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THE ABOLITION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC PROBLEM IN THE LAST FIVE DECADES

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Abstract: The appearance of the nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War, as well as their development in an extremely high number (of the order of tens of thousands) by the great powers, especially during the Cold War, represented first of all a real problem of security for the humanity. The present paper aims to evaluate both aspects regarding the alarming nuclear race, especially after the '50s, but mainly the way in which it has been attempted over the last decades to stop/diminish the development of the nuclear arsenal at a global level with extremely high direct/potential destructive effects for human and the environment. Although in the last 5 decades there have been numerous strategies of abolition/non-proliferation of the nuclear arsenal, part of these being briefly presented in this paper, the real decrease of the nuclear weapons strength has proved to be extremely difficult, especially in the context in which their existence has represented until now one of the most important guarantees for the preservation of the geopolitical and geostrategic supremacy of the great powers.

Key-words: nuclear arsenal, abolition, geopolitics, geostrategy, non-proliferations, treaties.

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INTRODUCTION

The abolition of the nuclear weapons represents an actual preoccupation of the global community, especially in the context in which their existence represents nowadays one of the greatest uncertainties for the nations' security. The beginning of the nuclear era started at the same time with the experimentation of the first nuclear bomb on 16 of July 1945 near Alamogordo locality in the south of New Mexico state, within the so-called Trinity test (Schenck & Youmans, 2012) has represented the start of the nuclear race at a global level, first in the U.S.A, and then in Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China, etc.

At the same time, the debut of the nuclear era determined international crucial moments in the following decades, creating the premises of some real nuclear political crisis between states. One of the worst effects is represented by the nuclear attack of the U.S.A against Japan, at the end of the Second World

War, the effects being devastating both for the Japanese state on the whole, and especially for the population (Malloy, 2012).

Another example, though of an extremely high potential-conflictual nature, is represented by the nuclear missile crisis in Cuba from 1962, year in which it is observed one of the greatest geopolitical-military (nuclear) crises from the second half of the XXth century. Although it is one of the most tense bilateral moments between the U.S.A and Soviet Union during the Cold War, this event creates the initial premises of the nonproliferation action at a global level, at the same time with the understanding by the governments of the potential devastating effects on the humanity, in the case of a nuclear war (Van der Meer, 2011).

Although initially the perspectives of extension of the number of nuclear states were quite alarming, the signing and confirmation of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from 1968, both by the already existent nuclear powers (the U.S.A., Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China), and also by the majority of the world's states, represented one of the most important opportunities of abolition of the nuclear arsenal from the second half of the XXth century until now (Weitz, 2011).

The signing and the confirmation of other important nuclear treaties after 1970 has represented important evolutions in the international politics of abolition of the nuclear weapons (Schenck & Youmans, 2012). Although in the last four decades it is observed a relative decrease of the nuclear arsenal due to the abolition politics, nowadays there is still a number of approximate 25 000 nuclear warheads at the level of the five *official* great nuclear powers, these being owned in the ratio of approximate 95 % by the U.S.A. and Russia (Van der Meer, 2011).

The maintenance of the nuclear weapons in the military arsenal of the five states mentioned in the context of the exception stipulations of the treaty, as well as the non confirmation of this until now by three nuclear existing powers, namely Israel, India and Pakistan (Weitz, 2011), represent the main lacks of the nonproliferation treaty from 1968. Also, the contemporary possession of the nuclear weapons by North Korea (Revere, 2010), the only state which owns nuclear weapons (with the exception of the five great powers) from the 198 states which confirmed the treaty of nonproliferation (Magnarella, 2008), represents another obstacle of the global nonproliferation. In the context of the actual geopolitical isolation, the situation of North Korea is at the same time one of the most important contemporary unsolved problems, this fact taking shape on the background of the critical military geopolitical conflicts with the U.S.A. after the second half of the XXth (Carter, 2010).

At the same time, the actual geopolitical conflicts between the states which own nuclear arsenal represent one of the most critical issues regarding the nuclear abolition, but especially in the preservation of an optimal strategic safety at a global and regional level. In this context, there can be observed two contemporary conflictual situations, one being represented by India-Pakistan military geopolitical conflict (Stransky, 2011) on the background of the mutual claim of some territories situated at the frontier, whereas the second situation brings to the foreground the geopolitical conflict and the potential military one between Israel and Iran (Lindsay & Takeyh, 2010). Actually, the efforts of the nuclear arming of Iran, as well as the military geopolitical threats to Israel, the nuclear armed country (Dayyeh, 2010), also represents a real difficulty in the preservation of the geopolitical stability in the Asian region, therefore creating nowadays the premises of some major obstacles in the international nonproliferation politics.

METHODOLOGY

For the elaboration of the present article there have been utilised data both from the specialised literature and from the data base atomcarchive.com. Therefore, the analysis of the information within the data base mentioned above it has been realised both from the spatial and from the temporal point of view, hence trying a complex approach of the analysed theme. In this way the spatial representation (the mapping) of the different information regarding the subject of the nuclear geopolitics it was possible with the help GIS softs, while the temporal analysis has been realised with the help of the tabular calculation.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL AND THE NUCLEAR EXPERIMENTS

The beginning of the Cold War after 1945 started the alarming nuclear race, especially between the two great global actors, the U.S.A. and Soviet Union, thus creating the premises of the foundation of a bipolar nuclear world created of two main poles, namely the capitalist and the communist. Therefore, in the period of the Cold War (1947-1991) there is observed a powerful proliferation of the nuclear arsenal both in the capitalist states (the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, India, Israel), and in the communist states (Soviet Union, China), the main actors owners of the nuclear arsenal at the global level being the United States and Soviet Union. The period after the Cold War marks the appearance of another two nuclear powers, namely Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006), this fact being possible on the background of the non-confirmation, respectively the non-compliance with the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from 1968 (Van der Meer, 2011).

Therefore, the number of the nuclear states has increased from five in 1968 (the U.S.A., Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China) to nine in 2006, in this period, states such as India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea became nuclear powers (Sauer, 2006). However, there are numerous doubts regarding the status of nuclear power of North Korea (Van der Meer, 2011), thus being likely that nowadays are only eight nuclear powers.

Along the decades, the nuclear race at the level of the five great nuclear powers gained apocalyptic dimensions, currently the two main protagonists being the United States and Soviet Union, followed by Great Britain, France and China, from the point of view of the nuclear weapons stocks owned (table 1, figure 1).

Table 1. The development and proliferation of the nuclear weapons (1945-2000) (data processing from atomicarchive.com)

States	1945	1955	1965	1975	1985	1995	2000
U.S.A.	2	2.280	32.400	28.100	23.500	14.000	10.500
Soviet Union/Russia	0	200	6.300	23.500	44.000	28.000	20.000
U.K.	0	10	310	350	300	300	185
France	0	0	32	188	359	500	450
China	0	0	5	185	426	400	450
Total nuclear weapons	2	2.490	39.047	52.323	68.585	43.200	31.535

The main aim of these huge stocks with extremely high financial implications over the decades hasn't been a strictly military one, but a geopolitical strategic one. Thus, any state with the status of nuclear power benefits of a certain prestige at an international level, of a geostrategic consolidation at a regional level, as well as the status of regional/global power (Van der Meer, 2011). The mentioned premises for the starting of the

development of the military nuclear programs determine real current problems in the nuclear abolition.



Figure 1. The current spatialization at a global level of the main nuclear (military) facilities (data processing from atomicarchive.com)

Although these mass destruction weapons have never been utilized, with the exception of the second World War, however, during the Cold War there have been at least ten moments of maximum tension between the two power centers (the United States and Soviet Union) which have brought to the foreground the idea of using them in a nuclear war: six times during the Dwight Eisenhower presidential administration, twice during the John F. Kennedy administration, once in the case of Lyndon Johnson administration and at least once during the administration of the soviet prime-minister Leonid Brezhnev (Magnarella, 2008).

It is very important to signal the fact that the devastating effects of these mass destruction weapons haven't been felt directly in a military conflict, excepting the United States attacks from 6 and 9 August, but indirectly by the numerous nuclear experiments (figure 2) generally during the Cold War period, experiments which have had negative repercussions both over human health and over the environment. The major region in which the most nuclear tests (approximately 900) have been effectuated is the Nevada desert, here the U.S.A. effectuating the majority of the nuclear experiments (Lay, 2007). The second major site is represented by the ex-soviet region Semipalatinsk from the east of Kazakhstan, the second region in the world from the point of view of the number of nuclear experiments (almost 500) (Yamamoto *et al.,* 2010).

Another relevant example is South Pacific, region in which numerous nuclear experiments have been effectuated by the U.S.A., Great Britain and France. Thus, in the region of the Christmas Islands, the U.S.A. made approximately 106 nuclear tests only before 1963, while Great Britain effectuated over twenty nuclear tests in the period between 1952 and 1957 in the areas of Maraligna, Emu Field, Monte Bello, as well as in the area of the Christmas and Malden islands (Magnarella, 2008). Unfortunately, there are more alarming situations, France being an example in this way, with a number

of 193 nuclear tests in the 1966-1996 period, in the region of French Polinesia, in the proximity of Moruroa atoll (Magnarella, 2008).



Figure 2. The number of nuclear tests at the level of the five nuclear powers (data processing from atomicarchive.com)

The great number of nuclear experiments of France in the South-East Pacific until 1996 is due to the non-confirmation of Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) from 1963 by this (Schenck & Youmans, 2012). The treaty prohibited the testing of the nuclear explosive in the atmosphere, the cosmic space as well as underwater (excepting the underground), its effects being felt directly by the severe restriction of the number of nuclear experiments after 1963 (figure 2). Thus, from 1945 until the present there have been over 2000 nuclear tests at a global level, the majority being made by the U.S. (50 %) and Russia (37 %) (table 2). The situation becomes more alarming because a great part of these have been made in the terrestrial atmosphere and underwater (25 %), environments with the greatest vulnerability and fragility of the ecosystems.

Table 2. The number of nuclear tests on types of environment (1945-1998) (data processing from atomicarchive.com)

Nuclear states	Period of nuclear tests	Underground tests	Atmhosferic and underwater tests	Total nuclear tests
U.S.A.	1945-1992	815	215	1030
Soviet Union	1949-1990	496	219	715
U.K.	1952-1991	24	21	45
France	1960-1996	160	50	210
China	1964-1996	22	21	43
India	1974-1998	7	-	7
Pakistan	1998	6	-	6

THE STRATEGIES OF ABOLITION OF THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND THE GEOPOLITICAL-STRATEGIC PROBLEMS INVOLVED

Although the most important abolition actions have begun after the 1960s, it must be reminded the fact that one of the first initiatives of nuclear non-proliferation has been unwound as far back as 1946, along with the proposal of *Baruch Plan* during Truman administration (Schenck & Youmans, 2012).

The plan stipulated for the founding of a supreme authority in the supervision and control of the nuclear weapons, named the International Atomic Development Authority. Among the most important provisions on which the

authority was due to function was the abandon of the nuclear weapons by the United States (the only nuclear power which existed at that time) with the condition that all states with potential of developing a nuclear program accept the recognition and the control of the authority. Even though the plan did not function because of the denial of Russia to join in, this remains one of the key-moments from the beginning of the atomic era which could have changed radically the course of the geopolitical-nuclear events from the second half of the XXth century.

It follows a period of over a decade of international decisional void in the control and restraint of the nuclear arsenal, for as after 1959, are taken the first measures regarding the testing of the nuclear weapons. Therefore, the first international treaty which regarded the control of the nuclear weapons is the *Antarctic Treaty* open for signing in 1959 and entered into force in 1961 (Gottemoller & Arnaudo, 2008). The treaty prohibited the experimentation of the nuclear weapons in the region of Antarctic, therefore saving the Southern continent with the huge potential of nuclear tests due to the isolation from the rest of the continents, lack of inhabitants and of the vast surface.

Other treaties which regarded the prohibition of the nuclear experiments in the uninhabited areas are *The Outer Space Treaty* (Lall, 1996) open for signing and entered into force in 1967 (followed by *Moon Agreement* open for signing in 1979 and entered into force in 1984) and *The Seabed Treaty* open for signing in 1971 and entered into force in 1972 (Schenck & Youmans, 2012).

Although the Outer Space Treaty (treaty which aimed at the prohibition of the nuclear tests in the outer space) represented a success by the great number of signatory states, The Moon Agreement (a continuation of the previous treaty which prohibited the military activities on the moon, including the nuclear ones) represented a failure because of the non-signing and non-confirmation by neither of the cosmic powers, except India and France (signatory, but which not confirmed) (unoosa.org).

The Seabed Treaty also presents a special importance because, at the same time with the becoming operative of Limited Test Ban Treaty which permitted the testing of the nuclear weapons exclusively in the underground, without a clear delimitation of this environment, the possibility of the effectuation of the nuclear experiments on the ocean floor it would have been real. Therefore, the concern regarding the utilization of this new environment for the effectuation of the nuclear tests, as well as the interests of the states on this environment seen as a resource, led to the opening for signing of the Seabed Treaty in 1971 (Schenck & Youmans, 2012).

The real starting point in stopping the nuclear tests and therefore in the abolition of the nuclear weapons consisted the *Limited Test Ban Treaty* (LTBT) open for signing in 1963 and entered into force in the same year. This prohibited the nuclear tests in the atmosphere, the outer space and under water, excepting the underground environment. The treaty arises in the context of the imminent dangers observed after 1950 for the humanity and the environment at the same time with the advancement of the most powerful nuclear experiments ever winded by the U.S. and Soviet Union (Goodby, 2005). The testing of the first bombs with hydrogen by the U.S. in 1954 (Castle Bravo experiment from Bikini atoll, Marshall Islands) and Russia in 1961 (the Tsar experiment from Novaia Zemila archipelago, north from Ural Mountains), creates the premises of the first important international collaboration regarding the restraint of the nuclear tests. Therefore, the treaty arises in 1963, currently being 116 signatory states.

The main lack of LTBT was its non-signing by France and China (Mastny, 2008), states which were at that time in full ascension in the development of their own nuclear programs. The geopolitical strategic causes of the non-signing and non-confirmation of the treaty in the case of France consisted in the fact that the testing of France's nuclear capabilities, without restrictions, became a priority in France's geostrategic consolidation as a nuclear power after the '60s, especially in the context of some military conflicts with the former colonies, but especially on the background of some geopolitical tensions with the U.S., the reason for which France draws back from NATO in 1966 during Charles de Gaulle presidential administration (Ghez & Larrabee, 2009).

The situation of China was even more difficult, because joining LTBT would have meant a limitation of the nuclear capabilities, especially in the conditions in which the testing of the first nuclear bomb takes place in 1964, at just a year after the opening of LTBT. Thus, in full research and ascension in the development of the nuclear program, China refuses to sign and to confirm the treaty. Also, other important considerations are connected to China's geostrategic consolidation in this period, the development of the nuclear program as well as its confirmation via the nuclear test, representing a real opportunity of independence and geopolitical-strategic consolidation towards Soviet Union and the United States at that time (Mastny, 2008).

Eventually, the treaty is continued by *Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty*, open for signing in 1996, an international treaty of wide scope which prohibits any kind of nuclear experiments in any kind of environment on Earth. Although the treaty disposes of a very modern and complex system of supervision regarding the detection of the signals of the possible nuclear explosions, the main currently issue of the treaty is the non-confirmation by the key nuclear powers such as the U.S., China, India and Pakistan (Larsen *et al*, 2011).

To be mentioned the fact that, likewise LTBT, another strategy of reducing nuclear danger, it is represented by the creation of a connection line in 1963 between the two superpowers (the U.S.A. and Soviet Union), regarding the avoidance of some potential nuclear disasters caused by possible accidents, misunderstandings, or deliberate nuclear attacks. Thus, the communication agreement between the two states was named *Hot Line Agreement*, this representing a major consequence of the missile crisis of Cuba (Schenck & Youmans, 2012).

The first international treaty with a major impact on the abolition of the nuclear weapons consisted of the *Non Proliferation Treaty* from 1968. The treaty stipulated the prohibition of the expansion of the nuclear programs at a global level, with the exception of the U.S.A., Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China, nuclear powers which already existed until 1968 (Weitz, 2011). In the case of these states it hasn't been imposed a total nuclear disarmament, but only a recommendation of stopping/restriction of the military nuclear programs, this fact remaining to be decided by each state.

The application of the stipulations of the restraint and control treaty at the level of each signatory state has been possible via International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an authority responsible until present for the identification of the nuclear programs with military purposes in different states. However, according to the stipulations, the treaty permitted the signatory states to utilize the atomic energy in a civil (economic) purpose, this fact being possible after the checking and approval by the IAEA inspectors.

The experience of the geopolitical situations in the last two decades in the case of some states such as North Korea, Iran and even Siria, shows that the efficiency of the treaty, via the main instrument, IAEA, has been a relative one (Weitz, 2011). One of the most relevant examples is Iran, situation in which IAEA has not been capable in the last two decades to present concrete proof regarding the development of its nuclear program, so that the Security Council of United Nations to take real measures of abolition (Shen, 2006).

As a consequence, the nuclear ambitions of Iran materialized by an advanced current stage of development of its own nuclear program could lead to a series of repercussions among which the most important is the destabilization of the Middle Orient by starting a potential nuclear war with Israel (Lindsay & Takeyh, 2010).

Another major deficiency of the treaty is represented by its own basic principles by which the treaty arose. Therefore, the exceptional stipulations regarding the abolition of the nuclear armament in the case of the five main nuclear powers, stipulations which permitted the owning of the nuclear weapons by these (the U.S.A, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China), have represented a real discrimination for the other signatory states, thus generating a strong lack of confidence regarding the moral eligibility of the treaty.

However, having 189 signatory states and via some severe measure of checking the nuclear programs, in the majority of the situations, the treaty remains until now one of the most important initiative of nonproliferation of the nuclear weapons.

Another international very efficient form of nuclear abolition stands out towards the end of the '60s at the same time with the creation of the NWFZ (*Nuclear Weapons Free Zones*). These zones represent state regions on the globe, whose states, via some multilateral treaties have agreed to prohibit the acquisition, the stocking, the development or the testing of nuclear weapons in the terrestrial, atmospheric or aquatic area of the respective region (Magnarella, 2008). The main causes of the foundation of these NWFZ are related to the consolidation and increase of the security of the signatory states from the respective space by the prohibition of any nuclear activities, excepting those which have a civil purpose (the obtaining of energy). In this direction, the security of the respective space was going to be realized both by the supervising activities of IAEA inspectors, and by their own inspectors named within NWFZ treaties.

Therefore, until now, there have been fixed five NWFZ areas at a global level (figure 3), namely South-America and the NWFZ Caribbean area, the NWFZ South Pacific, the NWFZ south-eastern Asia, NWFZ Africa and NWFZ Central Asia (Magnarella, 2008).

South-America and NWFZ Caribbean is the first region of prohibition of the nuclear activities for a military purpose, this being formed after an open multilateral agreement for signing in 1967 at Tlatelolco (the area within Mexico City capital) and which entered into force in 1969. The main cause of the first form of nuclear abolition of this type in this area it is related to the nuclear missile crisis in Cuba, the intense geopolitical crisis between the two superpowers (the U.S.A. and Soviet Union) which highlighted how vulnerable it is the international community in front of a nuclear war.

Though initially there have been issues regarding the integrity of the treaty because of some geopolitical tensions from the region (the communist régime in Cuba, the military governments from Brazil and Argentina), into 2002, at the same

time with Cuba's acceding, the treaty covered the entire area of Latin America and the Caribbean, including Mexico from North America (33 states) (Tabassi, 2009).

NNWFZ South Pacific is the second treaty open for signing in 1985 at Rarotonga, Cook Islands, which entered into force in 1986. The creating a new NWFZ in the South Pacific was absolutely necessary, especially in the context of the numerous nuclear experiments developed in this region by the U.S.A., Great Britain and France. Having a number of 13 signatory states, the majority of the small states (island states) from South Pacific, but among which also Australia and New Zeeland, the treaty assures the nuclear security both for the state communities, and for the numerous fragile aquatic ecosystem from South Pacific.



Figure 3. The globally spatial representation
of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone areas (NWFZ)

NWFZ in south-eastern Asia is another important region of prohibiting the military nuclear activities, the treaty being open for signing in 1995 and entered into force in 1997 (Magnarella, 2008). Although the idea of constituting a new free area was older with two decades, the treaty became realistic at the same time with the removing of the nuclear weapons by the U.S.A. from the Philippines. Currently, the treaty covers the entire area of the states included in the economic structure ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), area which overlaps in the greatest part the peninsula Indochina.

In the case of Africa, its designation as NWFZ became of a vital importance at the same time with the progress of the French nuclear experiments in West Sahara in 1991. Also, the development of the nuclear program of South Africa during the apartheid represented another necessity of creating a new NWFZ on the African continent.

The creation of Africa NWFZ became possible at the same with the collapse of the apartheid in South Africa after 1990, the only country on the African continent who owns nuclear weapons due to the nuclear program developed in the period of apartheid. Thus, in the context of the political changes from South Africa and its adherence to the NPT after the complete destruction of their own nuclear weapons, the Africa NWFZ treaty was opened for signing in 1996 and entered into force in 2009 (Tabassi, 2009).

Although it was named the Pelindaba treaty in the memory of the destruction of the nuclear installations from the nuclear center with the same name, situated in the proximity of the capital Pretoria, the treaty was open for signing in the city Cairo, currently being signed by approximately half of the number of African states.

The last region designated as NWFZ is the region of Central Asia, constituted by the former soviet states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Open for signing in 2006 at Semipalatinsk, the eastern region of Kazakhstan, the treaty represented a real necessity for Central Asia, especially in the context in which these constituted the main region of testing the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union.

Very important to mention is also the situation of Mongolia, which declared in 1992 its own NWFZ (Tabassi, 2009), its unique situation being currently a role model for all the world's states.

Therefore, the covering of a large surface from the southern hemisphere in the last four decades by the NWFZ treaties led to the premises of the idea of creating a new NWFZ for the entire southern hemisphere. Currently, this fact is very difficult because it would presuppose the violation of the Law of the Sea Convention, convention which allows inclusively the transport of the nuclear weapons (Magnarella, 2008).

Another major issue of the efficiency of NWFZ treaties is that their areas of covering include neither of the current nuclear powers. Thus, with the exception of Central and Southeastern Asia, the greatest part of the northern hemisphere is discovered (lack of NWFZ treaties), this needing mostly the creation of some NWFZ due to the situation of all the nuclear powers at northern latitudes. However, the real possibility of creating some new NWFZ treaties in the near future, which cover the territories of the nuclear states, is a small one, this fact being due to the very complex geopolitical interests of the great powers.

At the same time, it is very important to mention the fact that after the '70s, it is observed a series of abolition bilateral treaties which were concentrated especially on the confinement politics of the nuclear arsenal between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union. Thus, among the most important bilateral treaties there can be observed Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II (START I, II) and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

Although *Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty* entered into force in 1972 (Schenck & Youmans, 2012), hasn't represented a major success in the confinement of the nuclear stockpiles between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union, this has played an essential role in the politics of the nuclear abolition during the Cold War, representing the key moment for the triggering of the negotiations between the two superpowers regarding the confinement of the offensive nuclear weapons.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, open for signing in 1987 and entered into force in 1988 during Ronald Reagan's presidential administration (the U.S.A.) and Mihail Gorbaciov's (Soviet Union), it is of a special strategic importance because via this an entire series of nuclear weapons is being removed, namely those with intermediate-range (Cimbala, 2009).

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) and *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II),* are two treaties signed in 1991, respectively 1993 which aimed the removal of an important number of nuclear warheads with long-range. Thus, START II treaty imposed the confinement of the nuclear warheads at

approximately 3,500 both for the U.S.A. and for Russia (Schenck & Youmans, 2012), the most aimed categories of the nuclear weapons being the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). The treaty represented a failure because of the Russia's abandon as an immediate reaction of the U.S.A.'s retreat from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is the most current treaty of nuclear abolition, signed in 2010 and entered into force in 2011 after the confirmation from the two states. The main objective consists in the reducing of the nuclear warheads for both parts at approximately 1,500 (Futter, 2011), the most aimed being ICBM and SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile) rocket missiles. Although the reducing objectives seem to be quite daring, in reality, the difference between the two states and the other nuclear powers is quite big (France – 300 nuclear warheads, China – 240, UK - 220, India/Pakistan/Israel 70–90) (Futter, 2011).

Likewise, unfortunately, these bilateral treaties between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union/Russia regarding the nuclear abolition haven't been very efficient because the maximum limits imposed by these regarding the owning of warheads, didn't include all the categories of nuclear weapons, but only a part of them. The situation is similar also in the case of the multilateral treaties, hence, after five decades of important negotiations between the nuclear powers, currently still exists, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a total number of over 20,000 nuclear weapons at a global level (Futter, 2011).

CONCLUSIONS

Even if in the last five decades have existed numerous abolition treaties at a global level, their efficiency was a relative one, because of the difficulties between the nations to reach a favorable agreement.

The diverse strategies of nuclear abolition of the global political community have played in the last five decades an essential role in the reducing of the nuclear arsenal, therefore decreasing considerably the risk of some nuclear conflicts between the nations. However, in the majority of the abolition efforts there can be observed a real lack of participation and collaboration from some key states such as Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The situation becomes more complicated in the context in which these states are involved, not only in the geopolitical conflicts, but also military ones, therefore increasing the risk of a potential nuclear conflict at a regional scale or even at a global one. It is the situation of India and Pakistan, and more clearly, the situation Israel-Iran, conflictual axis with enormous potential of destabilization of the Middle Orient.

Thus, among the most important solutions of diminishing the conflicts is cooperation and joining these states to the nonproliferation politics. In this way, one of the most real strategies is the creation of a new NWFZ in the Middle Orient, strategy which implies huge efforts, both from the part of the international community, but especially from the part of the implied states.

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