the contrary, they proposed that "the real world may exist, but its 'true' characteristics are unknown or unknowable to the environed individuals" (Sprout and Sprout, 1965: 119). As a result of this shortcoming, the Sprouts argued that "what matters in the explanation of decisions and policies is how the actor *imagined* his environment to be" (Sprout and Sprout, 1960: 147).

Though many of the Sprout's theoretical propositions resonated with many IR scholars in the following decades, it was Henrikson's *The Geographical "Mental Maps" of American Foreign Policy Makers*, published in 1980, that first applied the geographic mental map as a conceptual instrument for FPA. Acknowledging that traditional political science has long been ill-equipped to deal with the geographic perceptions underlying foreign policy decisions, Henrikson (1980) contends that the mental map allows for a better comprehension of how individuals make sense of different spatial relationships. With the intention of providing a functional framework for analytical purposes, Henrikson expanded the conceptual knowledge of geographic mental maps, first by identifying the formational factors subjacent to mental maps – i.e., the maps *cognitive base* and a person's world-view (or *Weltanschauung*) – and then by describing the appropriate methods for analysing an individual's mental maps – the *geographic mind* and the *geographic field*.

Borrowing from Downs and Stea's (2005) earlier work, Henrikson (1980: 498) defined geographic mental maps as "an ordered but continually adapting structure of the mind – alternatively conceivable as a process – by reference to which a person acquires, codes, stores, recalls, reorganizes, and applies, in thought or action, information about his or her large-scale geographical environment, in part or in its entirety". In this sense mental maps are cognitive processes that structure geographic information in order for individuals to understand their environment, relate it to their prior experience, and make it susceptible to problem-solving activities.

However, this is a rather limited definition since it reveals nothing about the function and utility of geographic mental maps as an instrument for FPA. As a result, we must advance our definition to encompass greater analytical convenience More precisely, geographic mental maps, are useful for revealing "the awareness, images, information, impressions, and beliefs that individuals and groups have about the elemental, structural, functional, and symbolic aspects of real and imagined physical, social, cultural, economic, and political environments" (Moore and Golledge, 1976: 5). In this sense, they "refer not only to *information*, with its implication of truth and validity, but also to admittedly subjective *beliefs* based on partial, incomplete, or intentionally misleading information" (Moore and Golledge, 1976: 5). Put very simply, a geographic mental map is a cognitive representation which encloses an individual or group's beliefs about the geographic character of a particular place or places and their relationship to other places or spatial phenomena. While clearly underdeveloped in terms of their structures and processes, geographic mental maps are commonly regarded as fundamental to foreign policy decision-making (Best, 2008; Casey, 2008; Casey and Wright, 2008; 2011; Henrikson, 1980; Latham, 2001; Sloan, 1988; Sprout and Sprout, 1965; Walker, 2000). Even while recognizing that geographic mental maps are prone to numerous distortions, few authors would contest that "the *decisions* that lead to political action, however, are taken in the more amorphous, nuanced world of the mental map" (Henrikson, 1980: 497). Political decision-makers have to make decisions based on information and events that are generally outside their national or even regional contexts. Therefore, mental maps are "systems of orientation" which are used for guidance in foreign policy-making (Henrikson, 1980; 2002).

To make sense of the diversity and complexity of the political world, decision-makers rely on simplified representations or mental models (Barr et al., 1992; George, 1969; Golledge and Stimson, 1997; Holsti, 1976; Sapienza, 1987). No one individual can encompass the complexity of the world in its entirety (Lowenthal, 1961). Scientific studies have established that individuals and groups have cognitive spatial constructs which they use to simplify reality and aid political decision-making (Golledge, 2002; Henrikson, 1980; Mark et al., 1999). Consequently, "the beliefs that compromise these [mental] maps provide the individual with a more or less coherent way of organizing and making sense out of what would otherwise be a confusing array of signals picked up from the environment by his senses" (Holsti, 2006: 34).

More precisely, decision-makers act with regard to their perceived geographic context, meaning "what matters in the explanation of decisions and policies is how the actor *imagined* his environment to be, not how it actually was" (Sprout and Sprout, 1960: 147). Accordingly, different actors can respond differently to the same event in the international environment (Bilgin, 2004; Gould and White, 1974; Jervis, 1976; Kiesler and Sproull, 1982). As a result, mental maps are essential to policy-making in the sense that they are a "critical component of general spatial problem-solving activity" (Golledge and Stimson, 1997: 239). By informing decision-makers about particular geographic contexts and relationships, mental maps contribute to the process of spatial choice inherent in foreign policy decision-making.

## LOCATING GEOGRAPHIC MENTAL MAPS IN THE COGNITIVE RESEARCH AGENDA

According to the aforementioned conceptualisation, geographic mental maps should be framed within the cognitive research agenda in FPA. Recent decades have witnessed the development of a considerable amount of research applying a wide variety of concepts, theoretical foundations, subjects, and "data-making" operations, making the cognitive approach to IR an eclectic research field (Holsti, 2006). Nevertheless, it is possible to identify the central postulations that permeate the cognitive research agenda in FPA. According to Tetlock and McGuire Jr. (1999) there are two key assumptions underlying the core of the cognitive research agenda:

1) The international environment imposes heavy information-processing demands upon policymakers. It is very difficult to identify the best or utilitymaximizing solutions to most foreign policy problems. Policymakers must deal with incomplete and unreliable information on the intentions and capabilities of other states. The range of response options is indeterminate. The problem consequences of each option are shrouded in uncertainty. Policymakers must choose among options that vary on many, seemingly incommensurable value dimensions (e.g., economic interests, international prestige, domestic political advantages, human rights, even lives). Finally, to compound the difficulty of the task, policymakers must sometimes work under intense stress and time pressure.

2) Policymakers (like all human beings) are limited-capacity information processors who resort to simplifying strategies to deal with the complexity, uncertainty, and painful trade-offs with which the world confronts them. The foreign policy of a nation addresses itself, not the external world per se, but to the simplified image of the external world constructed in the mind of those who make policy decisions. Policymakers may behave "rationally" (attempt to maximize expected utility) but only within the context of their simplified subjective representations of reality. (Tetlock and McGuire Jr., 1999: 505-506)

From these key assumptions the authors identify the cognitive research program's central research objective as the understanding of the "cognitive strategies that policymakers rely upon to construct and maintain their simplified images of the environment" (Tetlock and McGuire Jr., 1999: 506). They further distinguish between two types of cognitive strategies in their effort to simplify the understanding of how the different cognitive dimensions involved foreign policymaking function. The first strategy corresponds to representational research, which relies on cognitive or knowledge structures that provide the framework for assimilating new informational inputs and choosing between the diverse policy options. Above all, these studies look to explain what policymakers think. This entails understanding their assumptions about themselves, other states, inter-state relationships, the goals and/or values underlying foreign policy, and the types of policies most helpful to achieving those goals or values. Some of the concepts most readily applied to describe these cognitive structures are "operational codes", "cognitive maps", "images", "schemas", "stereotypes", "scripts", "frames", and "prototypes".

The second strategy embodies process research, with its central focus on identifying the abstract laws of cognitive functioning that clarify *how* policymakers think about issues. The bulk of this research looks to comprehend the rules or procedures that are subjacent to the policymaking decision process. Some of the most significant lines of research in the process strategy are on the fundamental attribution error, extracting lessons from history, avoidance of value trade-offs, the policy-freezing effects of commitment, and crisis decision making. Accordingly, in all these cases "the cognitive miser image of the decision maker serves as leitmotif: policymakers often seem unwilling or unable to perform the demanding information-processing tasks required by normative models of judgment and choice" (Tetlock and McGuire Jr., 1999: 511).

#### PLACING GEOGRAPHY IN THE MENTAL MAP CONCEPT

Several colleagues have questioned us about what's so exceptional about "geographic" mental maps? To be more precise, we have often been interrogated as to whether including the word "geographic" is not just another meaningless terminological concoction which merely retitles an already existing concept? The common reservation is "what does the geographic mental map have to offer FPA that hasn't already been accomplished using other analytical concepts such as the operational code, cognitive map, or schema theory"? While initially taken aback by

such queries, we have repeatedly contested that the change of terminology denotes in fact a genuine change of perspective – i.e., a geographic perspective.

While the cognitive research agenda has witnessed the development of a wide assortment of models and methods of analysis and explanation, the geographic dimensions associated with cognition remain clearly lacking. When geography is emphasized in FPA it is almost always acknowledged as an essentially spatial feature. Despite the fact that there has been a recent renewal of interest in geography within IR, the discipline has yet to "develop a sophisticated understanding of the term" (Flint et al., 2009: 827). Therefore, the themes of physical distance, contiguity, location, and the physical features of the terrain continue to prevail in the majority of the academic research.

To be sure, as Henrikson (1980: 507) has noted, geography is rarely the decisive factor in determining international politics. But it would be imprudent to dismiss geography altogether, for IR scholars have long acknowledged that decision-makers act with regard to their perceived geographic context, i.e., psycho-milieu (Sprout and Sprout, 1960; see also Golledge and Stimson, 1997; Jervis, 1976; Moore and Golledge, 1976; Sloan, 1988). Nevertheless, geography's spatial attributes have been the overriding concern for those researchers attentive to geographic variables in their studies. Of the numerous spatial attributes (or "spatial primitives") identified by Golledge (1995), only a few have been of interest to IR scholars – i.e., location, distance, order, density, and dispersion.

Several significant studies have recently been published that buttress this point (Colaresi et al., 2007; Mearsheimer, 2007; Starr, 2005; Walt, 1985). In fact, distance has traditionally been the dominant geographic attribute for IR and FPA (Henrikson, 2002). Geographic proximity has long been considered a highly relevant factor in international conflict. Several studies applying formal analytical models have determined that "there can be little doubt that the effect of state-to-state contiguity on the occurrence of war is quite strong" (Bremer, 1992: 327). When considering the main factors contributing to international threats, Walt (1985: 10) has reinforced this conviction by supporting that "because the ability to project power declines with distance, states that are nearby pose a greater threat than those that are far away".

There is no denying the importance of the spatial attributes for IR and FPA, but the scope of geographic mental maps surpasses this narrow analytical dimension. They inevitably must focus on *all* the geographic dimensions. Ultimately, this implies defining the object of geographic research – an endeavour that has spurred controversy since the dawn of the discipline (Claval, 2006). Though this task clearly exceeds the intentions of the current paper, a few considerations must be made in order to truly comprehend the scope of geographic mental maps and their value for FPA.

Accordingly, we can only benefit from geographic knowledge when we approach geography from a holistic perspective. This implies that we cannot submit to partial perspectives in geography. If it is impossible to reach a consensual definition of geography, it is however possible to identify three core concepts which have permeated geographic thought throughout the ages – i.e., space, place, and environment (Massey, 1994; Matthews and Herbert, 2008). As pointed out above, the concept of geographic space has long been embraced by IR. Even the vastly multifaceted concept of environment has been gaining considerable terrain in IR and FPA, namely through the ecopolitics and critical geopolitics research agenda.
Yet the concept of place has not been central to IR research. Indeed, "place" is as disputed a concept as you can find in the social sciences. It is in the context of Human Geography that the concept of place is usually attributed great significance, and for "many geographers, place and the difference between places are the stuff of Geography, the raw materials that gives the discipline its warrant" (Gregory et al., 2009: 539). Defining place is certainly no easy undertaking. Staeheli (1993) identifies five conceptualisations of place - 1) place as physical location or site; 2) place as a cultural and/or a social location; 3) place as context; 4) place as constructed over time; and 5) place as process. In the first approach, place is featureless point of reference that locates one position in relation to another. In contrast, place held as cultural or social location suggests that the local cultural, social, economic, and political networks help shape people's identities. In a similar fashion, place as context attributes identities to particular places and spaces, rather than people. As opposed to identity-in-place (as in the previous conceptualisation), the contextual perspective favours identity-of-place. Another conceptualization further develops this reasoning, introducing the factor of time. Accordingly, in this perspective place is a dynamic concept which is subjected to the historic layering of human activity. Finally, when place is conceptualised as a social process it breaks with the prior perspectives of place as a product. As a result, the emphasis is on the process of social construction of place, namely those operating at different scales. Accordingly, place is perceived as "intricately binding locales with broad processes and with other locales" (Staeheli, 1993: 163).

Despite the peculiarities inherent in each approach, the dominant feature underlying the different conceptualisations presented by Staeheli (1993) – with the exception of the first – is the unmistakable attribution of meaning to place. In each of these conceptualisations place is imbued with symbolic social significance. Ultimately, the use of place "provides a context for the formation of political identifies and the identification of political interests" (Jones et al., 2004: 99).

These conceptualisations do not deny the existence and value of the physical landscape. Rather, they imply that "a landscape has no meaningful shape and significance until it is accorded place and identity in the social and cognitive worlds of human experience" (Helms, 1988: 20). Moreover, the conception of place as a social process is particularly important for international politics and FPA. The allegedly fixed, unchanging nature of geography has been one of its main attractions for scholars subscribing to traditional geopolitical theories (Gray, 1999; Kaplan, 2009). However, due to its social structure, we must recognize place's fluid and volatile nature (Flint, 2005). Consequently, understanding the distinction between space and place is essential for grasping the true potential of geographic mental maps for international politics and FPA.

Space is associated with abstractness, quantitative modeling (the spatial approach), freedom, movement, formality, and impersonal location; while place is associated with familiarity, security, home, intimacy, historical tradition, social-cultural relations, context, and geo-sociological effects. (O'Loughlin, 2000: 133)

In effect, by focusing exclusively on space we risk missing out on a great deal of information and knowledge that is useful for appreciating foreign policy. Most notably, human agency, with its emphasis on spontaneity and creativity, is side-tracked (Ley, 1996). Human agency is an essential element of geography. Individuals socially construct and are socially fashioned by geography. As Flint (2006: 4) has suggested "Since places are unique they will produce a mosaic of experiences and understanding". Form this perspective, our milieu contributes to our understanding of the world. However, the social construction of place is equally important to grasp. In other words, individuals actively contribute to the construction of place by providing images and narratives that portray and explain them and their relationships to other places. This is precisely the strength of the traditional geopolitical theories. Flint (2006: 13) claims that "Geopolitics creates images: geopolitics, in theory, language, and practice, classifies swathes of territory and masses of people". Therefore, geopolitical representations associate spatial attributes, such as geographic location and configuration, with the cultural attributes of a place.

In fact, research on mental maps has demonstrated the predominance of the human dimension in geographic knowledge. For instance, studies of students' sketch maps of the world have revealed that a "factor common to almost all maps, [is] the predominance of *human* over *physical* features" (Saarinen, 2005: 151). Likewise, Schulten (2001) has confirmed that various means of conveying geographic information, such as maps, atlases, and geographic journals, generally placed great emphasis on human traits. For example, late 19th century atlases combined physical and human aspects of geography creating distant, homogeneous, and underdeveloped places ripe for colonial modernization. In fact, the non-cartographic pages conveyed as much information as the maps, if not more:

As a result we find an emphasis on "quantifiable" information such as industrial production, ethnic breakdown, and religious association. Though apparently idiosyncratic, the information generally related to the human rather than to the natural world. These atlases framed the world as a racial hierarchy by highlighting the unified relationship between race, climate, and "progress," and in the process created an ethnographic world that functioned according to certain laws. (...) As a result of cartographers' treating the nation as a product of both the physical environment and the racial constitution of its inhabitants, race and nation – sometimes race and continent – became conflated. (Schulten, 2001: 33)

We need not look so far into the past to encounter such evocative representations. Contemporary society is replete with similar examples. Skimming over the more than one thousand pages of the recently edited *Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Asia and Oceania* (West, 2009) we can encounter literally hundreds of "informative" and "enlightening" descriptions of the different "peoples" of the regions of Asia and Oceania. For example, we are informed that, while among the poorest citizens of the former USSR, the Tajikistanis "are peaceful, but prosperity is still a long way off for most" (West, 2009: 770). Similarly, whilst the Aeta "are all small in stature, dark skinned, with curly dark hair and dark eyes", resembling some African communities, recent genetic research has demonstrated that "they are as removed from African gene pools as the rest of the population of the Philippines" (West, 2009: 23).

However, these sorts of representations are not restricted to encyclopaedic works. On the contrary, many policy oriented texts in journals of reputable stature also develop similar reasonings. Consider, for instance, Robert Kaplan's (2009) recent acknowledgment of the importance of geography for the future of international politics. While admitting that ideas are important in foreign policy, they are nevertheless geographically determined:

The wisdom of geographical determinism endures across the chasm of a century because it recognizes that the most profound struggles of humanity are not about ideas but about control over territory, specifically the heartland and rimlands of Eurasia. Of course, ideas matter, and they span geography. And yet there is a certain geographic logic to where certain ideas take hold. Communist Eastern Europe, Mongolia, China, and North Korea were all contiguous to the great land power of the Soviet Union. Classic fascism was a predominantly European affair. And liberalism nurtured its deepest roots in the United States and Great Britain, essentially island nations and sea powers both. Such determinism is easy to hate but hard to dismiss. (Kaplan, 2009: 100)

This deterministic outlook allows Kaplan (2009: 101) to identify that the "Eurasia of vast urban areas, overlapping missile ranges, and sensational media will be one of constantly enraged crowds, fed by rumors transported at the speed of light from one Third World megalopolis to another". The same logic underlies the prediction that "the plateau peoples of Turkey will dominate the Arabs in the 21st century because the Turks have water and the Arabs don't" (Kaplan, 2009: 105).

In sum, the object of geographic knowledge is quite vast. IR theories have not benefited from the full potential that geographic knowledge has to offer. By merely acknowledging the spatial attributes inherent to geography we fail to understand how geography actually affects decision-making, particularly with regards to foreign policy. More precisely, a geographic outlook implies we proceed to

... study the specifics of the world, not just where Pyongyang is but what are its characteristics. "Characteristics" may include weather patterns, physical setting, the shape of the city, the pattern of housing, or the transport system. (...) Understanding a place requires analyzing how its uniqueness is produced through a combination of physical, social, economic, and political attributes – and how these attributes are partially a product of connections to other places, near and far. (Flint, 2006: 2).

It is difficult to understand this disregard for place considering the territorial state is crucial to IR scholarship (Agnew, 1994; Flint et al., 2009). As cultural geographers have stressed in their research program, identity and space are usually coalesced into a unitary object. This is especially true when we consider nationalities which are "seen as both fixed object, passed from generation to generation, and as territorial where the space of the culture becomes imbued with ethnic or national ideas" (Crang, 1998: 162). The involuntary denial of this holistic perspective has led to discarding the geographic mental map as a useful analytical concept for understanding foreign policy decision-making. Nevertheless, we are certain that a better appreciation of how geographic factors influence our beliefs can aid in comprehending foreign policy decision-making.

# ACCESSING THE CONCEPTUAL "GOODNESS" OF GEOGRAPHIC MENTAL MAPS

We have argued that while concept formation is never an unproblematic enterprise, at minimum, an effort should be made to develop the geographic mental map as rigorous an analytical concept as possible. How to properly develop concepts has been open to debate for quite a long time (see Collier and Mahon Jr., 1993; Gerring, 1999; Goertz, 2005; Sartori, 1970). Nevertheless, Gerring (1999), though recognizing that there is no single "best" solution to this problem, identified a series of criteria which can help determine the "goodness" of a concept – i.e., familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth, theoretical utility, and field utility. Accordingly, we can evaluate the conceptualisation of the geographic mental map above in order to verify if it exhibits all the criteria of conceptual "goodness" presented by Gerring.

The first criterion – i.e., familiarity – is one of the major strengths of mental maps for FPA. According to Gerring (1999: 368), "The degree to which a new definition 'makes sense,' or is intuitively 'clear,' depends critically upon the degree to which it conforms, or clashes, with established usage – within everyday language and within a specialized language community". The use of mental maps as a metaphor for the cognitive representations of geographic space has been widely cited (Golledge and Stimson, 1997). In fact, mental maps hastily lead to thoughts of internal cartographic-like representations that individuals possess<sup>4</sup>. The frequency with which we encounter references to mental maps in the scholarly and non-academic literature testifies to the familiarity of the concept, as well as the second criterion – resonance. The simplicity and common-sensical quality of the allegory of the mental map is precisely responsible for its generalised, though under-conceptualised, usage.

The definition of mental maps presented above also guarantees parsimony. Considering that a concept "*is* an abbreviation" (Gerring, 1999: 371), by defining mental maps as a cognitive representation encompassing an individual or group's beliefs about the geography of a particular place or places we have avoided saturating the concept with endless attributes. Also the concept reveals coherence in that all of its attributes and characteristics "belong" to one another. In other words, none of the attributes of mental maps here defined are in contradiction with each other. Rather the core features are effortlessly identified and consistently associated: i.e., cognitive representations and geographic places.

Especially important in this conceptualising effort is the process of differentiation. One of the major denunciations of the traditional application of mental maps in FPA is the difficulty in distinguishing them from other similar concepts. By defining them and highlighting their geographic quality we can differentiate between other related concepts, namely those associated with the cognitive research agenda. For example, while sharing many resemblances with operational codes, these centre on the philosophical and instrumental beliefs of decision-makers. They say nothing about the geographic character of those beliefs. By focusing on the geographic representations underlying decisionmakers beliefs we are able to examine and evaluate an entirely different set of variables at work in the decision-making process. Accordingly, a good conceptual enterprise simultaneously identifies what a concept is as what it is not (Gerring, 1999; Sartori, 1970). An additional criterion - depth - is also achieved with the above conceptualisation. While depth may seem in disagreement with parsimony, Gerring (1999: 379-380) clarifies that it is necessary to "group instances /characteristics that are commonly found together so that we can use a concept's label as a shorthand for those

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> However, the mental map has no literal correspondence with physical maps, for we do not necessarily have map-like representations in our head.

instances/characteristics". Therefore, by acknowledging the notions of geographic space *and* place we can offer greater analytical depth to mental maps without losing focus of our principal research objective.

More importantly, by conceptualising geographic mental maps we give them a truly analytical value, for concepts are crucial to most theoretical undertakings. As Sartori (1970: 64) pointed out, concepts "are the central elements of propositions, and – depending on how they are named – provide in and by themselves guidelines for interpretation and observation". By delineating the conceptual underpinnings of mental maps we can then proceed to develop the theoretical framework necessary to explaining how geographic mental maps affect foreign policy decision-making. As noted above, we have witnessed considerable causal inference regarding the role of geographic variables in foreign policy decision-making without establishing the theoretical propositions underlying such conclusions. Until this conceptualisation is accomplished we are walking an empirical tightrope without a net.

The last criterion is field utility. Gerring (1999) has suggested that most conceptualisations are in fact *re*conceptualisations and that their redefinition has implications for adjacent concepts. As a result, "any change in the original definition involves changes in these relationships" (Gerring, 1999: 387). Achieving such a correspondence between meanings is a taunting feat. We feel however that the initial paucity of any conceptualising effort of geographic mental maps has avoided this predicament. Not only were geographic mental maps underdeveloped conceptually, but many of the concepts used in a synonymous fashion have also lacked clear conceptual development.

Accordingly, we believe the conceptualising exercise provided in the preceding pages contributes to a superior understanding of geographic mental maps. Above all, we trust that the present conceptualisation allows for a better and more consistent application of mental maps in FPA. While there is certainly a great deal of scholarly debate and research to proceed with, we are certain that any such discussions and investigations must begin from a solid point of departure. In our view, this implies first and foremost clarifying the basic assumptions of what we are looking to study and understand. Without this, we share the risk long recognized by Sartori (1970: 1033) and which cautions to being "a wonderful researcher and manipulator of data, and yet remain an unconscious thinker".

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Submitted:	Revised:	Accepted:	Published online:
August 29, 2011	September 1, 2011	October 20, 2011	November 30, 2011

## EUROPEAN UNION: DESTINATION AND TRANZIT AREA FOR COCAINE TRAFFICKING

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Abstract: Drug trafficking remains the main activity of the transnational organized crime networks, providing the bulk of revenue and fueling corruption and conflict at the European Union Member States. In this article we analyzed some aspects concerning the import and distribution of cocaine in the European Union, focusing on the transnational organized crime hubs, the origin of trafficking networks acting on this illegal markets, the European cocaine entry points, as well as the routes considering for the transport of cocaine.

Key words: cocaine trafficking, trafficking routes, organized crime networks

#### \* \* \* \*

## **COCAINE TRAFFICKING NETWORKS ORIGIN - FROM THE PRODUCTION** TO THE STREET SALES

Existing studies highlight an obvious specialization of the trafficking networks on different types of drugs, making them simultaneously engaged in other illegal activities through the control over the entire circuit, from production to the retail sales on the underground markets<sup>1</sup>. In Colombia, which is one of the leading cocaine suppliers, the FARC and the paramilitary groups have the control over some significant areas, monopolizing the purchase and sale of coca paste and cocaine base, setting the prices these products can be purchased from the manufacturers and sold for processing<sup>2</sup>. Members of these groups promote

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Europol, EU Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA), European Police Office, The Netherlands, 2008, p. 30, http://www.europol.europa.eu.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Jansson, O., L'impact des politiques paramilitaires sur la production de cocaïne, Les Cahiers de la Sécurité, dossier «Drogues et antidrogue en Colombie», nº 59, quatrième trimestre, 2005, pp. 87-106.

simultaneously, the illicit cultivation of coca plants and collect protection fees for the cocaine laboratories and for the clandestine landing corridors of the aircrafts carrying drugs<sup>3</sup>.

The EU markets are dominated, in terms of cocaine imports, by the members of Colombian organized crime networks, taking advantage of historical and linguistic affinities with Spain and Portugal, as well as the existence of a significant Diaspora, set along the coast regions of the Iberian Peninsula<sup>4</sup>. They act as importers and dealers, while the involvement on the retail markets is restricted only to Spain. The complexity degree of the European markets has allowed, on the EU territory, the existence of several groups, obtaining considerable profits from cocaine distribution in other European countries, which is especially imported in the Iberian Peninsula, directly from Latin America. In this regard, we can mention the Dominican networks acting especially in Spain, the Jamaican networks in Great Britain, as well as those originating from Antilles, controlling Netherlands cocaine markets. West African traffickers are active in the retail activities, being less involved in cocaine imports from France, Switzerland, Austria, Italy and Germany, while the North African groups are visible in the coastal areas of Mediterranean countries, or in those countries with a significant Diaspora from North Africa, such as Spain, Italy, France and the Netherlands. Lately, the Balkan networks (mainly originating from Romania, the countries of former Yugoslavia, Albania and Turkey) have an important role on the cocaine markets in Western Europe<sup>5</sup>.

## IMPORT AND DISTRIBUTION OF COCAINE IN EUROPEAN UNION

As regards the import and distribution of cocaine, Europol<sup>6</sup> has identified two major organized crime hubs in Europe, namely *the Southwest organized crime hub*, with networks that act in the Iberian Peninsula, using France as a transit country and *the Northwest organized crime hub*, with groups located in and around Netherlands and Belgium, which have a major transport infrastructure, generating a significant volume of commercial traffic through connections with the illegal markets around the world. According to Europol, the Northwest nucleus acts as a center of drug redistribution to other European countries, especially to Western Europe (Denmark, Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden, United Kingdom) for both the cocaine entering the Iberian Peninsula and for that which is discharged into the major seaports in the region<sup>7</sup>.

In this context, the most important entry points of cocaine into Europe are, according to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction<sup>8</sup>, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands and in the background, Germany Belgium, France and Great Britain, benefiting both the advantage of good infrastructure and excellent connections with the production areas and drugs transit through ports and airports, as well as their access to trans-European corridors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Calvani, S., Debería Colombia solamente reducir aún más sus cultivos ilícitos, o también debería reducir el número de productores de cocaína, esclavos de los grupos de la cocaína, esclavos de los grupos armados?, speech, Bogota, Universidad de los Andes, October, 2005,. <u>http://www.sandrocalvani.com/speech/discursoUniandesfinal.pdf</u>.

<sup>4</sup> Ibidem, p. 23.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> UNODC, The globalization of crime. A transnational organized crime threat assessment, Viena, 2010, p.p. 98, 99.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Europol, OCTA – EU Organised crime threat assessment 2007, Europol, The Hague, 2007.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Europol, Project COLA — European Union cocaine situation report 2007, Europol, The Hague, 5 September 2007.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Drug situation in Europe. Cocaine and crack cocaine, 2007, p. 18, <u>http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/situation/cocaine/2</u>.

Cocaine import and distribution are concentrated mainly in Western European countries, one of the most important being Spain, where the authorities seized in 2007, almost 38 tones of cocaine, largely brought on by sea, representing approximately 50% of the total estimated amount intercepted in Europe<sup>9</sup>. A trend of increasing quantities of cocaine seized (34 tons) was registered, by the year 2006, followed by their decline, as in 2008, only five tones were seized by the authorities, as shown in Table 1. The amount of cocaine seized has sharply declined in recent years, in the Netherlands, in part because of the authorities efforts to stop the shipments before they leave their origin countries<sup>10</sup>, but despite this, large quantities of cocaine have been confiscated by the coastal guards, in Antilles and Aruba. Iberian Peninsula remains the main transit area for cocaine in Europe, followed by the Netherlands, but lately, increased the number of direct shipments from the Caribbean to France, which reported in 2008, the second highest annual total amount of cocaine seized in Europe<sup>11</sup> (Table 1).

http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/stats10/szrtab9)									
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Country									
Belgium	1652	-	3946	644	3522	9228	3946	2470	3852
Bulgaria	2	9	45	3107	1	142	144	5	10
Czech Republic	-	-	6	3	3	10	5	38	8
Denmark	36	26	14	104	32	57	76	88	56
France	913	1288	2136	1009	969	1079	1717	1878	1069
Germany	156	297	239	201	1152	43	57	255	67
Greece	6165	33681	17617	49279	33135	48429	49650	37784	27981
Italy	1311	2096	3651	4172	4484	5186	10166	6579	8215
Spain	2368	1813	4042	3539	3589	4380	4638	3928	4110
Hungary	11	6	55	23	94	8	7	15	23
Austria	20	108	37	58	76	245	62	78	78
Poland	81	51	399	801	28	17	22	161	29
Portugal	3075	5574	3140	3017	7423	18083	34477	7363	4878
Romania	13	3	3	13	25	110	11	47	3
Croatia	39	7	0.4	1	1	1	7	4	3
Finland	50	39	41	42	29	34	1358	39	49
Sweden	3948	2841	3566	7773	4644	3862	3321	3457	-
United Kingdom	-	1	3	351	18	9	6	105	29

 Table 1. The amount of cocaine seized in the interval 2000-2008, in the EU Member

 States (in kilograms)

(Data source: Table adapted from \*\*\*EMCDDA, *Statistics and country data*,

#### **ROUTES OF COCAINE TRAFFICKING TO WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION**

Cocaine is trafficked to Europe via different routes, being used a great diversity of methods and means of hiding it, from cargo ships, fishing boats and private yachts to small commercial aircraft or small planes. Routes preferred by the trafficking networks for transporting cocaine in Europe have changed in recent years, being mentioned the following routes in the literature:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> \*\*\*EMCDDA-EUROPOL, *Cocaine. A European Union perspective in the global context.* Spain, 2010, p.25, <u>http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Joint\_publications on illicit\_drugs/Cocaine.pdf</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> \*\*\* UNODC, *The globalization of crime. A transnational organized crime threat assessment,...*, p. 98. <sup>10</sup> \*\*\* UNODC, *The globalization of crime. A transnational organized crime threat assessment,...*, p. 98. <sup>11</sup> Idem.

- Northern route from the Caribbean via the Azores to Portugal and Spain -International Narcotics Control Board<sup>12</sup> estimated that 40% of the cocaine entering Europe passes through the Caribbean. In a first step, the cocaine is transported by sea or air directly into the Caribbean where it is organized transshipment to Europe, frequently using the pleasure boats, the cargo ships and the cargo containers. The aircrafts are another mean of transporting packages of cocaine, which once thrown into the international waters, it is expected and uploaded by the traffickers. The couriers are also frequently used in transporting cocaine through the European airports<sup>13</sup>. The large volume of cocaine trafficked through the Caribbean can be explained by the geographical position of this region, its historical roots with Europe and the fact that shares the same languages with the countries of destination. For example, the Netherlands Antilles are involved in the supply of cocaine to the Netherlands, Jamaica is used as a platform for the UK, while Martinique and Guadeloupe play an important role in the transshipment of cocaine in France. Azores Islands are equally exploited in transshipment of cocaine to the Iberian Peninsula<sup>14</sup>.

- Central route from South America through Cape Verde or Madeira and the Canary Islands, to Europe. The traffic is often carried out at sea, with large cargo ships, often fueled by fast boats. Drugs are then transferred at Cape Verde and Canary Islands, where they will be uploaded into smaller boats, such as the fishing vessels, to the Iberian Peninsula<sup>15</sup>. Couriers also have an important role in transporting cocaine on the central route, especially when passing through the Madrid Barajas airport.

- African route from South America to West Africa and from there, mainly to Spain and Portugal. In the interval 2004 - 2007, at least two distinct transshipment centers in West Africa have emerged: one comprising Guinea-Bissau and Guinea, the other located in the Gulf of Benin, from Ghana to Nigeria. Colombian traffickers transport the cocaine to the West African coast, where it was uploaded into small vessels, with the destination Spain or Portugal. This transit route has become lately less used, as, during 2006-2008, Portugal which is a major port of entry for cocaine into Europe, has experienced a strong decline in terms of quantities of cocaine seized<sup>16</sup>. This descending trend is also demonstrated by the UNODC estimates based on analysis of known origin cocaine seized on the European territory, claiming that 6.8% of cocaine seized in Europe was brought on smuggling through West Africa, in decreasing from 28% in 2007, but still more than 2.7% estimated in 2005<sup>17</sup>. Cocaine is also transported by air, from the West African countries to the European airports, using small aircrafts or the cargo planes<sup>18</sup>. As there is a limited capacity of law enforcement for verification of a large number of passengers, on each

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> International Narcotics Control Board, INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2007, United Nations, New York, 5 March 2008.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> UNODC, 2008 World Drug Report, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, 2008, <u>http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR 2008/WDR 2008 eng web.pdf</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> EMCDDA-EUROPOL, Cocaine. A European Union perspective in the global context,..., p.21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Zaitch, D., *Trafficking cocaine: Colombian drug entrepreneurs in the Netherlands*, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 2002.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), The United Kingdom Threat Assessment of Organised Crime, 2009/10, London, 2009.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> UNODC, 2009 World Drug Report, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna 2009, <u>http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR 2009/WDR2009 eng web.pdf</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> JIATFS, Cocaine found after emergency landing, The International Cocaine Weekly Round-Up, 27.07.2007–03.08.2007, Joint Inter Agency Task Force South, Key West.

commercial flight to Europe, are placed couriers carrying various amounts of cocaine, using their own body or hiding it in the travel luggage. Cocaine trafficking from West Africa and Europe is facilitated by both maritime trade, the regular flight connections and the historical existing links (such as the links from Ghana, Nigeria and Great Britain, Côte d'Ivoire and France, Cape Verde and Portugal), issues that justify the presence of the West African networks in distribution of drugs in Europe<sup>19</sup>.

In conclusion, according to data from the World Customs Organization, 69% of the total volume of cocaine seized en route to Western Europe, was detected on board of boats, either hidden in their structure or in the cargo containers. Although the largest shipments of cocaine come on sea, still significant loads were detected at the airports<sup>20</sup>.

## ROUTES OF COCAINE TRAFFICKING THROUGH THE BALKANS REGION

Trade liberalization and the presence of transnational criminal networks in the Balkan region, provide a fertile ground for the development of cocaine trafficking, the area becoming a transit point, as the new routes of trafficking emerged. Although less convenient, the Balkan routes are designed to avoid Western European routes, being lately, under careful monitoring of the authorities.

Although most shipments of cocaine from South America continue to be directed to Western Europe, in recent years, have been made substantial seizures of cocaine, in the Balkans major ports, usually hidden in containers<sup>21</sup>. For example, in January 2009, Romanian authorities have seized, in the port of Constanta, 1.2 tons of cocaine hidden in a consignment of wood. Also, in July 2009, authorities in Varna, Bulgaria, seized 1020 bottles containing a mixture of cocaine with wine, shipped from Santa Cruz, Bolivia, the total weight of the cocaine being estimated at approx. 100 kilograms. In Greece, at Piraeus, were also seized in August 2009, nearly 450 kilograms of cocaine hidden in a shipment of metal<sup>22</sup>.

All this aspects accompanied by the tendency of increasing involvement of the Balkan organized crime groups indicate that the infrastructure, already developed in the region, particularly for cigarette and heroin smuggling, is currently used for the transport of considerable quantities of cocaine.

Analyzing the existing trends, we believe that, lately, may have seen a diversification of trafficking routes regarding the Eastward expansion of the cocaine trafficking in Europe (see Figure 1), leading finally, to the cocaine consumption emergence in countries which are currently unaffected<sup>23</sup>.

Based on existing data regarding the amounts of cocaine seized, the most visible route, used until now as an entry point, is *the Balkans Southern route*. Evidence that Greece had become a transit and entry point into the European Union, for the cocaine trafficking, have appeared since the early 90s, a trend that continued to strengthen in the next decade. For instance, the Greek

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> EMCDDA-EUROPOL, Cocaine. A European Union perspective in the global context,..., p.24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> World Customs Organization, Customs and Drugs Report 2008, Brussels, June 2009, see also EMCDDA-EUROPOL, Cocaine. A European Union perspective in the global context. Spain, 2010, p.20, <u>http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Joint\_publications\_on\_illicit\_drugs/Cocaine.pdf</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> International Narcotics Control Board, INCB, Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2010, United Nations, New York, January 2011, p. 101, <u>http://www.incb.org/pdf/annualreport/2010/en/AR 2010 English.pdf</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> EMCDDA-EUROPOL, Cocaine. A European Union perspective in the global context,..., p.29.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Idem.

authorities, in cooperation with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), seized in 2001, over 200 kilograms of cocaine, which were stored in the Prebeza (Greece), ready for transport to the Western European markets. The existing route, based primarily on cocaine entering Europe through Greek ports, no longer guarantees the safety of illegal cargos transit, as the introduction of new technologies for monitoring possible terrorist activities, in most European ports, diminished the organized crime networks interest in terms of using this trafficking route<sup>24</sup>.



Organised Crime, Jane's Intelligence Review, Volume 19, Number 3, March 2007)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Panos A. Kostakos, Jana Arsovska, *Emerging Cocaine Routes in the Balkans*, SGOC Newsletter Volume 6, Issue 2 – 14 May 2007, p. 4.

The first case of using *the Balkans Eastern Route*, as an alternative entry point, was reported in 2005, when the Greek police dismantled a network that imported cocaine from South America. Drugs entering Bulgaria, were trafficked through Skopje and the northern Greece, reaching then, the EU illegal markets (see Figure 1)<sup>25</sup>. The emergence of this route is closely related to increasing number of criminal networks in Bulgaria, associated with the transnational criminal groups, interested in European cocaine markets.

The literature was revealed the existence of a third route for cocaine trafficking in the EU, namely *the Balkans Western route*, as shown in Figure 1. This new trend has been facilitated by the existence of counter-trafficking measures taken by the European authorities and shows the role of Serbian and Greek smuggling networks operating in the region, that have used the same route during the Yugoslav crisis, for trafficking in cigarettes and oil. Greece and Serbia have always had strong historical, geopolitical, economic and religious ties, wich lately, have contributed to the long-term establishing partnerships of criminal networks, particularly concerning the cigarette smuggling, oil and drugs trafficking, but also the other illegal activities<sup>26</sup>.

Cocaine production and trafficking were moved from one area to another, and often in places where instability, difficult conditions or other obstacles have caused a poor response from the authorities. The international community should strengthen the link between drugs supply and demand reduction measures and to achieve better integration of national efforts in developing an effective international strategy countering these illegal markets. We estimated for achieving these plans, became necessary to conduct additional studies on the European cocaine markets profile, analyzing their structure, dynamics or the changes occurring on the trafficking routes.

#### Acknowledgment

This contribution presents some results from research project PD\_451 - *Dynamics* of the illegal markets in European Union, financed by CNCSIS. We would like to express our thanks to anonymous reviewer for their thoughtful suggestions and comments.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Idem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Ibidem, p. 5.

\*\*\*EMCDDA-EUROPOL, (2010), Cocaine. A European Union perspective in the global context. Spain, p.25;

http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/Joint\_publications\_on\_illicit\_drugs/Cocaine.pdf \*\*\*EUROPOL, OCTA (2007), — EU Organised crime threat assessment 2007, Europol, The Hague.

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Submitted:	Revised:	Accepted:	Published online:
March 18, 2011	March 22, 2011	July, 11, 2011	November 30, 2011

ISSN 1454-2749. E-ISSN 2065-1619

## CLASHING GEOPOLITICAL VISIONS: **IRAO FROM THE FIRST WORLD WAR TO THE 1958 REVOLUTION**

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Abstract: The relationship of geography and politics does not only have a material dimension. Seeing politics from a geographical perspective also means addressing "geopolitical visions", i.e. ideas about geographical space. By using the concept of geopolitical visions, geographers can help to structure historical processes. This value of the concept of geopolitical visions is demonstrated in this article by the history of Iraq from the First World War to the 1958 revolution. Various geopolitical visions about Iraq clashed. Driving forces and turning points of Iraq's pre-1958 history become apparent within the frame of geopolitical visions.

Key words: Iraq, British mandate, indirect rule, geopolitics, geopolitical visions

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Adherents of classical geopolitics focus on material structures in geographical space in order to find out how they influence politics or, more generally, the course of history: Halford Mackinder wrote that "my concern is with the general physical control"1 of socio-political processes. Nicholas Spykman declared that "geography is the most fundamental factor in the foreign policy of states because it is the most permanent. Ministers come and go, even dictators die, but mountain ranges stand unperturbed".<sup>2</sup> Taking the perspective of Mackinder and Spykman, it is sometimes forgotten that there is more to geography than mountain ranges and the physical control of socio-political processes. Geography does not only have a material dimension. The meaning of geography to politics, which is without doubt bound to objectively given physical limits, varies according to the way human decision-makers ascribe values to places and geographical space. Geopolitics therefore also includes ideas and visions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Mackinder H. J., (1904), The Geographical Pivot of History, "Geographical Journal", Anul 23, nr. 4, p. 422.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Spykman N. J., (1942), America's Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power, Harcourt Brace, New York, p. 41.

Peter Taylor's term "geopolitical codes" is most frequently used by geographers when it comes to the non-material dimension of geopolitics. Geopolitical codes are cognitive values that politicians ascribe to places beyond the borders of their state: They indicate which foreign places should be linked to one's state (e.g. for economic reasons) and tell which other states are allies or enemies. Forming mental maps, geopolitical codes are the fundament for decision-making in foreign policy.<sup>3</sup> Yves Lacoste's concept of "représentations de l'espace" is very similar to but more elaborated than the one of Taylor. For Lacoste, geopolitics is a tool to examine the geographical reasons of the outbreak of wars. Geographers should look at political conflicts from a spatial perspective because practically every conflict is a conflict over configurations of space: "Par géopolitique, il faut entendre [...] toutes rivalités de pouvoirs et d'influences sur du territoire".<sup>4</sup> What matters from Lacoste's perspective is not geography the way it objectively is but geography the way it is subjectively understood and represented. Représentations de l'escpace, or representations of space, subsume all ideas about space. Nations, for example, are spatially delineated us-groups. The representation of space of a nation does not only define which territories belong to it but also who is a citizen of the nation and how it should be governed.

Lacoste further reasons that geographers should examine conflicts that have a territorial dimension as clashing representations of space. He shifts away from objectively given, material geopolitics to a geopolitical analysis of discourses. Methodologically, this implies to compare the speech acts advanced by the antagonist sides. Only the comparison and reconstruction of representations of space allows us to understand conflicts. In his own words: "L'analyse géopolitique [...] ne prend pas seulement en compte les enjeux territoriaux 'objectifs' des rivalités de pouvoirs; elle considère aussi leurs raisons plus ou moins 'subjectives', c'est-à-dire les idées vraies et fausses, les représentations que les protagonistes de ces conflits et l'opinion qu'ils influencent se font des raisons de leurs différences et de leurs désaccords".<sup>5</sup>

Lacoste's concept points in the right direction. It however takes the constructivist input to geopolitics too far. Following Lacoste, scholars of geopolitics have to carry out discourse analysis only. Lacoste's constructivist perspective cannot be combined with a realist or materialist version of geopolitics. If one considers subjective ideas about geography being essential, objective facts cannot be examined as such. From a constructivist viewpoint, everything matters only the way it is socially constructed. Constructivism is thus alien to Spykman's explanation of politics (the dependent variable) by mountain ranges (the independent variable). Its adherents argue that only the discourse about a mountain range can be the independent variable. Using Lacoste's representations of space therefore requires abandoning classical geopolitics. Sticking to classical geopolitics means neglecting Lacoste's approach.

Since I think that it is beneficial for realist geopolitics to comprise human actors and their decisions, I suggest studying "geopolitical visions". In distinction from geopolitical codes and representations of space, I define geopolitical visions

158

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Taylor P. J., (1993), "Geopolitical World Orders", in: Taylor P. J., (ed.), Political Geography of the Twentieth Century, Belhaven Press, London, p. 37; Taylor P.J., Flint C., (42000), Political Geography. Word-Economy, Nation-State and Locality, Prentice Hall, London, pp. 91-92, 371.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Lacoste Y., (2001), Géopolitique des grandes villes, "Hérodote", nr. 101, p. 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Ibidem, p. 4.

as strategies that possess a territorial dimension, as strategies that materialise in geographical space. The materialisation of geopolitical visions does not need to be successful or permanent but it has to have a material impact, which makes geopolitical visions more than speech acts. Geopolitical visions tell how a specific territory should be delimited and organised. Given that geopolitical visions are not about the way humans see and understand a geographical phenomenon but about the way they want that phenomenon to be delimited and organised, the constructivist trap is avoided – geopolitical visions fit in a materialist version of geopolitics as additional perspective as long as one conceptualises objectively given geography as opportunities and constraints but not as determining forces. Mackinder wrote that "man and not nature initiates, but nature in large measure controls".<sup>6</sup> Whereas adherents of classical geopolitics strictly limited their analyses to the control of nature, I shed light at the way man initiates, using geopolitical visions as a means of analysis.

In order to show the analytical value of the concept of geopolitical visions, I examine the pre-1958 history of Iraq.<sup>7</sup> I show how the clashes of geopolitical visions frame that period of the history of Iraq and help to understand the development of that country. In the first major section of this article, I explain three clashes of geopolitical visions (1. The Ottoman Empire versus Arab nationalism; 2. Arab nationalism versus British imperialism; 3. Imperialism versus national self-determination). These clashes serves as frame for the second major section – my explanation of the rise of the collaboration elite, sectarian divides, the political role of the army and the increasing repression that finally led to the 1958 revolution. While the first major section is focussed on geopolitical visions, the second major section addresses the drivers of Iraqi geopolitics. I conclude this article with a detailed overview of geopolitical visions that affected Iraq's pre-1958 history and suggest how to bring together the concept of geopolitical visions and the classical geopolitical approach in order to revitalise the materialist or realist perspective in geopolitics.

## CLASHING GEOPOLITICAL VISIONS The Ottoman Empire versus Arab nationalism

When the Ottoman Empire entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, Sultan Mehmed V, who was also the highest religious authority for all Sunni Muslims, declared the war against Britain and its allies to be a *jihad* (holy war). Because of this religious legitimisation, the British thought that Sherif Hussein ibn Ali was the ideal candidate for an Arab rebellion against the Turks. Hussein's legitimacy resulted from the roots of his family that can be traced back to the Prophet's grandfather. Yet nationalism had already begun to rise in intellectual circles in the Arab world. Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, a Syrian-born intellectual who already died in 1902, had called for an Arab

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Mackinder, The Geographical Pivot, p. 422

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Except for quotations and key data, I will not indicate specific references in the empirical part of this paper. My explanations on Iraq's history are of a rather general nature compared to the meticulous studies provided by historians. I use standard literature on the history of Iraq as basis for the empirical part of my paper: Fernea R. A., Louis W. R., (eds.), (1991), The Iraqi Revolution of 1958. The Old Social Classes Revisited, Tauris, London; Fromkin D., (1989), A Peace to End all Peace. The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East, Avon Books, New York; Haj S., (1997), The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963. Capital, Power, and Ideology, State University of New York Press, Albany; Tripp C., (<sup>3</sup>2007), A History of Iraq, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Caliphate that should replace the Ottoman Caliphate. In a context of rising nationalism, Hussein did, in the end, not lead a religiously legitimised movement but became the first key figure of Arab nationalism.

In May 1915, Hussein established contacts to an Arab secret society in Damascus. His son Faisal travelled from Istanbul to Damascus, where he received the "Protocol of Damascus". It specified the borders for an Arab state, which should include the entire Fertile Crescent and the Arabian Peninsula (except for British-controlled Aden). The Arabs had seen themselves for centuries as citizen of the Ottoman Empire, united by its Muslim identity. The geopolitical vision of a united Sunni Arab empire legitimised the rule of the Ottoman sultans. They were, first of all, fellow Sunni Muslims. Their Turkish ethnicity did not mater. First cracks in this geopolitical vision had been caused by the Ottoman tanzimat (reorganisation) from 1839 to 1876 – a reform period in which Turkish nationalism was promoted and the Turks were presented as the ruling ethnic group of the Ottoman Empire. The British efforts to launch an anti-Turkish rebellion put even more emphasis on the Arab ethnic identity. Defining oneself primarily as an Arab meant a recodification of geopolitics: For adherents of Arab nationalism, the "natural" unity of the Arab people had to be achieved within an Arab state, which by definition could not incorporate the Turks. The geopolitical vision of Arab nationalism did not only require a rearrangement of borders but also a rearrangement of political rule. Sultan Mehmed V was not a legitimate leader for Arabs anymore. He rather appeared being a foreign invader.

The roots of Arab nationalism in the Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul can be traced back to the years before the outbreak of the First World War. A secret society, consisting of not more than a dozen men, was established in Basra in 1913 under Talib Pasha. Talib Pasha and the like-minded people around him demanded the foundation of an Arab political entity within the Ottoman Empire. In reaction to the Young Turk movement, they called for equal rights for Arabs and Turks in one state. Their geopolitical vision was still compatible with the territorial status quo but not with the post-tanzimat way of governance in the Ottoman Empire. The group around Talib Pasha did however not gain much influence and remained a footnote in history. A similar organisation, the ahd al-iraqi (Iraqi Covenant), founded in 1914 by Aziz al-Masri, advanced a geopolitical vision that was totally incompatible with the status quo. It consisted of several high-ranking Arab officers of the Ottoman army. These officers did not envisage a state called Iraq. In these days, Iraq was just the name of a landscape. Similar to the term Levant, it did not have any political connotation. Moreover, before the British mandate, the provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul were poorly interconnected and there was no reason to think of their merger. What the *ahd* called for was an independent Arab state. They did however not say anything about the geographical location and boundaries of this state.

Yet the *ahd* remained as marginal as Talib Pasha's group. Due to the physical barrier between Mesopotamia and the Levant region, the Arab Revolt led by Hussein did not influence the military events in Iraq. Iraq was a major non-European setting for armed confrontation during the war: In November 1914, an Anglo-Indian expedition corps under orders from British India conquered Basra and marched upstream the Euphrates and Tigris towards Baghdad. The troops met heavy resistance and in April 1916, they suffered a decisive loss at Kut. For a few months, the Ottomans appeared to have gained the upper hand in Mesopotamia but, with reinforcements and direct control from London, the British troops finally conquered Baghdad in March 1917 and even Mosul in November 1918. The effect of the war on the people living between Basra and Mosul was terrifying: About 90,000 of them were forced to serve in labours corps. All others suffered from high war-related taxes. Hunger revolts broke out in Najaf, Kufa and Abu Zuhair. Although these conditions were most favourable to anti-Ottoman and anti-British uprisings, Middle Eastern societies in general lacked a strong bourgeoisie as carrier of nationalism. Arabs served as soldiers in the Ottoman army. The geopolitical vision of a religiously united Ottoman Empire was still strong: When the British expedition forces started to conquer the provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, Sunni Arabs from what later became known as Iraq followed the call for a *jihad*. In the Shiite areas of the three provinces, tribal chiefs and local clerics, i.e. traditional authorities and not nationalists, organised resistance to Ottoman and British troops. Religiously defined organisations such as the jamiyya al-nahda al-islamiyya (Society of Islamic Revival), which was founded in Najaf in 1918, still played a bigger role than nationalists.

Support for Arab nationalism was far stronger in the Levant because the Arab Revolt took place there, meaning that nationalist intellectual circles could refer to a movement that achieved political progress. Hussein did not control a large army but his guerrilla tactics were effective against the Ottomans and their German allies. Cutting the railway lines in the Hejaz deprived the garrisons of the Ottoman army of their supplies, which meant that they had to be abandoned. First successes brought Hussein popularity and the number of Bedouin soldiers under his command grew to about 50,000, of whom almost 10,000 had rifles. In July 1917, they conquered Agaba in what is today Jordan. In September 1918, Hussein and his army were the first to march into Damascus, even though the British troops were decisive in military terms. Because of the promises made by their British partners in the "Hussein-McMahon Correspondence", i.e. the letters in which Hussein and the British High Commissioner in Egypt, Henry McMahon, tried to specify the terms of their cooperation, Hussein and his adherents expected to become the rulers of a state that would unite all Arabs. Being the de-facto ruler in Syria, Hussein's son Faisal, who commanded the Bedouin army, began to build the first institutions for an Arab state, including a provisional government, the fundament of the later "Syrian National Congress". In March 1920, this congress declared Syria being an independent state ruled by Faisal as king.

## Arab nationalism versus British imperialism

The British however intended to make Hussein some sort of spiritual leader and wanted to see political power in the hands of Lord Kitchener, who was, during the First World War, probably the politically most influential person in the Middle East. Within the elite circles of British officials, it was consent that Hussein should be thankful if they left him the rule of the Hejaz.<sup>8</sup> Again, a clash of geopolitical visions becomes apparent: The British planned to limit Hussein's power to the area around the two holiest cities of Islam. Hussein believed to become the ruler of the Arab state that was envisaged in the "Protocol of Damascus". In addition to this territorial difference, the ideas of how to organise

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace, pp. 168-174, 186.

the post-Ottoman Middle East were incompatible. The British planned to separate political from religious authority, keeping the former in their hands and granting only the latter to Hussein. Their Arab partner expected to become the key political and religious authority in the Middle East.

In the aftermath of the war, the British did not even hold the most basic promises they had made to Hussein. At the peace conference in Versailles, the Arab delegates were nothing but observers. The 1916 "Sykes-Picot Agreement", which was published by the Bolsheviks after the October Revolution and became known in the Arab World in the course of the year 1918, advanced a geopolitical vision for the Middle East that was totally opposed to the basics of Arab nationalism: The Middle East was divided into British and French spheres of influence. The French, who were granted control over the Damascus area, stopped the creation of an Arab state under Faisal within months. Their troops easily beat Faisal's Bedouin army, which was neither trained nor equipped for direct military confrontation. In June 1920, three months after the foundation of his state, Faisal had to take refuge in exile in Italy.

Arab nationalism however prevailed not only in Syria but also became a significant political force in other parts of the Middle East. Immediately after the war, the British planned to keep the provinces of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul under direct rule. The military occupation was to be replaced by a civilian administration completely in British hands. This geopolitical vision - the three provinces as a British protectorate - and the corresponding political action resulted from Britain's dependence on the sea line to India. Moreover, oil resources began playing a relevant role in British geostrategy, although their quantity in Iraq was not exactly known. Already in 1913, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill had declared that his country had to control the amount of oil that its economy and its military needed. Oil was the reason for Britain's occupation of the province of Mosul in disregard of the "Sykes-Picot Agreement". At the end of the war, 420,000 British soldiers were stationed in Iraq.<sup>9</sup> The new British High Commissioner Arnold Wilson explicitly stated that he wanted to make Mesopotamia a protectorate.<sup>10</sup> The number of British officials working in the administration of the three provinces rose from 59 in 1917 to 1,022 in 1920. Only four people in higher administration were locals.<sup>11</sup>

In March 1920, the *ahd al-iraqi* held a congress in Damascus and declared Iraq a sovereign state, ruled by Faisal's brother Abdallah. Abdallah's reluctance and the Franco-British repression of Arab nationalism in Syria and Iraq put an abrupt end to the organised activities of the *ahd*. Nonetheless, other groupings advanced Arab nationalism in opposition to British dominance: The *sharifiyyun*, officers of Faisal's beaten army, returned from Syria like a wave anti-British unrest. They and civilian officials from Faisal's short-lived state such as Sati al-Husri articulated and diffused the fear that Ottoman rule was about to be replaced by British rule. The *jamiyya al-ahali* (Organisation of the People), established by students of the American University in Beirut in the 1920s, became the key organisation of these bourgeois nationalists. They hoped to gain true independence via the ballot box. In Iraq, the *haras al-istiqlal* (Guards of Independence) were founded in response to anti-nationalist repression. Contrary to the *ahd*, which consisted almost exclusively of Sunni Arab officers from the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Quoted in Sluglett P., (1976); Britain in Iraq. 1914-1932, Ithaca Press, London, p. 104.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Ibidem , p. 28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ireland P. W., (1937), Iraq. A Study in Political Development, Cape, New York, p. 147.

former Ottoman army, the *haras* recruited their members predominantly among Shiite civilians. Clerics took a leading role. Prominent Ayatollah Sayyed al-Shirazi issued a fatwa that condemned British rule and, beginning in May 1920, mosques of both confessions became the places of public gatherings and organisation against the British administration. In the Kerbala-Najaf area, some Shiite tribal chiefs rebelled. British forces were too weak to control the rebellion. More uprisings in other parts of the country, most importantly in the north where Kurdish tribal forces captured some towns near the Persian border, were inspired by the general instability.

The anti-British uprisings were however rather a fragmented rebellion driven by small nationalist circles in the towns and small tribal militias in rural areas, not a mass movement. Its spread also depended on how local elites valued advantages and disadvantages of British rule. Around Amara and Kut, for instance, tribal chiefs worked against the rebellion because their excessive landholdings had recently been recognised by the British. Collaboration of local elites with the British in order to hold down socially progressive nationalist movements became a guarantee for British dominance during the next four decades.

## Imperialism versus national self-determination

In the course of the 1920 rebellion, the British lost control of large parts of the three provinces. It took several months until British troops, using air bombardments against the tribes, stabilised the situation. More importantly, Britain had to invest around £40 million and suffered the loss of 453 soldiers. Immediately after the First World War, this was not bearable for the politicians in London. In 1921, Churchill, who had become the head of the Colonial Office, decided to replace direct by indirect rule.

Indirect rule also suited a new paradigm of international relations better. Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" were implicitly opposed to the "Sykes-Picot Agreement". The American call for national self-determination was therefore regarded by British and French politicians as a means to weaken their standing in the Middle East and open a door for the Americans. The new American geostrategy – turning colonies into formally sovereign states that were then penetrated by American business and thus made dependent – clashed with the traditional European concept of linking economic exploitation to political control. The first reaction of Britain and France to the "Fourteen Points" was a joint declaration that explicitly promised independence to all Arab people formerly under Ottoman rule. As a second step, Britain and France had their de-facto colonies legitimised by the League of Nations as "mandated territories" that they, so the official language at the conference of San Remo, should prepare for independence – informal empire replaced direct rule.

In order pass power de jure into Iraqi hands, the Lloyd George government decided in 1921 to make its betrayed partner Faisal King of Iraq by plebiscite. On the one side, Faisal became a strong king: According to the new constitution, the king was the central figure in Iraqi politics. Not only did he appoint the members of the upper house, he also held the powers to prorogue and dissolve parliament, to choose the prime minister and to appoint the ministers on the prime minister's recommendation. Moreover, the king had to confirm all laws. He was not obliged to assent any draft law. Whenever the parliament was not sitting, he held vast competences in financial and security affairs. On the other side, Faisal did not have any ties to the country. Iraq was foreign to him and he was foreign to Iraq. It is an often omitted detail of history that even the election of a famous Arab leader was manipulated by the British who had exiled Faisal's main rival Sayid Talib al-Naqib before the plebiscite. In order to rule, Faisal depended on British assistance. Faisal did not command any powerful executive forces (e.g. an army), whereas all tribes were armed. His weakness and the interest of the new elite to conserve the existing political and socio-economic system guaranteed the status quo, meaning the prerogative of British interests.

Because of Britain's drive towards subtle and legalised dominance, Britain made Iraq sign the "Anglo-Iraqi Treaty" in 1922. According to this treaty, Britain had to bring about Iraq's membership in the League of Nations in 1942. Until then, Iraqi authorities were obliged abstain from any action that might be in contradiction to British interests and coordinate all policies that affected British interests with British officials. The British High Commissioner remained the highest political authority in Iraq and British instructors had the last say on all decisions taken by Iraqi ministries. In military affairs, the Royal Air Force controlled the air bases in Iraq and the new Iraqi army was formed under British supervision.

Yet public resentment forced the Iraqi ruling elite to press for a new treaty. It was signed in 1930 and stated that Iraq should become independent by joining the League of Nations. This happened two years later. Iraq gained formal independence. The British High Commissioner, being the most demonstrative symbol of Iraq's inferiority, was replaced by an ambassador. The new treaty however gave important privileges to Britain for the next 25 years: Iraqi politicians had to consult the British Ambassador on issues relevant to British interests. The Royal Air Force kept control of the air bases in Habbaniyya and Shuaiba. British troops were granted the right to pass through the country in case of war.

Lastly, the oil sector, Iraq's most important asset for Britain, also remained in British hands. In 1925, the Iraqi government, being in short supply of money, had to renounce a 20% share of the "Iraqi Petroleum Company" (IPC). The predecessor of the IPC, the "Turkish Petroleum Company" (TPC), had been founded before the First World War. Since the early 1920s, it was predominantly controlled by Britain: The "Anglo-Persian Oil Company" and "Royal Dutch Shell" owned each 23.75% of the TPC's shares. France and the United States were the other big players. The "Compagnie Française des Pétroles" and a US-based consortium owned each another 23.75% of the TPC's shares.<sup>12</sup> The British expanded their control of the oil sector to the entire country in 1938. Then, the Iraqi government was in urgent need of financial resources because of a bad wheat harvest – wheat was the most important export good in Iraqi hands. The Iraqis addressed the IPC, demanding a higher share of the oil revenues, which were paid as royalties. The IPC agreed but gained further concessions for oil exploitation in exchange: Instead of formerly 400 square kilometres, it controlled 100,000 square kilometres from then on, owning a de-facto monopoly of oil production in Iraq.<sup>13</sup>

With oil totally in British hands, Iraq's economy did not develop. The country was mainly agricultural. Food crops such as dates and grain dominated production, while cash crops such as cotton did not flourish because of a lack of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Tripp, A History of Iraq, pp. 58-59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Fürtig H., (2003), Kleine Geschichte des Irak. Von der Gründung 1921 bis zur Gegenwart, Beck, München, p. 29.

investment. Suggestions made by British advisor Hilton Young in 1930, who strongly opposed great landownership and tax exemptions for great landowners, were ignored because they did not match the interests of Iraq's elite. Manufacturing was based on small workshops and pre-industrial technologies. Industrialisation almost exclusively depended on investment by the government, which chronically ran short of money. This socio-economic structure, which was disadvantageous for the development of the country, had crucial political reasons.

## DRIVERS OF IRAQI GEOPOLITICS

## The rise of the collaboration elite and sectarian divides

In order to realise indirect rule, the British created a well-functioning system of proxies. In the first months after the war, they abolished institutions of self-rule such as the municipal councils and replaced them with political officers who interacted directly with local notables. In this spirit, they had already introduced the "Tribal Civil and Criminal Disputes Regulation" in 1916. It was encoded into Iraqi law in 1924 and gave tribal sheikhs, designated by the British, the power to handle all disputes that concerned members of their tribe and collect the taxes for the central government. The new order, which the British describes as "natural", was in fact the outcome of their interaction with traditional authorities.

The British High Commissioner moreover introduced a land reform in 1918 in reaction to the first anti-British unrests. This land reform transferred the tribal common property to the tribal chiefs and wealthy urban families. About 90% of the arable land of Iraq was from then on owned by a thin class of great landowners. Iraq became the "country of the 1,000 sheikhs". This way, the British hoped to create an elite loyal to them. After having fundamentally changed economic power, the British worked towards the creation the *hizb alhurriyya al-iraqiyya* (Party of Iraqi Freedom), founded in 1922, as political organisation that united the new elite. Virtually cementing the dominance of the new elite, the election law gave only citizens with sufficient property (either land or money) the right to vote and to be elected. The new parliamentary system was therefore practically open to the 1,000 sheikhs only.

In military affairs, the British instrumentalised the Assyrian minority. They encouraged Assyrian settlement around Mosul in order to influence a referendum on the adherence of the province to Iraq or Turkey. The Assyrians understood that they could only uphold their position against the Kurds and Arab Sunnis in collaboration with the British. Hence, they were eager to participate in an army under British control, the 5,000 men strong Assyrian Levies. This army helped to fight anti-British forces during the post-war unrest.

In the following years, the British refined their approach of confessional and ethnical division, which had been successfully tested with the Assyrians. In 1919, Percy Cox, who had replaced Wilson as High Commissioner, proposed exclusively to the Sunni Arabs to form a national government. The Sunni Arabs (about 21% of all Iraqis compared to 54% Shiite Arabs) had already been privileged under Ottoman rule because the Ottomans suspected the Shiites of being closer to Shiite Persia than to the Sunni Ottoman Empire. As a direct result of British influence, the new Iraqi administration was dominated by Sunni Arabs, most often ex-Ottoman officials. Posts in the wider administration became an easy way for Sunni Arabs to rise to powerful positions. Shiites were excluded from senior posts. However, in order to stabilise the situation in the Shiite areas, the British and King Faisal partially integrated the Shiite sheikhs, separating them from *mujtahids* (Muslim jurists) who did not only envisage real independence for Iraq but also social change. The sheikhs, both Sunni and Shiite, were given roughly 40% of the seats in the constituent assembly, were granted with tax exemptions and, in some cases, received lucrative posts in the state apparatus. The British also managed to divide the Shiite clerics: In 1922, about 200 Shiite notables met at a conference in Kerbala, calling for an end of the mandate. Two years later, the British made exiled Shiite clerics, who wanted to return to Iraq, sign pledges to abstain from politics.

The centralisation of governance moreover paved the ground for a new system of patronage. Given that most key decisions were from then on taken in the capital, local leaders from the provinces needed patrons in Baghdad. Still, in order to keep the periphery calm and supportive, the political elite in Baghdad depended on clients in the provinces. The currency of this new system was land property. Land was the means for the authorities to purchase social standing and a way of self-enrichment. It also proved credibility and weight in political circles – again, the power given by the British to the 1,000 sheikhs becomes clear.

Bringing together these developments and the conceptual frame of geopolitical visions, the British managed to divide those forces who called for a de jure and de facto independent Iraq into two camps: The new Iraqi elite were in favour of national sovereignty but their vision for Iraq included socio-economic stability. Because the new elite considered socio-economic stability being more important than national sovereignty, they supported, in the end, the British. The outcome was a de jure but not de facto independent Iraq. The Arab nationalists struggled for a sovereign and socio-economically revolutionised Iraq. Their vision for the country appeared being the major threat to Iraq's collaboration elite.

#### The political role of the Iraqi army

After the death of Faisal in 1933, the ruling elite tried to increase its power vis-à-vis inexperienced 21-year-old King Ghazi. The army under Bakr Sidqi suppressed various local revolts, most prominently the 1933 Assyrian uprising, which ended an anti-Assyrian pogrom by the army. Being the popular force that guaranteed national integrity, the army gained a political role. Sunni Arabs from then on hoped that the army was able to foster nation-building across confessional and ethnic divides. The army used its new power to launch a coup in 1936. They installed a civilian cabinet. Prime Minister Hikmat Suleiman, who ruled de facto in cooperation with Bakr, proclaimed national modernisation following the examples of Persia under Reza Khan and Turkey under Mustafa Kemal as main objective. Bakr, who had Kurdish origins and favoured Iraqi nationalism over pan-Arabism, was however assassinated by a pan-Arab officer in the following year. This murder revealed the deep rift between two nationalist geopolitical visions: Pan-Arabism (qawmi) aimed at a state of all Arabs. Iraqi nationalism (watani) envisaged a truly independent Iraq. This confrontation led to a series of military coups.

In addition to the clash of nationalists and pan-Arabists, leading Iraqi politicians of the 1930s can be divided into two camps: The dominant minority wanted to maintain a close partnership with Britain. Nuri al-Said, the key political figure in Iraq from the late 1930s onwards, was their most prominent representative. A radical majority regarded Fascist Germany being the better partner. Bakr and Rashid al-Gailani – the latter became prime minister by coup in 1940 – were key representatives of the pro-German camp. They were convinced that Germany, being the arch-enemy of Britain, would help the Arabs to get rid of British dominance. Moreover, the general attractiveness of fascism in the 1930s caused a boost of fascist intellectual circles in Iraq. The split between pro-British and pro-German factions also occurred within the army. Highest ranking officers such as chief of staff Ahmad Fawzi were pro-British. Younger officers were pro-German.

Although Prime Minister al-Gailani was only moderately pro-German, the British ended his rule in January 1941. They declared vis-à-vis the Hashemite regent Abd al-Ilah, who was ruling for minor King Faisal II after Ghazi had died, that Iraq would lose Britain's "friendship" if al-Gailani remained in power.<sup>14</sup> Four young army officers – Salah al-Din al-Sabbagh, Kamil Shabib, Fahmi Said and Mahmud Salman, also known as the "Golden Square" – were unwilling to tolerate British interference in Iraqi politics anymore. On 1<sup>st</sup> April, they carried out a successful coup and handed over power to al-Gailani. It does not need much imagination to anticipate that the British did not tolerate this. On 17<sup>th</sup> April, British troops from India landed in Basra. They marched into Baghdad on 1<sup>st</sup> June, accompanied by Abd al-Ilah and leading pro-British politicians, who had escaped the country after the coup.

## Increasing repression and the 1958 revolution

After the Second World War, Iraq experienced a short episode of liberalisation under Prime Minister Tawfiq al-Suwaidi from February to March 1946. It ended when al-Suwaidi called for a reform of the 1930 treaty with Britain. In the beginning Bloc Confrontation, every call for reforms was understood by the British, and more importantly by the Americans, as Communist subversion. Their fear for a rise of Communism in Iraq was justified in the mid-1940s. The presence of British troops had sharply increased the demand of manufactured products, paving the fundament for industrialisation. The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) was strong among oil, port and railway workers. In 1946, it controlled twelve out of sixteen legalised trade unions. The ICP frequently organised strikes that brought key sectors of the economic to a standstill. It led the strike at a pumping station near Haditha and the subsequent *masira al-kubra* (Great March) towards Baghdad, which was stopped by the army near Fallujah. In the following years, Iraq's elite around Nuri brutally and successfully stoke down Communist activities in the oil sector.

In foreign affairs, the Iraqi regime also provoked the anger of many of its citizens. The separate ceasefire with Israel during the Israeli War of Independence was regarded as a treachery to a common Arab cause. Supporting for the Royal Air Force, which used air bases in Iraq during the 1956 Suez Crisis, led to mass protests. In 1955, a government headed by Nuri moreover signed a treaty of military cooperation with Britain. This treaty, the "Baghdad Pact", reflected Anglo-American geostrategy of the early Cold War. In order to contain the Soviet Union and threaten its "soft underbelly", Middle Eastern states were pressed into pro-Western military alliances. For the Arab people, these alliances symbolised the continuing dominance of the former colonial powers. The vast majority of the Iraqi people, probably also the majority of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> al-Hashimi T., (1967), *Mudhakkirati. 1919-1943*, [publisher unknown], Beirut, pp. 372-373.

elite, did not share the Cold-War geopolitical vision according to which all states could be divided into those supporting "Western freedom" and those cooperating with "Soviet expansionism". According to an official summary provided by British Ambassador John Troutbeck on opinions expressed in Iraqi newspapers, most Iraqis saw the world as divided into imperialist oppressors and oppressed people.<sup>15</sup> The only way Nuri could make the parliament ratify the treaty was to surround it with tanks.

Given this context of domestic repression and a foreign policy that was widely rejected by the Iraqi people, reforming the political system and getting the majority of the Iraqis to support the government would have been the only way to prevent the coming revolution. Yet as one of Troutbeck's statements highlights, the political and socio-economic system of Iraq was immune to any attempts to reform it. Troutbeck remarked that "whatever the colour of the prime minister, Iraq is at present governed by the old guard of landowners whose leader is Nuri".<sup>16</sup> Michael Wright, Troutbeck's predecessor correctly pictured the situation in the mid-1950s as a race between development and revolution. On the one side, the benefits from the oil wealth began to trickle down to ordinary people. There was progress in education, health, house building and other issues of everyday life. On the other side, young intellectuals and young army officers considered this progress being too slow and only superficial because it did not change the dominance of the ruling elite. While Wright overestimated positive effects and argued that Iraq was stable, Sam Falle, a younger British official who travelled through the country, reported to his superiors that rural poverty laid the fundament for a coming revolution.<sup>17</sup>

Politically, Nuri neither managed to integrate the emerging middle class. Nor did he break the political power of the tribes that were hardly controlled by the central government. Because of the brutal repression of any opposition, major opposition organisations formed a joint national front in 1954. Michael Ionides, British member of the "Iraqi Development Board", warned that if Nuri and the ruling elite fell, British influence in Iraq would end.<sup>18</sup> Earlier, Troutbeck had already summarised the problem of Britain in Iraq in one sentence, saying that "one of our main embarrassments here was that everyone tended to identify us with the elder statesmen".<sup>19</sup> In July 1958, young army officers, led by Abd al-Karim Qasim and Abd al-Salam Arif, took over power in Baghdad and assassinated Nuri, Faisal II and Abd al-Ilah. The geopolitical vision of the anti-British nationalists finally became reality.

#### CONCLUSION

By using geopolitical visions as a frame for Iraq's pre-1958 history, it is easy to highlight which ideas about the country, which ascriptions of value to territory that we call Iraq, mattered for its political development. This perspective moreover provides a framework for identifying the geopolitical drivers and the turning points of the history of Iraq – the transformation of three Ottoman

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Louis W. R., (1984), The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951. Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism, Clarendon, Oxford, p. 713.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Quoted in Louis W. R., (1991), "The British and the Origins of the Iraqi Revolution", in: Fernea R. A., Louis W. R., (eds.), *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958. The Old Social Classes Revisited*, Tauris, London, p. 39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Ibidem, pp. 45-46, 54-55.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ibidem, p. 44.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Ibidem, p. 38.

provinces into a sphere of British rule into a mandated territory into a de facto dependent state into a sovereign country. Table 1 gives an overview of the competing geopolitical vision that I have addressed in the previous sections. It shows the clashes of each geopolitical vision and thus summarises the key elements of Iraq's pre-1958 history.

geopolitical vision	explanation	clashes			
religiously defined Ottoman Empire	pre- <i>tranzimat</i> system; unity of the Ottoman Empire results from the Sunni Muslim identity of its citizens	ethnicity-based geopolitical visions			
Turkish dominated Ottoman Empire	Turkish nationalism changes the idea how to organise the space controlled by the Ottoman Empire	pre- <i>tanzimat</i> system, Arab nationalism (as a reaction to Turkish nationalism)			
Arab nationalism	various visions of a political entity defined by the Arab ethnicity of its people; clashes of subvisions: pan-Arab ( <i>qawmi</i> ) versus nationalist ( <i>watani</i> )	religion-based geopolitical visions, Turkish nationalism, British imperialism			
directly British- ruled Middle East	division of the Middle East according to the "Sykes-Picot Agreement"; direct colonial rule	Arab unity, Arab / Iraqi sovereignty			
Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points"	self-determination of nations ends direct British and French rule and makes indirect American influence possible	direct British and French rule in the Middle East			
indirectly British- ruled Middle East	"mandated territories" as internationally legitimised way of indirect rule; rise of pro- British collaboration elites	Arab unity, Arab / Iraqi sovereignty			
truly independent Iraq	various forces in Iraq struggle to end indirect British rule; mostly in connection with far-reaching socio-economic change	British indirect rule, Middle East as a part of anti-Soviet containment			
Iraq as partner of Britain during the Second World War and the Cold War	Britain intervenes (sometimes forcefully) in order to keep Iraq a subordinated ally against Fascist Germany and the Soviet Union	Iraqi-German partnership, Third Worldism			

**Table 1**. Clashing geopolitical visions about Iraq (author's draft)

Concerning geopolitical visions as an approach to geopolitics, the next step to advance this concept should be its incorporation in classical geopolitical reasoning. In this article, I demonstrate the use of geopolitical visions as a perspective on political processes. Yet my analysis does not incorporate classical geopolitical thinking. I do not ask how location and physical geography, i.e. nature in order to use Mackinder's words, exert a control in the clash of geopolitical visions about Iraq. Nonetheless, first hints appear in my analysis: Arab nationalism had almost no effect on Iraq during the First World War because Iraq was far away from Hussein's tribal forces - location matters. The decision of the British to seek control of Iraq after the war resulted from Iraq's abundance in oil - physical geography matters. Even the success and failure of geopolitical visions can be explained by geography: Those who advanced the pro-German geopolitical vision during the Second World War failed because the British could easily send troops from India to Iraq, whereas German support was not at sight. It is these connections between geopolitical visions as initiatives by human actors and location and physical geography that should be examined in order to bring a materialist or realist version of geopolitics back into the scientific debate.

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Submitted:	Revised:	Accepted:	Published online:
May 4, 2011	May 9, 2011	August 17, 2011	November 30, 2011

ISSN 1454-2749. E-ISSN 2065-1619

## LOCAL FITTING AND GLOBAL PREDICTION

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**Abstract**: The presence of the decision-maker at mesoscale has become a key element in the balance of detailed information on local level and general information on regional level. Decision-makers play an important role during recessions because they fit local evolution into regional evolution, a reverse approach to periods of economic boom.

**Keywords:** decision-maker, local sensitivity, regional prediction, mesoscale, labour market

\* \* \* \* \* \*

## **INTRODUCTION**

This study analyzes the relationships between the components of spatial economic systems from a new perspective providing solutions that avoid the trap of such questions like: How to change a model at component level when transition from local to global occurs? How can we generalize a model without losing touch with reality?

In order to determine differences in the spatial complexity of the local and the regional and how regional complexity is arising from local complexity the issue was reduced to types of relationships between local and global and types of structure (vertical hierarchies or horizontal networks) that integrate the local into the global.

However, there is a mutual impact between economic systems and not merely one system impact on the others. In addition, because each system has several components, any initial impact will have complex effects on the internal relations of another system. Therefore, the system response is unlikely to be simple. This analysis shows the limits of studies based on local territorial levels which are then integrated into higher territorial levels based on the idea of establishing a "balance" between sensitivity (small perturbations can be expanded into large and lasting effects) and metastability (path-dependence and lock-in) in complex systems.

On the other hand, the geographical scale defines the limits and restricts

entities on which control is exercised and disputed. Through crossing scale processes, policies supported and established by the political power at one geographical scale are being extended to the other scales.

The decision maker - economic system relationship is driven by a goal or an important objective that is taken into account by the decision-maker and the model that he/she creates mentally will help to relate adequately to the system. The presence of the decision-maker at the mesoscale become a key-element in the balance of detailed information on local level and general information on regional level. Decision maker links analysis to synthesis, and local level to global level. He builds the global from the local by forecasting and the local from the global by fitting. At mesoscale 'reality' (micro) meets "desire" (macro). "The decision area" is the space of variation of other system components in relation to those chosen by decision maker to be modified into an economic policy. A good choice of components leads to greater efficiency of policy implementation.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the differences between local and global level. Section 3 presents the interactions between components, while section 4 describes the methodology used to estimate the role of decision-maker as a link between two different territorial levels and, finally, section 5 presents the concludes.

## LOCAL-GLOBAL DIFFERENCES AND SPATIAL AGGREGATION

In order to determine differences in the spatial complexity of the local and the regional and how regional complexity is arising from local complexity, the issue was reduced to types of relationships between local and global and types of structure (vertical hierarchies or horizontal networks) that integrate the local into the global.

Overlapping the local level other upper levels, each with its peculiarities, increase difficulties and prevent finding viables and lasting solutions. Therefore analyzing how the "local goes global" and "the global is located" is extremely important in terms of the exponential evolution of the territorial situation. (Ianos, 2006)

There are many researchers trying to solve the spatial problem of the localglobal link starting from structure such as scale (vertical hierarchy) (e.g. Herod and Wright 2002) or from a structure that combines hierarchy and networks, nuancing the notion of scale in different ways: Amin (2002), Brenner (1998), Leitner (2004) and Taylor (2004). The distinction between local and global levels is seen by Marston, Jones, Woodward (2005) as having its roots in the fundamental oppositions that have preoccupied philosophical thinking long ago, listing the micro-macro dualities in social analysis (Layder 1994), atomistic thinking versus holistic thinking. Also, the theoretical boundaries between the abstract/practical and the theoretical/empirical are often associated with the global-local binary (Sayer 1991). And last but not least, we can see the scale categories processed by differences between order and determination, on the one hand, and complexity and randomness, on the other (Jones and Hanh, 1995; Smith, 2001).

## **DECIPHERING THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN COMPONENTS**

Centrality is an attribute of horizontal networks and defines higher connectivity of a point compared to the others because of its location which is interposed in such a way that can coordinate the underlying territory. Another aspect is that this central position relaties to the scale at which we consider it and if referred to a broader area there can be other points that may have greater connectivity. Scale does not unbound all relationships established between components.

Marston's conception about complex territorial interlinks is due to the influence of researchers like N. Smith and N. Brenner, the former considered the "father" of "politics of scale" argues that "is geographical scale that defines the boundaries and bounds the identities around which control is exerted and contested" (Smith 1992, also Herod, 1991). The complexity of these forces is unexpected, being revealed by processes of 'scale jumping', whereby 'political claims and power established at one geographical scale are expanded to another' (Smith 2000, see also Staeheli 1994; Miller 2000), or by 'scale bending', in which 'entrenched assumptions about what kinds of social activities fit properly at which scales are being systematically challenged and upset' (Smith, 2004).

Richie Howitt (1993 1998 2003) has a view similar to Brenner's about scales and relations between them, adding them dialectical "multi-directional and simultaneous" operation modality, "between and within" various scales. For Howitt, like Swyngedouw, the local is not so distinct from other scales, it most not be considered separately, but together with other higher territorial levels, the local "containing important elements of other geographic scales', thereby achieving a more 'complex [understanding of the] interpenetration of the global and the local" (1993).

In the direction of a complex approach of scale invites Helga Leitner's work (2004): "transnational networks represent new modes of coordination and governance, a new politics of *horizontal relations* that also has a distinct spatiality. Whereas the spatiality of a politics of scale is associated with *vertical relations* among nested territorially defined political entities, by contrast, networks span space rather than covering it, transgressing the boundaries that separate and define these political entities." Marston, Jones, Woodward (2005) are dissatisfied with attempting to produce "hybrid solution" by joining the conceptualizations of hierarchy with those of network, the deficiencies of scale cannot be filled by adding or integrating the theoretization of network.

Cartwright (1991) finds a "balance" between sensitivity and metastability in complex systems that suggests lower limits (small perturbations can be expanded into large and lasting effects) and higher limits (path dependence and lock-in) to assess the models of complex systems .

Gregory and Urry acknowledges the difficulties posed by the delimitation of economic connections in relation to territorial scales that are bounded by administrative criteria "... the economic relationships in a regional economy are spatially structured, but there is no simple mapping from geographic location to place in the interaction structure. Rather, place is a complex web of social, economic, political and other relations, which are themselves spatially structured and configured over time. These are themes that have become familiar in the human geography literature". (Gregory and Urry 1985).

## Nested relationships between components resolved by the graph theory

According Sheppard (1990), space is viewed by economists as endogeneous and uneven. Endogeneity is based on the social nature of distance, the closeness of the two places not being simply based on the Euclidean distance separating them, but on intensity and how easy they interact. It is clear that communication and transportation technologies are endogeneous of spatial economy and spatial structures are caused by socio-economic processes leading to their unevenness spatial distribution. Furthermore, these spatial structures affect the socio-economic processes that produced them (Soja, 1980, quoted in Sheppard, 2002). Ed Soja coined the term socio-spatial dialectic to refer to such reciprocity, whereby "social and spatial relations are dialectically inter-reactive, interdependent" (Soja, 1980, quoted in Sheppard, 2002). Geographical preexisting unevenness shape spatial-temporal changes. Despite recent arguments about "death" of distance in the face of globalization, differences in relative location remain critical of the possibilities available to economic actors (Sheppard, 2002).

What interests us in this study is the remote influence of the action of some determinants (economic and financial crisis) underlying exogenous growth theory that can be illustrated by graphs. On the other hand, regional economic indicators do not contain information related to the importance of firms and relations within the region. By the instrumentality of graphs we can illustrate the importance of economic links and nodes in comparison with other links and nodes and regional synergy illustrate by cartograms. This approach stems from the fact that firms are more sensitive to changes in other firms with which they have economic links than to changes in the region as whole. Representation by cartograms tend rather to equalize economic indicators and spread them throughout the region, losing contact between cause and effect. At the same time, adding these relations makes the areas to be converted to points (by concentration) and lines that link the points (crossing only space). So, the geographic concept of space is surpassed making place to the mental concept of space, the space of relations between the components of the economic system and remote action. During the crisis negative effects are spreading through these relations seen as means for transformation.

## PLACEMENT BETWEEN THE LOCAL AND THE GLOBAL OF DECISION-MAKERS

Deciphering how the economic system is made and the links between its components is a necessity for the decision-maker's work.

Nor are the local and the global easily separated from agency and structure, in which subjectively experienced and individually felt thoughts, feelings and actions are held opposed to and to be integrated with objectives, broadly operating social forces, relations and processes (Gregory 1981, Giddens 1984).

#### Mental models

Complexity theorists like Gell-Mann (1995), Prigogine and Stengers (1984), Rössler (1986) and Casti (1994) believe that the understanding, knowledge, internalization by a mental model of the system depends on each observer, whether he has a privileged relationship with the observed object, the complexity being not an intrinsic property of an independent reality but, at least in part, a property of the knowledge process, a property attributed by the observer.

The observer-observed relationship is driven by a goal or an important objective of the observer and the model that he creates mentally must help him to refer properly to the observed. As suggested by existentialism, there is no sense of the universe itself, but each of us may make it understandable.

Forrester (1969) described mental models as mental image of the world around us. One does not have a city or a country or a government in mind. He has only selected concepts and relationships that use to represent the real system. The balance between detailed and general information required to be entered into models in order to formalize data of real systems was observed by Kaneko (1984) who relates details with sensitivity to change and universal aspects with robustness.

The two types of data are used according Ramsey (1996), for different purposes: global properties facilitating the prediction, while model fitting to reality is local and therefore sensitive to details.

Incompatibility between models used in local fitting and those used in the forecasts is due to the possibility of exponential growth of small deviations from fitting stage to forecast stage and if a match is made on the region with local instability, "unrepresentative" for the extrapolation studies in a stable global system, fitting has no relevance for foresight (Ramsey, 1996).

## Decision-makers options to act

Institutional rational choice share the assumption of interdependence developed by network governance theorists. Governance network theories also have in common with institutional rational choice the concept of polycentricity. As polycentricity theory, the network governance theories recognize the existence of multiplicity of actors in metropolitan governance and unhierarchical relations between them. (Morcol, 2003)

Decisions of agents forming economic systems can be divided in:

- economic decisions having of maximizing profit (looking for abundant labour for economic activity, raw materials, cheaper transport, externalities), influencing agglomeration;

- political decisions that have as purpose regional development and welfare of residents, leading to convergence (see below the influence of policies by type of state);

- people's decisions as employees and consumers

Information about the decisions of each type are the causes of future decisions, inside of an evolving process. The information used in decisionmaking has different components, different weights of components and different levels of aggregation. Territorial area of competence of economic decision-makers depends on the size of the company that still is reflected in the economic relations with other firms. Economic decisions can target both local, regional and even supranational levels. As employer, the company can recruit labour from neighbouring or a more distant, polarizing area, overcoming geographical restrictions of administrative units. Location decisions are constrained by socioeconomic factors. Geographical scale cannot constrain the economic system to operate within its limits in an open economy, which means that it will not include all relations between components these extending outside and being able to turn it into external shocks. The area of jurisdiction of policy-makers is limited to constituency and depends on the degree of decentralization of national policy. When local policy makers do not act, the influence of top-down policies occurs (from national to local level).

Decision makers act on economic systems, as discussed above, based on mental models, anticipating their evolution. Anticipation is the end we have in mind to follow the evolution of the system according to a given "order", it is a law according to which the system evolves and the end will be reached. Anticipation implies the existence of an observer who can act on the system at any time if it changes evolution, following a different trajectory than that anticipated of the observer. The observer takes over the system and leads it to the purpose pursued. Anticipation and control are two subjective processes that depend on the observer's discernment and "vigilance". In anticipation the path of evolution is not a usual one for the system because the nonlinear behavior of the system is trying to be removed by the anticipator. Rosen (1972 http) said that the difficulty of understanding anticipatory behavior is linked to the principle of causality and time scale, many scientists rejecting that the current state of the system could depend on the future. Referring to anticipation Nadin (Nadin http) goes on sayng that "to see the world once again is not an easy thing".

According to Capra (1996) structures in nature are continuously transformed, by forces and mechanisms into other structures, these structures are, in fact, only manifestations of the underlying processes. Capra avoids the term of component of system not to create the impression of a hierarchical structure within systems, which are only nested. Even so, it presupposes the existence of the structure components. Structure component is a concept which explains the flexibility of structure subjected to influences by reducing or enlarging effects. Thus, the components have a reaction buffer space, in which they move when an external cause "requires" a reaction, an effect. This freedom can be understood rather as quasi-independence.

Quasi-independent evolution does not mean a high degree of isolation of a system from the other systems. The degree of connectivity make the difference between an ordered system (low connectivity) and a chaotic system (maximum connectivity, all subsystems link to all other, influencing each other in the same proportion). Quasi-independence of a subsystem is given by structure, by the number of components, territorial arrangement (location) and their temporal ("evolution level").

## The impact of each other's decisions

Social and economic processes emerge from the actions of various agents with bounded rationality that can learn from experience and interactions and those differences contribute to change.

Quasi-independent behaviour of the system's agents is due to certain constraints of the network structure they are part of. At the same time there are constraints imposed on network structure by the discursive construction of the agent's reality (agents can change the structures through constructs and actions) is the conclusion reached by Klinj (2001) following the Giddens structure theory to emphasize the interrelationship between the stability (structure) and dynamism (process) of networks and the role of agents:

"Through their sustained interactions, actors create network structures: rules and resources that (will) have a structuring effect on future interactions in the network... Giddens summarize the distinctive relationship between structure and interaction in his term *duality of structures*. Structure is a precondition for action, and at the same time, it is affirmed and changed during action" (Morcol, 2003).

Next, we examine how social and economic changes propagate from one region to another (from center to periphery or in outlying regions), both during growth and recession and what factors underlying the spread of these changes and how change occurs (in which areas, intensity, and delays), in two different circumstances: when firms are in complementarity when firms are in competition. As a starting point we have taken two types of models in which policy makers, economic decision makers and individuals have different roles: the center-periphery models and the unemployment models.
In order to provide an empirical analysis of the relationship between regional components we have analyzed employment, migration, education data for two region (NUTS II - IV): Bucharest-Ilfov and South. The data analyzed here are taken from the 2007-2009 Yearbook of the National Institute for Statistics.

### The center-periphery models

According to Beck, Gleditsch, and Beardsley, 2006, the goal of comparative research is invariably to test hypotheses about certain relationships between unit attributes and variation in outcomes of interests. Inferences from comparisons across units assuming that observations are independent can yield misleading conclusions if the outcome of interest varies because of diffusion among units rather than functional relationships between the attributes compared (Galton, 1889).



Figure 1. Bucharest-Ilfov and Southern Region (case study regions)

Regional policies, based on traditional theories of regional development (von Tunen's land prices models, Weber and Marshall's industrial location, Loch and Christaller's settlements) recognize that firms may benefit from locating close to one other due to agglomeration economies and tried to create opportunities in order that agglomerations may occur in other locations and obtaining regional economic convergence. In that way, they tried placing the business in underdeveloped and depopulated regions (Massif Central in France, suthern Italy) by incorporating those of developing nearby areas, because according to Christaller (1966), larger settlements are likely to provide a wider range of functions than smaller settlements. More over, agglomeration forces are self-enforcing. This feature is sometimes called "circular causality" to stress the feedback relation between economic activities: upstream expansion can lead to downstream expansion and vice versa. How this is understood by regional policies can or not work in their favour. Policy makers should be aware that once started the process of development is more difficult to revert to the beginning. Indeed, the removal of the initial shock would not lead to a reversal of its effects. This is "hysteresis" or "path-dependency": transitory shocks have permanent effects. When the magnitude of intervention rises above some threshold level, the economic landscapes starts to change. When this happens, the forces that sustained the *status quo* unwind quite rapidly giving rise to sudden geographical shifts. This threshold property of effective policy intervention casts doubts on regional fine tuning. Marginal policy changes are completely ineffective until the cumulated change remains below a certain threshold. After the threshold is crossed, the impact is catastrophic (Ottaviano, 2003).



Figure 2. Net migration, 2007

To the extent agglomeration economies do exist in higher-order locations the external benefits associated with spatial industrial clustering will be spread across a diverse range of sectors, whereas in lower-order sectors, the external benefits of clustering will tend to be contained within in a small number of industrial sectors. (Dewhurst, J. and P. McCann, 2003).

Our available data will enable us to check if the center-periphery models work in the same way in the period of economic growth and recession and what decision makers do in order to adapt at the new situation. As we see, nett migration in some rural regions become positive in 2009. Peripheral regions are semi-industrialized regions with small manufacturing industries that use lowlevel technologies and are sparsely populated, resource-based industries dependent (population migrates to other regions in periods of economic boom) while central region is dominated by services.

One of the most likely sources of regional differences is variation in industry composition. Shocks to aggregate demand have differential effects in terms of each industry. As consumer income falls, the demand for relatively more income-elastic goods should fall relatively further; as further incomes become more uncertain, the demand for durables should decline relatively more than the demand for nondurables. Industries that produce input for more volatile demand industries are themselves more likely to experience severe demand shocks. As Bernanke (1983) has argued, the banking crises not only reduced money supply but also disrupted the operation of local capital markets (Rosenbloom and Sundstrom, 1999).



Figure 3. Net migration, 2009

### Unemployment models

In Hoover's (1948) classification, higher-order urban areas will generally exhibit greater economies of urbanization, whereas lower-order urban areas will generally exhibit greater economies of localization. From the point of view of local employment patterns, these arguments would also imply that in general, higherorder urban areas will exhibit a relatively diverse range of local employment activities, whereas lower-order areas will tend to exhibit a highly skewed sectoral employment distribution (Dewhurst, J. and P. McCann, 2003).

The larger the pool of workers that a firm can access the more likely it is to find the exact skills that suits its needs (Helsley and Strange, 1990; Amiti and Pissarides, 2005). Another aspect is risk sharing; if firms are subject to idiosyncratic shocks then a larger labour market exposes workers to less risk by increasing the probability of re-employment if they are made redundant (Krugman (1991). Perhaps the most important argument is that a large labour market increases the incentives for workers to undertake training. In a small market, workers who acquire specialist skills may be 'held-up' by monopolistic employers, in which case there is no incentive for them to invest in skills. The presence of a large number of potential employers removes this threat of opportunistic behaviour, and thereby increases the incentives for skill acquisition (Matouschek and Robert-Nicoud 2005). The largest cities tend to be diversified, while smaller cities are more specialized. (Duranton and Puga 2000, 2001). (quoted in Overman, Rice, and Venables (2008)



Figure 4. Employees, 2007 (a) and changes in the number of employees (b), 2008-2007

The mechanisms of the movement of labour and firms have been summarized by Puga, 1998 as follows:

"When workers migrate towards locations with more firms and higher real wages, this intensifies agglomeration. When instead workers do not move across regions, at low trade costs firms become increasingly sensitive to cost differentials, leading industry to spread out again."

There are interdependencies across places so that what happens in one region has implications not only for this location but for other regions as well. The objectives of this paper are to investigate these linkages, identifying the channels through which these effects operate and their net impact. The issue is important because, as we will see, under some circumstances changes that benefit one region also have positive effects on other areas. When this complementary relationship between regions holds, the impact of a shock is in some sense shared between regions. Under other circumstances, however, regions are in a competitive rather than a complementary relationship with one another. A positive shock to one region has a negative impact elsewhere, with the result that the effects on the first region are amplified at the expense of other regions (Overman, Rice, and Venables, 2008).



Figure 5. Employees, 2009 (a) and changes in the number of employees (b), 2009-2008

The long-term unemployed may lose skills or contact with the labour market, generating hysteresis (Blanchard and Summers, 1987), and blocking the possibility of further reductions in the unemployment rate (Abraham and Shimer, 2001).

### CONCLUSIONS

Therefore, not all subsystems evolving at the same rate and in the same direction so that the most dynamic and strong mutual ties create a trend that will spill over to other subsystems in the form of external shocks, the latter managed to "rescue" the gaps or differences, generalizing the trend in system evolution. Geographically, we refer to those local economies which, losing the quality of raw material suppliers to some industries, reinvent themselves. Another example is the loss of competitiveness compared with other regions that have the same economic profile and are in relation of competition.

Relations between the components have a bearing on the evolution of the system and the importance of components in the system is given both as absolute and relative or relational value which includes types (positive or negative feedbacks) and intensity (strong or weak) of relations. The importance of a component makes that a change within it to be incorporated into the evolution of the system, and when it comes to reaching a critical threshold in the evolution of a component can destabilize the system. There are critical thresholds at both the local and the global results from interactions at different levels and components of thresholds' overflow across several levels.

A good decision is based on peculiarities of the territorial unit administered. The integration of the evolution of this unit into the territorial system as a whole and the intuition of the way forward of the whole system (forecast achievable) is a good decision because the aggregated data give the trends and particular data support it. Taking a decision involves rethinking the past, the result being that the return to a previous decision means regaining a lost past.

### Acknowledgment Invest in human resources!

This work was supported by project: POSDRU/88/1.5/S/61150 "Doctoral Studies in the field of life and earth sciences", project co-financed through Sectoral Operational Program for the Development of Human Resources 2007-2013 from European Social Fund.

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Submitted:	Revised:	Accepted:	Published online:
July, 19, 2011	July, 22, 2011	September 22, 2011	November 30, 2011

### THE ROLE OF URBAN TRANSPORT IN THE POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS HUNGARIAN ASPECTS

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Abstract: Transport is playing an important role in our everyday lives. It is an essential tool in the formation of social-economic relations. Urban transport is of great importance due to the fact that the number of the inhabitants of the cities has rapidly increased throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century and even today, more than 60 percent of the population is living in cities. Furthermore, 85 percent of the GDP of the EU is produced in cities. In addition to this, transport is providing 10 percent of the Gross Domestic Product of the Union and nearly 10 million people work in this sector which is growing about 2-3 percents annually. With regards to urban transport, there are many important tasks the Hungarian cities are facing in order to reach the level of the EU. Unfortunately, these cities are still far away from the future objectives of the community. This study is trying to present the current situation

**Key words:** urban transport, sustainable mobility, passenger transport, city, transport policy, green city,

### THE MAIN OUTCOMES OF THE DEVELOPMENT PLANS, STRATEGIES, **CONCEPTS FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORT IN THE EU**

Transportation was counted among the most important subjects already at the time of the forming of the EU. Nevertheless, no serious progress could be experienced for decades in the subject of transportation. This is due to the fact, that the community does not interfere with the transport politics of the countries, its role is determined by the legal and political questions. Although the Rome Treaty conceived that transport is to be an important part of the cooperation and several tasks were initiated in the subject, regarding i.e. international traffic or free movement of service. Already in the sixties, a legislative plan of harmonization was being outlined with the aim of eliminating physical and administrative restrictions. However, the carrying out of real steps was set back by the fact that member states were following different politics in this area and the state had the right to interfere on regulations, tariff policies as well as on state supports. On the other hand, another problem is that different member states have different preferences in the question of transport methods. Various international agreements are also regulating the operation of transport.

Significant steps have been taken since the beginning of the nineties, which was preceded by the verdict of the Court of Justice dating 1985. In the named verdict the European Council was found guilty in not making the necessary achievements in spite of the clearly appointed objectives in the subject of transport (Horváth Gy., 2007).



Figure 1. Modal split of passenger transport in 2007 (Source: Eurostat)

Treaty of 1992 delivered a breakthrough, which The Maastricht beginning of Trans-European materialized in the constructing the Transportation Network and also with the determination of the necessary tasks. During the nineties, all restrictions that made the European cooperation difficult were eliminated, and thus all areas of transport were liberated. The present goal of the common transport politics is the sustainable mobility. In the interest of this, transport systems need to be unified, the efficiency of transport service needs to be increased, which are musts in order to keep up with the current competitiveness of the European Union. The other important objective of the common transport policy is the so-called equalization - there are extremely great discrepancies, mainly in passenger transport. 81 percent of transport is realized on roads and in the first place by cars while 6 percent by railways and 8 percent by air traffic (Map 1). This trend is to be changed with the help of different roadfee systems, i.e. in London. The urban transport in the EU also needs to be focused on, since more than 60% of the population of Europe is living in urban areas and the same areas are being used for transport. Very important goals of the Community are the reduction of congestion, the mitigation of the number of accidents, decreasing pollution, which activities represent 1% of the budget of the EU. It is the task of each individual city to find the best strategy, although in most of the cases the issues are similar therefore common efforts shall be taken for the sake of the common plans and financing. The European Commission made its first proposal on urban mobility back in 1997/1998, then the so-called Green Paper "Towards a new culture for urban mobility" meant an important

step in the subject, followed by the Action Plan on Urban Mobility dated 2009. In these works the aims were images of city traffic without traffic-jams and greener cities. Urban transport systems build up an important part of the transport system of the EU and they are also the central elements of common transport policies. Apart from this, there are several EU policies that are being unable to neglect the urban transport when trying to achieve their objectives (i.e. cohesion policy, environmental policy, health policy) (Figure 2)



Figure 2. Motorisation rate in EU at 2006 (Source: Eurostat)

Reports that have been made since the beginning of the nineties (in the subjects of urban transport and urban environment) have founded the base for the so-called Local Agenda 21 process. It is clear from the documents, that complex thinking is necessary in order to achieve the aims. It is not enough to evaluate one particular area, but all areas of economic and social life must be taken into account. Therefore the study titled "European Sustainable Cities" from 1996 is emphasizing on the importance of the unity between town management, political integration, ecological thinking, cooperation and partnership together. Two years later, the so-called "Sustainable urban development in the EU: Action Framework" is listing specific political goals aiming at improving the urban environment. Urban Environment Strategy is a part of the Sixth Environmental Action Program – set in 2002 –, and it made the following suggestions for urban transport. On one hand, relations are to be reduced between economic growth and transport demands. On the other hand, the share of environmental friendly methods of transportation shall be increased. Third point should be the reduction of the growth of traffic and the support vehicles with low emission levels. Last point is the appreciation of urban environmental indicators (Kiss Diána, 2006). Therefore the actual objectives of urban transport were set by the millennium.

Local Agenda 21 is dealing with the 28<sup>th</sup> chapter of the UN-conference Environment and Development held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. This chapter is detailing the local sustainability agenda. The main objective of the document is to elaborate and implement a program created with the active participation of local governments and the support of the inhabitants and is based on the principle of sustainable development. This strategy includes environment protection, built environment, agricultural environment program, transport, industry, energy, tourism, and health. Transport is treated as one of the most challenging programs due to its effects being divided, distributed and the existing transport traditions are difficult to be modified. Road transport has become one of the most serious issues in the towns, causing health problems as well. According to Local Agenda 21, the most important tasks for transport are promoting environmental friendly methods of transport, supporting bicycle traffic and accelerating the modernization of the vehicle fleet. The document is describing tasks in the following areas. The residential and employment areas should be designed in a way that commuter traffic is supposed to be the minimized. It needs to be appreciated by the construction and maintenance of roads that larger throughput capacity will generate denser traffic, and the impacts of the bypass roads need to be examined as well. In case of public transport it has to be kept in mind that transfer stations should be attractive. There are many economic and legal incentives that are available for the sake of mitigating traffic. One such factor can be the annual vehicle tax which is capable of influencing the density of vehicles. Parking can be controlled both in space and time. Bus lanes might support bus traffic, but generates congestion on the other lanes. The expectation that car drivers are willing transfer to public transport (to avoid congestions) has only been partially realized. The usage of access licenses and access restrictions is only an effective traffic reduction method in smaller areas. The alternative means of transport are becoming attractive through network transformation, one-way streets, and inauguration of speed limits. Different types of tolls might also lead to significant results (distributed after road or territory usage). Buses and cars travelling with more than one people might be favoured. In many places, P+R (park and ride) is considered to solve all problems, but numerous drivers do not stop at the designated parking facilities. P+R can also not be carried out in massive dimensions if it is operated free of charge. Supporting the idea of working at home can contribute to decreased mobility however its advantages are still not clear due to its side-effects (Local Agenda21 Guidelines).

The Thematic Strategy of Urban Environment had the improvement of the environmental quality and the performance of urban areas as objective, as a support for the sustainable urban development. In addition to the earlier documentations it states that every capital city and every town with more than 100.000 inhabitants should prepare, adopt and realize a sustainable urban transport plan. This plan should be linked to regional and national strategies and should cover all methods of transport. It is important that environmentally efficient transport systems are to be established. It is mentioned as an advantage that at the new member states (joined in 2004) public transportation is having a greater share than in the old member states, however this trend is subject of rapid change, and also its quality is far from perfect (Thematic Strategy of Urban Environment, 2006).

The White Paper on Transport Policy (Transportation until 2010, now is the time to decide) by the European Union has determined the tasks of the past decade, with regards to transport. The part of the paper which is dealing with urban transport is stating that the spread of urbanization is associated with several lifestyle changes. In the past 40 years traffic inside of the cities has significantly increased and unfortunately in many cases urban construction planning and transport policies have not been coordinated. The document highlights the importance of subsidiarity. Nevertheless it allows the EU to take the initiative and the legislations in transport for the sake of diverse energy utilizations. In this respect, two decisions were made by the Commission in 2001. On one hand, compulsory rate of biofuels were introduced, and on the other hand the tax of these fuels were reduced. The objective of the CIVITASinitiative (started in October 2000) is to support the realization of low-emission rate urban transport innovative projects (Commission's communication to the Council and the European Parliament on Thematic Strategy of Urban Environment, pp. 5-6).

Traffic congestion and pollution are problems that are impairing the quality of urban life. Therefore alternative methods of transport need to be made attractive. Several European cities have chosen this option in raising the quality of transport by the introduction of new subway and tram lines or by launching new buses which can be easily used also by the handicapped. It is essential that public transport should be able to accommodate for the social changes. Respecting the principle of subsidiarity and appreciating that most of the actions belong to the responsibilities of national, regional or local authorities, the Commission recommended on the following. First of all, towns and cities having pioneer roles in this subject should be supported (from the fund of the Community) while the member states are still responsible for the submission of national plans. On the other hand, transport with clean vehicles available for all passengers (especially for the elderly and for the disabled) should be supported. As a third point, the good practical solutions in urban transport systems including urban and regional rail services and in management of the related infrastructure should be determined and spread (White Paper 2001.).

The Green Paper with the title: Towards a new culture in urban mobility highlighted the importance of cities since more than 60% of the European population lives in cities and 85% of EU's GDP is being produced there. In the centre of major cities traffic jams are regularly formed with severe disadvantages, such as time loss or pollution. The urban transport (mainly the one on roads) is responsible for ca. 40% of carbon dioxide emissions and 70% of the other polluting emissions. In additions to this, the number of accidents in the urban areas is constantly increasing usually having pedestrians and cyclists as victims. The listed problems might be local issues, however the entire continent might by affected by them in terms of climate change, health problems, and the bottlenecks jeopardizing the proper functioning of the logistics networks. Therefore this subject requires common planning and cooperation among European cities. Hence, the document is detailing the re-orientation of urban mobility in a way that transport methods should be optimized and the possibility of combining individual and public transport should be rendered possible. On the other hand, the improvement of living standards and environmental protection should also be supported. Interests of passenger transport and cargo transport should be synchronized, regardless of the means of transportation.

Apart from organizing consultations, the Commission plays an important role in making contact between target groups such as the inhabitants of the cities, urban transport users, employers and employees of public transport companies, economic groups (e.g. local companies), representatives of urban transport companies, representatives of car-manufacturing companies, as well as national, regional and local representatives of relevant areas. The moral of the various documents is that urban mobility policies can only be effective if the most integrated approaches are adopted. Technical innovation, development of clean, safe and intelligent methods of transportation, economic incentives and legal changes must be dealt together. All these can become particular contributions to the effective implementation of the Lisbon strategy.

The European Union has to play an important role in the execution of these, it has a so-called mobilising role, but forced steps coming from above are challenging to carry out due to the different local environments. The Community can help with the so-called European added values, such as advancing the exchange of good practices, development and harmonization of common standards, supporting financial aids, or favouring projects that keep safety, mobility and improving environmental state in mind, or simplifying, repealing or renewing of legislations.

The Green Paper has listed five challenges in order to achieve on the above mentioned objectives. On one hand, towns free from traffic jams should be developed. Congestions are complex problems, since they have economic, social, health and environmental effects as well and due to their sizes they are affecting the effective operation of the Trans-European networks. Increasing popularity of walking and cycling, optimization of car usage, telecommuting, teleshopping and the changes in the parking systems may improve the situation.

The second challenge is to create "greener" cities. The greatest problem of the cities is that in the vast majority of the cases, traffic is using petroleumbased transportation forms, resulting in significant carbon dioxide emission and noise pollution. Environmental pollution - in spite of significant technical developments – is in such a degree (due to the many stops) that it is affecting climate change. The European Council has an objective to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases by 20% in the European Union until 2020. There are many options how the EU can obtain these aims. One such possibility is that the Community supports research and development projects aiming towards clean and efficient transportation technologies and towards alternatives fuels like biofuels, hydrogen and fuel cells. On the other hand, vehicles that are currently in traffic might be upgraded and the obsolete ones should be withdrawn from the traffic. In addition to the support of new technologies, it can be an opportunity to form green public tenders which would include the indication of what amount of environmentally polluting costs a vehicle is creating throughout its entire lifetime. This should be indicated together with the price. The environment can also be protected by stimulating energy-saving driving habits driving schools and various educations could have a significant role in this. Also it is possible to apply various restrictions and to inaugurate local road tolls.

The third challenge is to create intelligent urban transport. The cities must bear even denser traffic while they are struggling with the lack of free space and with the payment of various environmental fees. In order to diminish these problems, adequate information should be provided to passengers, car drivers, fleet operators and network controllers with regards to transport and travel. There are currently many IT systems already in operation; however the new Galileo satellite system will make positioning even more accurate. It order to validate data, a new exchange protocol and new rules of data usage shall be established. The system could be used for fleet management, passenger information and ticket sale systems and it should support interoperability. Greater effectiveness might be achieved in transport with the usage of this system.

The fourth challenge is to develop accessibility in urban transport. This is essential from the point of view of the disabled, mentally handicapped people, elderly people, or families with small children. On the other hand it is also important what kind of access do people and services have to the urban transport system. High-quality infrastructure is needed in cities, which should include roads, bicycles routes, trains, buses, public areas, car parks, bus stops, terminals, etc. Proper public transport is of good quality, it is effective, accessible, has appropriate density between the vehicles, it is fast, reliable and comfortable. More attention should be paid to the combination of different transport methods. Accordingly, the demands of the passengers should be satisfied, the basic rights of passengers should be determined, especially that of the disabled. Public transport should adequately satisfy the basic mobility needs, and has to be competitive with cars. The European Commission can play an important role in promoting various innovative solutions such as support of rapid bus services instead of costly development of the rail transport or the support of special areas for taxis in the public transport network. In addition to this, guidelines are needed concerning the intermodal terminals. It should be clear that urban public transport must stay attractive also to the highly skilled workforce. Effective and environmentally friendly transport should also be provided in areas where significant outskirts and suburbs are presented (in other words, where workplaces, residential and free time areas are remote).

The last challenge is the development of safe ways of urban transport. In this area, transport mentality should be changed. In 2005, more than 40.000 people lost their life on the roads. On the other hand, inauguration of safer vehicles, enhancing visibility, the better protection of public areas should be included in this subject. In addition to this, large trucks and cars should be excluded from city centres.

Financial requirements of urban transport are diverse and constant. They include infrastructural investments, investments providing the transfer of passengers, maintenance and management of networks, renewal of the fleet, and diverse campaigns for passengers. In the European Union nearly 53% of the vehicles used in the local transport are older than 20 years of age, and these should be inevitably replaced by 2020. For the successful financing of urban transport financial, legal and fiscal instruments should be jointly utilized.

There are several financial resources available on Community level to support urban transport, such as Structural Funds, Cohesion Funds, loans from the European Investment Bank, or the European Regional Development Fund, the value of which jointly exceed 17 billion Euros. Various sections might be supported by various financial resources. Research for sustainable urban transport was proposed in the seventh framework program for research and development (Green Paper 2007).

The action plan for urban mobility was issued in September 2009. The main activities are grouped in six categories and each of them is linked to consultations in connection to the Green Paper. The first subject is the promotion of integrated policies. The urban transport systems are vey complex (with regards to the relationship between cities and regions, interrelations of certain transport concerns, lack of free spaces in the cities, etc.). An integrated approach is not only relevant from the viewpoint of infrastructural developments, but also due to the fact that issues regarding transportation are connected to environment protection, healthier environment, the planning of area usage, as well as to housing, social and industrial policies. With regards to this, first activity is supposed to be the acceleration of the submission of plans on sustainable urban mobility. The Committee wishes to support cities in creating the above mentioned plans which should include goods and passenger transport as well. The second arrangement is the sustainable urban mobility and regional politics. The Committee is planning the make information about resources that can be utilized from Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds and European Investment Bank more transparent. Related arrangements are the transport and the healthy urban environment. With sustainable mobility it might be contributed to a healthier living environment.

The second subject is focusing on the citizens themselves. Here, highquality and affordable public transport is emphasized (which should also be easily accessible, reliable, etc.). First activity within this is the discussion on the rights of passengers of urban public transport. Discussions are planned to be carried out between the concerned ones. Improved accessibility for the disabled is the next task. There are already successful developments in this subject, such as the low-floor vehicles but the services are not entire, since the access to subway lines are problematic for the handicapped. The improvement of the passenger information system is the third task. The Committee, along with the authorities and the operators are going to come up with the renewed information systems, provided through various communication channels. Access to the green zones is the fourth task. Various legislations are to be examined in order to choose to the most fitting ones for the practice. The fifth task is about the transport habits serving sustainable mobility. For the sake of this, educational, informative and attention-arouser campaigns have important roles; European Mobility Week is a good example of this.

The third subject is a more environmental friendly urban transport. In order to strengthen the role of the new, clean vehicle technologies, decisions must be made on EU-level. In this context the first activities are the research and demonstration projects for the low or zero emission vehicles. In this manner the Committee is supporting the seventh research and technological development program, which is a part of the development of new technologies. Second such activity is the internet guide about clean and energy-saving vehicles. The Committee is planning to develop the homepage dealing with clean and energy-saving vehicles, their market, the corresponding laws and supporting system. The third activity is a study on internalizing external costs in urban relations. Various pricing solutions and their implementations are going be analyzed from the viewpoints of their acceptance by the people, their social consequences, their payout, intelligent transport systems. The fourth task is the information exchange with regards to public transport fees. The Committee is going to support the information flow between the experts and the responsible personnel in the subject of transport pricing.

The fourth subject is the strengthening of the financing. Investments are needed for the exploitation of the advantages of sustainable mobility. These investments are usually covered from local, regional and national funds. The first topic is the optimization of the existing financing funds. In the current programming period, the European Union has detached eight billion Euros for the clean urban transport project. Next step is the surveying of the financial needs in the future. In this context it is being researched how the successful CIVITAS project can be transferred into a so-called CIVITAS FUTURE project.

The fifth subject is the exchange of experience and know-how. Regarding this, the actions of the EU might be definitive with regards to collecting, processing, comparing and distributing statistical and other data and information. Updating of information databases is the first step. The Committee is going to prepare a study on how the collection of such data can be made more effective. The second step is the establishment of urban mobility observatory centres. A virtual forum will be created for urban mobility experts as an urban mobility observatory centre for data transfer. The third step is the participation in international conversations and information transfer. Local and regional authorities all over the world fight the same problems, hence co-operation is needed.

The sixth subject is the optimization of urban mobility. Questions such as interoperability between different transport methods, promotion of more environmental-friendly ways of transport, affordable and family friendly public transport belong here. Especially focused are the alternative methods of transportation. The first step is the optimization of urban cargo transport. The Committee would like to solve the problems of the transport on its last kilometres, so that it is smoothened out and integrated into the urban traffic. The second step is to form intelligent ways of transportation for the sake of urban mobility. The guidelines are going to detail electronic ticketing systems, traffic management, passenger information systems, regulation of supplies and demands and going to deal with the opportunities offered by the Galileo System (Plan for Urban Mobility 2009).

Than visible a number document, a strategy and a development concept were made in European Union in the course of the past years. Common in them, that similar aims are designated for the optimisation of the urban traffic. It is emphasized in all documents the dissemination of environment protective means of transportation, the applying of equal opportunity in wider circle and the application of leader system with tall technical standard. There may be good examples for our homeland too, and use the union strategies as a guide the Hungarian cities to the development of development plans.

### **CONCLUSION FOR THE HUNGARIAN CITIES**

In Hungary, the rate of public transport within transport sections is high, compared to the European average. The situation of the country and its population is standing in the background of this phenomenon (low motorization level and low GDP per person). Currently, the public transport network density and frequency is significantly better in the Hungarian cities than the European average. However, in order to keep up with this ratio, public transport has to stay competitive with personal transport.

Statistical data tell a lot about the current traffic situation in a given country. The diagram below shows that since the beginning of the nineties, Hungary is in a leading position among countries with similar number of inhabitants, when it comes to public transport. In the first half of the examined period it is still Greece being on the first place among such countries. It is easy to see from the diagram, that public transport plays a significantly less important role in the developed countries and also in the EU-average (with ca. 10 %, Figure 3).



The role of urban transport in the politics of the European Union and its Hungarian... 193

(Source: Eurostat)

Taken a look at the rate of change among the countries joined in 2004, then it can be noticed that Hungary has been at the first place since 2004 among these countries as well (taking over the lead from Bulgaria). Public transport also represents a high ratio in Slovakia and in Estonia. Unfortunately these indicators are not necessarily connected with the improvement of public transport (Figure 4).



With regards to the rate of automobiles in passenger transport among countries with ca. ten million inhabitants and among the countries joined in 2004, it becomes obvious why Hungary is in a good position from the viewpoint of public transport. Out of the countries joined in 2004, automobile usage has significantly increased in Poland, Romania and Slovakia. Smaller decrease might be observed in developed member states (i.e. in Belgium or in Portugal) or the high rates are constant. However, in Hungary the rate of automobiles has hardly increased, or even decreased in the past few years, ending up at 62 per cent currently, leaving Hungary at the last place on this list (Figure 5). Upon evaluation of the trends, it is expected that the increasing tendencies will continue, the rate of personal transport will increase and the role of public transport will further decrease.



Especially the number of bus passengers decreased in Hungary after 2000, while a moderate increase can be noticed by tram transport users until 2005 thanks to the modernization. Considering other ways of transport, the number of passengers has not changed significantly (Figure 6).



(Source: KSH)

The decrease in the ratio of public transport can be explained by a significant reduction in the satisfaction of the passengers, which can be lead back to the mitigated attractiveness of public transport. The dissatisfaction can be explained by the quality of the service and with the significant increase in the

fares of service. Background of this is the increasing pressure on transport companies, or the continuously unsatisfactory financing of them. The increasing demands should be satisfied from decreasing budgets. Technological developments and investments cannot be initiated under such circumstances (Farkas-Hagymási-Nagy, 2010).

Soon after the change of the regime the legal regulation of transport development was created and the country's EU-bid played an important role in it already in the early nineties. The transport politics of the Government of the Republic of Hungary was written in 1993-1994 and the Hungarian Parliament accepted it in 1996. The document determines five strategic directions, these being the support of the integration into the European Union, improved cooperation with the neighbouring countries, balancing the regional development of the country, protection of human life and environment, as well as an efficient, market-oriented transport regulation. Among the priorities of the urban transport, the reduction of the mitigated usage of public transport is being mentioned, which phenomenon is related to the modernization of the vehicle fleet, to the establishment of P+R facilities, bicycle-depositories and transport associations as well as to the development of various fare zones. Several other priorities were also being listed, such as the reduction of the traffic of cars in densely populated areas and holiday settlements, the development of pedestrian zones, or the development of comprehensive parking regulations and reduced traffic zones (Ehrlich, É., 1999.).

The development path of the Hungarian transport and its quantitative and qualitative components are affected by how socio-economic developments are influencing the settlement structure, the settlement network layout and to the relationships within the transport methods, or to the economic opportunities and political wills. The principal aim is that the relationship between mobility and sustainable development is being formed in such a way that the increased mobility should end up in "urban friendly" transport systems. In order to achieve this, the work tasks within transportation need to be reallocated, so that the major part of the society also accepts them (Berényi, J., 2002).

In order to that the transport companies could serve the growing demands of the passengers, easily understandable and predictable regulations are needed. The customer's expectations and autonomies of the board need to be synchronized. An important condition of the service is the improvement of the sources supplying with increasing quality devices. Gained values need to be kept and the opportunity of personnel development needs to be provided. Crossfinanced funds are the main basis and deposit of the companies standing on safe feet. (Borbélyné, Sz.H., 2004).

The modern urban transport is obviously of national interest, since the board and management of multinational companies will not live in "uninhabitable" Hungarian cities and this is making a very important influence on the foreign capital investments in Hungary.

The document with the title Hungarian Transport Policy 2003-2015 is determining that cities ought to develop separate urban transport policy conceptions. Obviously, this section belongs to the competency of local governments, but the professional representation of interests and urban alliances require the handling of the transportation problems in a government level which would secure the cities being more inhabitable.

A paper prepared by the government includes the pillars of the EU Thematic Strategy on the technical aspects of sustainable transport planning. The document is dedicating an important role for the participation of the state and there is a special chapter on the importance of social dialogue. When preparing the named document, the professional requirements for transport development in the settlement layouts need to be taken into account. The Hungarian Transport Politics defines the following tasks of the state in order to reduce the issues of urban transport. The transport politics should be coordinated by the urban transport development plans of the cities. The free usage of bypass-roads and other ring roads have to be assured for the sake of environment protection and reduction the risk of accidents. It is also necessary to ensure the attractiveness and competitiveness of the public transport with the support of its functionality and modernization, as well as with the reimbursing the lack of incomes and with up-to-date traffic management. Establishing modern city-logistics systems, operating transport alliances, installation of smart ticketing, as well as the usage of public transport inspired fees are musts. The coordination of urban, suburban, intercity and private transport with intermodal and telemetric systems is essential. The support of bicycle transport and improved accessibility shall be supported on state level.

Hungary did not apply for any kind of postponement in the area of public transport when it joined the EU. In accordance to the EU requirements, the satisfaction of transport needs, reduction of road congestions and environment pollution and diminishing the excluding of any group of people from the transport are being formulated as key aims. A key element of current EU regulations is the obligation of informing the people. In this context the importance of cost reductions and the improvement of the quality can be highlighted. The EU determines when contracts can be made (exclusive competence, free service), as well as the forms of contract (on the basis of service requirements, direct awarding and qualitative comparison).

In the Hungarian passenger transport, the appearance of foreign companies was expected when joining the EU – along with privatization. However this trend cannot be noticed so far in the towns with county rights.

Particular tasks were also given in connection with the EU membership. The most important task is the modification of the conditions of awarding licenses and concessions, which is coupled with the inauguration of deadlines in this area. The operating areas of companies established with this objective shall be defined and the relationships of the authorities and services must be fixed in contracts. The EU would expect the separation of local and long distance transports for the sake of easier management and budgetary reasons. The measurement of the support of the state is also necessary in order to find out whether it is still within the EU allowance. Such support can be i.e. the reimbursement of the tax on the diesel fuels or the expenses of the employer. The EU demanded that every passenger company should be in contract with the state, however this was only a temporary situation since 3 years after Hungary's joining the EU, and the Community also planned various modifications in this area (Ehrlich É. 2003.).

As a summary, it can be stated that in Hungary, similar trends can be experienced in the area of transport, as in the other member states of the EU. This means that the role of individual transport is increasing against public transport. The documents on transport development are formulating similar goals and tools in Hungary as well (i.e. sustainable mobility, conserving the environmental resources, paying charges, building bus lanes, etc.) However, Hungary is still in a more problematic situation, since on one hand the EU regulations need to be adopted (i.e. concession contracts), and on the other hand the operation and development may be found more difficult due to the worse financial situation.

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Submitted:	Revised:	Accepted:	Published online:
July, 12, 2011	July, 14, 2011	August 31, 2011	November 30, 2011

ISSN 1454-2749. E-ISSN 2065-1619

### ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR OF EUROPEAN ELECTORS **IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS (1979-2009)**

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**Abstract**: The paper aims to highlight the features of European voters behavior at the European elections, based on the correlation between political-electoral variables (voter turnout, political options) and various social, demographic and economic indicators (population density, urban population rate, professional structure of population, active population rate, unemployment rate, gross domestic product per capita, parity purchase power included, etc.). These particularities are highlighted with the aid of a combination between the principal component analysis and the hierarchical ascendant classification.

Key words: electoral behavior, European elections, political-electoral variables, social, demographic and economic indicators, principal component analysis, hierarchic ascendant classification

\* \* \* \* \* \*

### **INTRODUCTION**

We intend to highlight the chrono-spatial distribution of the particularities of the vote in European Parliament elections (turnout, Europeans voters' political choices) by the correlation of political-electoral variables with different social, demographic and economic indicators (the population density, the share of urban population, the professional structure of the population, the share of active population, the unemployment rate, the GDP per capita, including purchasing power parity, etc.).

#### WORK METHODOLOGY

As problems we mentioned that, before 2004, some election information was obtained through hard. Also, the variability of the administrative European divisions imposed to recalculate data for earlier periods. The differences in detail of the data and the fact that some indicators are presented in a more general level, required submission of all statistical information at NUTS 2 level of the European Union<sup>1</sup>. Please note that all statistical information was brought to mapping, in percentage format.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Over time, there have been changes in the number and size of administrative units of the Member States. The data have been made, but the current administration divisionsfor the member

The working methodology comprises two categories of methods: methods of data collection and analysis methods and interpretation. We used as a source the Yearbook of Statistical Office of the EC/EU (Eurostat) for both the electoral data (the 1979 and 1984) and for the data on other indicators (with informations covering the period before 1990), works published by the European Parliament (on the European elections of 1989), the site of the Norwegian Social Data Service (detailed data about the European elections for the years 1994 to 2009), the site of the European Parliament, the European electoral institutions, the Eurostat website, the statistical database of CUGUAT-TIGRIS, personal calculations. The program used is Microsoft Excel 2007.

The methods of interpretation and analysis are mapping method, geographical method. For the mapping of statistical information we used the Philcarto program, the maps were processed in Adobe Illustrator. As mapping methods we used the hierarchical ascending classification and the principal components analysis, combined. Please note that, as the correlation coefficients between election variables and/or between other indicators, the resulted cartographic material from principal components analysis highlights the main trends of the countries/regions mentioned, not have an exhaustive character.

# CORRELATION BETWEEN THE ELECTORAL VARIABLES AND THE SOCIAL, DEMOGRAPHIC AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS

In 1979, voter turnout has been higher in regions with voters of the Communists, Christian Democrats and non-inscrits of administrative units with a high percentage of activity in agriculture, high unemployment rate (Italy, Greece, without Attica, south-east Belgium, and Northern Ireland). With the Communists and Christian Democrats voted especially regions with a significant proportion of activity in agriculture and where the unemployment rate reaches above the European average (especially in Italy and Greece).

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	Elect pres 1979/1981 %	COM 1979/1981 %	SOC 1979/1981 %	LD 1979/1981 %	CD 1979/1981 %	C 1979/1981 %	DP 1979/1981 %	NI/Aut 1979/1981 %	Urban ok % 1978	Dens pop % 1979	agr % 1979	ind % 1979	serv % 1979	som tot % 1979	pop act tot % 1979	PIB (ecu/loc) ok % 1978	PIB (ecu/loc- ppc) ok % 1978
Elect pres 1979/1981 %	1	0.496	-0.194	-0.191	0.579	-0.747	0	0.305	-0.036	-0.111	0.386	-0.279	-0.209	0.212	-0.298	0.042	-0.101
COM 1979/1981 %	0.496	1	-0.43	0.005	-0.039	-0.417	0.27	0.135	-0.203	-0.198	0.429	-0.361	-0.179	0.351	-0.225	-0.344	-0.319
SOC 1979/1981 %	-0.194	-0.43	1	-0.221	0.059	0.172	-0.267	-0.482	0.12	-0.033	-0.012	0.222	-0.217	-0.369	0.385	0.118	0.086
LD 1979/1981 %	-0.191	0.005	-0.221	1	-0.554	0.088	0.515	0.063	0.277	-0.005	-0.331	0.072	0.353	0.168	0.031	0.303	0.311
CD 1979/1981 %	0.579	-0.039	0.059	-0.554	1	-0.617	-0.365	-0.031	-0.108	-0.027	0.21	0	-0.271	-0.161	-0.364	0.213	0.049
C 1979/1981 %	-0.747	-0.417	0.172	0.088	-0.617	1	-0.219	-0.352	0.173	0.037	-0.364	0.274	0.185	-0.175	0.377	-0.288	-0.088
DP 1979/1981 %	0	0.27	-0.267	0.515	-0.365	-0.219	1	0.082	-0.053	-0.15	0.096	-0.102	-0.018	0.299	0.035	0.04	0.003
NI/Aut 1979/1981 %	0.305	0.135	-0.482	0.063	-0.031	-0.352	0.082	1	-0.034	-0.01	0.111	-0.323	0.194	0.339	-0.237	0.01	-0.031
Urban ok % 1978	-0.036	-0.203	0.12	0.277	-0.108	0.173	-0.053	-0.034	1	0.166	-0.556	0.331	0.375	0.032	-0.065	0.362	0.411
Dens pop % 1979	-0.111	-0.198	-0.033	-0.005	-0.027	0.037	-0.15	-0.01	0.166	1	-0.275	-0.042	0.401	0.029	0.01	0.404	0.448
agr % 1979	0.386	0.429	-0.012	-0.331	0.21	-0.364	0.096	0.111	-0.556	-0.275	1	-0.654	-0.614	0.073	0.191	-0.494	-0.599
ind % 1979	-0.279	-0.361	0.222	0.072	0	0.274	-0.102	-0.323	0.331	-0.042	-0.654	1	-0.196	-0.293	0.024	0.294	0.38
serv % 1979	-0.209	-0.179	-0.217	0.353	-0.271	0.185	-0.018	0.194	0.375	0.401	-0.614	-0.196	1	0.211	-0.275	0.333	0.38
som tot % 1979	0.212	0.351	-0.369	0.168	-0.161	-0.175	0.299	0.339	0.032	0.029	0.073	-0.293	0.211	1	-0.351	-0.141	-0.21
pop act tot % 1979	-0.298	-0.225	0.385	0.031	-0.364	0.377	0.035	-0.237	-0.065	0.01	0.191	0.024	-0.275	-0.351	1	-0.047	-0.021
PIB (ecu/loc) ok % 1978	0.042	-0.344	0.118	0.303	0.213	-0.288	0.04	0.01	0.362	0.404	-0.494	0.294	0.333	-0.141	-0.047	1	0.935
PIB (ecu/loc-ppc) ok % 1978	-0.101	-0.319	0.086	0.311	0.049	-0.088	0.003	-0.031	0.411	0.448	-0.599	0.38	0.38	-0.21	-0.021	0.935	1

**Table 1.** Correlation between the electoral variables and the social,<br/>demographic and economic indicators (1979/1981)(Data source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat;

countries at that time. Were taken into account – including all European Elections – the elections in the countries that joined the EU after the term (Greece – in 1981 for the 1979 election, Spain and Portugal – in 1987 for 1984, Sweden – in 1995, Finland Austria – in 1996 for 1994, Bulgaria and Romania – In 2007, for the European elections in 2004).

With the Socialists were voted regions significant percentage of active population with high weight and active in the secondary (West Germany, eastern Denmark, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, a large part of Belgium) (Table 1<sup>2</sup>). Around the same features they have and what voters preferred the conservative (England, Wales and Scotland) (figure 1). The European Liberals and Democrats, the progressive Democrats were preferred by the urban voters, active in the tertiary sector and having a GDP per capita above average (located in France, Ireland and Denmark).



Figure 1. Distribution of votes in the election for the European Parliament correlated with social-economic indicators (1979/1981). Principal component analysis and hierarchical ascendant classification. (Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/)

<sup>2</sup> Abbreviations used in the tables: Elect pres = Voter turnout: COM = Communist Group: GUE = United European Left; UG = United Left; GUE-NGL = United European Left-Nordic Green Left; SOC = Socialist Group; PSE = Party of European Socialists; APSDE = Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats; ARE = European Radical Assembly; ARC = Rainbow Group; V = Green Group; V-ALE = The Greens-European Free Alliance; PVE-ALE = European Greens Party-European Free Alliance; LD = Liberal and Democrat Group; LDRE = European Liberal, Democratic and Reformist Group; ALDE = Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; CD = Christian Democratic Group; PPE-CD = European People Party-Christian Democratic; PPE-DE = European People Party-European Democrats; PPE = European People Party; C = Conservative Group; CRE = European Conservatives and Reformists; DP = Progressive Democrats; DE = European Democrats; RDE = European Democrats Alliance; UPE = Union for Europe; UEN = Union for Europe of Nations; IEN = Independents for a Europe of Nations; EDD = Europe of Democracies and Diversities; ID = Independence-Democracy; ELD = Europe of Freedom and Democracy; DR = European Right; IST = Identity, Tradition, Soverignity; GTI = Technical Group of the Independents; NI/Aut = Non Inscrits/Others; Urban ok = Urban Population; Dens pop = Population Density; agr = primary sector; ind = secondary sector; serv = tertiary sector; pop act = Active Population; PIB (ecu/loc) = GDP (Gross Domestic Product) (in European currency unit - ecu per capita); PIB (ecu/loc-ppc) = GDP (in ecu per capita – parity power purchase). All the date was converted in %.

# **Table 2.** Correlation between the electoral variables and the social,<br/>demographic and economic indicators (1984/1986)

(Data source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat;

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	Elect pres 1984/1986 %	COM 1984/1986 %	SOC 1984/1986 %	ARC 1984/1986 %	LD 1984/1986 %	PPE-CD 1984/1986 %	DE 1984/1986 %	RDE 1984/1986 %	DR 1984/1986 %	NI/Aut 1984/1986 %	Urban ok % 1983	Dens pop % 1983	agr % 1984	ind % 1984	serv % 1984	som tot % 1983	pop act tot % 1984	PIB (ecu/loc) ok % 1983	PIB (ecu/loc- ppc) ok % 1983
Elect pres 1984/1986 %	1	0.535	-0.179	0.216	-0.271	0.454	-0.573	-0.158	0.184	0.192	-0.043	-0.092	0.35	-0.104	-0.286	-0.267	-0.564	-0.333	-0.262
COM 1984/1986 %	0.535	1	-0.464	-0.118	-0.262	0.141	-0.352	0.031	0.54	-0.076	-0.166	-0.123	0.233	-0.134	-0.155	-0.088	-0.298	-0.324	-0.25
SOC 1984/1986 %	-0.179	-0.464	1	-0.21	-0.152	-0.092	0.266	-0.323	-0.491	-0.13	0.161	0.047	0.076	-0.042	-0.115	0.063	-0.066	-0.043	-0.062
ARC 1984/1986 %	0.216	-0.118	-0.21	1	0.02	0.244	-0.399	0.09	0.04	-0.021	0.297	0.099	-0.338	0.074	0.316	0.198	0.061	0.56	0.472
LD 1984/1986 %	-0.271	-0.262	-0.152	0.02	1	-0.444	0.282	0.028	-0.134	-0.147	0.126	0.043	-0.204	-0.043	0.279	0.135	0.399	0.066	0.087
PPE-CD 1984/1986 %	0.454	0.141	-0.092	0.244	-0.444	1	-0.692	-0.253	-0.04	-0.126	-0.196	-0.114	0.139	0.202	-0.225	-0.07	-0.264	0.064	-0.046
DE 1984/1986 %	-0.573	-0.352	0.266	-0.399	0.282	-0.692	1	-0.201	-0.366	-0.101	0.171	0.035	-0.125	-0.05	0.126	-0.012	0.344	-0.094	0.003
RDE 1984/1986 %	-0.158	0.031	-0.323	0.09	0.028	-0.253	-0.201	1	0.588	0.065	-0.042	-0.146	-0.063	-0.011	0.089	0.144	0.129	0.122	0.07
DR 1984/1986 %	0.184	0.54	-0.491	0.04	-0.134	-0.04	-0.366	0.588	1	-0.043	-0.036	-0.152	0.03	-0.092	0.055	0.064	-0.148	0.001	-0.005
NI/Aut 1984/1986 %	0.192	-0.076	-0.13	-0.021	-0.147	-0.126	-0.101	0.065	-0.043	1	-0.024	0.035	0.113	-0.011	-0.142	-0.279	-0.222	-0.171	-0.09
Urban ok % 1983	-0.043	-0.166	0.161	0.297	0.126	-0.196	0.171	-0.042	-0.036	-0.024	1	0.236	-0.517	0.065	0.387	0.12	0.001	0.359	0.4
Dens pop % 1983	-0.092	-0.123	0.047	0.099	0.043	-0.114	0.035	-0.146	-0.152	0.035	0.236	1	-0.242	-0.295	0.171	0.025	-0.135	0.223	0.25
agr % 1984	0.35	0.233	0.076	-0.338	-0.204	0.139	-0.125	-0.063	0.03	0.113	-0.517	-0.242	1	-0.343	-0.71	-0.399	-0.146	-0.653	-0.635
ind % 1984	-0.104	-0.134	-0.042	0.074	-0.043	0.202	-0.05	-0.011	-0.092	-0.011	0.065	-0.295	-0.343	1	-0.113	-0.016	0.214	0.243	0.216
serv % 1984	-0.286	-0.155	-0.115	0.316	0.279	-0.225	0.126	0.089	0.055	-0.142	0.387	0.171	-0.71	-0.113	1	0.484	0.089	0.554	0.556
som tot % 1983	-0.267	-0.088	0.063	0.198	0.135	-0.07	-0.012	0.144	0.064	-0.279	0.12	0.025	-0.399	-0.016	0.484	1	0.134	0.363	0.282
pop act tot % 1984	-0.564	-0.298	-0.066	0.061	0.399	-0.264	0.344	0.129	-0.148	-0.222	0.001	-0.135	-0.146	0.214	0.089	0.134	1	0.26	0.179
PIB (ecu/loc) ok % 1983	-0.333	-0.324	-0.043	0.56	0.066	0.064	-0.094	0.122	0.001	-0.171	0.359	0.223	-0.653	0.243	0.554	0.363	0.26	1	0.952
PIB (ecu/loc-ppc) ok % 1983	-0.262	-0.25	-0.062	0.472	0.087	-0.046	0.003	0.07	-0.005	-0.09	0.4	0.25	-0.635	0.216	0.556	0.282	0.179	0.952	1



Figure 2. Distribution of votes in the election for the European Parliament correlated with social-economic indicators (1984/1986). Principal component analysis and hierarchical ascendant classification. (Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/)

In 1984, the participation to the vote has been important among voters that he voted for the Communists, the Greens and the European People Party, in regions with large shares of the actives in the primary sector and rate of unemployment above European average (Italy, France, and Ireland) (Table 2). The Communists have been preferred by voters in regions with a large proportion of the actives in the primary sector (particularly in Italy and France), the same who voted with the European extreme right. The Socialists were voted into the same regions as the European Democrats, received the strongest support from the administrative units with significant share of the active population (England, Wales and Scotland).

The ecologists have been supported in areas with high percentage of urban population, working in the tertiary sector and with an GDP per capita above average (Denmark, West Germany, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Catalonia, Madrid) (Figure 2).

The European Liberals and Democrats received support from voters in regions with significant shares of the economically active population, where a good part of it is engaged in the tertiary sector (United Kingdom). The Assembly of European Democrats received support from the same region as the far right (France).

The year 1989 was highlighted by significant participation in voting in areas where voters have voted mostly with the European United Left, with ecologists and/or with the European People Party, regions characterized by significant percentages of the actives in the primary sector (Greece, southern Italy, a big part of Spain, Portugal and much of the Netherlands). The communist far left was divided into two groups: the European United Left (supported by voters in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal) and Left Unity (passed in France, mainly active in the primary sector), the latter being preferred in the same administrative units as the Assembly of European Democrats (Figure 3).

The Socialists, and European Democrats, received the electoral support of voters in regions with large percentages of urban population (United Kingdom, western Netherlands, Denmark, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Hamburg, Bremen). The ecologists have been backed by a predominantly urban electorate, with a standard of living above the European average, was voted in the same regions as the European Liberals and Democrats, the extreme right and / or the European People Party (West Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, northern Italy, Madrid) (Table 3).

**Table 3.** Correlation between the electoral variables and the social, demographic and economic indicators (1989)

 (Data source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat;

http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/)

	Elect pres 1989 %	GUE 1989 %	UG 1989 %	SOC 1989 %	V 1989 %	ARC 1989 %	LD 1989 %	PPE-CD 1989 %	DE 1989	RDE 1989 %	DR 1989 %	NI/Aut 1989 %	Urban ok % 1988	Dens pop % 1988	agr % 1989	ind % 1989	serv % 1989	som tot % 1989	pop act tot % 1989	PIB (ecu/loc) ok % 1988	PIB (ecu/loc- ppc) ok % 1988
Elect pres 1989 %	1	0.441	0.082	-0.05	0.386	0.032	0.147	0.696	-0.482	-0.078	-0.004	-0.333	0.122	-0.162	0.273	0.049	-0.305	-0.122	-0.581	0.04	0.077
GUE 1989 %	0.441	1	-0.153	-0.333	0.022	0.153	-0.132	0.236	-0.199	-0.161	-0.262	-0.118	-0.049	-0.117	0.149	-0.103	-0.066	0.168	-0.33	-0.008	0.046
UG 1989 %	0.082	-0.153	1	-0.057	0.043	-0.168	0.142	0.015	-0.252	0.449	0.247	-0.205	-0.249	-0.167	0.49	-0.252	-0.284	-0.09	-0.204	-0.383	-0.376
SOC 1989 %	-0.05	-0.333	-0.057	1	-0.247	-0.171	-0.134	-0.119	0.212	-0.266	-0.149	0.172	0.341	0.132	-0.031	0.186	-0.115	0.134	-0.03	-0.062	-0.029
V 1989 %	0.386	0.022	0.043	-0.247	1	-0.068	0.299	0.309	-0.475	0.283	0.546	-0.495	0.236	-0.036	-0.224	0.14	0.112	-0.213	-0.257	0.461	0.423
ARC 1989 %	0.032	0.153	-0.168	-0.171	-0.068	1	-0.008	-0.159	0.074	-0.121	-0.141	-0.017	0.046	-0.065	-0.12	-0.05	0.157	0.007	0.15	0.143	0.129
LD 1989 %	0.147	-0.132	0.142	-0.134	0.299	-0.008	1	0.109	-0.389	0.107	-0.007	-0.257	0.091	-0.01	0.052	-0.099	0.025	-0.048	-0.098	-0.054	-0.054
PPE-CD 1989 %	0.696	0.236	0.015	-0.119	0.309	-0.159	0.109	1	-0.689	-0.107	0.17	-0.501	-0.085	-0.17	0.345	0.066	-0.388	-0.13	-0.494	0.003	-0.034
DE 1989 %	-0.482	-0.199	-0.252	0.212	-0.475	0.074	-0.389	-0.689	1	-0.181	-0.284	0.651	0.159	0.142	-0.336	0.08	0.266	-0.105	0.596	0.063	0.126
RDE 1989 %	-0.078	-0.161	0.449	-0.266	0.283	-0.121	0.107	-0.107	-0.181	1	0.472	-0.224	-0.055	-0.128	0.063	-0.037	-0.032	0.101	-0.059	0.046	-0.006
DR 1989 %	-0.004	-0.262	0.247	-0.149	0.546	-0.141	-0.007	0.17	-0.284	0.472	1	-0.392	0.127	-0.108	-0.162	0.319	-0.086	-0.231	0.056	0.4	0.3
NI/Aut 1989 %	-0.333	-0.118	-0.205	0.172	-0.495	-0.017	-0.257	-0.501	0.651	-0.224	-0.392	1	0.126	0.11	-0.169	0.012	0.155	0.2	0.241	-0.13	-0.025
Urban ok % 1988	0.122	-0.049	-0.249	0.341	0.236	0.046	0.091	-0.085	0.159	-0.055	0.127	0.126	1	0.293	-0.495	0.235	0.302	0.044	0.001	0.428	0.47
Dens pop % 1988	-0.162	-0.117	-0.167	0.132	-0.036	-0.065	-0.01	-0.17	0.142	-0.128	-0.108	0.11	0.293	1	-0.287	-0.152	0.397	0.221	0.06	0.251	0.301
agr % 1989	0.273	0.149	0.49	-0.031	-0.224	-0.12	0.052	0.345	-0.336	0.063	-0.162	-0.169	-0.495	-0.287	1	-0.365	-0.697	0.056	-0.316	-0.63	-0.616
ind % 1989	0.049	-0.103	-0.252	0.186	0.14	-0.05	-0.099	0.066	0.08	-0.037	0.319	0.012	0.235	-0.152	-0.365	1	-0.414	-0.357	0.214	0.348	0.336
serv % 1989	-0.305	-0.066	-0.284	-0.115	0.112	0.157	0.025	-0.388	0.266	-0.032	-0.086	0.155	0.302	0.397	-0.697	-0.414	1	0.221	0.143	0.348	0.343
som tot % 1989	-0.122	0.168	-0.09	0.134	-0.213	0.007	-0.048	-0.13	-0.105	0.101	-0.231	0.2	0.044	0.221	0.056	-0.357	0.221	1	-0.442	-0.343	-0.329
pop act tot % 1989	-0.581	-0.33	-0.204	-0.03	-0.257	0.15	-0.098	-0.494	0.596	-0.059	0.056	0.241	0.001	0.06	-0.316	0.214	0.143	-0.442	1	0.315	0.264
PIB (ecu/loc) ok % 1988	0.04	-0.008	-0.383	-0.062	0.461	0.143	-0.054	0.003	0.063	0.046	0.4	-0.13	0.428	0.251	-0.63	0.348	0.348	-0.343	0.315	1	0.967
PIB (ecu/loc-ppc) ok % 1988	0.077	0.046	-0.376	-0.029	0.423	0.129	-0.054	-0.034	0.126	-0.006	0.3	-0.025	0.47	0.301	-0.616	0.336	0.343	-0.329	0.264	0.967	1



# **Figure 3**. Distribution of votes in the election for the European Parliament correlated with social-economic indicators (1989). Principal component analysis and hierarchical ascendant classification.

(Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/)

## **Table 4**. Correlation between the electoral variables and the social,<br/>demographic and economic indicators (1994/1996)

(Data source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/)

	Elect pres 1994/1996 %	GUE 1994/1996 %	PSE 1994/1996 %	V 1994/1996 %	ARE 1994/1996 %	LDRE 1994/1996 %	PPE-DE 1994/1996 %	UPE 1994/1996 %	IEN 1994/1996 %	NI 1994/1996 %	Aut 1994/1996 %	Urban ok % 1993	Dens pop % 1993	agr % 1994	ind % 1994	serv % 1994	som tot % 1994	pop act tot % 1994	PIB (ecu/loc) ok % 1993	PIB (ecu/loc- ppc) ok % 1993
Elect pres 1994/1996 %	1	0.09	-0.172	0.341	-0.118	0.111	0.004	0.214	-0.152	0.371	-0.385	0.056	-0.076	0.158	0.17	-0.278	0.019	-0.375	0.132	0.143
GUE 1994/1996 %	0.09	1	-0.073	-0.17	0.014	-0.068	-0.07	0.22	-0.064	-0.057	-0.308	-0.154	-0.192	0.44	-0.241	-0.199	0.374	-0.171	-0.392	-0.335
PSE 1994/1996 %	-0.172	-0.073	1	-0.128	-0.315	-0.307	0.235	-0.389	-0.392	-0.33	-0.048	0.174	0.194	0.005	0.085	-0.074	-0.075	0.057	-0.192	-0.131
V 1994/1996 %	0.341	-0.17	-0.128	1	-0.225	0.316	0.007	-0.138	-0.153	0.065	-0.227	0.237	0.06	-0.277	0.181	0.101	-0.224	0.325	0.582	0.428
ARE 1994/1996 %	-0.118	0.014	-0.315	-0.225	1	-0.13	-0.399	0.157	0.217	0.137	0.042	-0.13	-0.104	-0.056	-0.13	0.156	0.085	-0.118	-0.012	0.003
LDRE 1994/1996 %	0.111	-0.068	-0.307	0.316	-0.13	1	-0.24	-0.11	0.291	-0.017	-0.339	0.116	0.006	-0.155	-0.206	0.305	-0.056	0.189	0.228	0.206
PPE-DE 1994/1996 %	0.004	-0.07	0.235	0.007	-0.399	-0.24	1	-0.459	-0.376	-0.37	-0.026	0.021	0.065	0.078	0.244	-0.268	0.007	-0.068	-0.095	-0.13
UPE 1994/1996 %	0.214	0.22	-0.389	-0.138	0.157	-0.11	-0.459	1	0.037	0.36	-0.25	-0.275	-0.162	0.299	-0.135	-0.158	0.06	-0.419	-0.184	-0.089
IEN 1994/1996 %	-0.152	-0.064	-0.392	-0.153	0.217	0.291	-0.376	0.037	1	0.057	-0.017	0.044	-0.106	-0.091	-0.152	0.204	-0.019	0.044	0.204	0.11
NI 1994/1996 %	0.371	-0.057	-0.33	0.065	0.137	-0.017	-0.37	0.36	0.057	1	-0.291	0.011	-0.024	0.002	0.035	-0.03	0.01	-0.05	0.157	0.165
Aut 1994/1996 %	-0.385	-0.308	-0.048	-0.227	0.042	-0.339	-0.026	-0.25	-0.017	-0.291	1	-0.057	0.049	-0.218	0.102	0.113	-0.049	0.228	-0.002	-0.019
Urban ok % 1993	0.056	-0.154	0.174	0.237	-0.13	0.116	0.021	-0.275	0.044	0.011	-0.057	1	0.395	-0.52	0.077	0.403	0.014	0.089	0.407	0.459
Dens pop % 1993	-0.076	-0.192	0.194	0.06	-0.104	0.006	0.065	-0.162	-0.106	-0.024	0.049	0.395	1	-0.276	-0.202	0.41	0.149	-0.012	0.244	0.323
agr % 1994	0.158	0.44	0.005	-0.277	-0.056	-0.155	0.078	0.299	-0.091	0.002	-0.218	-0.52	-0.276	1	-0.312	-0.642	0.073	-0.302	-0.56	-0.548
ind % 1994	0.17	-0.241	0.085	0.181	-0.13	-0.206	0.244	-0.135	-0.152	0.035	0.102	0.077	-0.202	-0.312	1	-0.528	-0.2	0.137	0.249	0.176
serv % 1994	-0.278	-0.199	-0.074	0.101	0.156	0.305	-0.268	-0.158	0.204	-0.03	0.113	0.403	0.41	-0.642	-0.528	1	0.096	0.158	0.299	0.348
som tot % 1994	0.019	0.374	-0.075	-0.224	0.085	-0.056	0.007	0.06	-0.019	0.01	-0.049	0.014	0.149	0.073	-0.2	0.096	1	-0.329	-0.356	-0.351
pop act tot % 1994	-0.375	-0.171	0.057	0.325	-0.118	0.189	-0.068	-0.419	0.044	-0.05	0.228	0.089	-0.012	-0.302	0.137	0.158	-0.329	1	0.335	0.24
PIB (ecu/loc) ok % 1993	0.132	-0.392	-0.192	0.582	-0.012	0.228	-0.095	-0.184	0.204	0.157	-0.002	0.407	0.244	-0.56	0.249	0.299	-0.356	0.335	1	0.934
PIB (ecu/loc-ppc) ok % 1993	0.143	-0.335	-0.131	0.428	0.003	0.206	-0.13	-0.089	0.11	0.165	-0.019	0.459	0.323	-0.548	0.176	0.348	-0.351	0.24	0.934	1

In 1994, the most active supporters voted with the ecologists and/or the Union for Europe (Italy, a large part of France, northern Scotland). The extreme left has received voter support in regions with a significant percentage of actives in the primary sector and a high unemployment rate (Greece, Spain, Portugal, a large part of Finland). The European socialists have been supported mainly by voters in regions with a high percentage of activity in the secondary sector, the same as the European People Party (southern Finland, Germany, eastern Austria, Spain, England) (Figure 4).

The ecologists have received the support of regions with an urban electorate, with a proportion of the active population above-average and with an GDP above European average (Sweden, Denmark, German-land cities – Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen – Western Austria, Ile de France, Luxembourg, Belgium, Netherlands, southern Scotland, Northern Ireland). The European Radical Alliance, the group of Independents for a Europe of Nations and the European Democrats and liberals have been chosen by an electorate more actively in the tertiary sector and with an GDP per capita above the average (generally in the same regions where the ecologists have been supported) (Table 4).



**Figure 4**. Distribution of votes in the election for the European Parliament correlated with social-economic indicators (1994/1996). Principal component analysis and hierarchical ascendant classification.

(Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/)

The year 1999 brought to the polls than the average, the supporters of the Technical Group of Independents (with an ephemeral existence), in regions with a significant proportion of activity in the primary sector (Italy, France, Belgium). The extreme left has received support from the electorate especially in regions where, besides the significant weight of the active primary sector, is remarkable and a notable unemployment rate (Greece, Spain, Portugal, the former German Democratic Republic) (Figure 5).

The Socialists and the European People Party have been sustained by the voters of the regions with a significant percentage in the secondary sector (Greece, Spain, Portugal, and eastern Germany). The ecologists and / or regionalists, the liberal group and the group of Europe of Democracy and Diversity party received the support of the electorate in areas where significant

shares of the actives is recorded in the tertiary sector, with a high GDP per capita (United Kingdom, Ile de France, Brussels, Netherlands, Denmark, Luxembourg, Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin, southern Sweden, Finland). The Union for Europe of the Nations has received more votes in regions where the average unemployment rate exceeds the European average, the same as the Technical Group of Independents (Table 5).

**Table 5**. Correlation between the electoral variables and the social, demographic and economic indicators (1999) (Data source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat;

			n	tp:/	/ww	w.ns	a.un	).no/	euro	opear	n_eie	ectior	1_dai	tabas	se/)					
	Elect pres 1999 %	GUE- NGL 1999 %	PSE 1999 %	V-ALE 1999 %	LDRE 1999 %	PPE-DE 1999 %	UEN 1999 %	EDD 1999 %	GTI 1999 %	NI 1999 %	Aut 1999 %	Urban ok % 1998	Dens pop % 1998	agr % 1999	ind % 1999	serv % 1999	som tot % 1999	pop act tot % 1999	PIB (eur/loc) ok % 1998	PIB (eur/loc- ppc) ok % 1998
Elect pres 1999 %	1	0.152	-0.055	-0.031	-0.138	0.047	0.118	-0.353	0.409	0.037	0.054	0.019	-0.09	0.235	0.12	-0.146	0.171	-0.288	-0.138	0.011
GUE-NGL 1999 %	0.152	1	0.072	-0.301	-0.196	-0.2	0.137	-0.095	0.039	-0.189	0.02	-0.232	-0.152	0.39	-0.184	-0.094	0.42	-0.081	-0.296	-0.287
PSE 1999 %	-0.055	0.072	1	-0.274	-0.429	0.195	-0.296	-0.266	-0.372	0.063	0.049	0.069	0.114	0.175	0.101	-0.071	0.127	0.017	-0.207	-0.18
V-ALE 1999 %	-0.031	-0.301	-0.274	1	0.25	-0.317	-0.162	-0.025	0.058	0.021	-0.115	0.153	0.07	-0.295	-0.083	0.303	-0.157	0.317	0.271	0.238
LDRE 1999 %	-0.138	-0.196	-0.429	0.25	1	-0.408	-0.162	0.442	-0.002	-0.157	-0.217	0.191	0.038	-0.271	-0.203	0.37	-0.292	0.271	0.284	0.242
PPE-DE 1999 %	0.047	-0.2	0.195	-0.317	-0.408	1	-0.202	-0.362	-0.196	-0.097	-0.146	-0.04	0.01	0.06	0.35	-0.186	0.072	0.043	-0.072	-0.045
UEN 1999 %	0.118	0.137	-0.296	-0.162	-0.162	-0.202	1	0.098	0.351	-0.128	-0.032	-0.185	-0.141	0.133	0.026	-0.087	0.22	-0.268	-0.108	-0.09
EDD 1999 %	-0.353	-0.095	-0.266	-0.025	0.442	-0.362	0.098	1	-0.086	-0.14	-0.101	0.155	0.001	-0.219	-0.179	0.307	-0.215	0.208	0.178	0.096
GTI 1999 %	0.409	0.039	-0.372	0.058	-0.002	-0.196	0.351	-0.086	1	-0.1	-0.142	0.078	-0.047	-0.067	0.101	-0.011	0.049	-0.213	0.057	0.138
NI 1999 %	0.037	-0.189	0.063	0.021	-0.157	-0.097	-0.128	-0.14	-0.1	1	0.014	-0.012	-0.003	-0.017	0.14	-0.081	-0.18	0.04	0.064	0.088
Aut 1999 %	0.054	0.02	0.049	-0.115	-0.217	-0.146	-0.032	-0.101	-0.142	0.014	1	-0.049	0.044	0.082	-0.037	0.016	0.048	-0.089	0.056	0.055
Urban ok % 1998	0.019	-0.232	0.069	0.153	0.191	-0.04	-0.185	0.155	0.078	-0.012	-0.049	1	0.364	-0.559	0.019	0.492	-0.175	0.233	0.433	0.423
Dens pop % 1998	-0.09	-0.152	0.114	0.07	0.038	0.01	-0.141	0.001	-0.047	-0.003	0.044	0.364	1	-0.26	-0.305	0.422	0.087	0.058	0.427	0.46
agr % 1999	0.235	0.39	0.175	-0.295	-0.271	0.06	0.133	-0.219	-0.067	-0.017	0.082	-0.559	-0.26	1	-0.186	-0.563	0.277	-0.284	-0.543	-0.448
ind % 1999	0.12	-0.184	0.101	-0.083	-0.203	0.35	0.026	-0.179	0.101	0.14	-0.037	0.019	-0.305	-0.186	1	-0.443	-0.226	0.233	0.056	0.056
serv % 1999	-0.146	-0.094	-0.071	0.303	0.37	-0.186	-0.087	0.307	-0.011	-0.081	0.016	0.492	0.422	-0.563	-0.443	1	0.045	0.343	0.455	0.409
som tot % 1999	0.171	0.42	0.127	-0.157	-0.292	0.072	0.22	-0.215	0.049	-0.18	0.048	-0.175	0.087	0.277	-0.226	0.045	1	-0.388	-0.417	-0.408
pop act tot % 1999	-0.288	-0.081	0.017	0.317	0.271	0.043	-0.268	0.208	-0.213	0.04	-0.089	0.233	0.058	-0.284	0.233	0.343	-0.388	1	0.442	0.422
PIB (eur/loc) ok % 1998	-0.138	-0.296	-0.207	0.271	0.284	-0.072	-0.108	0.178	0.057	0.064	0.056	0.433	0.427	-0.543	0.056	0.455	-0.417	0.442	1	0.954
PIB (eur/loc-ppc) ok % 1998	0.011	-0.287	-0.18	0.238	0.242	-0.045	-0.09	0.096	0.138	0.088	0.055	0.423	0.46	-0.448	0.056	0.409	-0.408	0.422	0.954	1



Figure 5. Distribution of votes in the election for the European Parliament correlated with social-economic indicators (1999). Principal component analysis and hierarchical ascendant classification. (Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/)

### **Table 6.** Correlation between the electoral variables and the social,<br/>demographic and economic indicators (2004/2007)

(Data source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat;

			ht	tp://	/www	v.nsd	.uıb.	no/e	urop	ean_	elect	10n_0	data	base	()					
	Elect pres 2004/2007 %	GUE-NGL 2004/2007 %	PSE 2004/2007 %	PVE-ALE 2004/2007 %	ALDE 2004/2007 %	PPE-DE 2004/2007 %	UEN 2004/2007 %	ID 2004/2007 %	IST 2004/2007 %	NI 2004/2007 %	Aut 2004/2007 %	Urban ok % 2003	Dens pop % 2004	agr % 2004	ind % 2004	serv % 2004	som tot % 2004	pop act tot % 2004	PIB (eur/loc) ok % 2004	PIB (eur/loc- ppc) ok % 2004
Elect pres 2004/2007 %	1	0.08	0.175	-0.034	0.157	-0.069	-0.07	-0.124	0.278	-0.26	-0.312	0.019	-0.003	-0.197	-0.109	0.219	-0.279	-0.209	0.315	0.291
GUE-NGL 2004/2007 %	0.08	1	-0.083	-0.202	-0.172	-0.077	-0.119	-0.067	-0.172	-0.017	0.029	-0.117	-0.108	-0.058	-0.029	0.063	0.121	0.085	-0.024	-0.036
PSE 2004/2007 %	0.175	-0.083	1	-0.083	-0.196	-0.075	-0.314	-0.149	0.03	-0.316	-0.273	0.05	0.064	0.04	-0.165	0.082	-0.013	-0.231	0.01	-0.013
PVE-ALE 2004/2007 %	-0.034	-0.202	-0.083	1	0.065	-0.2	-0.268	0.073	0.039	-0.247	-0.017	0.3	0.135	-0.312	-0.136	0.322	-0.143	0.251	0.515	0.454
ALDE 2004/2007 %	0.157	-0.172	-0.196	0.065	1	-0.575	-0.022	0.169	0.253	-0.122	-0.302	0.092	0.004	-0.108	-0.215	0.225	-0.211	-0.002	0.234	0.144
PPE-DE 2004/2007 %	-0.069	-0.077	-0.075	-0.2	-0.575	1	-0.124	-0.318	-0.334	-0.042	0.095	-0.155	-0.021	0.111	0.415	-0.362	0.047	0.005	-0.276	-0.142
UEN 2004/2007 %	-0.07	-0.119	-0.314	-0.268	-0.022	-0.124	1	-0.219	-0.151	0.452	0.032	-0.182	-0.096	0.354	0.038	-0.288	0.359	-0.192	-0.296	-0.274
ID 2004/2007 %	-0.124	-0.067	-0.149	0.073	0.169	-0.318	-0.219	1	-0.024	-0.168	-0.153	0.15	0.08	-0.288	-0.262	0.39	-0.399	0.317	0.285	0.208
IST 2004/2007 %	0.278	-0.172	0.03	0.039	0.253	-0.334	-0.151	-0.024	1	-0.148	-0.05	0.204	0.018	-0.053	-0.049	0.072	-0.054	-0.244	0.028	-0.017
NI 2004/2007 %	-0.26	-0.017	-0.316	-0.247	-0.122	-0.042	0.452	-0.168	-0.148	1	0.163	-0.179	-0.078	0.246	0.096	-0.246	0.337	-0.03	-0.271	-0.241
Aut 2004/2007 %	-0.312	0.029	-0.273	-0.017	-0.302	0.095	0.032	-0.153	-0.05	0.163	1	-0.097	-0.029	0.048	0.201	-0.171	0.126	0.104	-0.177	-0.105
Urban ok % 2003	0.019	-0.117	0.05	0.3	0.092	-0.155	-0.182	0.15	0.204	-0.179	-0.097	1	0.377	-0.452	-0.193	0.464	-0.048	0.079	0.361	0.39
Dens pop % 2004	-0.003	-0.108	0.064	0.135	0.004	-0.021	-0.096	0.08	0.018	-0.078	-0.029	0.377	1	-0.233	-0.355	0.412	0.056	0.05	0.399	0.474
agr % 2004	-0.197	-0.058	0.04	-0.312	-0.108	0.111	0.354	-0.288	-0.053	0.246	0.048	-0.452	-0.233	1	-0.001	-0.738	0.338	-0.246	-0.59	-0.589
ind % 2004	-0.109	-0.029	-0.165	-0.136	-0.215	0.415	0.038	-0.262	-0.049	0.096	0.201	-0.193	-0.355	-0.001	1	-0.674	0.007	0.051	-0.354	-0.312
serv % 2004	0.219	0.063	0.082	0.322	0.225	-0.362	-0.288	0.39	0.072	-0.246	-0.171	0.464	0.412	-0.738	-0.674	1	-0.255	0.148	0.675	0.646
som tot % 2004	-0.279	0.121	-0.013	-0.143	-0.211	0.047	0.359	-0.399	-0.054	0.337	0.126	-0.048	0.056	0.338	0.007	-0.255	1	-0.362	-0.465	-0.46
pop act tot % 2004	-0.209	0.085	-0.231	0.251	-0.002	0.005	-0.192	0.317	-0.244	-0.03	0.104	0.079	0.05	-0.246	0.051	0.148	-0.362	1	0.329	0.354
PIB (eur/loc) ok % 2004	0.315	-0.024	0.01	0.515	0.234	-0.276	-0.296	0.285	0.028	-0.271	-0.177	0.361	0.399	-0.59	-0.354	0.675	-0.465	0.329	1	0.961
PIB (eur/loc-ppc) ok % 2004	0.291	-0.036	-0.013	0.454	0.144	-0.142	-0.274	0.208	-0.017	-0.241	-0.105	0.39	0.474	-0.589	-0.312	0.646	-0.46	0.354	0.961	1

http://www.nsd.uib.no/european election database/)



Figure 6. Distribution of votes in the election for the European Parliament correlated with social-economic indicators (2004/2007). Principal component analysis and hierarchical ascendant classification. (Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/)

The next election (2004) made a more significant turnout of voters in areas where there were far-right supporters to vote and where to register a GDP per capita above average (Cyprus, western Austria, northern Italy, France, northern Spain, Belgium, Holland, Southern Ireland, the Netherlands, German-town lands, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, etc.). The far-left received votes in the regions with above-average unemployment rate (Greece, southern Italy, most of Spain, Portugal, etc.) (Figure 6).

The ecologists and / or regionalists enjoys the support of an urban electorate, active in the tertiary sector and with a higher GDP per capita (western Austria, northern Italy, France, Catalonia, the Basque Country, southern Ireland, United Kingdom, Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark, Bremen, Hamburg, Berlin, Sweden, Finland) (Table 6).

The European liberals and the Independence and Democracy group received also support a vote for the tertiary sector and higher income than the European average. The European People Party have been receiving the votes especially in regions with a high percentage of activity in the secondary sector (Madrid, Basque Country, Eastern Austria, Germany, Czech Republic, northern Hungary, Slovenia, Attica, etc.). The short-lived group of extreme right (2007) received the support of areas with a significant proportion of urban population (Belgium, France, northern Italy, Austria, etc.).

The last European elections (2009) have an electorate larger turnout in areas with a large proportion of urban population and a higher GDP per capita (figure 7). The far-left has largely benefited from the support of the electorate in regions with high unemployment (Greece, southern Italy, a big part of Spain). The ecologists and / or regionalists, that, in fact, the Liberals received more votes from the voters especially in regions with predominantly urban population, especially active in the tertiary sector and high-income (mostly located in the central part of the European Union – France, a big part of Spain, northern Italy, Germany – but also in the north – Sweden, Finland, in the west – Ireland, except in the east) (table 7).

The European Socialists and Democrats, the European People Party receiving the electoral support in approximately the same regions. The Conservatives and the Europe of Freedoms and Democracy group has received support from some regions with significant share of the actives in tertiary sector and with an income above the European average (Great Britain, Ile de France, Bavaria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Hamburg, Bremen, Germany, Denmark, East Sweden, southern Finland).

**Table 7.** Correlation between the electoral variables and the social,<br/>demographic and economic indicators (1979/1981)(Data source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat;

http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/)

	Elect pres 2009 %	GUE- NGL 2009 %	APSDE 2009 %	PVE- ALE 2009 %	ALDE 2009 %	PPE 2009 %	CRE 2009 %	ELD 2009 %	NI 2009 %	Aut 2009 %	Urban ok % 2008	Dens pop % 2008	agr % 2008	ind % 2008	serv % 2008	som tot % 2008	pop act tot % 2008	PIB (eur/loc) ok % 2007	PIB (eur/loc- ppc) ok % 2007
Elect pres 2009 %	1	-0.1	0.176	0.123	0.189	0.052	-0.367	0.021	-0.024	-0.074	0.078	0.027	-0.223	-0.142	0.25	-0.123	-0.099	0.334	0.302
GUE-NGL 2009 %	-0.1	1	0.041	-0.028	-0.202	-0.069	-0.173	-0.194	-0.21	0.109	-0.033	-0.062	0.045	-0.102	0.041	0.278	0.071	-0.081	-0.071
APSDE 2009 %	0.176	0.041	1	-0.229	-0.279	0.222	-0.41	-0.205	-0.214	-0.18	-0.109	0.025	0.19	0.016	-0.14	0.268	-0.154	-0.158	-0.096
PVE-ALE 2009 %	0.123	-0.028	-0.229	1	0.313	-0.44	-0.102	0.058	0.047	-0.201	0.279	0.094	-0.302	-0.287	0.405	0.015	0.228	0.478	0.365
ALDE 2009 %	0.189	-0.202	-0.279	0.313	1	-0.436	-0.095	0.179	0.022	-0.177	0.136	0.027	-0.204	-0.187	0.269	-0.201	0.148	0.356	0.253
PPE 2009 %	0.052	-0.069	0.222	-0.44	-0.436	1	-0.458	-0.56	-0.159	-0.07	-0.235	-0.158	0.313	0.336	-0.447	0.211	-0.321	-0.388	-0.268
CRE 2009 %	-0.367	-0.173	-0.41	-0.102	-0.095	-0.458	1	0.399	0	0.069	0.035	0.115	0	0.004	-0.003	-0.209	0.139	-0.097	-0.106
ELD 2009 %	0.021	-0.194	-0.205	0.058	0.179	-0.56	0.399	1	-0.025	-0.084	0.026	0.058	-0.194	-0.243	0.301	-0.236	0.134	0.283	0.169
NI 2009 %	-0.024	-0.21	-0.214	0.047	0.022	-0.159	0	-0.025	1	-0.187	0.139	0.074	-0.079	-0.085	0.113	-0.255	0.077	0.089	0.06
Aut 2009 %	-0.074	0.109	-0.18	-0.201	-0.177	-0.07	0.069	-0.084	-0.187	1	-0.003	-0.061	-0.151	0.196	-0.034	-0.071	-0.004	-0.045	0.005
Urban ok % 2008	0.078	-0.033	-0.109	0.279	0.136	-0.235	0.035	0.026	0.139	-0.003	1	0.369	-0.451	-0.234	0.469	0.039	0.111	0.368	0.389
Dens pop % 2008	0.027	-0.062	0.025	0.094	0.027	-0.158	0.115	0.058	0.074	-0.061	0.369	1	-0.222	-0.354	0.398	0.185	0.067	0.418	0.469
agr % 2008	-0.223	0.045	0.19	-0.302	-0.204	0.313	0	-0.194	-0.079	-0.151	-0.451	-0.222	1	0.055	-0.718	0.169	-0.26	-0.537	-0.54
ind % 2008	-0.142	-0.102	0.016	-0.287	-0.187	0.336	0.004	-0.243	-0.085	0.196	-0.234	-0.354	0.055	1	-0.734	-0.129	0.003	-0.447	-0.377
serv % 2008	0.25	0.041	-0.14	0.405	0.269	-0.447	-0.003	0.301	0.113	-0.034	0.469	0.398	-0.718	-0.734	1	-0.025	0.174	0.677	0.63
som tot % 2008	-0.123	0.278	0.268	0.015	-0.201	0.211	-0.209	-0.236	-0.255	-0.071	0.039	0.185	0.169	-0.129	-0.025	1	-0.436	-0.26	-0.288
pop act tot % 2008	-0.099	0.071	-0.154	0.228	0.148	-0.321	0.139	0.134	0.077	-0.004	0.111	0.067	-0.26	0.003	0.174	-0.436	1	0.4	0.426
PIB (eur/loc) ok % 2007	0.334	-0.081	-0.158	0.478	0.356	-0.388	-0.097	0.283	0.089	-0.045	0.368	0.418	-0.537	-0.447	0.677	-0.26	0.4	1	0.954
PIB (eur/loc-ppc) ok % 2007	0.302	-0.071	-0.096	0.365	0.253	-0.268	-0.106	0.169	0.06	0.005	0.389	0.469	-0.54	-0.377	0.63	-0.288	0.426	0.954	1



Figure 7. Distribution of votes in the election for the European Parliament correlated with social-economic indicators (2009). Principal component analysis and hierarchical ascendant classification. (Source: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/; http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat; http://www.nsd.uib.no/european\_election\_database/)

### CONCLUSION

The turnout has been steadily decreasing trend in the three decades of Euro-elections. With the weakening of interest in these elections, at the discipline in terms of voter turnout at the polls in areas that supported the communists and / or Christian Democrats or the Greens, with notable share of the assets in the primary sector and affected by unemployment after 1999, probably due to the massive EU eastward enlargement, which also presents voters in these elections is represented largely by urban citizens with a high living standard.

The extreme left had, in general, the electoral support of the regions with significant share of the actives in the primary sector (until 1999) and, consistently, by the vote meant to the administrative units seriously affected by unemployment.

The Socialists were supported by the administrative units with aboveaverage share of economically active population, engaged mainly in the secondary sector (until 1999), after being voted largely regions with high rates of unemployment (2009).

The ecologists were voted constantly (since 1984, when he is recorded the first time) by an urban electorate, active mainly in the tertiary sector and GDP per capita above the European average.

The European liberals have been sustained, by the same regions that sustained the ecologists, continuous, by mostly urban voters in regions with large percentages of activity in the tertiary sector, with above average incomes. The Christian Democrats (the European People Party) have received the support of quite different categories over time. Sometimes, the electoral support came from regions with significant share of the actives in the primary sector, seriously affected by unemployment (1979, 2009), others – from a predominantly urban electorate and high income (1989), but in general, a good part of their supporters are among voters actives in the secondary sector.

The Conservatives have benefited, before joining the European People Party (1994), by the electoral support of the regions with significant share of the working population engaged in the secondary sector, thanks to the recurrence of group (2009), in contrast, support from the administrative units significant share in the tertiary sector and GDP per capita than average. In fact, in 1994, it was an important segment of voters who supported the moderate nationalist forces that promote the Euroskeptic current.

The far-right group that had inconsistent attendance, discontinuous in the political European scene, was backed by an unusual electorate: at the regions with large shares of the actives in the primary sector (1984), the most heavily affected by unemployment (1999) to the highly urbanized (1989, 2004).

### Acknowledgements

This contribution presents some results from the Exploratory Research Project CNCSIS ID\_2017 "MUTATIONS IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY OF ROMANIA. POLITICAL TERRITORIALITY AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR", director: Prof. Corneliu Iațu Ph. D., Department of Geography, "Alexandru Ioan Cuza" University of Iași.

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Submitted: August 15, 2011 Revised: August 16, 2011 Accepted: October 27, 2011 Published online: November 30, 2011

### THE EVOLUTION OF THE ROAD TRANSPORT NETWORK **IN MOLDAVIA – FROM GEOGRAPHICAL COHERENCE** TO PERIPHERAL DEPENDENCE

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**Abstract**: This study is primarily aimed at diagnosing the development of road network in the north-east part of Romania, as a prerequisite for an analysis of its quality. Tracking how this network was formed during the last three centuries, was allowed to browse a large bibliography and support that was original or processed cartographic representations. Starting from the existence of natural and anthropogenic premises of the road network development in this region, the analysis was carried in accordance with to conventional means of historical geography, highlighting the political implications. The periodization made to take account of the moments of rupture in the evolution of the network studied, overlapping of major geopolitical changes. Essential conclusion is the assumption that the structure validation center of road network in northeast Romania (Moldavia) was profoundly distorted due to a continuous process of marginalization, emphasized in the contemporary period. In this way, what could be a shaft of the network coordinatory axis, the transcontinental road that was Siret Valley terminus with the port of Galati, was deeply reshuffled being diverted towards the capital (Bucharest), in a process of excessive centralization.

Key words: historical changes, political factors, deficiency/optimization, marginal space, convergence areas

### NATURAL AND ANTHROPOGENIC PREMISE OF THE WAYS OF ROAD TRANSPORT DEVELOPMENT

The Genesis of the communication network is tightly related to the practical and organisational necessities of any community. As these necessities have become more and more complex, the occurred networks have got a

special strategic importance. Most often, these networks were governed by a centre with a large capacity of polarization directed to this one (or starting from this one) the large spread axes of communication. The complex relations between these points of space (nodes, poles) reunited in network is expressed through differences of accessibility (Fremont, 1999) that may generate spatial inequalities, especially in the case of an inadequate conception of the territorial management (Giraud, 1996, p.19). Transport networks have self management and as certain studies present, their evolution has known a continuous progress from the dominance of certain intuitive and heuristic rules to those based on optimisation and simulation (Xie, Levinson, 2009, p.212). In the analysis of a transport network evolution, it should be also taken into account a relation of dependence between this one and the social and economic system for which the formalization of certain patterns of economic development and spatial reorganization have become a priority (Pini, 1998, p.177). The rapports between the individual and his life environment, the population spatial behaviour that may govern decisions which are apparently inadequate to the geographic reality (Rougerie, 2000, p.150) should not be neglected either. Last but not least we should take into account the role of transport infrastructure (especially the ruttier transport) as agent of geographical changes (Johnston, Gregory, Smith, 1994).

The western part of the historical Moldavia displays some physical and geographical features that have guided in time the appearance and the evolution of the communication network (Figure 1):

- The presence of handsome fluvial axes which are parallel and convergent toward the Low Danube river (Siret and Prut or if we extend the analysis at the scale of the historical Moldavia, including Dniester which is directly tributary to the Black Sea) are essential issues in the orientation of main roads;

- The presence in the western part of the Oriental Carpathians crossed by longitudinal and transversal valleys collected by Siret river, issue that interposes a relative natural barrier toward Transylvania and which guides the main flux( tide) toward the flow of Siret river. From this point of view, a major role in directing the main Trans Carpathian routes was played by the commercial – manufacturing towns from Transylvania, Braşov and Bistrița especially (Cebuc, Mocanu, 1967);

- The dominance of a hilly relief within Siret – Prut interfluve which is quite varied from morphological and slope perspective, reducing from here and there the possibilities of communication on east –west direction with the notable exception of some saddles which become therefore obligatory passing points, placed with predilection in the northern half of this interfluve. The main effect consists in the division of the eastern part of the region in two divergent areas from natural favourability perspective for the development of the communication network: one directed to the hilly Plain of Jijia river and the other one directed to Bârlad Plateau;

- The existence of some areas of natural convergence, especially around some major confluences (of the two fluvial axes with the Danube river especially and to the Carpathian rivers with Siret). These ones naturally structure the evolution of transport networks. As unfavourable issue especially in the lower regions, the presence of large areas of wetland may be mentioned.



Figure 1. The natural premises for the road network development in Western Moldavia

Having these natural premises, the communication networks from this region respected quite accurately at least in the past the physical-geographical offer. The development of the networks and means of transport is however indissolubly related both to the production and circulation of goods and to the population mobility. In this way, to the natural premises, a series of human – geographical particularities was added. Their importance in the dynamics of the road transport had the same meaning:
- The concentration of the population especially in the neighboured area of the Carpathians (in the Subcarpathians depressions, in Suceava Plateau and in Siret Passage). This one was a constant in the demographical evolution of Moldavia, at least starting with the 14<sup>th</sup> century and may be explained by the more generous offer of those areas and by the larger distance toward the troubled areas of the North Pontic steppes;

- -the existence of some natural resources which are more varied in the Carpathian and Sub Carpathian region, that stay at the basis of the earlier development of industrial activities even if nowadays the inherited infrastructure was submitted to a large process of degradation in the last twenty years;

- The presence of some political barriers resulting from successive dismantling of the Principality of Moldavia at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century which imposed therefore a divergent evolution of the communication networks from the perspective of their efficiency and quality inclusively. There is a difference between the former Moldavian Austrian frontier (till 1918) which is more permanent and favourable to innovations diffusion, including the infrastructure of transportation and frontier on Prut river which is as opaque now when it divides the historical Moldavia in two as well as when it separates the western part of the Tsarist Empire, even if this one was made from different historical reasons;

- The positioning at the Southern end of the communication area which is first of all dysfunctional nowadays from geo-political reasons. The Ponto-Baltic Isthmus, which the historical Moldavia in overall belongs to, has lost in the latest centuries the importance as commercial route between the North -West and the South –East of the Europe, even if it remains however at European scale, a relatively dense populated area at least in the Southern sector. The way the commercial fluxes were redirected in the states that are extending in this Isthmus (Poland, Ukraine and Romania firstly) was a divergent, centred on capitals (Kiev, Bucharest) or on the main industrial - urban axes (Silesia in the case of Poland), resulting therefore a marginalization of the natural corridor which unifies the middle and low flow of Vistula, the upper valleys of Dniester and Prut, and finely the Siret Passage, the latter being made by accessible saddling, parallel to the Carpathian chain. This marginalization was accentuated in the latest decades and will continue probably to be accentuated more in the conditions in which the states from the present Eastern frontier of the European Union will be maintained in the area of influence of the main political actor from Eastern Europe, the Russian Federation.

All these particularities were differentially manifested in time, mixing up in different degrees, and depending on the specificity of each category of communication network. This is the reason why a detailed analysis of their evolution is required as well.

# THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ROAD TRANSPORT NETWORK IN MOLDAVIA IN THE PRE MODERN PERIOD

The organisation of a network of coherent roads in the Moldavian space is relatively recent, just from Middle Age, being mentioned clues of the existence of some well précised routes which are tightly related to the insertion of this territory in the European economic circuits. Moldavia was previously only tangentially exposed to the diffusion of the antic communication network (from the Roman period) but there were transit couloirs directed by the main valleys, passes, saddles toward the Central Europe or to the south - east in the period of the great migrations. The existence of those roads was however pretty uncertain till the 18<sup>th</sup> century, even if the medieval documents mention many local or continental roads of large scale, being unable however to set up a précised route. The appearance of some more précised cartographic documents after the year 1700 allow a more faithful reconstitution of the routes, even if many of them were not inserted (among them being mentioned the famous map of Dimitrie Cantemir). As most of these cartographic materials were drawn up by the Austrians, these ones were several times displaying only the connection routes between Moldavia and Transylvania which was integrated after 1699 in the Hapsburg Empire. The cartographic materials from the last decades of the 18<sup>th</sup> century are much more generous with such information (Băican, 1996, p. 135-142, see Figure 2). The symbols used in these maps, the Austrian maps (Büschel, Otzellowitz, von Mieg etc.) or in the Russian maps correspond to those used nowadays, having also the advantage of the scale in several cases, presenting detailed issues and bridges ( inclusively the floating ones that are variable as position), the post stations, the inns, the distances (measured in fasting) etc.

The origin of the transcontinental road which diagonally crosses the historical Moldavia, connecting the Galician town Lvov (and indirectly the Baltic harbour Gdansk) to the North - East seashore of the Black Sea (Caffa, Cetatea Albă, Chilia), having a variant toward the Low Danube (Galati-Brăila), should be looked for in the 13th century after the great Mongolian invasion (cf. of the historians N. Iorga and C. C. Giurescu, 1920 and 1967 respectively). The North -Western part of the Black Sea being one of the outlets of the Euro - Asian transcontinental routes connected to the Byzantine Empire, had become a very attractive area for the Genovese merchants, who were transiting oriental goods which were looked for by the Hanseatic merchants from the region of the Baltic Sea for which Lvov, town situated at the half distance of the two continental maritime basins, had become a sort of poured plate of a very prosperous trade. This one has also been manifested by an afflux of Oriental merchants in the towns situated on this route (Armenians first of all). This transcontinental road was controlled at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century by several states (Prussia, the Tsarist Russia, the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire) after it had been for a long time under Poland control mostly with the exception of its Ponto-Danubian outlet which was under Ottoman control. In fact, we can draw the conclusion that it is this extreme fragmentation of the Ponto - Baltic Isthmus that has generated the decrease of the importance of this route, decline which continues nowadays as well.

It should be mentioned here the fact that this route has two variants:

- the so called "the Tatar Road" which started from Caffa and was using approximately the inter river between the basins of Dniester and Bug rivers having as more important halts Kamenet and Tarnopol towns<sup>1</sup>;

- the so called "the Moldavian Road" which had as outlets, the commercial towns from the North West of the Black Sea (Chilia, Cetatea Albă, Vicina (?)), using the shortest and the most accessible routes from Prut – Dniester and Siret – Prut interfluves and then, the natural couloirs made up by the Carpathian valleys from the superior basins of those rivers passing through the successive capitals of the Moldavian Principality (Siret, Suceava and Iaşi).

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 1}$  The section which was unifying the capital of the Principality, Iaşi, to the harbours of the Black Sea had the same name



Figure 2. The road network of Western Moldavia in the late of the XVIIIth century

The first variant is more vulnerable crossing a forest steppe region, so that the second route (the Moldavian one) has become in time more important, gradually moving the route to the west as Chilia and Cetatea Albă enter in decline becoming military garrisons only in the favour of some newer commercial centres such as first of all Galați town, the two variants of the "large Moldavian route" detached from Suceava area were converging to: the first one through Botoşani – Iaşi – Tecuci and the second one faithfully following the Siret Valley. Noted that the first variant crossing a predominantly agricultural region and the second one was crossing a mixed agricultural and forester region, wood being for a long time an important resource for Moldavia<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The same importance for the second variant had the salt obtained mostly from Târgu Ocna, the road from this town to Bacău being named Ocna Road, this resource being massively exported to Russia

From early times, these main routes had ramifications toward East and West, gradually forming a wrought network using the fords of the main water flows (where a tax was usually paid), the Carpathian halts or the saddles from the Moldavian Plateau. The followings were more important: Soroca's Sleah<sup>3</sup> Sorocii which was detached from Botosani, following the route to Prut river, to Stefănesti and farther to the east using the transversal valley of Răut river between Bălti and Gura Camencei, from Soroca on Dniester river going to Vinita and Kiev; Suceava Road which was from early times connecting the first more durable capital of the principality from the northern Transylvania (Rodna, Bistrita also called the Upper Road) using Rotunda and Tihuta halts forming with the previous one a real transversal axes which was connecting the Central Europe to the basin of the middle Dnieper river; Brasov Road detached from Bacău toward Târgu Trotuș and Oituz passing, connecting the road from Siret Valley to the important commercial axes which was connecting the Central Europe to Constantinople, through Bucharest (also called the Lower Road); the Wallachian Road detached from Tecuci toward Focsani and farther toward Bucharest; The Road of the Vizir, used especially by merchants and emissaries from the Ottoman Empire, which was accompanying the inferior flow of Prut river, detached from the Tatar Road, crossing the Danube to Oblucita - Isaceea, etc; Hotin Road detached in the extreme northern part of the principality, at Cernăuti and using the high plateau over the valley of Dniester river, toward Hotin and farther toward Soroca, Orhei and Chisinău where it was meeting the Tatar Road, etc. This major network was accompanied by various secondary roads which were connecting the main fairs and towns of the principality, mostly using the most facile routes along the valleys and on inters rivers.

Toward the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, major modifications within this network are produced once with the occupation of the north- west part of Moldavia by the Austrians (in 1775). Vienna's interest for the western part of Moldavia was a special one, for this purpose being also arranged post roads along some old routes, firstly between Sniatin-Cernăuți-Suceava-Câmpulung-Vatra Dornei, secondly belong the Siret Valley road, from Suceava to Wallachia<sup>4</sup>. The same interest was stirred by the Tsarist Empire which used in that period the routes from the central – eastern part of Moldavia principality which had become the theatre of military operations, place of convergence of the interests of the great powers of that epoch. The Russian interests were related however especially to the Danube outlets of those roads, the target of the Tsarist expansion being Constantinople. The network of ruttier transportation in that period was generally tributary to the closed feature of feudal economy prolonged in the region under study which was in full development and modernisation (Chiriac, 1976, p.36-43).

This troubled period has profoundly marked the further evolution of the roads in Moldavia, destroying the medieval network, reducing the importance of some roads or limiting the relations from both parts of the frontiers imposed in 1775 and 1812. If we are able to talk previously of the existence of certain true ruttier nodes as the capital of the principality, Iaşi towns like Cernăuți, Botoşani, Suceava, Roman, Bacău, Tecuci, essential for the network

216

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Şleah is a word of Polish origin, meaning road.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This was the pretext of annexing the north-west part of Moldavia and the creation of a ruttier connection between Transylvania and Galicia

management being the quadrilateral made up of Roman-Suceava-Botoşani-Iaşi, later these nodes are rather to become stages along some inferior roads that depend on the large routes which have maintained their transcontinental status. In this way, the large Moldavian Road was gradually attracted toward Siret Valley and from the Carpathian Curvature area it was deviated toward the capital of Wallachia, decreasing the importance of the Moldavian Road variant which was crossing Prut – Siret interfluve by unifying Galați with Tecuci and Iaşi with Botoşani.

## THE STAGE OF THE BEGINNING OF THE MODERNISATION PROCESS OF THE ROAD NETWORK

Along the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the ways of transport from Moldavia in overall supported profound positive and negative changes, in tight connection to the evolution of the European economy in general. Crucial was also the decease of the dependence toward the Ottomans through the trade liberalization (with cereals especially) after the peace from Adrianople (1829) and through the diversification of goods production. Some studies made in the past showed that the discordance between the necessity of a more fluent circulation of goods and the way the ruttier network really looked like was stronger than in Wallachia which had the advantage of the presence of a vast Danubian space which was compensating, through its harbours, the necessary of the terrestrial transport. The same differences are noticed in Transvlvania where the Austrians, in their wish to explore as intensively as possible the natural resources, in full phase of capitalist industrialization, earlier modernized the ways of communication (Boicu, 1963). Moldavia reduced to something more than a third of territory after its division from 1775 and 1812, having access only to the single Danubian harbour, Galati, peripherally situated, was practically obliged to down in a single direction its goods/cargo, hence resulting the higher cost price of transportation, having effects therefore on the isolation of some areas. In some situations, the high transportation cost obliged the population from certain areas to change the goods (cereals especially) in alcohol as in the north of Moldavia (as N. Sutu was mentioning, quoted by Boicu, 1963). The cost price of some import goods brought through Galați harbour was also higher especially at great distance from the harbour<sup>5</sup>.

The problem of improving the ways of transport was required with acuity, especially after 1829, along with the reforms from the regulatory period. This imperative has determined the initiation of performing some actions of modernizing the main roads, so that till 1849, it had been managed to be arranged the routes Mihăileni-Iaşi-Galați and Cornu Luncii-Roman-Bacău-Mărăşeşti (on a distance of approximately 360 km), being built as well an important number of stone bridges ( approximately 400 in number). This effort was enabled by the initiation of the first forms of engineering academic education (in 1850) and by the formation of a free handing work made up by the Bemis who had among their duties such activities, within some quasi – feudal relationships which were maintained till 1859. Not incidentally, some historians consider that the origin of the remaining behind of the East Europe and of Romania especially must be looked for in the context of modernity from that period which instead of leading to a relaxation of the relationship of feudal type

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The transportation cost from Galați to Dorohoi overpasses that from the English harbors up to Galați.

it rather accentuated them (Chirot, 2004, p. 17). The most part of the executed works had the task to facilitate the transport of the Russian military forces, reason for which the attention was drawn between 1829-1859 more on the routes used by the Tsarist army (Figure 3).



Figure 3. The evolution of the road network of Western Moldavia in the first part of the XIXth century

In many cases, the excessive use of roads was leading to their massive degradation in spite of the efforts of modernization, mentioned by some sources. For instance, the International Commission of studding the Danubian Principalities state of facts, founded through the Peace Treaty from Paris, in a rapport made in 1858 and quoted by Boicu, (1963) it was mentioned that in 1858, Moldavia had approximately 600km of roads in comparison with the 262 km of roads found in Wallachia, registering therefore higher progresses than the latter one (situation which was mentioned in the Romanian Encyclopaedia in 1939 as well).

In Moldavia, a Public Works Department which was managing the roads had been founded even from 1849. Moldavia's relative openness to modernity in the first part of the 19<sup>th</sup> century may be attributed to some faster insertions in the commercial circuit, in the cereal export field especially, whose evolution were not depending so much on the international treaties as it had been often stipulated but on the economic factors (Murgescu, 2010, p. 114-123.

In this way, Moldavia seemed to be the favourite in that epoch, this one having tighter relations with the Habsburg Empire after the occupation of Bukovina, benefiting of a less stressing taxation than that in Wallachia, in the context of very controversy relations between the two powers which were controlling the Principalities territory at that time, the Ottoman Empire de jury and the Tsarist Empire de facto. Not incidentally, the regions which had registered the fastest extension of the areas cultivated with cereals were those from the north of Moldavia in close neighbourhood with Bukovina (Dorohoi, Botoşani, Suceava, Roman areas, etc.). This tendency was coordinated with great interest for the modernization of the transport ways in those regions.

This modernization, which was supposing first of all the roads levelling and paving, was accompanied by the modification of some routes, not always the economical and functional ones or in agreement with the physical geographical realities. The most typical case was that of the road which was connecting Iași to Galati deviated through Bucium-Poieni-Solesti to Vaslui, route which is used nowadays as well by the National Road 24 (DN24) in the disfavour of the old shorter road which was using Bordea pass through Nicolina and Rebricea streams, route which was later used for the railway building. In spite of this effort, vast spaces have remained almost completely with no important roads, especially in the mountainous and hilly areas (the west part of Bârlad Plateau, Vrancea Subcarpathians, etc) areas where the freeholder property and an agriculture based on a subsistence traditional poli-culture were still dominating. It should be noticed however that the authorities of that time complained and performed some actions of repairing and rehabilitation of some roads which were connecting the towns from Siret Valley and those from Barlad Valley, first of all Bacau, Barlad and Vaslui. The same thing happened with the connection road between Mălini and Dorna, necessary for the recordation of those isolated mountainous areas, imperiously required by the inhabitants (Boicu, 1963, p. 440).

A special attention was given to the building of bridges along the main arteries, especially on Siret River and its Carpathian affluent.

We may notice the existence of some main waves of diffusion of progress performed in the ruttier transport networks, having the origin during the Habsburg Empire, approximately along the classic route between the Baltic Sea and the Low Danube, axe which was accompanying more or less faithfully Siret Valley, and maintaining its role of coordinator of the network.

This wave of diffusion had also a deviation in the direction Mihăileni-Botosani, with a ramification toward Dorohoi, these towns being earlier inserted in modernisation circuits than other towns from Prut - Siret inter river. For this key period in the evolution of modern ruttier transport network from Western Moldavia, the importance of the political factor is noted as well. Iasi town, which had become peripheral after the occupation of Bukovina managed to adept pretty quickly to this wave of progress, before achieving it, becoming a secondary centre of diffusion having two preferential directions: the road which, according to the market economy logic, was going along Bahlui and Bahluet valleys toward Siret axe and the new road which was built on Vasluet valley toward Galati harbour along Bârlad valley. After 1850, the decrease of its political importance, its changing in a simple county capital diminished up to disappearance this tendency of centralization of the ruttier network from the central eastern part of the principality, the capital of the United Principalities, that is Bucharest, determining the deviation toward west of the connection routes of the main Moldavian towns, including Iasi as well.

Thus, the road which was connecting the localities Podu Iloaiei and Botoşani, crossing the interfluves from Bahlui, Miletin and Sitna, a straight road was redirected toward Hârlău-Târgu Frumos, the same as Siret axe was deviated in Mărăşeşti area from its classic route toward Tecuci- Galați, along the old mountainous road toward Focşani-Buzău-Bucharest. This deviation toward west left therefore no chance for the development of a necessary alternative route Iaşi – Galați, along Prut river, at least from the perspective of making dynamic some areas with important agricultural potential, this area remaining isolated, being practically the last area "touched" by modernization from the Romanian space, at least from the social – cultural perspective( through the prism of demographic indicators which were here marked by traditionalism till after the Second World War). Otherwise the neighbour Bessarabia was in that period at a lower level of infrastructure development, this province being almost completely with no roads till the inter belly period when it had only 230 km of paved roads.

Besides this wave of diffusion come also from the Habsburg Empire, there were manifested other two secondary directions of diffusion along the Carpathian passes Oituz and Pângărați having as targets Piatra Neamț town, and the multiple confluence from the middle basin of Trotuş River (around Oneşti town). The origin of those routes was found in the Transylvanian towns Braşov and Târgu Mureş which were earlier connected to a modern ruttier network and the purpose was in fact the searching for some outlets toward the Low Danube. These transversal roads were meant to reduce the effect of barrier exercised by the Oriental Carpathian chain, in the north having already been arranged a trans-Carpathian route, partially transversal, between Cernăuți-Gura Humorului-Vatra Dornei and Bistrița.

We can state therefore, that the main impulse given to the modernization of the ruttier transport network from the Western Moldavia came from the Habsburg Empire with a stronger north- west vector, (according to the natural potential of the accessibility potentials firstly),from east and south, at least until 1960 non existing any wave of progress. Without being definitively established, a great part of the major ruttier network from the contemporary period was finished within this interval, later being brought only some corrections according to a logic which was placing the Western Moldavia in a peripheral position, oriented toward an exterior node situated in the central part of the vast Danubian valley from the south – east of Wallachia, that is Bucharest, the capital of the United Principalities and later of the Romanian Kingdom.

## THE STAGE OF MARGINALIZATION OF THE ROAD TRANSPORT NETWORK FROM MOLDAVIA

The period 1860-1948 was marked by a centralizing logic which diminished the nodal position of Iaşi city as well as other Moldavian towns and had rather harmful effects from economic and social point of view, creating an excessive dependence on the ruttier transport network from this part of the country in comparison with the major nodes placed beyond it (Bucharest, Braşov, etc., Figure 4).



Figure 4. The road network of Western Moldavia during inter-wars period

The effects of this exaggerated centralization were felt more strongly in the Eastern part (Prut - Siret interfluve) which was disadvantaged also by the existence of some opaque frontiers with less points of connection. Beyond Prut River, after 1812 the road network was practically entirely drawn again, having as polarizing centre Odessa harbour. The divergent evolution of the ruttier network between the eastern and western part of the historic Moldavia placed lasi town in an extremely sensible position which is maintained nowadays as well, considerably diminishing its polarising potential assured by its placing in the southern part of the hilly Valley of the middle Prut, natural area of convergence for the entire Carpathian - Nistrian space. This peripherization, process which may be followed pretty faithfully after 1860 was mentioned at least until the end of the post belly period, in a time when the historic Moldavia was found reunited within the Romanian Kingdom and seemed to give a chance to some towns which were looking for the lost centralization, among which Iaşi was the first. Although the effort of modernisation had continued, the importance of Moldavia within the European road networks had been considerably reduced, from a position of crossing of the some transcontinental roads, it became a simple space of transit on north -south direction.

The only national road (according to the classification used in the inter belly period ) was that which was using in large part the old road along Siret river, connecting Cernăuți town to Bucharest city on the route which was including Botoşani town, in stagnation after 1860, Roman, Bacău and Focşani towns.

Iaşi and Galați towns, the main urban centres of the Western Moldavia had become just secondary nodes, being just crossings of national roads, favoured in a way between 1918-1940 years by the new possibilities of polarization of vast rural spaces situated from the east of Prut River. If in the case of Galați town the dense county roads network was a compensation, Iaşi town had the disadvantage of being in the neighbourhood of vast areas which were poorly integrated in the major network of communications (Bârlad Plateau, the hilly Valley of Jijia River), situation which gradually accentuated a series of disparities within the space between Prut river and the Carpathians., which is visible nowadays as well.

The first special unitary law for roads was issued in1868 under the guidance of the engineer Panait Donici who was minister of public works in that period. This law was stipulating the maintenance of the large roads from the state budget though a department which had under control ten territorial circumscriptions. The local roads (communal, vicinal and county roads) were under the jurisdiction of the local authorities, the work benefits being gradually eliminated. This progress was materialized after 1870 in the quick evolution of building roads and bridges (appearing now the metal bridges as well). Therefore, in the Old Kingdom, from 1800 km of bridges arranged in 1870 they reached to 26 426 km in 1905, from which 3036 bridges had the status of national roads. Till 1929, there were various amendments to this law, this year being created an autonomic organism (The Autonomic House of State Roads) which depends on the Ministry of Public Works and Communications) with own budget and provided by specific incomes. This evolution wanted to keep pace with the new realities derived from the extension of the monitoring process. But as previously, the county and communal roads were left in the local authorities care, creating therefore the premises of some disparities related to their quality. Important progresses were registered in the first part of the 20th century regarding the materials that were used for roads arrangement and maintenance, paved and concreted parts of the national roads being extended as well.

The way in which the road network of the region was organized in that period was displaying several deficiencies that are explainable through its peripheral status. If in the north, the existence of a less served area in the southern part of Suceava Plateau may support explanations of political reasons, being crossed by the former frontier between the Romanian Kingdom and the Austrian – Hungarian Empire, the convergence area from the confluence of Suceava and Siret rivers being ignored in crossing the main ways of communication as well, to the south we can't accept but a severe lack of economic thinking when we notify the inexistence of a possible connection between Bârlad and Siret valleys (as that between Bacău and Vaslui or between Adjud and Bârlad) or the neutralisation of some shorter routes (which were previously frequented) between Iaşi town and other important towns such as Roman or Botoşani

Some areas were maintained in an extreme isolation with reminiscences up to nowadays although the spatial logic proposes relatively facile connections. Therefore, the Subcarpathian area of Vrancea was at that time (as it is nowadays) completely separated of Tazlău-Cașin Depression and the central part of the hilly Plain of Jijia River was divergently crossed, greatly diminishing the possibilities of communication, the network (as it was existing) being oriented toward the county capitals (Iasi and Botosani in our case), the easily accessible sections as well as those created by the valley of Jijia River and its affluent (the Miletin especially) being completely ignored. If in the mountainous area, the existence of some various road endings may be explained by the relief fragmentation or by the reduced density of population, in the extra Carpathian hilly regions in Barlad Plateau especially, this situation explains firstly the decreased economic interest represented by an area dominated by a largely self – sufficient social – economic life. We may invoke as well the effects of the administrative structure of the road networks which were several times crossing some physical – geographical regions, the same as in the invoked cases.

The region situated under the jurisdiction of Iaşi Inspectorate gave the impression of a more disarticulation of the network with large disparities between the western part (Roman and Bacău counties especially) and the eastern part. Galați and Cernăuți counties were managing denser networks (if we mention only the national and county roads) and more coherent with a better serving of the space, mainly from connectivity perspective. The fact that no major connection on the east – west direction between Moldavia and Transylvania hadn't been underlined, was a reflex of both the excessive centralization of the Romanian ruttier network and of the political situation from the inter belly period, as the frontier with the Soviet Union was practically closed, diminishing thus the possibility of traffic on that direction. In addition, all the connections to the other north –south international route which was connecting Bucharest to Braşov and Cluj were rather sinuous, especially in the central part of the limit between Moldavia and Transylvania.

This situation was in the disfavour of the relationships between the two provinces, maintaining disparities which in time have become more acute, preserving the barrier effect induced by the Oriental Carpathians whose particularities weren't in their greatness but rather in their extending on width ness with several parallel peaks, transversal valleys and passes, etc, all of them making harder the circulation in comparison with the Southern Carpathians which separate Transylvania from the south of the country.

# THE STAGE OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ROAD NETWORK

In the post belly period an enormous effort was made along the communist regime especially for remodelling the communication network at national level, inclusively through a more rigorous ranking of the routes, according to the development necessities imposed by the principles which stayed at the basis of Romanian social - economic system after 1945. The western Romania has become again a frontier region, stressing its peripheral status with all the corrections made to the ruttier network. Its centralized organization has persisted, having the same essential principle, the maintaining of the capital as main node of convergence, of structuring the network. A part of the sinuous sections of some important roads (national and international ones) were resettled in the hierarchical frame, inclusively with the aim of obtaining a higher coherence or a more efficient centralization (nodding). In some cases, the restructuring was felt as a compensation for some urban centres situated in the position of railway head (Botoşani, Huşi for instance), the ruttier transport strongly competing the railway transport, especially after the nationalization performed in 1948 (Turnock, 1990).

The most spectacular in the case of the region under study was the recovery in general of the classic route of Siret Road, changing Suceava in an important ruttier node( besides its status of railway node, inheritance of its positioning on the frontier until 1918) and guiding the international road E85 on Moldova Valley, between Spătărești and Roman, a more facile route than the previous ones which were going round Dealul Mare ( the Big Hill) through Botoșani – Târgu Frumos, using Bucecea and Ruginoasa – Strunga passes. Beside the advantage of reducing the distance, it was however manifested an increase of isolating Botoșani and Iași towns in comparison with the major European network. This route was wanted as a duplicate of the railway section which belongs to the "extra Carpathian ring" (Pop, 1984, p.204).

This situation was in a way solved in the latest years, either by the introduction of some new roads such as the National Roads 17, 29, 28 and 28b which are presently constituted as the European Road E 58, considered as an east- west route which is necessary for the connection of the Republic of Moldavia and of the Southern part of Ukraine to the main sections of the European transport from the west and centre of the continent. Its relatively sinuous route is a result of a conjuncture compromise, the hypothetic highway provided to be built between Iaşi and Târgu Mureş, following to assume this role.

This status as European road of category A was also obtained by the National Road 21(DN 21), part of an artery which connects the main urban centres from the northern and western part of the Black Sea (E 87). In the category of European roads of category B, there were introduced the following sections: Tişiţa - Albiţa , part of an artery which makes the connection between E 85 and E 87; the National Road 11 (DN11) Bacău – Brasov, part of an artery which connects E 87 and E 79 between Bacău and Craiova (figure 5).



Figure 5. The contemporary oad network of Western Moldavia

This new skeleton of transcontinental roads which cross Moldavia is completely different of the previous ones, apparently denser, but demonstrating the same dependence on the major nodes that are outside the region. Moldavia, in overall, isn't connected to Galați and Brăila harbours and to Constanța harbour implicitly, through one European road, and Iaşi is just a stage in the disjunctive long European road, having no precise identity. A much clearer identity was acquired by Focşani – Tețcani section from E85, continued with the National Road 28(DN 28) up to Iaşi by their enlarging and rehabilitation made at the end of the 1990s. This route has become one of the best roads from the Romania of nowadays. It was naturally imposed a connectivity of the great Danubian harbours Galați and Brăila to the important ruttier and railway node from the south – eastern Transylvania, that is Braşov, by the introduction in the European circuit of the National Road 25 (DN 25) (Galați – Tecuci) and of the National Road 11a (DN 11a) ( on Adjud – Onești section), being obtained therefore the connection of the entire Moldavia to E87, which, theoretically at least, unifies the main harbours from the low Danube and Constanța.

The ruttier network of national and county importance was strongly adjusted in the period of the Communist regime, being less adjusted after 1989 and eliminating some of the previous deficiencies. Many of county roads endings have therefore disappeared, especially in the half west of the region under study, being several times in tight connection with the administrative limit, occurring therefore discordances between counties (between Bacău and Vaslui counties, but especially between Neamț and Iași counties).

The route of some national roads was corrected (Vaslui-Roman etc.), new roads from this category being arranged such as Vaslui – Bacău which reunified in fact two sections of the former national roads Bacău – Bârlad and Vaslui – Roman, Adjud – Bârlad, etc., both being east- west transversal roads, extremely important for the dis enclave of the western part of Bârlad Plateau.

However, the level of serving some regions continues to be reduced as in the case of the Eastern part of the hilly Plain of Jijia River or of Bârlad Plateau in overall. It is maintained the repulsive feature of some mountainous and Subcarpathian areas ( the north – east part of Bukovina Ridges, Tarcău Mountains, Ouşoru Massive which function as veritable barriers) and the absence of some natural connections on roads which are imperiously required to be modernized as well..

It is also noticed the formation of two areas of convergence of the main roads:

- one in the North, in a large space marked by Roman, Fălticeni, Suceava, Botoșani, Hârlău and Târgu Frumos towns, having in centre Siret Valley crossed only by county roads. The most important role is played by "the gate from Târgu Frumos" as Victor Tufescu named it in 1939, which was opening the western part of Moldavia toward the main node of convergence from the middle Prut, having in centre Iași town;

- the other one in the South, territorially more concentrated, comprising firstly Tecuci – Tişița and Focșani nodes, insufficiently coherently connected, thing which is explicable also by the floating character of the valley of the Inferior Siret and of the affluent which converge to this area.

The first area regulates the longitudinal traffic along the main axe and the transversal traffic on the main trans-Carpathian route from Suceava to Vatra Dornei and further to Dej. Iași town has a lateral position to this one, being rather a frontier node with no special importance for the moment, although the generated traffic should impose it, with the condition of the creation of a faster connection toward Ungheni town from the Republic of Moldavia, this one being the main ruttier node from Prut Valley in this state. The second area of convergence regulates the longitudinal traffic both toward Roman – Siret and toward Sculeni or Albița, secondary towards the Danubian harbors, being however in deficit from the connectivity perspective to the possible routes of

transversal traffic as it is Bacău - Brașov road. In this way, a modernization of DN 2c (National Road 2c), Focșani-Târgu Secuiesc should increase its importance as major ruttier node at national scale.

For the first time, Prut River is accompanied by national roads along its valley (with deviations imposed by the local morphology). Unfortunately, the sections which form them are divergent, their quality is rather inferior, therefore, that we can not talk about of a traffic to justify creating a second major longitudinally road between Galați-Iași-Rădăuți-Prut, otherwise extremely necessary for the reduction of the effect of barrier imposed by the frontier, generator of economic gaps. Such an artery should lead to a better connection of the ruttier network from the Republic of Moldavia to the Romanian network.

### CONCLUSION

The analysis of the evolution of the road network from the western part of Moldavia along more than two centuries underlines the reduced degree of coherence which doesn't correspond to the natural offer, paradoxically more and more depending on a centralized logic as we get near the modern age.

The coherence assured by the coordinator axe that unifies the northern part of the region with the Low Danube (Galați town more exactly) was gradually abandoned, subordinating the main roads of the region of the centre of convergence made up in the southern part of the country, around the capital, more or less justified from natural and human perspective. The absence of coherence besides the modest quality of transport infrastructure proves to be an impediment in the development of the interregional changes (Rey & all, 2006, p.102). It is anti- economical and against any tentative of judicious planning of the territory to exclude from the basic network of a whole region an important road which is to connect the former political – administrative centre (Iaşi town) to the only harbour of the region, essential outlet for the invigoration of the economical flows, the latter being cut off of the axe which in fact has generated it, assuring it for a long time a specificity among the Danubian harbour, that of timber harbour.

For the entire eastern part of the country, the deviation of the old commercial road of Siret from Tecuci -Focşani area toward Bucharest, was an error which should be repaired. Naturally, this road should have been oriented towards the harbours from the confluence of Danube with Prut and Siret rivers, naturally extended transversally over Dobrogea Plateau, toward Constanta, the only important maritime outlet of the country. But this one is a tribute given to the extremely conservatory vision of a capital which seems to ignore the suburbs. These discordances were analyzed inclusively in the case of certain researches of large scale (Tălângă, 2000, p. 158-161). They only diminish the spatial equity considered to be one of the key factors in the creation of an efficient transport network, a possible desiderate, everywhere in the world, might be achieved only through a public – private partnership, through a combination between the national interest (centred several times on the capital) and the interests of the local communities (Docherty, Shaw, 2009). In this way, the respect for space (understood in the way Ion Ianos presented, 2008) is to suffer as well. The analysis which has been displayed in the classical spirit of the historic geography, illustrates as obviously as possible the harmfulness of such rush decisions that are in dissonance with the local necessities for the development of a functional ruttier network. It worth to give a chance to the convergence areas, to the poles and nodes selected along a secular evolution of a transport network in the region under study in the spirit of the theories of a polycentric development (Peptenatu & all., 2009).

#### Acknowledgement

This contribution presents some results from research projects, entitled "The quality of transport infrastructure as a premise of rural spaces differentiation in Moldavia", financed by the CNCSIS research program PNCD-IDEI (code ID-1987). The authors acknowledge while to anonymous reviewer for their thoughtful suggestions and comments.

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Submitted:	Revised:	Accepted:	Published online:
June 30, 2011	July 4, 2011	October 3, 2012	November 30, 2011

### **ROMANIA – A FUTURE REGIONAL ENERGY HUB**

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Abstract: The paper highlights Romania's geostrategic potential and advantages as transit state of the future "Nabucco" transport route of natural gas from the Caspian Basin and Central Asia to the Central and East-European countries still heavily dependent on Russian hydrocarbon supply. Apart from the geostrategic advantages conferred by its geographical position, Romania is the only state in Central and South-Eastern Europe that can meet its own oil-and-gas demand and besides can also export this resource. The country also has the biggest Black Sea harbour which is ever more important economically and geostrategically after becoming port of the new Euro-Asian hydrocarbon transport axes.

Key-words: energy hub, gas war, Nabucco, Constanța, Romania.

#### BACKGROUND

The importance of the Transcontinental strategic line that links the EU to the oil-and-gas reserves of Central Asia which, after the dissolution of the COMECOM economic co-operaton system opened up to the West-European market, has been described by various syntagms. The stake is high (of the order of several million of barrils/day translating into billions of euros/year) and the fulfillment of this project would push the Caspian Basin into the position of world leader, surpassing the Middle East in the production and export of oil and gas. This geostrategic game has entailed very many state players hugely interested to benefit their economies. It is not only the producers and the direct users who are involved, but also the "intermediaries" - states like Romania (who wish to act as transit hydrocarbon route), as well as others like Russia, US, Turkey or even China, who do not contemplate being eliminated from the game.

#### **ROMANIA IN THE "NABUCCO" PROJECT**

At present, oil-and-gas flows from the south of the Caspian Basin through three pipe-lines that start from the same point, namely Baku: one in the north, inaugurated in 1997 (5 million crude t/year) which reaches the Russian port of Novorossiisk (1,330 km), and another two through Turkey: one for oil (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan) (1,768 km), operational since 2006, flowing some 1 million barrels/day and the other for gas (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) (692 km), annual

transport capacity around 8 billion m<sup>3</sup>, predicted to reach 20 billion m<sup>3</sup> after being connected to the Transcaspian gas corridor scheduled to include, beside Azerbaidjan, also other hydrocarbon-rich states, such as Turkmenistan and Kazahstan. This gas pipe is to feed the European Project "Nabucco" planned to cross Romania and reduce EU dependence on Russian exports (Figure 1). The project would benefit Romania in many ways, first and foremost by increasing its revenues from the transit of hydrocarbons, and create new jobs that would revigorate some economic problem-areas (the faltering mining sector of the Jiu Valley and of Oltenia Coal Basin, or the Oltenia Plain agriculture) by employing the redundant workforce.



Figure 1. Caspian oil and gas transport to Western Europe

The "gas wars" of 2006 and early 2009 brought to the fore the strong dependence of the Central and East-European states on Russian energy resources. Designed and put in place during the COMECOM era, the oil-and-gas transport and distribution system from this part of Europe still bears the mark of the policy-markers of the 1950-1960 decade who devised the then economic relations. The Nabucco line, financed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), will run along 3,893 km between *Erzurum* (Turkey) and *Baumgarten an de March* (Austria). In these two points it is to be linked to the existing corridors and thus have it connected with extraction and consumption areas; 66.3% of its total length (2,581 km) is to cross Turkey, a EU candidate state, the other 33,7% will transit Bulgaria (412 km). Romania (469 km) and Hungary (384 km), the end point being Austria (47 km). After being commissioned in 2017, the Nabucco pipe-line is schelduled to carry annually 31 billion m<sup>3</sup> of gas, thus reducing considerably Europe's energy dependence on Russia. The main question is

whether the necessary quantities of gas can be provided since current political negotiations speak only of some one-third of the pipe-line transport capacity. Apart from the Caspian Basin, alternative supply sources are Irak, Egypt and Lybia, possibly Iran, despite the Lybian conflict, or the political instability in Egypt and Syria and the foreseeable difficult political negotiations in the event of talks with Teheran.

In view of the importance attached to the Nabucco Project, Russia came up with a rival plan, the South Stream, of similar capacity, which is to skirt Romania, run south of the Danube and reach Hungary and Austria through Bulgaria and Serbia, two Pan-Slav and Pan-Orthodox countries, historically allied to Russia.

Here are Romania's main geostrategic assets with regard to the transport of Caspian hydrocarbons to Central and Western Europe:

- It is the largest country in the region, has political stability and lies at the crossing of the east-west and north-south economic and commercial corridors;

- It is part of three major Pan-European transport corridors: corridor 4 (Berlin-Prague-Bratislava-Györ-Budapest-Arad-Bucharest-Giurgiu-Sofia-

Istanbul); corridor 7 (the Danube-Main-Rhine transcontinental navigable route which links the Black Sea with the North Sea); corridor 9 (Helsinki-Sankt Petersburg-Pskov-Vitebsk-Ljubasivka-Chisinău-Bucharest-Plovdiv). The Danube-Black Sea Canal (64.4 km) was commissioned in 1984 and four years later the Danube-Main-Rhine Canal (171 km) was opened to navigation linking the Black Sea Basin to the North Atlantic ports. Thus, the opening of a second navigable thoroughfare shortened the Near East (Port Said) to Rotterdam route from 11 days (through the Mediterranean and the Gibraltar, 3,375 miles, by skirting the Black Sea) to only 3 days and 8 hours (on the Dardanelles-Bosphorus-Danube-Main-Rhine route) (Ghenovici, 1993). Similarly, connecting the Danube-Black Sea Canal to Europe's inland network of canals reduced the distance between Rotterdam and Constanta from 6,000 km on the old maritime line to 3,000 km, again from 11 days to 3 days and 8 hours. In this way, the importance of the Danube (2,588 km) has considerably increased. Moreover, 34 of its 120 tributaries are accessible to Europe's river traffic. The geostrategic importance of the two canals as transport routes was confirmed at the Pan-European Transport Conference, Helsinki 1997, when the Danube-Black Sea Canal was put on the Transeuropean transport list and Corridor 7 (North Sea -Black Sea) was extended to Constanța. Behind that decision lay ecological considerations (the fragility of the Danube Delta natural ecosystem), the risks posed to navigation security by the Sulina Canal (the grounding of a vessel imposing sailing restrictions), geopolitical reasons (connected with Ukraine's intention to continue with the building of the Bystroe Canal in the North of the Danube Delta) and more recently the measures taken to contain the spread of bird flue (leading to traffic restrictions).

- The pipe-line is supposed to cross lowland regions, especially plain areas, which offer greater technical advantages than the variants naming Burgas as point of departure, to say nothing of the routes across Turkey, in which case the pipe-line is to be built at up to 2,000 m altitude;

- Romania's offer is not simply to transit crude-oil from the Caspian Sea, but also to process it, because it has a fairly well-developed pipe-line system both for the transport of crude oil (around 4,500 km) and of oil products (2,500

km). The system can easily be connected to the Central and West-European transport route with minimum investments.

- The Romanian port of Constanța is the largest and most active one at the Black Sea, having all the special terminals operational both for crude-oil (24 million t/year) and oil products (12 million t/year), as well as the respective reservoirs (1.7 billion m<sup>3</sup>). Ongoing works will turn this harbour into the second largest port in Europe (after Rotterdam). The port of Constanța is sheduled to have a liquid gas terminal (12 billion m<sup>3</sup>/year) as stipulated in the April 2010 Memorandum signed by Romania with Azerbaidjan and Georgia, on the development of the Azerbaidjan-Georgia-Romania Interconnection (AGRI) for the transport of liquid gas through Constanța port; the initial transport capacity is to be of 3 billion m<sup>3</sup>, prospectively increasing up to 12 billion m<sup>3</sup> in 2016;

- The construction of the Nabucco gas-pipe could bring orders for the local iron-and-steel industry (Galați, Târgoviște, Călărași and Reșița), given that Romania is still competitive in this sector, moreover, the transport of iron-andsteel semi-fabs from long distances is not cost-effective;

- Transport facilities: *railway* (the route of the future gas pipe will run almost parallel to the Bucharest-Timişoara train line); *waterway* (through the Danube Black Sea and Poarta Albă – Năvodari canals);

- The presence of major urban agglomerations close to the pipe-line route (Timişoara, Arad, Craiova, Caransebeş, Lugoj, etc.) means easy access to air traffic as well;

- The future bridge over the Danube between Calafat and Vidin;

Several other opportunities ensuing from the regional and international geopolitical framework:

- Partnership opportunities facilitated by the cross-border co-operation Euro-regions: Danube-Criş-Mureş-Tisa (DKMT), Middle Danube-Iron Gate, Danube 21, Giurgiu-Ruse and The Lowe Danube; funds are obtainable from the EU regional development programme;

- The Pan-European vocation of Turkey, Azerbaidjan and Georgia;

- The pipe-line crosses or runs close to some states deeply energy-dependent on Russia: Bulgaria – 100%, Slovakia – 98.3%, Greece – 72.3%, Hungary – 66.5%, Turkey – 66% and Austria – 62.9%;

- The Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) initiative, an institution of regional co-operation, brings together the Black Sea riparian states;

- The geostrategic goal of the former Central-Asian Soviet states (e.g. Turkestan) is to get rid of the Russian geopolitical influence through a rapprochement to the West and to Turkey (by virtute of geocultural affinities).

On the other hand, there are also weaknesses and constraints imposed by possible accidental hydrocarbon pollution with negative consequences for the environment as the pipe-line is to run in the proximity of protected natural areas (the Valea Cernei – Domogled Natural Park) which shelter many rare and endemic species; construction and exploitation works undertaken in the mountain region (Timiş-Cerna and Mureş corridors) are very costly, transport efficiency being affected by competitive projects (*Blue Stream* and *South Stream*); there are also political constraints imposed by certain conflictual situations existing in the proximity of the transit area (Kurdistan, South Osetia, Abhazia and Kosovo), or of supply basins (Azerbaidjan, Iran, Irak, Lybia, Syria, etc.).

In these conditions, new questions arise with regard to Romania's preparedness for the Third Millennium Project, and its prospective supporters in

the bid. Russia supports the transport variants across Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece, largely because it has good traditional relations with these countries; on the other hand, the United States favours the transport corridors through Turkey, a NATO member-state and its main ally in the region (Negut et al., 2004).

Romania's hopes to be a successful bidder are pinned primarily on its geostrategic and economic assets, because the big companies likely to participate in this project are interested in maximising profits with minimum risks.

## THE HYDROCARBON RESOURCES ON THE ROMANIAN BLACK SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF

Another asset is the contry's hydrocarbon resources on the Black Sea Continental Shelf, it holding 79.3% (9,700 km<sup>2</sup>) of the total Shelf area disputed with Ukraine, an area attributed to Romania by Decision of the International Court of Justice in The Hague on February 3, 2009.

Estimated reserves are put at same 12 million tons of oil and 70 billion m<sup>3</sup> of gas (Figure 2). This could make Romania the first Central and East-European state capable to meet domestic consumption needs from own resources and act not only as transit country, but also as a hydrocarbon-exporting state.



Figure 2. The Romanian-Ukrainian border-line in the Black Sea Continental Shelf area

#### THE PORT OF CONSTANȚA IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

As the main consumer of hydrocarbons, Europe has lately become interested in integrating oil transport routes into its short-and-medium-term development programmes and besides, to include the whole of the Black Sea region into medium-and-long-term programmes. Viewed within a global integrating perspective, the Black Sea might play a major role in the future cohesion and stability of a rather complex geopolitical area.

Ever since the seventh decade, Romania has endeavoured to enlarge the geopolitical area of its external trade exchanges, developing *Constanța* harbour as the main gateway of international maritime traffic. At the same time, also a port at the Danube - Black Sea Canal, Constanța can become a transit destination between remoter and economically complementary geographical regions.

The complex post-war works, especially those of 1964, extended the port area to the south, which eventually became three times larger than before, as did the length of its wharfs. In the years 1970-1980 extensions continued north and south along the coast with the building of two more harbours: Midia-Năvodari specialised in shipping crude-oil and oil products, and Constanța Sud – Agigea, the terminus of the Danube – Black Sea Canal. The former harbour, built exclusively for the homonymous refinery, is also a river port being connected (through the 26.6 km-long Poarta Albă – Midia Năvodari Canal) to the Danube – Black Sea Canal). It is also a point of convergence of the submarine oil pipe coming from the oil drillers on the Black Sea Continental Shelf.

These extension and modernisation works increased Constanța harbour's traffic capacity from 60 to 85 million tons / year, establishing it as the biggest Black Sea port and the fourth in Europe after Rotterdam, Antwerp and Marseille. Port installations and equipments cover 3,926 hectares, out of which 1,313 ha on land and 2,613 ha on water. The harbour is shelterd by two sea walls, situated north and south, which confer safety and optimal conditions for the development of port activities. At present, the north and the south sea walls are 8,344 m and 5,560 m long, respectively. Constanța Port has 156 births, of which 140 are operational. The total length of the wharfs is 29.83 km, depths between 7 m and 19 m allow for oil tanks of 165,000 tdw and cargo ships of up to 220,000 tdw to anchor here.

Constanța dockyard has the capacity to build and repair ships of up to 200,000 tdw, and the free zone can discharge the whole range of specific activities. For all that, traffic is far below capacity, basically not even half its potential values being reached. The structure of goods is dominated by cereals (about <sup>1</sup>/<sub>4</sub> of the total), crude-oil and oil products, iron ores and derived products, general commodities, non-ferrous ores, fossil fuels and chemical products.

The fundamental political mutations experienced by the Black Sea riparian countries after 1990 have led to radical changes in the volume and structure of maritime traffic in the area; with the exception of the Turkish ports, all the others and more especially those located on the western coast of the basin, were in some cases faced suddenly with massive of the traffic volume decreases. From 62 million tons passing through Constanța in 1988-1989, values dropped to 42.4, 28.4 and 26.8 million tons in 1990, 1991 and 1992, respectively, a slight increase being noted in 1995 (30 mill. tons/year). The financial-economic crisis affected also the traffic of goods in Constanța harbour, the 2009 volume being by 30% lower than the year before.Beside difficulties in volume and structure due to economic restructuring processes in the reverine countries, radical changes

also occurred in what concerns the geographical area and the direction of transported goods. So, traffic through the ex-Soviet harbours decreased in favour of the southern and eastern Black Sea ports.

The level at which the Black Sea port capacities are used at present is distinctively different. Some harbours (e.g. Constanța and Odessa) have excess capacities, others are in deficit (Caucasian ports).

In these conditions Constanța can become a competitive actor at the Black Sea: it has a complex transport system – sea, river, rail and air. Ship entry to the Danube-Black Sea Canal being placed in the south of the harbour, enables direct reshipping from sea vessels to barges; it has a vast hinterland which includes both the Black Sea and the Danube basins; it has the biggest and modernmost operation capacities in the region, receiving all types of vessels transiting the Suez Canal; it converges river and sea transport, and has important strategic facilities (shipyard and free-zone regime).

Works to upgrade port equipments, diversify services and integrate regional, European and global transport systems more efficiently are underway or scheduled to begin. As a result, Constanța will strengthen its position of Europe's eastern maritime gateway and principal Black Sea harbour.

#### CONCLUSIONS

For all the efforts made by the Romanian side after 1989, the Black Sea has not regained its status of regional geopolitical power, although the dissolution of Soviet Russia kindled the hope of new prospects for international relations to develop in this strategic zone. Despite various international organisations being established nearly throughout the last two decades, Russian intervention, Ukrainian and Turkish interests and the lack of interest on the part of international alliances brought positive evolutions to a halt. As the oil crisis got momentum, a crisis actually triggered by Islamic revolutions, the Black Sea was found to have an exceptional geostrategic potential, so far not fully exploited. A shift in the economic-military policy of Western states opened up new vistas for a fresh approach to the Black Sea, an area lying at the crossroads of some vital axes (Pontic-Baltic, Pontic-Caspian, Caspian-Arab, Mediterranean-Arab and Balkan-Caspian) for international alliances, part and parcel of the geopolitical system of intra-continental European seas.

So, Romania's geographical position links it essentially to the Black Sea, which thus becomes the main gateway to Europe (through the ports of Constanța, Constanța Sud – Agigea and the Danube – Black Sea Canal, unfortunately still not exploited at its full strategic capacity) and the main Caspian-Pontic interface with the West. Situated in the central zone of the geopolitical system of intra-continental seas, Romania can become the "Eastern key" to NATO and EU relationships with Russia, Asia and the Arab states.

In this period of searches determined by the globalisation process, Romania possesses the necessary infrastructure to take over, store and transport energy resources, it being a real partner in the alliances it belongs to. A founder, together with Bulgaria, Georgia, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine, of the Black Sea Economic Community (BSEC), Romania has been actively involved in strengthening trade relations, public and telecomunication works and environmental protection (especially of the Danube Delta, tensioning its relations with Ukraine), stimulating cultural exchanges and granting political support to the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkey on the world's stage.

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Submitted: June 20, 2011 Revised: June 23, 2011 Accepted: September 28, 2011 Published online: November 30, 2011 ISSN 1454-2749. E-ISSN 2065-1619

### THE PERMEABILITY OF THE ROMANIAN BORDER AND THE INTERNATIONAL TOURIST MOVEMENT **IN THE PERIOD 1994-2008**

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Abstract: The dynamic of the European political space, the changing role and functions of the border, the EU enlargement to the East are phenomena that have profoundly affected the Romanian economic system in general and the tourism in particular. By analyzing a comprehensive basis of official statistics of the number of tourists arriving in the Romanian political space, between 1994-2008, we determined the main tourist transmitting areas, the volume, structure and direction of these flows, the official tourist offer use and the used type of transport infrastructure. This approach aims to identify effective solutions mainly in development strategies, the diversification and promotion of Romanian tourism system based on facts arising from visits conducted in Romania in the period under review, by over 80 million tourists mainly Europeans.

Key words: Romania, tourism, tourist flows, international tourism, tourist destination, emitting area.

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#### INTRODUCTION

At the turn of the 2<sup>nd</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup> millenniums the European political space knew deep structural-political and socio-economic changes. On the same geographical area, which can be considered "support for the development of a new spatial order" (Forster, 2000, 11), with the fall of the Socialist system and

specific planned economy the most important changes were: multiplying the number of states; changing role and functions of state borders, expanding the market economy to the Center and East, extending the area marked by "the free movement of people" and the amplification and diversification of international flows and the EU and NATO enlargement and the inclusion of new members from the former Socialist system etc. Also, the impact of the new EU external borders and in particularly the Eastern one generates significant changes on the border human flows and to the key factors contributing to the size and restriction of the international movement in this area. Given that the number of human resources, the structure and dynamics is the most important modeling agent of a territorial political system, we believe that a detailed analysis of tourist flows in the Romanian space, of the directions to it and from it, represents an important step in the current political and economic context. It is a process for identifying, understanding, defining and integrating of the elements and mechanisms that can cause the continuous modeling, turistification (Cazelais et al., 2000), self regulating and adaptation mechanisms of territorial European political systems and subsystems.

#### THE CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAME

The concepts used are those determined by the flow of international tourist arrivals built from the foreign visitors to the Romanian tourism system. The survey is based on information obtained from the official statistics source and from border police. By using proved tools in the literature (Ianoş, 2000; Dinu, 2002; Muntele & Iaţu, 2003; Cocean, 2005) we analyze quantitative and qualitative the characteristics generated by the volume, structure and intensity of international tourist flows (Cocean et al., 2002; Cândea et al, 2003; Ciangă, 2006). There are analyzed the quantitative and qualitative parameters that structure and size the international tourist flows by the number of foreign tourists entering the country, by the number of officially turned the tourist offer (including accommodation) and also by means of transport. For example, changing the role and functions of the borders, the rhythm and dynamics of an appropriate/inappropriate temporal segment causes deep structural-functional mutations of the territorial system or subsystem, by the size, dynamics and structure of tourist flow.

#### THE ANALYTICAL COMPONENT

The quantitative and qualitative components of a territorial-political system modeled at local and regional level by the tourist flows, by the interdependencies between them and natural and anthropogenic determinants. The configuration of the tourism flows is based on (Williams, 1998): the absolute and relative geographical position, the morphological characteristics of the the accessibility, the communication landscape, system, the specific quantitative, qualitative and structural of the human resource, the economic development level, the socio-economic and political conditions etc. To all this must be added the fact that the border is physically, mentally, politically, culturally and socially constructed (Sofield, 2003), whose components, mechanisms and operating principles required to be decoded and understood in order to be relocated in new functional systems integrated structures.

Romania has an extremely complex situation generated by the profound changes that took place in the last 20 years, especially politically, economically

238

239

and therefore impacting the tourist flows. Faced with new challenges arising from successive position and rapidly outside the EU and NATO and then inside EU and NATO, the most difficult phase to overcome will be the adaptation to a position "*on the edge of abundance*" (Lichtenberger, 2000, 406).

In most cases, these territorial systems border area at the edge of the EU, the opened borders and increased international mobility of the population is characterized by inconsistency (crossing with visa/visa-free), all these reflected in the economic development and living standards of population. This attitude is reflected in the attitude of the resident population in the EU external border areas and where, because of general and specific security measures, the population located on both sides of the border outlines their views diametrically opposed in terms of social status and understanding of the concept of cross-border cooperation. In terms of structure, the foreign tourist flows includes two categories (Ilieş et al., 2011; Figures 1 and 3): those who use the official accommodation infrastructure and those who are not registered in such structures, using accommodation from friends, relatives or acquaintances.



Figure 1. Tourist flow according with official registration at tourist destination areas (Source: Ilieş et al., 2011)

# THE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE PARAMETERS SPECIFIC TO THE TOURIST FLOWS

The intensity, dynamics and volume of the cross-border flows shall be sized and directed according to socio-economic and political context of the area of origin and the destination. In this study there are analyzed the border areas quantitative, quality and spatial parameters of the tourist flows, setting up areas, their technical support favoring the border permeability and finally the transportation used for this purpose. Also, an important role in determining the size, orientation and structure of tourist flows is played by the quality and diversity of the tourist offer. The spatial tourism phenomenon in terms of tourist mobility is subject to an extensive complex of factors which come together in the structure of quantification that became "*classic*" (Ciangă, 1998) also the regional distribution of specific elements. Similarly, the economic development through tourism will adapt and (re)size according to the tourist offer and the determined flows. From the structural point of view, for the period 1990-2008, tourist flows are analyzed in terms of inputs and outputs of the Romanian political territorial system in the volume generated by tourists emitting areas.

**The border permeability** by the density and number of border crossing points is the basis for the orientation of the cross-border tourist flows, for their size, for the qualitative and quantitative parameters of the transport network, and for the specific means. The analytic component should consider the border permeability in terms of: *technical issues* - the number of border crossing points and their morph-functional characteristics (figure 2), namely accessibility to tourist destinations and *legal issues* - facilitating/hinder access (visas, bureaucratic crossing points etc). From this point of view, the 7 Romanian border areas are of great functional diversity, from the increased accessibility for domestic EU sectors to difficult accessibility for external EU border (figure 2).



Figure 2. Romanian borders and cross-border points typology and territorial distribution (Data sources: Romanian Police Guard; www.politiadefrontiere.ro)

Difficult formalities at border crossing points, especially at the external EU border, retain the people from visiting another country and makes harder the free flow between the parties. **Border passing legislation and agreements** signed by Romania and neighboring countries, reflected almost in strict visa regime in few intervals of the period, determined continuously reorganization of the international tourist flows. "*The visa game*" was reflected strongly on tourism activities, generating according to the implementation of freedom/restriction of movement juxtaposed systems in the visa periods and early stages of integration

in the non-visa periods (Ilies et al., 2012). For example, for the cross-border flows on the Romanian-Ukrainian border, where apparently the Romanian citizens have the advantage to travel freely in the space of Ukraine, in terms of development of the tourism phenomenon, the use and development of infrastructure and service revenue growth, the advantage of the tourist system belongs to the Ukrainian side as it is less restrictive. Moreover, differences in prices between the two border systems emphasize the imbalance in favor of Ukrainian part, which in the context of proximity tourism and quality services, can record considerable progress towards the Romanian side (Ilies et al., 2012).

**Arrivals of foreign visitors in Romania.** Becoming a tourist destination country is derived from tourism supply and product quality which in turn guides and dimensioned the number of foreign tourists and expand their area of origin. Corresponding statistics for the period 1994-2008 recorded that officially entered Romania a number of 87.403 million foreign tourists with an average of 5.8 million tourists per year (Figure 3). Compared to this average value the less specific entries in the Romanian space dates from 2002 (4.794 million), 2001 (4.938 million) and 1998 (4.831 million). The most important number of foreign tourists who visited Romania characterized the period 2006-2008, reaching to 8.862 million foreign tourists in 2008 (Figure 3). The greatest increase with 27.9% marks 2007 when the number of foreigners who visited Romania has grown by 1.7 million compared to year before. During this period of 15 years there were characterized the downturn interval 1994-1998, 2001-2002 and 2005, when it was registered the largest decrease from the previous year (-11.5%).





Figure 3. Romania. The tourist flow considering the number of arrivals of foreign tourists: total no; with and without official tourist accommodation in period 1990-2008 (Data sources: Romanian National Institute of Statistics, 2010; www.insee.ro)

After outlining areas of origin, for example in the year 2008 about 95% of all foreign tourists from the European political space, particularly from Romania's neighbors. The share of European tourists reached 97% in 1994 and the lowest values of 94% were recorded in 2005 and 2006. In the same year 2008, about 2.35% from foreign tourists came from Asia, of which about 1.0% mainly from Israel, U.S. 1.5% and Africa (mainly Egypt) 0.2%.

In the European political space (including Russia and Turkey) in 1994 the biggest tourist emitting area for Romanian tourist coincided with the neighboring states of Romania. Among them, according to official statistics, the most important were (Figure 4): Bulgaria 1.022 million (17.3%), Moldova 0.803 million (13.6%), Serbia and Montenegro 0.634 million (10.7%), Hungary 0.628 million (10.6%) and Ukraine 0.593 million (10.0%). A second area, more dispersed consisted of: Turkey 0.535 million (9.1%), Russia 0.443 million (7.5%), Germany 0.203 million (3.44%), Czech Republic 0.121 million (2.05%) Italy 0.093 million (1.6%), Slovakia, Poland, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Belarus, Macedonia, France, Austria etc (Figure 4). We notice that the dominant area of tourists who visited Romania overlaps with that of neighboring countries represent 62% (3.680 million) of total foreign tourists.



Figure 4. Arrivals of foreign visitors in Romania, by main origin countries (1994-2008) (data sources: Romanian National Institute of Statistics, 2010; www.insee.ro)

In the period that followed there were numerous changes in the structural aspect in the total annual tourist flow, under the influence of political and economic framework marked mainly by EU enlargement and integration. In 2008, a year after Romania's EU accession a number of foreign tourists increased to 8.862 million, with 14.76% compared to 2007, the year of integration. Compared with 1994, the EU space remained the main area of origin, representing 95% of the total, substantial changes being made at the state of origin. The main emitting area remained that of the neighboring countries except Serbia, deeply affected by its citizen's visa requirements to enter Romania. In this case the number of tourists decreased from 0.634 million in 1994 to 0.184 million in 2008 and representing mostly a local border traffic and tourism business. Thus, in 2008 the major emitting countries neighboring Romania: Hungary 22.0% (1.950 million),

242

Moldova 16.1% (1.429 million), Bulgaria 12.5% (1.114 million) and Ukraine 8.2% (0.730 million), while the Serbs were only 2.1% (0.184 million). In the second area consists of non-contiguous countries the most numerous tourists came from Germany (0.522 million), Italy 4.9% (0.433 million), Turkey 3.4% (0.303 million), Poland 3.1% (0.277 million), Austria 2.36% (0.210 million), France 2.06% (0.183 million), Slovakia 1.67% (0.148), Czech Republic 1.52% (0.135 million), United Kingdom 1.44% (0.128 million), Greece 1.33% (0.118 million) etc. Compared with 1994, in 2008 we find a similar area of origin for the 8.862 million tourists, but with a different distribution among the states. All neighboring states except Serbia (with about 0.450 million drop in tourists) send a greater number of tourists, but the most important state is Hungary, followed by Moldova and Bulgaria. In the category of tourists emitting states not bordered by Romania stands Germany (with an increase of 0.319 million tourists), Italy (+0.340 million), Poland (+0.158 million), Austria (+0.169 million), France (+0.143 million), United Kingdom (+0.090 million), Slovakia (+0.087 million), the Czech Republic etc. In contrast, massive drops were registered in Turkey (-0.232 million), Russia (-0.380 million), Macedonia and Belarus. In the Americas, the U.S. record in the same period a slight increase from 0.049 million tourists in 1994 to 0.137 million tourists in 2008. Also, Israel has tripled the number of visitors sent to Romania from 30,000 to 96,000 people. It should be noted that most tourists are on holiday and visiting friends and relatives (for neighboring states) and business in those states which are not bordered by Romania (especially Italy, Turkey, Germany etc).



Figure 5. Total and average by year of arrivals of foreign visitors in Romania, by main origin countries (1994-2008) (data sources: Romanian National Institute of Statistics, 2010; www.insee.ro)

**Intensity visits.** Another interesting aspect derived from the total number of tourists who visited Romania between 1994-2008. Regardless of political or economic circumstances, this indicator reflects the consistency of the population's interest in a particular state, to the Romanian tourist area. Thus, 83.3 million of the European tourists who came to Romania in a period of 15 vears (Figure 5), the most numerous were the Hungarians 22.7% (18.957 million) and Moldavians 21.4% (17.788 million). Compared to the total population of the states concerned we notice that virtually every Hungarian was at least twice in Romania, while for Moldova every citizen was over 4 times in the Romanian political space. Far away there are: Bulgaria 10% (8.321 million), Ukraine 8.4% (7.041 million), Turkey 5.2% (4.378 million), Germany 5.8% (4.807 million), Italy 3.9% (3299 million), Serbia 3.7% (3.076 million), Austria 1.463 million, 1.238 million Czech Rep., France 1.392 million, 1.057 million Greece, Poland 1.845 million, 1.313 million Slovakia, United Kingdom 1.002 million, 1.790 million Russia, USA 1.339 million, Israel, etc. 0.84 million. At the same it should be noted that the mentioned countries can be grouped into two categories: the upward trend (Hungary, Moldova, Bulgaria, etc.) and the downward trend (Serbia, Russia, Turkey etc).

Another interesting aspect on foreign tourists' preferences results from the **ratio between the number of arrivals in Romania (registered at border points ports) and number of officially registered tourist accommodation** with at least one night stay (Figures 1 and 3). The resulting difference is crucial in terms of foreign tourist option to the implementation of official Romanian tourism offer in relation to the unofficial version involving cost (accommodation to friends and relatives, visiting tourist objectives free of charge etc). Also for tourists coming from neighboring states, it does exist the version of returning to their home version on the same day, which does not involves accommodation costs in the official structures. The officially registered data the number of tourists entering Romania and who did not call for the official accommodation is on average 18% from the total official inflows. The upward trend from 14% in 1994 to 20% in 2008 is to be noticed, the maximum being 24.5% in 2004. As absolute values in 2007, about 1.55 millions foreign tourists used the services official accommodation.

#### **Transports and Communications network**

The state practice performance in hospitality and tourism industry shows that tourism is dependent on the quality and quantity of network communications and transportion routes. The favorable elements of the Romanian tourism are: the existence of pan-European corridors, national airports (new international routes can be added), river cruise etc all these marked by a low degree of connection with international systems (Figure 2). The question of costs required upgrading the existing ones and building new structures comes up. The characteristics of transport systems may be considered the cause and effect of regional contrasts (Ilies G, 2007) and correlated with the ports of entry creates determining relationships to guide tourist flows especially to the sense of entering the country.

An important aspect that can be the basis of the Romanian tourism development strategy and of the most profitable developments, fast and useful transport and communication networks, results from the analysis by *means of transport of the foreign tourists* who visited Romania (Figure 6). Thus, for the period

244

1990-2008 stands out the dominance of the road transportation whose share increased from 56% in 1990 to 77.7% in 2008. Annual average is 4.3 million tourists/year with extreme values of 3.5 million tourists in 1998 and 6.8 million tourists in 2008. The rail roads transportation came on the second place in 1990 with a share of 36% and about 2.3 million tourists. Gradually, their share has fallen dramatically, with a sharp decline after 2000, at a minimum of 2.9% in 2008 and only 0.253 million tourists carried. In parallel, the air transport by increasing the flights and the number of airlines operating on the lines for Romania increased from 0.271 million tourists (4.1% of total) in 1990 to 1.46 million tourists (16.55% total) in 2008. The shipping is distinguished by the constant number of tourists (about 0.173 million/year) and share (3.0% annually). The largest number of tourists who came to Romania by water was in 1990 (0.242 million) and in 2008 (0.262 million). The trend in 2008 compared to 2007 was the growth of road transport, constancy for water transport and the reduction for rail and air.



(data sources: Romanian National Institute of Statistics, 2010; www.insee.ro)

Given the international trends, the increasing speed and travel time for tourism an important role is played by the air transport. In Romania, the air traffic is served by a network of 16 national and international airports, the number of passengers being in 2004 of 3.4 million compare to 2 million in 1999. If scheduled flights in 1999 had 95% of all passengers in 2004 the charter flights rose to 15% with a total of 0.5 million passengers. In parallel we are witnessing an increase in low-cost flights operated by Wizz Air, Blue Air, MyAir etc. (the table 4.8 (Master Plan, 45). In parallel, it had joined the company TAROM, a member of SkyTeam, a number of other 26 Romanian companies operating also the internal lines (CarpatAir, BlueAir etc). The largest numbers of passengers were registered at the airports in 2006 Henri-Coanda Bucharest, with 3 million passengers, followed by 0.6 million in Timisoara, the Bucharest Aurel-Vlaicu Airport with 0.385 million, 0.244 million at Cluj-Napoca and 0.111 million at Constanta. The concept of rail travel like the Orient Express is a niche product. Internally, the railway access is provided to the large urban centers and an important number of tourist resorts. In the Maramures Mountains operates the only narrow railway line on 60 km, a scenic mountain route. So it is the Oravita-Anina route, the oldest railway in Romania.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The Romanian tourism system modeling and adaptation to the international market requirements can be done through a detailed analysis of the international tourist flows in terms of number of tourists, the area of origin, destinations, travel motivations, length of stay and the means of transport used. Data analysis shows that the main gateway to the Romanian tourism is made up of road and railway border crossing points existing in the Romanian-Hungarian and the Romanian-Moldavian borderland, plus the international air ports of entry. Although the main motivation is not the tourist act itself, the main emitting area is made up of Romania's neighbors plus another group of large states of Europe such as Germany, France, Turkey, Russia etc. In the latter case a large number of people enter the Romanian space for business tourism. Another interesting aspect is the result of the ratio of total number of tourists entering the country and the number who have turned to tourism officials, with superior values to the detriment of the latter category (about 5 times less). Also, the dominant car use by the tourists arrived in Romania requires the development and modernization of roads, particularly those to the main tourist destinations.

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Submitted: August 4, 2010 Revised: August 8, 2010 Accepted: November 3, 2011 Published online: November 30, 2011 ISSN 1454-2749. E-ISSN 2065-1619

### ASPECTS OF A 'BRILLIANT ASSERTION IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE WORLD'.1 THE THIRD WORLD IN SOCIALIST ROMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

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Abstract: Ceaşescu's Romania and the Third World interacted through a complex and complicated relationship of which the economic and geopolitical dimensions were by far the most important. The present paper performs a brief analysis of this relationship, pinpointing the advantages and also the disadvantages that socialist Romania was able to extract from it.

Key words: "socialist developing country", Third World, "Group of 77", international economic relations, development

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#### TIERMONDIST AMBITIONS

Presenting itself, starting with 1972, as a 'socialist developing country', the Romanian Socialist Republic (RSS) aimed to affirm its individuality with ratio to the rest, only socialist the East-European states, diversifying in this way its global commercial options. Targeted were the European Economic Community (EEC) and, first of all, the Third World countries. As a 'socialist developing country', RSS was giving more and more attention to the 'new international order' concept, residing, on short, in the 'democratization of international relations', amplifying the role of 'small and middle' states on the global stage, nurturing the new social forces that would have anticipated the coming of the (Leninist) 'new', permanently opposed to the 'old' ('bourgeois' and therefore ideologically overcome].<sup>2</sup> Within global geopolitical parameters, with a more and more deteriorated image in the West due to the lack of recognition for human rights, RSS aimed to play a active role in the Third World, with which it shared some ideological affinities of Maoist extraction.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "România și președintele Nicolae Ceaușescu – strălucită afirmare în conștiința lumii", Lumea 82 Almanah, 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Ronald Linden, Communist states and international change. Romania and Yugoslavia in comparative perspective, (London, Sydney, Wellington: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 58-59; Robert King, "Romania and the third world", Orbis, 4: (1978), 875-892; Concepția președintelui Nicolae Ceaușescu despre noua ordine economică internațională, (București: Editura Politică, 1976).

Because of the relaxation of the international environment once the Helsinki accords were signed in 1975, the dissident foreign policy of RSS was not as important as in the late 60's, when Bucharest managed to considerably distance itself from Moscow. The collaborative propensity of the United States and the Soviet Union, both confronted with a large specter of global problems had diminished the RSS's utility as a Western pressure tool against Moscow. Here lies the main signification of RSS's decision to intensify relations with developing states. Declaring itself a 'socialist developing country' and trying to integrate within the 'Group of 77' (international group formed by developing UN member states) or in the nonaligned movement (international group consisting of states which rejected the affiliation to or against a military block), the RSS actually tried to obtain, trough third parts, new forms of access to the credits and the developed markets, on which it was marginalized due to the uncompetitive products it tried to sell. How? In July 1971, the EEC indicated willingness to grant preferential treatment to imports from developing countries' and Romania, along with Bulgaria, proved receptive. Especially the first, which made consistent steps in this sense, but with only partial success

As well, UN procedures necessary for integrating RSS in the 'Group of 77', an alliance, as mentioned, of African, Arab, Asian or South American states which tried to remain neutral in the superpower confrontation in order to expand the range of their economic opportunities – were initiated. Ceauşescu and propagandists of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) were very active in promoting the image of RSS as a developing country, without forgetting to simultaneously mention its socialist, both to avoid Moscow's supplementary indisposition, irritated enough by the boost of Romanian foreign policy in the second half of the 60's. Correlative, the 'new international order' was vigorously affirmed within the UN and beyond, something which 'apparently naturalized credibility to Romania's claim to be a developing country'.<sup>3</sup>

The economic compatibility between RSS and the Third World states consisted in Romanian exports of 'machines, equipment and complete installations', for which it received 'raw materials, textiles and semiprocesate products'. For Robert King, 'Such a commercial structure is typical for economic exchanges between industrialized and developing countries'.<sup>4</sup> Ceauşescu was pretty much aware of this aspect. The proof lies in the fact that the general secretary of RCP publicly presented RSS as a developing model for the Third World, Dovada rezidă în faptul că el însuşi prezenta public RSR ca model de dezvoltare pentru lumea a treia, of which, however, it would have been part.

"Regarding the path the weak developed countries must walk, it depends first of all on the decisions revolutionary nationalist forces take in every country. But Romania's experience proves that for every people who wishes to quickly liquidate underdevelopment and to ensure its economic-social progress, it is necessary that the national health is hold by himself.

Second, it is necessary to concentrate the available material and financial means in the main decisive directions of the country's development and, in the first place, in the direction of developing industry and agriculture. It is understandable that in order to realize

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> King, "Romania", 880-882.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> King, "Romania", 879.
a quick progress the training of necessary cadres is imposed, both specialists with superior studies and qualified workers for all fields of activity; without this progress is not conceivable.

And, finally, I would like to mention that it is an objective necessity for countries which take on the development road to realize a large collaboration both among them, and with socialist countries and other states in the world – on the basis of respect and mutual advantage."<sup>5</sup>

This is exactly the developmental strategy that Ceauşescu conceived and applied in the RSS. As for the specialists or future specialists which to implement the developmental process, Ceauşescu did not forget to mention the 'technical assistance' the RSS offered to the Third World countries, consisting, in 1971, if we give credit to official dates, in '642 Romanian specialists, from which over 500 in African countries. From developing countries study in Romania in several teaching institutes 665 students, from which 166 from the African continent countries'. For the Bucharest leader, underdeveloped countries needed to intensify commercial contacts with RSS, first of all, and among themselves, thus prospering together with the one country which wanted to pass as their benevolent tutor, Romania: 'the way of production cooperation represents a solution – the only solution I could say – to allow small and middle countries to obtain a quick progress on the path of economic and social development, therefore on the path of strengthening national independence'.<sup>6</sup>

#### **ACCEPTANCE IN THE 'GROUP OF 77'**

Communist Romania's efforts to come close with underdeveloped states and to be accepted, within the UN, in the 'Group of 77', did not started during the Ceauşescu era', but in the last years of Gheorghiu-Dej's leadership, when Bucharest's foreign policy was progressively drifting from that of the Soviet Union and the 'socialist camp'. Romania filled its application to the 'Group of 77' in 1964, the year of Bucharest's maximum visibility on the international stage during Gheorghiu Dej's leadership. 'But the group was organized in regional sections, Asian, African and Latin-American and Romania was not acceptable for none of these sections. Doubts regarding receiving some non-regional members, Romania's motives, and the effect its position as a COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the economic organization of the 'socialist camp', m.n.) member would have had over the negotiating possibilities of the group, led to its rejection'.7 But Yugoslavia was allowed membership in the 'Group of 77' as a recognition of its essential contribution to create the nonaligned movement during the Bandung conference from 1955, being included in the Asian section of the group'.<sup>8</sup> The Romanian efforts were not, however, stopped by this failure.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Politica externă a României socialiste, (București: Editura Politică, 1972), 129-130.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Politica externă, 130-131; Arturo Frondizi, "Noua ordine economică internațională. Experiența României", în Concepția preşedintelui Nicolae Ceauşescu, 61; Constantin Botoran; Gheorghe Unc, Tradiții de solidaritate ale mişcării muncitorești și democratice din România cu lupta de emancipare națională și socială a popoarelor din Asia, Africa și America Latină, București: Editura Politică, 1977), 227.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Colin Lawson, "National independence and reciprocal advantages: the political economy of Romanian-South relations", Soviet Studies, 3: (1983), 362-375.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Nicolae Nicolae, O lume aşa cum am cunoscut-o. Amintirile unui fost ambasador al României, (Bucureşti: Pro Domo, 2000, 171-172.

After 1965, boosted by the obtaining of as many economic advantages as possible, RSS will resume its insistences to become a part of the group, constantly offering support to its initiatives in the UN.<sup>9</sup>

Nicolae Nicolae, a former ambassador in the United States in the second half of the 70's and dismissed by Ceauşescu after the escape of general Ion Mihai Pacepa in this country, for which it was, to a certain point, responsible – remembers the process through which Romania finally became a member of the 'Group of 77'. As regional appurtenance it was opted for the Latin American section, there being the most high-rank officials willing to sustain RSS's cause. The Brazilian and Argentinean delegations agreed to support receivement in their group, but conditioned this support on to a declaration of the Romanian part trough which it renounced its appurtenance to the list of countries with centralized economy at the UNCTAD'. A request impossible to be accepted by the Romanian part because the dangerous political tensions it would have entailed in the Bucharest-Moscow relationship. Finally, the Latin-American section gave up this claim, asking only that 'Romania not to pretend to participate at the decisions specific to the countries in this area'. The Romanian delegation had nothing to object, being satisfies that it had managed to make its application for the 'Group of 77' supported by one of the regional sections.

RSS had to face a redoubtable opposition. The first, but also the most difficult adversary, was the Arab countries, present both in the Asian and the African group. The Arabs manifested a certain irritation because, with the occasion of voting in the UN a resolution, initiated by them, trough Zionism was stigmatized, the Romanian delegation absented from the vote. RSS had notable political-economical relations with Israel, and it did not afford to compromise them. The second adversary was the African countries, especially those of Black Africa', not much impressed, it appears, by the Romanian economic courtship, despite Bucharest's real economic and propagandistic efforts. Furthermore, the Yugoslav minister of finances also opposed, at least in a first phase, thus placing himself outside the official position of its government, which supported, Nicolae claims, RSS's application.<sup>10</sup> Finally, RSS's most wanted appurtenance to the 'Group of 77' became realty, paradoxically, in spite of the opposition of numerous Arab and African countries which constituted the Third World itself according to the economic foreign policy of Bucharest.<sup>11</sup>

Inside the country, the event was emphatically presented as a confirmation of the more and more important status of RSS and Ceauşescu personally in the international life, being catalogued as unavoidable.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, RSS's integration in the 'Group of 77' validated 'a principle convincingly supported by our party, by its general secretary, that there is no and it cannot be a valid reason for which a socialist country that is in the same time a developing country not to act as a member of the "Group of 77"<sup>13</sup>.<sup>13</sup> The Soviets were not delighted by the Romanian success, manifesting soon their discontempt during a COMECON meeting. The delegation representing RSS at COMECON would have

<sup>12</sup> Lawson, "National", 366.

<sup>9</sup> Lawson, "National", 66.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Nicolae, O lume, 174.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Paul Gafton and the Romanian Section, "Romania's presence in Black Africa", Situation Report/Romania, Radio Free Europe research paper, 23 May 1979, Arhiva 1989, 7-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Constantin Ene; Radu Bogdan, "Instituirea unei noi ordini economice internaționale şi lichidarea subdezvoltării", în Constantin Ene (coord.), România. Douăzeci de ani de diplomație multilaterală, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1985), 209.

fought back by claiming that 'the Romanian government has no obligation to ask the agreement of USSR for its international actions, and the respective action had the objective of promoting specific interests of the Romanian economy'.<sup>14</sup> We should mention here that racist African states like South Africa, Rhodesia or Namibia did not occupy any place on RSS's diplomatic agenda, Bucharest permanently and publicly condemning 'apartheid and racial discrimination'.<sup>15</sup>

# THE IMPOSSIBLE INTEGRATION INTO THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

If RSS's strategy to become a member of the "Group of 77' was successful, not the same can be said on its repeated efforts to be accepted in the nonaligned movement, consisting basically from the same states as the 'Group of 77' but not belonging to the UN. The fact that RSS was a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organization mattered more for the nonaligned movement than its COMECON appurtenance mattered for the 'Group of 77'. Ceauşescu's ambition to transform RSS into a nonaligned country failed to materialize, Bucharest being able to obtain only the observer status at some meetings of the organization.<sup>16</sup> Nevertheless, RSS courted the nonaligned movement even in 1989, stressing the large' collaboration and the technical assistance it offered its members. Furthermore, the 'essential', according to Ceauşescu, 'consists not in the appurtenance or non-appurtenance to different political-military groups, but in the positions and the way of action of states to affirm the new international relations, in the active promotion of the peaceful coexistence principles, of the essential objectives, of the peace cause, of independence, sovereignty, detention and international collaboration'.<sup>17</sup> Or, more explicitly,

"(...) Regarding the Third World, we have mentioned before that Romania is a full member of the group of developing countries (Group of 77, m.n.). This does not contradict at all Romania's position as a socialist country and as a COMECON member or other organisms, including the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Furthermore, Romania wishes to participate as observer to the activity of nonaligned countries, considering that its policy to support the antiimperialist struggle, the national liberation struggle, the people independence harmoniously combines with the preoccupations of these countries. The fact that Romania is a Warsaw Treaty member does not constitute an obstacle in its participation as an observer to the activity of the nonaligned countries. I wish to remind that, at the constitution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, it was affirmed that it is temporary, that it will be abolished once NATO will be abolished. We have the firm conviction that we must reach the abolishment of all military blocks and to realize a new collaboration, on the principle of equality, a world of peace and collaboration."18

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Nicolae, O lume, 178.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Gafton and the Romanian section: 23 may 1979, 6-7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> King, "Romania", 882-885.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> George Sprințeroiu, "România şi mişcarea de nealiniere", în Cristian Popişteanu, (coord.), Independență, nealiniere, pace. Momente şi semnificații ale unei mişcări istorice a secolului XX, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1989), 30; Situation Report/Romania, Radio Free Europe research paper, 19 August 1976, Arhiva 1989, 2; George Ciorănescu, , "Rumania and the nonaligned countries", Background Report/Romania, Radio Free Europe research paper, 4 August 1976, Arhiva 1989, 1-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Constantin Oancea et. al., Tratatul de la Varşovia, 1955-1980. Culegere de documente, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1981), 63-64.

The limits of Soviet tolerance over the Ceauşescu regime's 'deviant' policy were making their presence felt, and will continue to do so even after Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, stressing the importance of a frequent theme of Romanian foreign policy, that of the simultaneous abolition of both 'military blocks' and the defense character of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Ceauşescu implied that it would not make concessions beyond a certain point, a fact which the Soviet part understood and accepted, as long RSS remained, despite its dissidence, a member of the 'socialist camp'.

RSS' claim to be considered a 'developing socialist state', aiming to reach in time the 'stage of middle developed country'19, did not possessed the persuasioness which Ceausescu hoped for, as Colin Lawson observes: 'No one doubts that Romania as once an underdeveloped country. No one believes Romania is as much as developed as the most industrialized market economies. But there are little convincing proofs that Romania is presently an underdeveloped country, in the general sense of the term'.<sup>20</sup> Nevertheless, Ceauşescu was not thinking to quit. The economic price payed by the RSS for the appurtenance of the 'Group of 77', consisting of credits granted to the African, Arab or Asian states within the organization, was a highly expensive one for an economy that, paradoxically, borrowed on its turn from Western states in order to finance its ambitious industrialization program. There have been several gains, to be honest, but not high enough to justify, in palpable terme, RSS's necessity to integrate in the above mentioned organization, which leads to the conclusion that Ceauşescu's image of a world renown politician counted more in taking the decision than the real economic interests of the Romanian state.<sup>21</sup> The romanticism of RSS's policy, both external and internal, perceiving itself through the prism of the RCP as a 'Prince Charming' which grew in a year like others in ten within an ideologically hostile world, made of the 'dragons of the modern world'22 like 'imperialism', 'bourgeoisie' or capitalism, was in bloom.

Here are some numbers representing the amounts delivered to developing states before RSS was part of the 'Group of 77': Algeria and Argentina, 100 million dollars in 1972; Brazil, 180 million dollars in 1975; Egipt, 230 million dollars between 1972 and 1974; Iran, 135 million dollars between 1968 and 1969; Syria, approximately 170 million dollars between 1971 and 1974, and the list can go on.<sup>23</sup> In general, the RSS exported between 1965 and 1977, 'according to official Romanian statistics', twice as much it has imported from the African states (Arab and non-Arab).<sup>24</sup> Between 1966 and 1970, the average credits offered by RSS to the Third World countries were up to 40 million dollars. Between 1971 and 1975 it simply exploded, reaching 350 million dollars,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Gheorghe Obreja, România în procesul trecerii la stadiul de țară mediu dezvoltată, (București: Editura Politică, 1988).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Lawson, "National", 369.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Lawson, "National", 371.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Român, 3-5 noiembrie 1971, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1971), 66-68; Nicolae Ceauşescu, Raport la cel de-al XIV-lea Congres al Partidului Comunist Român, 20 noiembrie 1989, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1989), 84-85; Michael Shafir, "Highlits of the 14th Party Congress", Situation Report/Romania, Radio Free Europe research paper, 14 December 1989, Arhiva 1989.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> "Rumanian credits to other countries", Background Report/Romania, Radio Free Europe research paper, 22 December 1975, Arhiva 1989, 1-8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Gafton and the Romanian section: 23 may 1979, 3-4.

outreaching by far any other East-European state<sup>25</sup>, a fact which proves Ceauşescu's perseverance in accepting the state it led into the organizational structures of the Third World. After 1976, this kind of help, offered with small interest rates on the basis of buying Romanian equipment and industrial technique or for raw materials – was intensified, affecting an economy which, in turn, was vertiginously entering the debt spiral.

Ceauşescu launched himself in true diplomatic peripluses in Africa and Asia. Many propagandistic volumes that described in the most elogious terms the meetings of the Romanian president with his homologous from states from the two continents testify in this sense.<sup>26</sup> But surely, the most important state with which RSS had political-economical relations and which majorly influenced its ideological strategy in approaching the Third World was China. This state will experience, after 1976, the year of Mao Tse Tung's death, a profound process of economic restructuration. 'Market socialism', as it was known, ensured an unusual synthesis for the communist world between economic planification and free market, China managing in this way to become attractive for foreign investors and to substantially develop its industrial infrastructure. It was precisely this new economic orientation that furthered it away from RSS, not willing to any kind of concessions to capitalism. Of course, the two states maintained their political collaboration at a high level, as Ceausescu's visits in China and the Chinese leader Hua Guofeng in RSS proved both consumed in 1987. <sup>27</sup> Moreover, Ceausescu would not forget the credit of approximately 25 million dollars, 'non-repayable' and 'unconditional' which China granted RSS during the massive floods of 1970.<sup>28</sup> But, especially after 1980, the ideological and economical distance between the two parts will increase considerably, as China will chose the transition towards 'market socialism', while the Ceausescu regime, not managing to understand and to adapt to the new world tendencies, was becoming more intransigent, rigid and oppressive than ever.

#### **CONCLUSIONS: ECONOMY AND IDEOLOGY**

RSS intervened in the Third World mostly for pragmatic reasons, clearly deriving from Maoist principles: the Third World represented, for Mao, the new global proletariat, the 'periphery' which was about to destroy the hegemony of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Ronald Linden, "Romanian foreign policy in the 1980s", în Daniel Nelson, (ed.), Romania in the 80s, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1981), 234.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Sub auspiciile înțelegerii şi cooperării internaționale. Vizita tovarăşului Nicolae Ceauşescu, secretar general al Partidului Comunist Român, preşedintele Republicii Socialiste România, în Libia, Liban, Siria şi Irak, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1974); Dezvoltarea colaborării şi solidarității Partidului Comunist Român cu partidele comuniste şi muncitoreşti, cu partidele socialiste şi social-democrate, cu alte partide şi organizații democratice, progresiste, cu partide de guvernământ, cu toate forțele antiimperialiste de pretutindeni, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1978); Solidaritate militantă. Întâlniri şi convorbiri ale preşedintelui Republicii Socialiste România, Nicolae Ceauşescu, cu şefii de stat ai Guineii-Bissau, Senegalului, Siriei, R.P. Benin şi cu preşedintele Comitetului Executiv al Organizației pentru Eliberarea Palestinei, în perioada aprilie 1976 - februarie 1977, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1979); Sub semnul solidarității româno-libiene, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1979).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Patrick Moore, "Hua Kuo-Feng in Romania", Situation Report/Romania, Radio Free Europe research paper, 24 August 1978, Arhiva 1989, 1-16; Sub semnul prieteniei frățeşti românochineze, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1978).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Ion Buzatu, Istoria relațiilor României cu China din cele mai vechi timpuri până în zilele noastre, (Bucureşti: Meteor Press, 2004), 118; Politica internaționalistă a Partidului Comunist Român, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1972), 195-196.

the Western 'centre' and therefore adapt the Leninist global revolution to the conditions of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>29</sup> The pragmatic reasons resided of course in the regime's efforts to efficientise the Romanian economy. And the latter was as ideologised as any other field of activity of what Kenneth Jowitt calls 'Leninist regimes'.<sup>30</sup>: massive industrialization, the central repartitions of production and activity branches, the voluntary neglect of light industry and the exporting of its products and the agricultural ones to finance the development of heavy industry – this kind of development planning is a direct consequence of the effect of Leninist ideology over all life aspects of a communist states, among which economic development.

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254

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> For a short analysis on Maoism see Emanuel Copilaş 'Implozia leninismului. O reevaluare a conflictului sino-sovietic din perspectivă ideologică", Sfera Politicii, 141: (2009), 89-111.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Kenneth Jowitt, New world disorder. The Leninist extinction, (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).

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Submitted: August 18, 2011 Revised: August 22, 2011 Accepted: October 27, 2011 Published online: November 30, 2011 ISSN 1454-2749. E-ISSN 2065-1619

# **OPPORTUNITIES IN TERRITORIAL CROSS BORDER COOPERATION AT THE EU EXTERNAL BORDERS.** CASE OF ROMANIA

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Abstract: Romania's accession to the EU in 2007 and the peripheral position within this super-state structure involve redefining the role and the functions of the border state, the functionality degree of the determined border systems and the cross-border interconnection potential. This situation is determined by the existence of two sectors of EU external land border (Balkan and Eastern), which summarizes 1877,1 km, representing 60% of the Romanian state border. This study analyzes Romania within the European Neighbourhood Policy Context, the changing and challenging context - as EU member state situated at the European eastern border and the Oportunities for Romania in terms of Territorial Cross Border Cooperation.

Key words: Romania, external border of EU, ENP, ENPI, territorial cooperation

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#### **INTRODUCTION**

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004 with the aim to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union. It provides the framework for closer cooperation with the neighbouring countries of the newly enlarged European Union, namely Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Russia, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Until 31 December 2006, EU assistance to the countries of the ENP and to Russia was provided under various geographical programmes including TACIS and MEDA, as well as thematic programmes such as EIDHR (European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights).

From 1 January 2007 the European Neighbourhood Policy and Strategic Partnership with Russian Federation are financed through a single instrument the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). It is designed to target sustainable development and approximation to EU policies and standards - supporting the agreed priorities in the ENP Action Plans. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument assists the partner country in its reforms and needs.

Funds allocated to individual country programmes depend on their needs and absorption capacity as well as their implementation of agreed reforms. An important aspect of the ENP, and the strategic partnership with Russia, is to markedly improve cross-border cooperation with countries along the EU's external land and maritime borders, thus giving substance to the aim of avoiding new dividing lines.

The ENPI therefore supports cross-border contacts and co-operation between local and regional actors and civil society. The 15 ENPI cross-border cooperation (CBC) programmes, identified on the external borders of the EU (9 land borders, 3 sea crossings and 3 sea basin programmes) are receiving financial support for the period 2007-2013 (CBC Strategy Paper 2007-2013 Indicative Programme 2007-2010).

Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) allows for the implementation of joint programmes covering regions from the Member States and regions from partner countries sharing a common border.

There are 2 main categories of programmes:

- programmes covering a common land border or short sea crossing
- programmes covering a sea basin

Cross –Border Cooperation has 4 main objectives:

- Promote economic and social development
- Address common challenges (such as in the field of environment)
- Ensure efficient and secure borders
- Promote people-to-people co-operation

By its nature, CBC is intended to benefit those regions which directly share a land or maritime border with the EU, and their counterparts on the EU side of the border. In line with Interreg practice, the regions eligible to participate in the programmes will be those departments or provinces directly sharing the border on both sides, defined at NUTS II/III<sup>1</sup> level on the EU side, and on the external side, in the absence of such a classification, in terms of the territorial units most closely corresponding to this definition. In special, duly justified cases, a NUTS II/III or equivalent region adjoining to a border region may also be included in the eligible programme area.

The emergence of cross-border regions (CBRs) provides a paradigmatic case for re-scaling processes. A CBR is a territorial unit that comprises contiguous sub-national units from two or more nation states (Perkmann and Sum, 2002). Regarding the emergence of the cross-border regions and Euroregions at the Romanian borders, an exhaustive study was carried out by Ilieş (Ilieş, 2003 and 2004).

# 2007 ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ROMANIA

Romania and Bulgaria integration in EU on 1 January 2007 caused profound changes of morphological-structural nature at the level of political EU space despite the fact that from a quantitative point of view this latest

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is a common regional classification used in the European Union for statistical purposes. According to this system regions are classified in decreasing orders of magnitude from NUTS I to NUTS V. The size of units classified at the same level varies according to the Member States. However NUTS III regions are broadly equivalent to a French "département" (or a British county) while NUTS II regions are broadly equivalent to French "regions" (or Italian or Spanish "regions"). For Romania, the NUTS II level is identified with 8 Development Regions and the NUTS III level coresponds with 42 județ administrative units (41) and the municipality of Bucharest.

enlargement wave is a lot below that of 2004 which is considered the most ample in EU history - integration of 10 states. Thus, from geographical-political point of view, EU territory enlarged with 349.843 km<sup>2</sup> translating towards South-East part the European geographic space - Romania with 238.391 km<sup>2</sup> and Bulgaria with 110.912 km<sup>2</sup> - reaching 4.624.895 km<sup>2</sup>. In terms of population European Union gained more than 30 million inhabitants.

In the context of the present study, the structural modifications are more obvious at external and internal EU border by the fragmentation of the Eastern line traced in 2004 that linked Baltic Sea to Mediterranean Sea and the redrawing of two new independent trajectories: a Balkan one and an East-European one. The old trajectory of external EU border - Baltic-Mediterranean, with a support of the sector dominantly traced in sectors of field and plane, was 4.278,54 km long and had 11 new terrestrial sectors. The EU/Russia neighbourhood remains constant after 2007 among the 2.689,2 km of terrestrial border and the three sector-Finnish (1.380,2 km), Baltic (737,2 km) and Kalinigrad exclave (571,8 km). The EU/ex-USSR space neighbourhood was in 2004 of 1.932,6 km among them with Belarus 1.162,2 km and with Ukraine 770,4 km.

The integration wave correspondent to 2007 substantially modifies a significant part of the political-geographical coordinates of the EU East-European space and especially regarding the border trajectory and the consequences of structural nature of its contiguous bordering space. Thus, the Eastern Baltic-Mediterranean external sector (4.278,54 km) is fragmented by including the Romanian/Hungarian sector (441,7 km) in the internal EU border category, resulted in two new external sectors: an oriental sector (6392,02 km) and a Balkan sector (2.846,4 km) that have in common only the fact that certain segments belong to the same state, as in the case of Hungary (Balkan sector with Croatia and Serbia; Eastern sector with Ukraine), Romania (Balkan sector with Serbia; Eastern sector with Ukraine and Republic of Moldova), Bulgaria (Blakan sector with Serbia and Macedonia; Eastern sector with Turkey) and Greece (Balcan sector with Macedonia and Albania; Eastern sector with Turkey).

The Eastern Sector, extended from the Arctic Ocean to Aegean Sea, is 6392,02 km long and it is formed of terrestrial (5780,32 km) and maritime sectors (678,3 km) correspondent to the external Black Sea maritime border (571,5 km) and interstate maritime sectors (105,6 km; 4 sectors). The complexity of the new trajectory of the external Eastern EU sector derives from the land trajectory of two segments whose junction is achieved through the maritime one in Black Sea. There is a number of 15 sectors of interstate border and two maritime (in Black Sea) determined by 10 EU member states (Finland, Estonia, Letonia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece) and 5 non-EU member states (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Republica of Moldova and Turkey) to which the international maritime sector in Black Sea is added (Grama, 2009).

*The* Balkan Sector, with interstate maritime terminations -Slovenian/Croatian and Greek/Albanian at the level of Mediterranean Sea, sums up 2.846,4 km of terrestrial border extremely diversified due to relief morphological variety that provides the trajectory support and 44,2 km of interstate maritime border. Except for Albania, the external EU border delimitates its space from the ex-Yugoslavian (without Slovenia), marked at the moment by political convulsions caused by interethnic and interconfessional disputes (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herțegovina case) (Ilieş et al. 2010). Structurally, the EU external Balkan border is formed of 8 interstate sectors that delimitates 5 EU member states (Slovenia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece) and 4 non-UE member states (Croatia, Serbia, F.Y.R. of Macedonia and Albania) (Ilieş and Grama, 2010).

# TERRITORIAL CROSS BORDER COOPERATION AT THE EU EXTERNAL BORDERS WITH ROMANIAN PARTICIPATION

The recent enlargement of the Union to 27 Member States, with Bulgaria and Romania joining in 2007, has dramatically increased disparity levels across the EU. As a EU member state, Romania is actively involved in 4 major CBC programmes concerning relationships with non-EU states (figure 1):

- Romania-Ukraine-Rep of Moldova (Managing Authority)
- Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine
- Black Sea Basin (multilateral CBC programme) (Managing Authority)
- Romania-Serbia (Managing Authority)



**Figure 1**. Territorial Cross Border Cooperation at the EU external borders with Romanian participation

Due to the relative position of Romania in Europe and European Union, we can consider it as one of the most important state in what regards the external border management. To support this thesis, we present the caracteristics of Romania as a periferal member state of European Union:

- 1/4 of the EU Eastern border

- the longest national border in the Eastern side of the EU

- combined border - terrestrial, river, Black Sea

These characteristics determine also opportunities for Romania:

- Pillar of ENP and the EU Eastern cross-border cooperation

- Hub (terrestrial and maritime) for trans-national relationships, between West (EU) and East, access to the Black Sea basin

- potential of developing cross-border and trans-national cooperation due to the balanced localities network and polycentric development potential

In accordance with the ENPI regulation, regions along shared land borders, or on sea crossings of significant importance, may be involved in programmes involving two or more countries sharing a common border. While a number of these programmes will cover only two countries, others will involve several countries with a view to establishing programmes covering a coherent geographic area, facilitating efficient management and responding to requests from the partners. All programmes over a land border or a sea crossing of significant importance will necessarily have a strong local focus, with a local partnership involving the key actors from the local and regional level, including civil society, from both sides of the border. The local partners will be the key actors in the programme, and will be jointly responsible for establishing the priorities of the programme.

# The ENPI CBC Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine Programme

The programme area is located on the Hungarian-Slovak-Romanian-Ukrainian border, and includes the following territorial units: Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (Hungary), Košický and Prešovský (Slovakia), Maramureş, Satu-Mare and Suceava (Romania), Zakarpatska, Ivano–Frankivska and Chernivetska (Ukraine). Suceava and Chernivetska are included on the basis of special rules. The programming area covers 32% of Slovak Republic, 14% of Hungary, 8% of Romania and 6% of Ukraine. The programme area includes approximately 598.9 km joint border with Ukraine which covers fully the Slovak-Ukrainian (97.9 km) the Hungarian-Ukrainian (134.6 km) and partially the Romanian-Ukrainian (366.4 km) border lines (Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine CBC Programme 2007-2013).

The programme area is inhabited by 8,012,259 people. More than 44% of the total population is Ukrainian citizens, 16% is Hungarian, 19% Slovak and almost 20% Romanian. The average population density varies from 82 per/sq km (Maramureş), to 114 person/q km (Košice region). This means 94 person/sq km in an average which does not differ significantly from the European average. The average data shows only insignificant majority of the rural population (51.4%) in the whole region. Looking at the statistics more in details, it can be stated that the population structure of the area is balanced. The majority of the population lives in rural areas in the Ukrainian regions (average amounting till 60%) and in Suceava (56.7%), and lives in cities in Maramureş (58.8%), Košice region and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County (56.2% each).

#### Table 1. Territorial Cross Border Cooperation at the EU external borders with Romanian participation

(Data source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Central Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, Regional State Administrations of Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska and Chernivetska, JTS NP Romania-Ukraine, Romanian Statistical Yearbook, National Institute of Statistics Romania, Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing Romania, JTS NP Hungary-Slovakia-Ukraine, National Institute for Statistics Romania, Ministry o Economy Ukraine, Ministry of Economy and Trade the Republic of Moldova, Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia)

Territorial units	Area	Population	Density
ENPI CBC Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-U			
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg	5,937	578,573	97.0
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén	7,247	725,779	100.0
Prešov	8,981	798,596	89.0
Košice	6,752	771,947	114.0
Maramureş	6,304	515,610	81.8
Satu Mare	4,418	368,702	83.5
Suceava	8,554	705,752	82.5
Zakarpatska	12,800	1,245,500	97.3
Chernivetska	8,100	908,200	112.0
Ivano-Frankivska	13,900	1,393,600	100.0
Total Romania	19,276	1,590,064	82.4
Joint Operational Programme Romania	Ukraine-Republic o	of Moldova	
Suceava	8,554	705,752	82.5
Botosani	4,985	459,195	92.1
Iasi	5,475	821,621	150.0
Vaslui	5,318	459,255	86.4
Galati	4,466	621,161	139.0
Braila	4,766	400,000	83.9
Tulcea	8,498	253,419	29.8
Chernivetska	8,100	908,200	112.0
Ivano-Frankivska	13,900	1,393,600	100.0
Ternopilska	8,519	654,000	76.8
Khmelnyitska	10,468	827,900	79.1
Vinniytska	26,400	1.720,100	65.2
Odessa	33,310	2,430,030	73.0
Rep. of Moldova	33,845	3,383,332	100.0
Total Romania	42,062	3,720,403	88.4
Romania – Republic of Serbia IPA Cross	-Border Cooperatio	n Programme	
Timis	8,697	677,926	77.9
Caraş-Severin	8,514	333,219	39.1
Mehedinti	4,933	306,732	62.1
Severno-Banatski	2,329	165 881	71.2
Srednje-Banatski	3,256	208,456	60.0
Južno-Banatski	4,245	313,937	73.6
Braničevski	3,865	180,480	46.7
Borski	3,507	123,848	35.3
Total Romania	22,144	1,317,877	59.5
Romania - Total area of cooperation	75,378	5,922,592	78.6
	238,392	21,623,849	90.7
ROMANIA	31.6 %	27.4 %	

#### The Joint Operational Programme Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova

The area of the programme is formed: in Romania - the counties of Suceava, Botosani, Iasi, Vaslui, Galati, Braila and Tulcea; in Ukraine - the oblasts of Ivano-Frankivska, Chernivetska, Ternopilska, Khmelnytska, Vinnytska and Odesska; in Republic of Moldova – the whole country. The length of the combined border of Romania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova is 1099.4 km. The border of Romania and the Republic of Moldova is entirely a river border (450 km) but the Romanian-Ukrainian border is complex and is part land border (273.8 km.), part fluvial (343.9 km) and part marine (31.7 km) (J.O.P. Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova 2007-2013). Enlargement of the European Union including Romania as a Member State has created a new situation for the relations between Romania, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. The border between the three countries became in 2007 an external EU border, creating both challenges and opportunities for the border area, in terms of economic development, environmental matters, or people to people contacts.

#### The Romania-Republic of Serbia IPA CBC Programme

The Romania-Republic of Serbia border is 546 km long, with the River Danube forming a natural frontier for approximately 230 km of this length. The eligible programme area is defined at NUTS 3 level for the Romanian side and, as there is no NUTS classification in Republic of Serbia, as defined by the Serbian Government.

The eligible border regions within the Romania-Republic of Serbia IPA Cross-Border Cooperation Programme cover an area of 39,351 Km<sup>2</sup>, of which 22,144 Km<sup>2</sup> is in Romania and 17,202 Km<sup>2</sup> is in Republic of Serbia. Thus 56% of the eligible border area is in Romania whilst 44% is in Republic of Serbia. The total population of the border area is 2.335 million, which constitutes 8.27% of the total combined national populations of Romania and Republic of Serbia. Of the 2.335 million people who live in the border area, 1.36 million live in Romania, and 1.035 million live in Republic of Serbia (Romania – Republic of Serbia IPA CBC Programme).

As a conclusion, we can state that Romania plays one of the most important role in what regards the management of the external borders of the European Union, due to the fact that 1877,1 km of the national borders represents the external border of the EU and almost a third of its territory is involved in territorial cross border cooperation with the non-EU contiguous territory.

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\*\*\* Joint Operational Programme Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova 2007-2013;

\*\*\* Romania – Republic of Serbia IPA Cross-Border Cooperation Programme.

Submitted:Revised:Accepted:August 30, 2011September 1, 2011November 21, 2011

Published online: November 30, 2011 ISSN 1454-2749. E-ISSN 2065-1619

# GERMAN SCHOOL OF GEOPOLITICS. **EVOLUTION, IDEAS, PROSPECTS**

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**Abstract**: German School is considered the founder of the discipline simply because the geopolitical research effort in this area was one massive, bringing together many illustrious German scientists. Through their contribution in the field of geopolitics, they gave it stand-alone character, and of particular importance, different from the other branches of human geography. One of the main contributions to the achievement of geopolitical concerns, was the understanding that since the dawn of history, people have been in a constant battle for space; this has led to changes in both human consciousness and thought and geographical space.

Key words: State, space, civilization, location, borderline, frontier

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#### THE EVOLUTION OF THE GERMAN SCHOOL OF GEOPOLITICS

"Geopolitics is to describe and explain the theories of power rivalries, national rivalries".1 Another definition of geopolitics says: "... Geopolitics is the focus of political phenomena and tries to give a geographical interpretation and also studying aspects geography of these phenomena".<sup>2</sup>

Geopolitics is therefore a theory-oriented research which reveals the relationship of substance between the geographical position of a state and its policy. The history of the term explicitly says so, "geo" meaning earth, ground. Geopolitics analyzes the policy landscape in terms of takes place, it aiming to explain policy measures and guidelines based on natural a state: geographical location, extent, natural wealth, population, etc.

In the late nineteenth century, the whole earth except the polar areas is divided between the major powers, so that after the national consciousness is the consciousness of space, last driven by the rivalry between these powers, which led to the emergence of geopolitical premises. "...geopolitical consciousness or, more broadly, looked space as a field for the exercise of power, was the first in the circles of power".<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Lacoste, Y. (1993) Dictionnaire de Géopolitique, Editura Flammarion, Paris.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Kristof, L. (1960) The Origin and Evolution of Geopolitics in "The Journal of Conflict Resolution", march, 1960, vol.IV.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Moreau, P. (1995) Introduction à la géopolitique, Editura Points-Seuil, Paris, p.29.

Inventor of the term "geopolitics" was Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellen. This term was used for the first time as this formulation in 1899, naming as a scientist in training, whose aim was to examine the member bowing on the premise that they are geographical or human bodies. Kjellen was part of such a paradigm, which had been built in German political geography of Friedrich Ratzel and Karl Ritter and showing that it creates a living link between human communities and the environment inhabited by them. The intellectual origins of geopolitics were not reduced by this type of approach and were more distant.

Geopolitics has been constituted as a subject through the efforts of scientists who came from different cultural and research areas. However, the consecration of the new course, shortly after the end of World War I, was attributed almost exclusively to the German school of geopolitics. The perception was caused by intense concerns and the many works devoted to topics in this field of intellectual authors and researchers in the German world. The intellectual background that conducted to these steps must be reported to the stage and the State Historical Society traveled to Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The process of unification of modern Germany has been a slow and difficult journey. This frustration generated reaction of German political and intellectual elites, who in the middle of the nineteenth century were obsessed by the idea that for over 250 years German territories were the scene of successive wars, most often caused or who otherwise participated. The powers, German nationalism developed under the influence of Johann Gottfried Herder's writings in a different paradigm of Western Germany. Generated as a counter to the cultural imperialism French, German nationalism of Herder was conceptualized in a specific form.

Unlike the British and French thinkers of the time, who had gone from the idea that man, the individual is the fundamental reality; Herder placed in the center of its concerns and gave the supreme value of the peoples. This vision and remained predominant after 1871, the year of German unification, German elites abandonment by scoring the last remnants of western European liberalism and dedicating type, by contrast, the belief that physical force is the proper instrument of any expression of thought stat. That assumed almost entirely by German elites was further increased in 1892, when the new Kaiser Wilhelm II, proclaimed policy of the World II Reich.

In this cultural and historical context, was not surprising development concepts, excite and fertile Darwinian disseminating ideas that supported the necessity of cultural triumph of the German-ethnocentric Europe. This geopolitical space to no more than a few steps were needed.

Empirical basis for the formation of German geopolitics -the political analysis system- was geography. Karl Ritter (1779-1859) was the first prominent German geographer who gave his discipline base in November. In Erdkunde (Geography), Ritter expressed his confidence that, until then, geography was studied as an amalgam, usually without any purpose and without internal rule. Rejecting rationalist argument that people are the same everywhere, Ritter stressed the role played by nature of men. He initiated in German thought in a specific direction, vision organics, that country, but Heimatland, is a natural geographic area, endowed with a natural configuration unit, natural boundaries, all of which form *natural organic territory*.

## GERMAN SCHOOL OF GEOPOLITIC'S IDEAS Friedrich Ratzel's contribution

A pupil of Ritter, Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) is considered the first of the founders of German geopolitics, although he himself calls his area as concerns political geography. Ratzel has endeavored to continue his mentor's steps in order to achieve a comprehensive and efficient way to support the study areas and human habitation. In this regard, he added, when the research tools used by geographical elements, methods and findings coming from other disciplines, biology and history lies in the foreground. The main work of Friedrich Ratzel in ethnography was "Volkerkunde" vol. 3 (1885-1888; "The History of Mankind" - 1896 to 1898).<sup>4</sup>

In his first major work, "Anthropogeography", subtitled "Principles for the application of geography on history" (first volume, 1882, vol. 2 in 1891), Ratzel presented methodological-interpretive device.

This paper shows that "we do not know if the man is the ultimate goal of planet, we know that the human species is an essential part of this cosmic body. Obviously it is wrong to let the man in the shadows, as it is unscientific to think that the ultimate purpose of creation and existence of earthly body". His first effort, confessed, was that of the recovery and placement of geographical environment in the core sciences of man, not to ignore or lose its development dimension as part of nature. Ratzel said that throughout history people have always been in a competition for space. Ratzel show (taking ideas from the English philosopher D. Hume)<sup>5</sup> that the nature of different influences on people's exercise: influence of body or soul of each individual, accelerations or delays in the way of spatial expansion of populations, effects on social structure.

Because of these multiple influences, large numbers of people is considered "mehrtypisch" (poli-typical), any modern nation is the product of a mixture determined between two or more ethnic pieces (of people), which is particularly noticeable in populations/peoples of merchants and sailors; pure peoples are dull, immovable and do not advance as a show case of ancient Egypt. In the bi-typical people they are unstable because they never get to the final dominance of one type over the other. Some racial mixes can have good results in the "humanization" of a territory; examples Ratzel are first brought the crossbreeding of American Indians with French and English settlers (hunters) which allowed a better exploitation of the territories surrounding Hudson Bay (Canada), then of crossbreeding between Native Americans and which allowed the recovery of black slaves in Mexico, arid plateaus and tropical moist forest area of Central America.<sup>6</sup>

During this process, considers Ratzel, culture as an organic reality was the factor that mediated the relationship between environmental factors and physical-geographical humans. In a first stage of their social organization, people have managed to transform the environment that we lived in a more favorable area of human existence. Later, as the evolution and development of states, it became clear that different human cultures are unequally endowed and capable, to varying degrees, to capitalize on the gifts of nature.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> http://www.britanica.com

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Appointed by Kant, as a geographer of human reason.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Nicolae, I. (2009) Antropogeography. A diachronic approach, University Publishing House, Bucharest, pp.127-128.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> http://idd.euro.ubbcluj.ro/ interactive/courses /Liviu Tîrău/1.htm

In Volume II (published in 1891) defines what we mean by Ratzel oikumen "the area inhabited by humans on Earth".<sup>8</sup>

A much stronger impact had "Politische Geographie" (Political Geography), work published in 1897, this being due to the fact that she was taken into account not only geographically but also by politicians, even outlining some principles international behavior. This paper is composed of nine parts.<sup>9</sup>

In his second important work "Politische Geographie", Ratzel pointed out that the historical development of states must be placed in a comparative politics with peoples flourishing. This latter phenomenon depends on the size and depth of relationships developed by the peoples concerned with land inhabited by them. Therefore conclude Ratzel, states should be considered organisms, like the animal and human, and are stronger or weaker. The nation was a more mobile, this feature is not characteristic of primitive societies, the gain greater political power. From this perspective, knowledge and size measurement of surface areas was directly subordinate to the circulation of people's ideas and political projects, with higher and lower concepts about space, in particular making it the first expansion characteristic trends. Wars were such geographical transposition of the need for movement of peoples and political expansion.<sup>10</sup>

In Part II, Friedrich Ratzel analyzes historical movements and increased of state. Between these movements is the most violent war: it is led by a primitive element and primary, volunteer of humanity, whose action is ephemeral, contrary to women's values of peace, are conservative and engineering, enhancing the gains of culture.<sup>11</sup>

At the end of Part Two of "Politische Geographie", Ratzel developed notions of territory of the state (Staatsgebiet) and the natural territory (Naturgebiet), showing both their internal structure as well as their mutual relations. These relationships create community cultural sphere, beyond the state can get at the oikumen. Ratzel sources identified the origin and formation of nations in political strength historical development of communities of individuals united by spiritual ties. In this perspective Anthropogeography was built by Ratzel method that could evaluate the criteria and means of comparison, the performance achieved by different human communities. Capturing the vision developed by Kant on space, Ratzel pointed out the fundamental role played in history of what the German philosopher, a resident of Königsberg's, called "Mittelpunkt" core of civilization. "Mittelpunkt" became, in fact, the essential criterion for analyzing and interpreting the state in establishing its organics. Three were the basic elements which function organics it: Area (der Raum), Position (die Lage), Borders (die Grenzen).<sup>12</sup>

Area (der Raum) represented the political nature of state support, because such historical relations Ratzel called the blood and earth, the people and territory.<sup>13</sup> In his analysis, he goes beyond political geography and makes policy analysis. Thus, he talks about space as the limit of expansion that occurs

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Oikumen term was created by Aristotle, the most famous philosopher of Antiquity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Nicolae, I.(2009) Antropogeography. A diachronic approach, University Publishing House, Bucharest, p.131.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> http://idd.euro.ubbcluj.ro/ interactive/courses /Liviu Tîrău/1.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Nicolae, I. (2009) *Antropogeography. A diachronic approach*, University Publishing House, Bucharest, pp.133-134.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> http://idd.euro.ubbcluj.ro /interactive/courses/Liviu Tîrău/1.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> http://idd.euro.ubbcluj.ro/ interactive/courses/Liviu Tîrău/1.htm

naturally between people, the area that it tends to fill. The author makes use of two notions: concordances and discrepancies Anthropogeography. Consistency is achieved through internal colonization, meaning by homogeneous distribution of state population on the surface. He disagrees in terms of space occupied by Russia, which had an area ten times larger than Germany and a population of 2.5 times the main European countries combined. At the same time, Ratzel speaks of "the hunger for space", which is not justified in the case of Russia, it already having a territory too large relative to need, but which becomes understandable when there is an excessive population density on a space small, as in Germany.<sup>14</sup>

In the same case will be foreign colonization, meaning a migration from the overcrowded territory to the under populated one. Friedrich Ratzel talks about the importance of space for people. He shows that if a people is rising, the rule is given and population, "the high density of people is culture".<sup>15</sup> Political organization of the people and the land resulted in the incarnation of a custom body Anthropogeography. Body is distinguished by taking a single biological and geographical-cultural identity of the individuals of the same people. Politico-geographical consolidation of the state body could be achieved in two stages: a) setting national territory Lebensgebiete; b) the establishment and organization of vital space Lebensraum. The last stage was to decide the conservation body's vital functions and even survival of the state.<sup>16</sup>

Friedrich Ratzel uses the term "geospatial", referring to the extension of a civilizing force forces throughout the continent (he talks about geospatial US).<sup>17</sup> It was for the historic mission of Germany to form a European geospace, pouring into first place in areas where human habitation was at a lower level. Friedrich Ratzel commonly used expression Volkohne Raum (people without space) when the Germans still assessing attainment of vital space.

Laws spatial growth, as they are represented by Ratzel, refers to a state that grows with its culture, its economic development. But to achieve this you must have a settlement that would allow you geopolitical development.

Ratzel launches the idea of "oceanic cycle", which means that the seas and oceans value changes depending on the importance of guarding their country.

The fourth part of "Politische Geographie" generally addresses the issue of location states their position on the Earth.

Position (die Lage) has been considered by Ratzel item found in a direct relationship with the formation of Mittelpunkt civilization, putting in a position to generate favorable geographic and climatic formation of such pulsars. Only natural geographic feature was valued political power conferred by the people. When it had not been able to maintain political power, despite the geographic and climatic conditions favorable, declined, as in the case of states in Mesopotamia (Euphrates and Tigris valleys), Egypt (Nile Valley), Rome, Anthropogeography body.

The position is one that gives value space. From these considerations will have a good position the state that will hold important areas on earth, but also

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Anechitoaie, C. (2008) Maritime systems Geopolitics, lecture notes, Top Form Publishing, Bucharest, p.35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Dobrescu, P. (2000) Geopolitica, op.cit., p.75.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> idd.euro.ubbcluj.ro/ interactive/courses/Liviu Tîrău/1.htm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Anechitoaie, C. (2008) Maritime systems Geopolitics, lecture notes, Top Form Publishing, Bucharest, p.36.

open enough to the sea. Friedrich Ratzel refers to the border as a peripheral organ of state. Borders (die Grenzen) were initiated from product movement Mittelpunkt.

A sixth part of "Politische Geographie" treats their border issues, products of historical movements and expressions of the type of movement that gave them birth. Frontier is a compromise between these two states. On this occasion, once again Ratzel states that "treaties guaranteeing the borders are based on that illusion that it would be possible to make a nation living barrier growth". Situated on the outskirts of the state's territory, economic and people do not remain a mere boundary line, it became a peripheral organ, but very important part of growing state. Ratzel has listed three ways to broaden Mittelpunkt generated boundaries: by military force and war, through trade, through the spirit and communication, meaning cultural triumph. Any state arises around a Mittelpunkt in focusing the energy of the people.

In 1901, Ratzel published his last major work, "On the laws of spatial growth of states" (Gesetz über die der Staaten des raümlichen Wachstums). He listed seven laws, while stage of expansion of the state. Expansion of states would occur at the expense of others. The process was generated by two factors: a) *internal input*, prominent people who were able to acquire the sense of space (Raumsinn) and school facilities (die Schule des Raumses). The two attributes authorized certain people to keep their proper space, and later to obtain even expand their living space; and b) *external input*, that under populated areas, which attracted strong outpouring of fertile and civilizations, whose territories were overcrowded.

Ratzel correlate the natural position with the political and social. Regarding the correlation he draws between the Ratzel and space position, we can truly say that when a state is economically strong, is located in geographically favorable, he can extend the natural boundaries.<sup>18</sup> So the statement "space position is perfectly true and verifiable".

Friedrich Ratzel's statement that "the space can increase position" can be tested in Germany. It is a state in terms of its geographical position has been substantially disadvantaged.<sup>19</sup> Germany along with several other nations is European oikumen center<sup>20</sup>. It did not have any large territory and population density was too high to be able to fit within the country's boundaries. However, the existence of strong neighbors would not allow him expanding the boundaries even if the necessities demanded.

This position requires a political solidity of the anchorage, while outlying areas may settle oikumen looser political ties with fragile political construction (examples are the Russian government and Amur region and northwest on the British Canada site). The political situation was eventually held to the same position favorable to increase the area of Germany, because it became too limited.<sup>21</sup>

Essentially Ratzel's thought geopolitics can be expressed in several major ideas, six in number. The first would be that states are living organisms that are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Anechitoaie, C. (2008) Maritime systems Geopolitics, lecture notes, Top Form Publishing, Bucharest, p.39.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Anechitoaie, C. (2008), *Maritime systems Geopolitics, lecture notes*, Top Form Publishing, Bucharest, p.40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Nicolae, I. (2009) Anthropogeography: a diachronic approach, University Publishing House, Bucharest, p.135.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Anechitoaie, C. (2008) *Maritime systems Geopolitics, lecture notes*, Top Form Publishing , Bucharest, p.40.

born, live and die. Growth states as bodies are determined antecedently. State geographer and man have a duty therefore to discover and describe laws perennial behind this growth. The third idea refers to the geographical landscape that marks the people, citizens of a state concept of living space (Lebensraum) are central. The opposition between the powers of continental and maritime powers appears as one of the first magnitude in the relations between peoples. "Political Geography" contains a subjective dimension composed of "meaning space" (Raumsinn) and "vital energy" (Lebensenergie).

# Karl Haushofer's contribution

Karl Haushofer was the central figure of the German geopolitics and most of the experts are reducing the German geopolitics at this author. Plus, his ideas have served as motivation and as programme to the Nazi regime, the author himself collaborating with it a part of his life. The importance of Haushofer within the German school consists mostly of his contribution in the domain of geopolitics, being responsible for the new orientation taken by the German school in the first four decades of the XX century.

Haushofer followed the military career, entering the Bavarian army in 1889. His orientation towards geopolitics was deeply connected with his assignment within the military mission of Germany in Japan, in 1908. On his sea journey to the Japanese archipelago, as well as on the terrestrial way back through Siberia, in 1910, Haushofer was fascinated by the strategic importance of the areas, respectively of some geographical locations.

In 1912 he presented his doctoral thesis, published later under the title of "Dai Nihon, Betrachtungen über Groß-Japans Wehrkraft, Weltstellung und Zukunft" (Reflections on Greater Japan's Military Strength, World Position, and Future), in which he supported his thesis, according to which the geographical location and the territorial characteristics are influencing the destiny of the states. Even though he becomes general, he decides to abandon the military career and to dedicate himself to the academic one.

The institutionalized study of geopolitics is the merit of Karl Haushofer. First of all, Haushofer operated a trenchant delimitation between the political geography, described as the discipline which studies the distribution of the state power in the terrestrial spaces (areas), and geopolitics, meaning the science of political life forms in the natural spaces (areas) of life, which tries to explain the dependency of the first to the conditionality of nature. Geopolitics as stand-alone discipline happened in 1924, once with the foundation of the Institute of Geopolitics within the University of Munich and repeatedly publication, between 1924-1945, of the monthly "*Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*" (Geopolitics Journal).

After the institution of the Nazi regime, the geopolitics studies have known a wide spread, being official coordinated by the Nazi government, from 1935.

The Association of the Researchers in Geopolitics was founded at Heidelberg University, Karl Haushofer becoming the first president of it. At the end of the 30', his son Albrecht took the job as geopolitics professor, within The School of Advanced Political Studies (Haochschule für Politik), in Berlin. It must be specified the context in which Haushofer's conception has appeared and configured, which imprinted some characteristics on his approach. The author said: "The genesis of the German geopolitics is at the same time its apologia".<sup>22</sup>

270

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> K.Haushofer, *De la geopolitique*, chapter "The Apology of German geopolitics", pp. 155-156.

The German geopolitics was born as a protest against Germany's situation at that time. He observed the fact that the political act runs its course on traditional bases, looking towards the past, while in other countries (USA, UK) the training of political men is done in specialized institutions. Germany went to war without a geopolitical vision, with ignorance regarding the balance of power, while all over the world "the storm rising at the horizon" was seen since 1904.

This is why it was absolutely necessary to appear a German geopolitics too, the author not agreeing with Ratzel and Kjellen's opinions which, he said, were derived from English sources.

On the other hand, the relationships of the Haushofer family with the Nazi politics were winding. Karl established lasting relations of friendship with Rudolph Hess before the National Socialist Party was to be established. He frequently visited Landsberg Prison, were Adolf Hitler and Rudolph Hess were detained after the putsch in 1923 failed. There are many testimonies of some witnesses, but also the notices of some specialists, which indicate the influence of Haushofer' geopolitical opinions over Hitler, traceable furthermore in "Mein Kampf".<sup>23</sup>

Right after Adolf Hitler became Chancellor, Karl Haushofer was named professor of geopolitics and dean of Science Faculty of Munich University. In 1934 was named president of the German Academy and in 1938 became with the support of Rudolph Hess, the president of Ausland Organisation, institution which was handling with the Germans living abroad. Meanwhile, his son was named special delegate of the German chancellor in Czechoslovakia from 1934 to 1938. The Haushofer family gave up the privileged relations they had with the Nazi regime after 1941, also due to the invasion of the Soviet Union by Wehrmacht, action that contravened the geopolitical thesis sustained by Karl. But his position was eased by Hess's "refuge" in United Kingdom. Albrecht was involved in the plot of the German officers against Hitler and ended up being executed in May 1945 just few days before Germany's surrender. One year later, desolated by the faith of the Third Reich and his nefarious involvement, Karl Haushofer committed suicide with his wife Martha.

Indubitable, the biggest and the most important change in worldwide politics of our times is the formation of a strong continental block to include Europe, the North and East of Asia.<sup>24</sup> Haushofer was taken up with the formation of a continental block to include Europe, the North and the East of Asia, not on political affinities but on geopolitical determinations. This idea appears as a counter to the great powers, England and USA, which in his opinion, have started a so called "anaconda politics". By the fact that these powers were in control of the Planetary Ocean, hence the shores (as shown by Nicholas John Spykman), they could control and the mainland, wrapping around and killing by strangling what is on the continent. Haushofer considered as the alternative to this threat would be an alliance between Russia, Germany and Japan, which would form the so called continental block.

This theory is very close to that of Mackinder's pivot area, which said that who will dominate this area will rule the world. In order to put into practice the theory of the continental block, Haushofer refers to what the Japanese political

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> In Mein Kampf (My Struggle), Hitler makes his way from his autobiography and his ideas, forms of Nazism, fascism are all dissected here.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> K. Haushofer, *De la geopolitique*, p.113. This is the phrase that begins Haushofer study Bloc continental Central Europe-Eurasia-Japan.

leader Goto was thinking, which was speaking about the rig called troika. He was referring to a possible advance under the conditions that Japan and Germany could have hold in Russia. Only this way these reunited countries could have succeed to gain access to the Baltic Sea, Adriatic Sea and Sea of Japan, by making an expansion from north to south: Germany would have ruled the Europe (India gaining independence from England, France would have been reduce to inability, and Africa would have become the main direction of expansion of a German Europe), Japan would have dominated the Pacific and the Far East, and Russia the Indian Ocean (under the conditions of giving up the revolutionary goals). But the German author speaks about 4 areas of territorial expansion, including beside the already reminded and USA which direction of expansion would have been South Africa.

Nevertheless this theory was disproved by history because Hitler decided to attack Russia, ignoring what Haushofer was saying that "*neither of the two strong countries of the continent should raise against each other*", repeating the mistake made by Napoleon and Wilhelm the second. Karl Haushofer sees geopolitics as a way to prevent wars of any kind, considering geopolitics as being "*the best tool to avoid worldwide catastrophes*".

For this reason he totally disagreed with the decision of attacking the USSR, therefore exactly the dominant part of the continental block. Due to this decision the chances for Eurasia formed by Germany, Russia and Japan have dropped, and important coalitions against Germany appeared from the oceanic powers that felt threatened.

Here it is that Bismarck's advice, Chancellor of Germany from the past century, was completely ignored and the fact that Germany should not reveal it's desire to become a great power, because it will attract against Germany a coalition represented by the great powers. Hitler ignored the fact that history send us warnings regarding some repetitive events, some mistakes made in the past which we must avoid. Karl Haushofer believes that "geopolitics replaces the political passion and tries to rely on natural connections". This idea is present in his theories regarding the realization of the continental block as well and as regarding the idea that should not exist neither left or right partisan approaches.

Karl Haushofer had a significant publishing activity. At his work about Japan, he added in 1924 (reedited book in 1938) "*Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans*". The geopolitical problems of the Extreme East were the first major theme debated by Hausfoher. Although he considered himself the intellectual successor of Ratzel and Kjellen, Haushofer permanently reported himself at Halford Mackinder and the projection developed by him over Eurasia. Furthermore, his interest raised by the Far East is explained by his believe that an alliance on the Berlin–Moscow–Tokyo Axis, with Russia occupying Mongolia, and Japan controlling Manchuria it would have given an transcontinental route free of Anglo Saxon pressures and interferences.

Social–Darwinist in vision, Haushofer took from Ratzel and gave supreme value to the phenomenon–objective "*Lebensraum*".

"We consider that the foundation for any discussion about the foreign policy is the vital space. The essential duty of the foreign policy is to watch over this vital space, to preserve it at the level of the inheritances transmitted from past generations, to increase it, when it became too tight".<sup>25</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> K.Haushofer, Les bases geographiques de la politique étrangère, in "De la geopolitique", p.203.

Situated under the impact of Germany's position after the First World War, Haushofer was permanently motivated in finding solutions to give her the possibility of surviving as great power. He agreed with Kjellen that the state is manifesting as an organism, and the perpetuation of its existence could be secured by purchase of plenty of space. The respective area would be occupied by cultural, racial and ethnic dissemination.

Haushofer developed the fundamental concept of vital space, as being the space necessary for people to live and develop. In fact it is about the 2 types of colonization about Ratzel was speaking, internal and external colonization. The fact that he was speaking about space increase when it became too tight, when Germany was in the same situation, made most of the authors to incriminate him, considering that his theories served as justification for the actions made by Nazi in their quest to conquer new territories. Even the author speaks about the German and Japanese people that had high population density ratio to hold area.

As extra justification is reminded the fact that in North of Germany are less fertile areas, and in some regions population density is quite higher. Germany, unlike Japan who had the possibility of expansion her territories in Pacific, did not have this privilege due to her strong neighbors in the area, being condemned at overpopulation.

If we consider the theory elaborated by Ratzel which said that the borders are a product of motion and the concept of "druckquotient" of Ion Conea, we can reach the conclusion that Germany's need of space was entitled. Only that this expansion once begun, did not stop at the vital space that Germany needed, Hitler continued the politics of conquer to fulfill his desire to become a great power. Regarding this concept of vital space, Haushofer's theories are taken entirely by Hitler and put into practice.

An essential role in this perspective would have played the borders<sup>26</sup>, considered "*rather places of confrontation and collisions, than juridical norms of political-state delimitations*". As for the concept of border, Haushofer took Ratzel's theories, adding at that the idea of border in motion and of political life of border.

The political life refers at the spiritual, cultural and economical phenomena that pass from the country of origin in the surrounding countries, in the moment when their intensity is quite strong. For this, he considered the detection in time of these perforations as being very important then to protect ourselves in the same way. Therefore the security of a country will not consist only in assuring the borders, but also in protecting against these perforations which can lead to modification of the borders in favor of the issuing state, when intense enough.

Here it is how Jakobsen characterizes the role played by the German author after the Nazi took power: "Haushofer played only an outside role, without a notable influence, if we abstract his activity in favor of Volkstum, which did not exercise, truth to tell, than at periphery". <sup>27</sup>

As for the pan-ideas (the mental map, the compass after we orient), Haushofer notices even from the beginning of the century that free Europe can be only "between the actual soviet border, Nordic seas and the Mediterranean basin".<sup>28</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> See work *Grenzen in ihrer Geographischen und Politikschen Bedentung* (*Geographical and political importance of the borders*), Berlin, 1927.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Introduction.Un esquise biografique, p.5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Haushofer developed this thesis in his following works, Geopolitik der Panideen and Geopolitik von Hente.

He oversees what the European Union will be, with the specification that this "confederation" will be viable only if the internal national rights of the members will be respected, and every country will speak its language. This condition is debatable if we consider the release of the unique European currency, the disappearance of the borders, the globalization attempt. Will all these lead to a sort of frustration from the member states, to a lost of the national identity, to the destroy of the union? At present the political factor outweigh the economical one, so the future of the union is questionable.

#### **Rudolf Kjellen's contribution**

The paternity of geopolitical term belongs to the Swedish Rudolf Kjellen, teacher of political science at the University of Uppsala. Kjellen first used this term in a public lecture, in 1899, which is to be used next year in the Swedish political monograph, published by him as "*Inledning till Sveriges Geografi*" (Introduction to Geography of Sweden). Unlike Ratzel, whose sources of inspiration were the anthropology and geography communities, Kjellen turned to the geopolitical concerns about the state of science. In this perspective, he saw that the relationship between the anatomy of power and its geographical foundation is fundamental. Therefore, geopolitics was the science that conceived and studied the state as a geographical organism or as a phenomenon of space. This political organism is kept in a perpetual struggle for existence and space, Kjellen concluding that, only those organisms would be able to survive and prosper.

The area used by Kjellen geopolitics included in fact two studied subjects: states seen as manifesting the emotions and argument equally with human beings and knowing the same fate as the last (birth, growth, development and decline), also he considered the space as a essential factor and vital objective of vigorous states, but spatial limited, which had the duty to expand its territories through colonization, conquest and expansion. Kjellen gave a great attention to geographical location of Mitteleurope, which included the Scandinavian Peninsula, under the threat and danger of the Russian invasion. The solution he proposed was the expansion and unification in a German Empire, of the perimeter of Dunkirk, Hamburg, Riga and Baghdad. This huge space, which and the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires were to be embedded, was destined to become a new center of world power, for minimizing the hegemonic aspirations of England through the seas.

In his major work, some first published in Germany "Die Ideen von 1914. Eine Weltgeschichtliche Perspective" (Ideas of 1914. A comprehensive historical perspective, Leipzig, 1915, "Staten som Lifsform" (the State as a form of life), Stockholm, 1916 (translated and published in German in 1917 at Lepizig) "Grundriss zu einem System der Politik" (Fundamentals of a political system), Leipzig, 1920 and "Die Grossmächte vor und nach dem Weltkriege" (Great powers before and after World War), published post-mortem, at Leipzig, in 1935, Kjellen Overview revealed his conception of geopolitics.

Deeply connected with German cultural traditions, he resisted and permanently discredited the political ideas of liberalism, of political citizen, also of the idea of legitimacy of the state by social contract. He forwarded instead vision of the authoritarian, corporatist and paternalistic state, to be constituted as an organics nation-state. Being opponent of excessive individualism and cosmopolitanism, Kjellen saw the National State was built on the principles of corporate solidarity, following the development and expansion to take shape of a community based on ethnic, political and economic connections. The Achievement of such a state included the elimination of all repressive events against citizens. The politics' general system of such a state was presented by Kjellen in his well-known work called *"Staten som Lifsform"*. The state would be organized on the principles of unity and interdependence of the five basic elements:

a. *Country (das Reich)* pursued in terms of its geographical internal and external position. Three subcategories making up its geographical location data: the position of the country (Topopolitica), configuration (Morfopolitics) and territory (Fisiopolitics).

b. *Nation (das Staabfolk)*, demographical composition, which is manifested by three other factors: ethnical awareness, ethnical body (Plethopolitics) and soul of the nation (Psyhopolitics).

c. Society (*die Gesellschaft*) or Socialpolics was relieved through the performance of two phenomena: structure and social form (Filopolitics), also social life (biopolitics).

d. *The country's economy (Ökopolitik)* based on functions as: to feed their needs (Autarhiopolitics), foreign and trade relations (Emporopolitics) and economical life (Economopolitics).

e. *Government (Das Staatsregiment)* or Kratopolitika involves the authority of state policy through its form of government (Nomopolitics), administration (Praxiopolitics) and state authority (Arhopolitics).

Kjellen also designed the eventual European political configurations. They would take the form of pan-ethnical representations and geopolitics' pan-ethnic. Both the work in 1914 (*Die Ideen von 1914*), and in that published post-mortem (*Die Grossmächte*), he appeared confident that under internal impulses generated from Mittelpunkte three racial-ethnical bodies were to be imposed in Europe: Latin Union (under the seal of ancient Rome), able to include Latin America trough its Ibero-Spanish version, Mitteleuropa, which was to become a germanic world, namely pan-Slavic idea. Last, found Kjellen, had countered the pan-German idea of the Drang nach Osten.

# **GEOPOLITICS OUTLOOK AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR**

Geopolitics is a relatively young science, having only a century back, with a sinuous evolution, controversial and sometimes even denied. The controversial question is: was the emergence and fast development justified or not?

Geopolitics appears during the period when the Earth is known in its fullness, when the process of formation of national states in Europe reached its climax and when the great powers begin struggle for division of the world, announcing the formation of colonial empires.

There is a mystical space, expressed by the need to conquer new territories without regard for state borders. Also appears the pan-ideas, focused on the opposition between American and British view, pointed by the relationship between the sea and earth and the German, based on the continental areas.

Geopolitics is born under the protection of political geography (a term introduced in the seventeenth century by Turgot) and German anthropogeography (a notion introduced by Friedrich Ratzel) and then, of history, international law in relation to the geographical factor.

Used for the first time by Kjellen, the term geopolitics is adopted by German literature, amplified with theories regarding of vital space, of racism and

concepts Neo-Malthusianism, which led to his compromise as a doctrine. The spirit of Nazis geopolitics has polluted Italian, Japanese and Hungarian geopolitics.

During the Cold War, there was a strong return to the geopolitical as a science, especially in the Anglo-Saxon. Geopolitics has become particularly topical in terms of power bipolar world system, illustrated by the opposition between the USSR and USA. Opinions were issued so that they varied from the definition of geopolitics as a objective science or as a method of analyses. It makes sense since almost all the important geopoliticians like Mahan, Mackinder, Spykman, Haushofer and the others, have built in fact the concepts from the perspective of the states interests they represented.

Along with the end of the Second World War, geopolitics has been carried in the field of forbidden knowledge as a consequence of the thing that it has become a tool for the preparation and justifying the expansionist policies pursued by Germany and Japan during the preceding period and during the War. The embargo over geopolitics had political connotations. The public opinion was not supposed to know that the division of spheres of influence between Germany and the USSR, in August 1939 and then between the USSR and Western powers in the autumn of 1944 was the result of geopolitical developments on the European continent. Geopolitical scenarios were well preserved in both East and West throughout the Cold War.

West' victory over East and the failure on the geopolitical and geo-strategic balance between USSR and USA has led to the collapse of the security architecture when the international relations have evolved after Second World War. In this fracture of history, geopolitics has returned to public space in an insistent manner, trying to find solutions.

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Submitted:	F
March 13, 2011	Septer

Revised: ember 6, 2011 Accepted: November 21, 2011 Published online: November 30, 2011



CLAVAL, Paul, 2010, **Les espaces de la Politique/The Spaces of Geopolitics**, Armand Colin, Collection U Géographie.

Paul Claval (born 1932) is certainly one of the world's most important humanist geographers. He imposed himself, ever since his early published papers, through the approach of theoretical, conceptual aspects of Human Geography, and through the treatment of some sub-branches less presented or treated in the specialty literature:

l'évolution Essai sur dela. Géographie humaine/Essay on Human Geography Evolution (1964). La pensée géographique/The Geographic Thinking (1972), La nouvelle géographie/The New Geography géographie Principes de sociale/Social (1977).Geography Principles (1973), Élements de géographie économique/Economic Geography Elements (1976), géostratégie/Geopolitics Géopolitique et and Geostrategy (1994), La Géographie du XX<sup>e</sup> siècle/The Geography of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (2003), La Géographie culturelle / The Cultural Geography (2003) etc.

The paper Les Espaces de la Géopolitique/The Spaces of Geopolitics (416 pages) includes, besides the Introduction and the six parts (with eighteen chapters), a Glossary of terms, a welcome Index (with common terms) and an extremely reach Bibliography (approximately eight hundred titles, from various schools, not only the French one).

This recent paper of Paul Claval, follows the same trend, the one of discerning the true dimensions of Human Geography, of the profound interdisciplinarity which characterizes nowadays Science in general, as well as the Geography, in particular. Basically, we deal with the first paper which focuses on all the sciences that contribute to the definition of an unstable space such as Politics: History, Sociology, Psychology, Social and Human Sciences, Literature and Linguistics, Philosophy, Economy, Political Science, all of these, obviously in a geographic context. Of course, it is not at all simple or easy to have in attention so many different sciences and especially to seize the interconnections, as well as the common points of them, and yet the author does manage to successfully do all these.

Among the numerous qualities of this book are counted the particular attribute of statement, the flawless and extremely convincing argumentation, the impeccable logic of the scientific speech, as well as the excellent thematic periodization in time of the concerned subject (the spaces of Politics), reflected on the six parts of the book, each containing more chapters:

1. *The Political Thinking, Political Geography and Geopolitics*: on one side, a review of the stages followed by the political thinking/reflection from Antiquity up until the globalization era, on the other side the underlining of the geographic reflection on the political organization of space in the same time interval.

2. The spatial logic of politics: the logic of power (with its different shapes) and their spatial deployment, basically a Geography of power given by skeins (écheveaux), bundles (faisceaux) and networks (réseaux) that canalize the relationships

that human beings and groups weave between them; attention is paid to *the political regulation (régulation politique)* of social systems, both of those of small dimensions (local cells= *des cellules locales*) as well of those of big dimensions, which require the existence of a state, I suppose.

3. The evolution of Political Geographies: a very original evolution of the power of architecture ever since the primitive societies up until the apparition and the development of the state (which realized the synthesis of the authority and of coercive power, indispensable to supervise and control a large territorial ensemble), with the variant of the modern state whose origins were the sovereignty and the absolutism.

4. The age of the industrial state: a critical analysis and yet objective of the modern forms of the state (the liberal state, the authoritarian state and the fascist state, the revolutionary socialist state, the totalitarian state); the state-civil society relationship in the industrial world, being also taken into account the building of nations, the role of parties and unions, the national sovereignty and the local autonomy (between the "national state" and "the local state", as the author writes); an original analysis of international relations, with an accent on the building of international networks (the diversity of flows and of networks in the transnational space), the games of power on the international scene, the center-periphery dynamics at a world scale, the international system after the Second World War.

5. The age of bringing again into discussion: demonstrates that the rapid mutations on the world political scene are determined by phenomena such as the demographic revolution, globalization (with effects on the economic, technical, scientific, informational etc. domains), environment issues; there are analyzed the mutations known by the state, from the nation-state to the state law and from here to questioning the nation-state and what is more to its implosion; an international scene full of tensions, with new big actors that assure the international equilibrium in a multi-polar world, but also an opening of the space (*l'ouverture de l'espace*), the liberalization of international trade creating big spaces (grandes espaces).

6. The last part of the paper, called *The Geopolitical Analysis*, is to a great extent an original approach of geopolitical thinking underlining the ancient origin and yet its late formalization, the territorial logic of Geopolitics and yet its universal vision, an original interpretation of governance as a new form of peace geopolitics (in contrast with the geopolitics of war) and of equilibrium ("governance is based on a profound change of attitude as far as protagonists of the political or economic game are concerned"). The author succeeds the most convincing configuration of geopolitics: "The Geopolitics analyzes the geographic realities in which the power reports (coercion, influence, domination, control) are born from the access to certain resources and are linked by their valorization and utilization. It does not have as a starting point physical data but actors. They are *localized*, rely on *territorial bases*, dispose of *networks*: they (the actors – our note) cannot be understood without taking into consideration their geographic dimensions" (page 321; the underlinings are the ones of the author).

Instead of a conclusion we remind the appreciation of the French editor to which the reviewer also consents: "In a paper that summarizes thirty years of reflection, Paul Claval proposes an extraordinary synthesis, renewing the Political Geography and Geopolitics".

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**REVISTA ROMÂNĂ DE GEOGRAFIE POLITICĂ** 

Romanian Review on Political Geography Year XII, no. 2, November 2010

### CONTENTS

STAKES IN CONTENTION AND MUTATIONS IN THE ORGANISATION OF THE URBAN AND PERIURBAN SPACE OF TIMIŞOARA Nicolae POPA
(Art#132101-232)
FOR FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS Luis DA VINHA (Art#132102-228)
EUROPEAN UNION: DESTINATION AND TRANZIT AREA FOR COCAINE TRAFFICKING Irina CAUNIC, Florin Bogdan SUCIU, Ionel MUNTELE
(Art#132103-222)
THE 1958 REVOLUTION           Sören SCHOLVIN           (Art#132104-227)           157
LOCAL FITTING AND GLOBAL PREDICTION Paul-Răzvan ŞERBAN, Dragoş BAROIU (Art#132105-225)
THE ROLE OF URBAN TRANSPORT IN THE POLITICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS HUNGARIAN ASPECTS
Agnes Recskesne VOLGII (Art#132106-224)
(Art#132107-230)
ROMANIA – A FUTURE REGIONAL ENERGY HUB       210         Radu SĂGEATĂ       229
THE PERMEABILITY OF THE ROMANIAN BORDER AND THE INTERNATIONAL TOURIST MOVEMENT IN THE PERIOD 1994-2008
Alexandru ILIEŞ, Dorina Camelia ILIEŞ, Cezar MORAR, Marin ILIEŞ (Art#132110-233)
WORLD'. THE THIRD WORLD IN SOCIALIST ROMANIA'S FOREIGN POLICY Emanuel COPILAS (Art#132111-230)
OPPORTUNITIES IN TERRITORIAL CROSS BORDER COOPERATION AT THE EU EXTERNAL BORDERS. CASE OF ROMANIA
Vasile GRAMA (Art#132112-234)
Silviu COSTACHIE (Art#132113-235)

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