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**GEOPOLITICS AND NEGOTIATIONS:  
MAIN ASPECTS OF NEGOTIATIONS REGARDING  
BIG INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS.  
CASE STUDY: DANUBE AND IRON GATE SYSTEM**

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**Abstract:** This paper aims to present the main peculiarities of negotiations carried on for big infrastructure projects. As man and human society act in time and in space, infrastructure projects help them to *manipulate the geographical environment*. On the one side, the article is focus upon how these negotiations proceed, and which are the factors who could have an influence upon their evolution. There are exposed both technical, economical, social, political, and geopolitical aspects of such negotiations; in the same time, it could be observed the role such projects have from technical, social, economical, and geopolitical points of view.

**Key words:** geopolitics, infrastructure projects, negotiations, political character, technical elements

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**DANUBE**

It is a simple observation that man acts in *time* and *space*; and human society do the same. It is the prisoner of time and space... But if man can escape time thinking to his past actions, or projecting in future his intentions, *space* is present in all his interactions. It is a determinant element; man cannot escape space. As such, geographical elements have an *integrative* character for human society. Furthermore, man builds infrastructure projects to control space and through this, to project its power. And when we have knit together these two elements – space and power – we are already in the field of *geopolitics*. Infrastructure projects are the expression of technical success, and they belong to the sphere of civilization. They can be built and they endure as long as there is peace. Peace and civilization are inseparable...

In the case of Danube, it has an integrative character on European continent; it knits together and integrates the societies which are wet by its waters. It is the most important river on European continent. It is the only big river which cuts Europe from West part to its Eastern part, and this through the middle of European landmass. Through it, Central Europe is linked, over the Black Sea, in the most facile way, to an area well endowed in natural resources,

agricultural potential, and human resources: the Middle East. Along it – as in all cases – are located the terrestrial communications, and important cities, which, in their turn, are *hubs* in the European transportation network; four European capital cities are located along it: Vienna, Bratislava, Budapest, and Belgrade.

As it could easily be observed, its importance is due to its location, but the exploitation of the geographical advantage is connected with the possibility of transportation on Danube.

Danube has been repeatedly a *political axis* for different political entities which appeared on historical arena... Roman Empire made it its boundary, while nomads used it to infiltrate from East to West; Ottoman empire used it as strategic line to consolidate its power in Central Europe (after it took Moldavian fortresses on the Black Sea shore, it marched along Danube to West; then followed Belgrade, Buda, and even Vienna). The Austrian revenge came along Danube, too: it took Hungary and a part of actual Romania (Oltenia) out of Turkish control, and promoted its interest in Black Sea using navigation on Danube; Vienna had the most powerful fleet on Danube. Vienna fully used its geographical location, benefiting from Danube navigation to promote its interest in the Danube river basin.

As we can note, geographical elements can fully be used by man only if he strives for the realization of projects which helps him in this regard. In case of Danube, it can be fully exploited only if man strives to create the conditions for free navigation on it, and riparian countries can use it only if there are not obstacles on it at all. In case of international rivers, category in which enters Danube, these obstacles can be technical, or legal.

The legal obstacles are made by man, and they can multiply the impact of natural obstacles, in order to promote specific *political* and *economic* interests. The administrative, legal, and commercial elements could be knit together, and presented as legal obstacles, in order to protect or promote some peculiar political interests by a specific political entity, while depriving others to fulfill their interests.

Danube is a special case. When one country enjoyed a position of relative superior power in one historical moment, and when this context favored it, it tried to push hard to promote its interests in transportation on Danube, while trying to hinder the realization of other riparian states' interests in this regard. Danube importance can be understood when we saw that France and England – non riparian states – were parts in different legal instruments which regulated navigation on Danube, and in this way they created diplomatic keys for access to continental politics.

Technical obstacles regard the natural elements which hinder the navigation on Danube, or augment the dangers and risks for this activity. The greatest danger for navigation was represented by natural elements located in the mountains, after its entrance on Romanian territory, in the Iron Gate sector.

Even if before the end of World War II, there had been a legal regime which regulated the way Danube riparian states could use it for navigation, and which provided guidance even for the way to create technical capabilities to eliminate natural impediments on navigation, the main international act which precisely induced riparian states to eliminate the natural hindrances was concluded in August, 1948; it is known as Danube Convention. In it, there it is mentioned that all riparian and non riparian states have the right to navigate on Danube on equal foot (Convenția Dunării, 1948, art. 1), (this means the elimination of legal barriers to navigation), while there could be found that each contracting party had to maintain the section of the river on the appropriate section which is

under its responsibility (along border represented by Danube, or on the whole river, in case it crosses along national territory, as in the case of Hungary, or Austria), (Convenția Dunării, 1948, art. 3, art. 4, al. 1) this meaning that states have the legal obligation to realize works in order to eliminate all technical barriers to navigation on this *international waterway*.

As we already have noted, Iron Gates section of Danube posed the greatest dangers for navigation. As contracting parties to Danube Convention convened to take specific actions in order to eliminate all these natural inconveniences, (Convenția Dunării, 1948, art. 20) these actions aimed to eliminate hindrances to navigation in this part of Danube; the direct responsible parts for this work were Romania and Yugoslavia.

There was a legal obligation for these two riparian states to work together in order to eliminate hindrances for navigation on their common frontier in Iron Gate sector, but between 1948 and 1956 there hasn't been nothing done. Again, as so many times in the past, political interests took first floor and put aside the elimination of technical barriers.

### **INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT**

International context has some peculiarities which pressed hard upon these two countries. There were created two structures with international character, both influenced by Moscow: Warsaw Pact (for politico-military affairs), and COMECON (for economic and political matters). Romania belonged to both of them, while Yugoslavia not; furthermore, to dilute Moscow's power at global stage, Belgrade, together with India, Mexico, Indonesia, Egypt, Sweden, and other states created in 1955 the nonaligned movement. It is to be mentioned that between Belgrade and Bucharest, there were very great tensions, especially alongside Danube border, but Bucharest were pressed to this position by Moscow, which wanted to invade Yugoslavia, in order to throw out Tito from power.

Furthermore, Stalin wanted Tito to owe him his power position, while Belgrade tried a policy of departure from Moscow because Tito wanted to respond to its country direct interests, not to promote through him the Moscow power position in the Balkans, and through Danube, to Central and Western Europe.

The rupture between Belgrade and Moscow eliminated the possibility of cooperation in Iron Gate sector between Bucharest and Belgrade in order to eliminate once and for all the hindrances for navigation on their common Danube border. And as Belgrade departed from Moscow's policy, Stalin pressed much harder upon Bucharest, in order to influence through it Tito's Yugoslavia.

But once the Stalin died, the top level fighting for power in Moscow took off, and as in 1954 Khrushchev took power, it tried to open Moscow to the world, but this was a measure with a tactical character, Khrushchev using it to escape top level party (and state) positions from Stalinists.

In 1956 in summer, Tito was invited to Moscow, as a sign of a new type of relation between Moscow and Belgrade; returning home, he crossed through Bucharest, where he and Dej, publicly announced that past asperities should be buried, and a new start for cooperation in Iron Gate sector should be done.

This was the shifting point in Romanian-Yugoslavian relations. It marked openly the starting of negotiations for Iron Gate System project and for its construction.

Once again, as in the past, political matters were more powerful than wellbeing ones; navigation on Danube river could have brought for all riparian

states, and beyond them, to all European and Middle Eastern states benefits, but as long as political interest of dominant power in Danube river basin were prominent, it had an upper hand upon the interests from economic area.

But Iron Gate System is much more than transportation on Danube: there is a system which generates energy, using the greatest natural potential offered by Danube – which is concentrated in Iron Gate sector – in a sustainable manner, in the same time rising the national capacities for electricity generation, and energy independence, in an era when industrialization was the prove that a country succeeds on the path to development.

This is a short presentation of *international context* before, and during the negotiations carried on for Iron Gate System construction, but its importance was very great. As a conclusion, this aspect should be part of any analysis regarding all big infrastructure projects: *the political aspects dominate over any economic, social, and technical affairs.*

Now, the main characteristics of negotiations carried on for big infrastructure projects, and in particular for Iron Gate System, are presented on the following pages.

### **LEVEL OF DECISION**

As in all cases of human interaction, on of the key elements are space and natural factors, while *negotiations carried on for big infrastructure projects, and their effect – infrastructure projects – create effects in space over a very long span of time, and for this reason they are under the influence of very important political decisions.* Transportation and energy are top political agenda elements, attracting the focus of highest political echelons in each state, its interests being directly and in the long run affected by projects in such areas.

Both in Romania and in Yugoslavia the highest political echelons were involved in starting negotiations, in signing what was negotiated, and in the moment of official opening of Iron Gate System in 1972; there were present Ceausescu and Tito, on the Iron Gate Dam, while photographers immortalized the moment... Of course, these persons were not aware of all details of negotiation, these being task of technical, legal, and financial experts, but in key-moments their intervention was of capital importance.

### **TECHNICAL CHARACTER**

The negotiations carried on for infrastructure project's building have in the same time a very pronounced technical character. For this reason, there are needed a lot of specialists from very different fields of specialization.

In the negotiations carried on for Iron Gate System's fulfilling, there were technical experts, financial and legal experts, as well as military and diplomatic experts.

### **HIGH COMPLEXITY, PARALLEL, CASCADE NEGOTIATIONS**

Political interests and technical character mean that the negotiations carried on for big infrastructure projects are *very complex.*

On the one side, there is needed a *big number* of specialists, from very different fields of activity, and on the other side, they expand over *long* period of time. The complexity of debates determines their grouping, depending on different aspects the project implies. There are to be found map designers, geology specialists, geographers, legal and financial specialists, diplomats and



military specialists, environmental specialists, even future analysts and statisticians.

In case of negotiation carried on for Iron Gate System project, they took place under the aegis of a Mixed Commission, which had to elaborate a Technical-Economic Memoranda, and it reunited Romania, and Yugoslavian specialists. These specialists were grouped in four sections, each in its turn being formed by Romanians and Yugoslavians:

- the section for terrain technical documentation;
- technical section;
- juridical section;
- economical – financial section.

Each section did its peculiar work, depending of its specialists, and where Romanians and Yugoslavians worked side by side. All these four sections worked in *parallel*, and all collected data were analyzed from time to time, during common meetings of each of the mentioned sections. Big steps in the process were taken at the meetings of the Mixed Commission, this one approving the work of the four sections, and establishing new targets for their future work.

There were six meetings of the Mixed Commission until the elaboration of final the Memoranda (1960).

But the four sections organized successive meetings, and data collected were analyzed, and new objectives were established for future work. Each of the four sections worked in parallel with other three, depending of its competence area, and from time to time, there were completed reports, which would have been accepted by responsible persons from each state. But each data collected in this manner by the specialists of each section, and specified in the report, were the starting point of the of debates in the others three sections. The specialists reunited in the four commissions worked and negotiated in parallel, but from time to time, they gathered in order to check the situation's evolution, in order to satisfy both parties' interests.

As such, there were debates carried on in parallel, in different sections, and a series of meetings for each one of the four sections; this means that the negotiations were carried on *in parallel* and *in series*.

## **DIMENSION**

In many cases, negotiations for infrastructure projects' construction are quite small, being involved a small number of parties; but this does not mean that the effects of the project are not felt at least regionally, and even at global level. Think about for example of Transsiberian Railroad, which crosses only Russian territory, but its geopolitical significance is global: it connects Europe and Asia, Atlantic power with Pacific powers, making Russia instantly a global player, while Panama Canal, crossing only a very small country's territory – Panama – makes USA the biggest naval power on Earth.

While China wants to rise its global influence through the rebirth of the Silk Road, this time a modern one, being made by steel: (Binyon M., 2013, pp. 2-6) she wants to connect its maritime shores to Europe through Central Asia via Turkey through a tunnel constructed under the Bosphorus Strait, in this way rising its leverage upon both Europe and Asia, and upon Atlantic and Pacific countries, while in the same time reducing the leverage Moscow has today... This is a project which is environmentally friendly and which can be negotiated independently between neighboring countries, but under some political umbrella

which emanates from Beijing and Bruxelles, and a financial umbrella which can emanate from big China's chest filled with liquidity. It is a project with global implications, and if this is coupled with a bilateral one – China intends to cut the Isthmus of Kra in Thailand to connect directly its rim on the South China Sea to Indian Ocean (Kaplan R., 2009, p. 22) – China will become the most important global player. It can manipulate all movements on the World Island, both on land and on the sea... These are short examples brought here only to highlight again the high connectivity between transportation and geopolitics, between infrastructure and power projecting capabilities.

Now, the negotiation carried on for the construction of the Iron Gate System project has small dimension, being mainly a *bilateral negotiation*, but its implications were felt at regional level, all riparian states being influenced by the project, due to improving conditions of navigation, and through taxes imposed by contracting parties as a measure to cover the cost generated by the works which were destined to improve the conditions of navigation.

The project satisfied in the same time two vital interest of Romania and Yugoslavia – transportation and energy – while the interests in transportation area were satisfied for all riparian states. And the conception of the project took this aspect in account: the part of investments destined to electricity generation were the burden of Romania and Yugoslavia, while, the investments destined for the improvement of navigation were to be supported by all states parties to Danube Commission, institution which was created as a result of Danube Convention. And as a result, the investments needed for this part of the project had to be accepted by the other riparian states than Romania and Yugoslavia, the negotiation taking here a quite bilateral form: one the one side, Romania and Yugoslavia elaborated *together* the Technical-Economic Memoranda, which would constitute the base of debates with the others riparian states, and the Memoranda constituted their (common) position in negotiation, while the other side was composed by other member states of Danube Commission, which itself was a forum of multilateral negotiations, but where there was defined their common position in regard with the common position presented by Romania and Yugoslavia.

So there were three interconnected negotiations: one small taking a *bilateral* form, between Romania and Yugoslavia; one a little bigger, being a *multilateral* one, which involved all Danube riparian states; and the third one, a *bilateral* negotiation between Danube Commission and Romania and Yugoslavia knit together.

### **CONTINUITY AND LENGTH**

Negotiations carried for infrastructure projects are highly influenced by political decisions. Even if they are very complex from technical point of view, they can advance continuously, but when there are at stake political interests, these can complicate negotiations, sometimes these being disguised under different reasons from financial or even technical fields; they can even prompt negotiation's halt.

Anyway, they are negotiations which span long period of time. This is because they are very technical and because they generate effects over long time through the creation of great leverages for rising influence man can exert upon space; their effect – the project/or the megaproject – consists in multiplying the power of the country which constructs the project in the long run... And for this reasons they must be very well balanced, which means that there is needed period of time for their successful conclusion.

As negotiations for infrastructure projects are long and intricate, so is the project's construction. And the necessary period for construction is over 5 years and even more than 10 years, time when there are made only investments; and the repayment period spans over two decades, sometimes even more... While the repayments period expands over many years, 20, or even more.

The negotiations had a character of *continuity*, and spanned over a *long period* of time: 7 years (1956-1963); in first part of this period (1956-1960) there were collected all necessary technical details for choosing the best solution from technical, financial, and energy points of view, and which were mentioned in the Technical-Economic Memoranda; in the second part (1960-1963), there were elaborated the texts of international agreements which constituted the juridical bridges which were the base for technical construction. In first part there were more active the section for terrain technical documentation, and technical section, respectively, while in the second part the greatest part of the work was for the juridical section, and economical - financial section.

During 1958, there could be remarked a slowing down of negotiating process, but it was not due to work complexity, but to political considerations; again politics dominated projects with reverberation in civilization area. As Tito adopted some quite hostile positions regarding the "interests of international trend of working force", Romania was forced, because of bipolar system and because elements connected to internal politics, to postpone negotiations.

The construction of Iron Gate System commenced in July 1964, and it was publicly and officially opened in May, 1972; the time needed for its construction was 8 years. While the repayments period was 20 years. But the effects were felt immediately in foreign policy and economic fields, while the technical, economic and social benefits can be felt even today, and even over the following decades...

### **OPENNESS**

The *openness* of negotiations is another peculiarity to be observed. As the negotiation for infrastructure projects involves an aspect which can change for long term the situation in one country or in the region where that country is located, the negotiation is more discrete. But discretion does not necessary means secretiveness. Furthermore, in case of debates with high complexity, they "speak" for a very specialized audience, while the common peoples are not familiar with it; this is another point which constitutes the motivation for discretion.

Taking account of the international context which characterized the negotiations carried on for Iron Gat System construction, opacity was necessary both from political, and from technical reasons. Russia and others COMECON member states intended to keep Romania on a preponderant agricultural position, while Bucharest intended to change its destiny, trying to step on the industrialization path; this mean that creating a national base for energy independence was of capital importance. But this Romania could do only allying with a non-aligned country, which was not in good terms with Moscow. Moscow even tried to control the project, imposing in Danube Commission to expand the negotiations from bilateral one to a trilateral base, Bulgaria being the third part in negotiation. This context and the very technical character of negotiations prompted the two main parties to hide from public eyes the process of negotiation.

But they were not secret at all: the international acts, the agreement and conventions, respectively, regarding Iron Gate System's construction were

publicly signed by Tito and DeJ in Belgrade (November 30, 1963), and they could be found in official publications of both countries by anyone who wanted to.

### **COMMON INTERESTS, FLEXIBILITY, COMMUNICATION**

The success of a negotiation is in great part due to the interests of the parties which identify points where these interests are superposed. Flexibility and communication are vital ingredients here.

Even that the countries which intend to build infrastructure projects can belong to different forms of cultures and religions, and they can have different forms of organization and government, they can promote their interest in creating the technical base for their economic, social, cultural, and political development. Big infrastructure projects from the fields of transportation and energy (especially dams) are such projects, which contribute to the civilization level's rising of the societies which implement them. For this reason each state and each society has a special interest in promoting such type of projects. As they belong to *civilization* area, they can overcome *cultural* differences between the parties involved.

Common interest is situated in civilization field, but different cultures can hinder the negotiation process; for overcome this impediment, parties to a negotiation for infrastructure project have to prove that they are flexible enough, in order to find solutions that satisfy all of them. Of course communication and trust are vital ingredients here.

In case of Iron Gate System negotiations, even the two countries involved had quite different political systems, and they belonged to very different international blocks, their flexibility and ingenuity in exploiting common interests pushed them to cross over numerous hindrances, and finally they found a solution which could be seen on Danube river even today: Iron Gate System. Of course, all riparian states wanted improved conditions in Iron Gate sector, and this element pushed them to sustain the project's fulfillment, but the main effort, responsibility, and burden were on Romania and Yugoslavia.

Specifically, both have interests in economic and social field, and in political field, too. While both Romania and Yugoslavia wanted to create their own energy base to sustain their own path to industrialization, while reducing dependence on foreign energy imports (in case of Romania, the main deliverer being Soviet Union) the project represented much more than that: it was a great work which proved to the whole world that two quite small countries could finish successfully the negotiations regarding the building of a big project, solely on their own efforts, in a quite tensioned international environment, aspect which contributed to present them to the world as countries which have good schools, and good organizational capacities.

Furthermore, even that Romania presented it as a friend of Moscow and of socialist countries it negotiated and built together with a quite opposing country from ideological point of view the dam which connected them *together* in energy and transportation, too.

This was the "bridge", the visible element for the whole world that Romania is nothing more than a dissident ally of Moscow and it could be interpreted from foreign policy point of view as a declaration of independence from Romania's part. Belgrade used the negotiation and the project as propaganda element, proving that it can be friend with a socialist country and that they can together built a giant project which served the *special interests* of Yugoslavia and Romania, and the *general* interest linked to navigation, for all riparian countries to Danube.

More than the negotiations regarding big infrastructure projects are complex, long, very technical, they involve complex financial, strategic, and environmental aspects.

### **FINANCING THE PROJECT**

The financial source for project's realization is vital to the satisfaction of all parties' interests. One solution is to borrow from international institutions (World Bank, or European Bank for reconstruction and Development), or from private banks, or even to agree with the builder company to finance it the project (or a part of it). This is the situation where financial provider can influence the country which intends to build the project, but does not have necessary sum of money, determining it to adopt some positions which it shouldn't have accepted, if it had enough money. These can interfere in economic area, the project's construction and its financing being only the first step to enter the economy of "helped" state, but it can expand to political area, too, the assisted state becoming an ally of the country which helps it, or the regime adopting a position favorable to the government which prompted the bank to lend money. In this moment big infrastructure projects are both the means to come out from underdevelopment stage, but in the same time they provide the key to make dependence on financial provider on long term. Building companies and international lenders become instruments in the hands of a peculiar government (or governments) which intend to project their interests in the country where the project is build, and even in the whole region where it is located.

In the case of Iron Gate System, Romania and Yugoslavia, more than that they build together the hydropower plant, the dam, and the locks, they provided together the *whole* needed money for project's construction. The whole sum was USD mil. 400, while USD mil. 95 being the part navigation contributed to project's fulfillment (USD mil. 55 represents the costs of objectives which are connected to improvement of navigation's conditions, and USD mil. 40 represent the part of navigation which supported the investments which aimed at rising the level of water: dam, sides protection, damages generated by the artificial lake created as a result of the project). This means that they had quite free hand in negotiation, and especially after that, during building phase.

The *political implications* of such a big infrastructure project are on the one side for the country which builds it, and for the lender country, in case the project is financed in such a manner. The country which fulfils alone big infrastructure projects has solid social and educational policies, has good organizational capacities, and is capable to mobilize human and material resources on its own. It can become an example which other countries would want to follow, in this way rise its influence upon them.

### **STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS**

In the case there is present a foreign assistance for big projects construction, the manipulation of the specific negotiation regarding the infrastructure project in such a manner that it determines the country to accept harder conditions is an omnipresent possibility.

In the case of infrastructure projects, there is present a strategic aspect, too; their impact upon the country which constructs it and on the region at large is on long and very long term. When a country start to build roads and railways to connect them to bordering countries, or only to *some bordering countries*, this

means that this country established its foreign policy objectives for a long period of time, transportation network being the network which acts like the *political bridges* among the nations it connects.

As there were finalized the negotiations between Belgrade and Bucharest, the foreign policy orientation of Bucharest became clearly one that departed from Moscow, and closed its ties with Western countries. Along the open position of sustaining Beijing over Moscow in international communist movement, Bucharest closed the ties with a nonaligned country, while at UN, voted openly against communist countries block, when it voted for Latin America denuclearization. (Malița M., 2007, p. 77)

### **ENVIRONMENT**

The environmental problem is present, too. Each big infrastructure project has a huge impact upon the environment; it is a technical mean which man uses to manipulate the environment in order to control energy, territory, and finally society. But this brings changes in environment, and there must be balanced the weak and strong point for each solution, before it is finally implemented.

In case of Iron Gate System, the water falls artificially created has 35 meters high – the highest in the world until then. (Nicorovici V., 1973, p. 46) The river multiplied its dimension ten times over, and the artificial lake has 270 km length, close to Tisa river connection. (Sobaru et al, 1998, p. 111) And the people which lived on Danube shores in Iron Gate sector had to move out, entire communities located on Romanian and Yugoslavian Danube's banks changing their location for ever... And roads and railways on both banks had to be rebuilt, while the rivers which flooded Danube changed a little their riverbeds and their fauna, too.

### **DOMESTIC POLITICS AND PROPAGANDA**

Being long term negotiations, and long term needed for bringing to life what there had been negotiated, it is possible that the negotiation is initiated by a government, other being the one which concludes the agreement, other which starts the infrastructure building, and other which finish the work. And for sure there are different governments which enjoy the civilization and financial benefits of the project, because it produces effects for generations...

The length of negotiations and the time needed for building the infrastructure project, spanning over long periods of time create the possibility to be influenced by international and regional context, and by political evolutions, too. One favorable context at the beginning of negotiations, and even at the beginning of construction period, can change in such a manner that it can create a negative impact upon the finalization of the project, and all efforts made until then are for nothing... We can say that the risks of international interference in project fulfillment are directly dependent on the time which is needed to complete the negotiations, and to put in practice what there had been negotiated.

The impact of big infrastructure projects upon society and environment, and the emotional agitation they create in humans' souls made them the subject to headlines news. This is a very important aspect of negotiations for infrastructure projects. For example, if an administration comes out and sustain that it will negotiate with another country or company the perspective of construction of a road, this news can constitute itself in *political capital* for that

government. This is the reason why the infrastructure projects are the subject of open political battles, especially in electoral years; this peculiarity being limited to the countries with democratic form of organization.

A promise to build or to continue the building of infrastructure projects can transform itself in magnet for undecided voters, and can incline the balance in favor of the project's proponent.

Furthermore, in an election year, the country where the elections are to take place can make greater concessions to the other party/parties involved in negotiation process in order to have the possibility to show publicly the success of negotiations and its determination regarding the project fulfilling. But this is made only for public delivery, and the gains obtained on short term could be counterbalanced by greater losses on the long run.

But political interests can sacrifice welfare ones, especially in young and poor consolidated democracies, they being the most vulnerable to such arrangements because in their case, they miss not only consolidate democratic institutions and strong check-and-balances peculiar to old democracies, but the technical infrastructure which can sustain their development, too. They lack both: organizational, social, *institutional* infrastructure, and technical infrastructure, too, elements so common to strong democracies. *They can be exploited by their own nationals in their own interests, and by other countries' interests, too, while depriving host society of their full potential benefits.*

In case of negotiations carried on for Iron Gate System construction, the lack of electoral process specific to democracies, both in Romania and Yugoslavia, created the possibility to provide continuity to negotiation process, and impediments which could have appeared during negotiation and implementation phases due to change in government, were eliminated from the beginning.

Put shortly, the negotiations carried on for Iron Gate System building, and as an expansion, the negotiations aiming at big infrastructure projects, have some peculiarities, as:

- they have a *political component* and a very *technical* one;
- the *political component* determines the pace of negotiation process, and the implementation of things agreed, too;
- they have a very *complex character* due to their political implications, and to technical characteristics of the project;
- they involve a lot of *specialist* from very different fields and specializations;
- they are *long*;
- they are susceptible to *political maneuverings* in electoral years (in case of democratic countries);
- they can awake *public* imagination, making them subject of the forefront newspapers' pages, and as such, being used as tactical maneuvering by competing political entities;
- once the negotiation regarding infrastructure project is commenced, the parties involved directly and indirectly have established their long term *foreign policy priorities*, infrastructure projects acting as umbilical cords through the territories crossed by them;
- they have a great impact upon the *environment*, infrastructure projects being in this regard technical means which help man to control space;

- they need for the full implementation of negotiated agreement *long period of time* and there are needed even two decades for the project's finalization;
- they involve *huge amounts of money*, and with this, the possibility to maneuver them by countries or lenders which have money, and intend to give them to the country which wants to realize the project;
- during project's construction time there are pumped enormous amount of money, while the period necessary for its *repayment* spans over 2-3 decades;
- being both *civilization resultants*, and *civilization promoters*, negotiations for infrastructure projects can be initiated by parties very different from cultural point of view, and successful negotiation in this case is due to flexibility, communication, and possibility of identifying common interest for all those involved;
- big infrastructure projects have a *geopolitical dimension*, too, and this is the most important aspect over the long run. A dam or a road, a canal or a railway, if it is conceived strictly in one nation's interest, being huge investments, generate jobs and money in their host economy, but after finishing it, there are more money, more jobs, *more motivation*, bigger experience, and *a greater capacity to mobilize* the natural resources on a wider area; and this are elements which in long run rose the power of the society and state which realized them.

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## **STUDYING THE NUMBER OF THE GYPSY MINORITY IN HUNGARY AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE NORTH GREAT PLAIN REGION**

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**Abstract:** In the current study, the Hungarian system of the minorities' advocacy is in focus with special regard to the Gypsy minority local governments. The representation of the Roma population has become very wide-spread from the mid 1990's by the Gypsy minority local governments, however this temporal change fits to general trends of other minority local governments. Important territorial characteristics were discovered by the example of the North Great Plain Region where significant part of the Hungarian gypsies are concentrating.

**Key words:** minority, advocacy, Gypsy minority local governments, Hungary

\* \* \* \* \*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Statistic calculation of the Roma population in Hungary and in neighbouring states (Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine) includes numerous uncertainties.

There are significant differences in the number and ratio of the Roma population. Adding the numbers together 1,278,898 people declared themselves as Roma in total in the course of censuses. Regarding the Roma population in the region 41.8% lived in Romania, 29.6% in Slovakia and 14.8% in Hungary in 2001/2002.

Various sociological estimations and surveys differ significantly from the data of censuses. According to such estimations more than 4 million (4 134 600 people) Roma people live in gypsyeight countries. More than half of them (52.3%) lives in Romania, while Hungary is in second place with 15.9% and Slovakia is overtaken by Serbia as well according to the estimations.

The difference between the total values of the censuses and that of the estimations is around 3.2-fold.

Problems associated with Roma people occur with different weights in the given countries. It is clear, however, that handling the situation of the Roma population has become a priority in the countries with a significant ratio of Roma inhabitants (Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Hungary).

The European Union attempts to help the integration of Roma people via a united Roma strategy – involving the national Roma integration strategies of the member states into a joint framework. In our opinion a key role could be associated with the Gypsy minority local governments in Hungary.

Therefore besides studying the change in the number of the Roma population in Hungary the focus of the present paper was placed onto the system of the Roma minority local governments. Changes in the number and spatial characteristics of Gypsy minority local governments are presented in detail on the example of the North Great Plain Region.

### **CHANGES IN THE NUMBER AND RATIO OF ROMA PEOPLE IN HUNGARY**

Ratio of the Roma population in Hungary increased from 1.1% at the time of the Gypsy census in 1893 to 5.6% at the time of the sociological survey in 2003 (Figure 1). Based on the census covering the entire population the number of Roma people in Hungary increased sevenfold between 1941 and 2001. Although estimations are from different times the increase of the number of Roma people can be characterised as exponential the primary source of which is high natural increase (Hablicsek, 2007).

Rapid growth is also the result of international migration excess and the increasing ratio of identity undertaking (effects of the latter are visible primarily in censuses) apart from high reproduction rate.

The demographic prediction of László Hablicsek calculates with 2 million people of Roma ethnicity by 2050, giving the quarter of the rapidly decreasing total population of Hungary based on the available data and numerous (current and probable) demographic characteristics (Hablicsek, 2000).


On the other hand, general demographic trends can be significantly different in particular Roma communities that make the problem even more complex. Productivity depends on education, employment and traditions that can be influenced by social relations as well. Certain Hungarian case-studies revealed that social segregation (isolation from other lifestyle models) may have stronger effects than residential segregation (Durst, 2007). Besides, demographic specifics are different in the case of different Gypsy ethnic groups as well (Janky, 2007) (figure 1).

Due to the characteristic natural productivity the age structure of the Roma population is markedly different from that of the Hungarian population. In 2003 almost 37% of Roma people were younger than 15 years old while the same age group covered only 16% of the entire population. Ratio of the age group above 60 years old was only 4% among the Gypsy population while the same group gave 21% of the entire population (Kemény, 2004). This difference cannot be explained by the high natural productivity of Roma people only but reflects the expected age significantly lower than in the case of the non Roma population.

Spatial distribution of Roma people in Hungary (similarly to the rest of the states in the region) is very uneven. Their ratio is higher in northeastern and southwestern Hungary.

Roma population is concentrated in the more underdeveloped regions. Primary places of settlement of Gypsy people are distant from the economic

centres and are areas characterised by small villages and hit by structural crisis (Kocsis-Kovács, 1991). This fact further increases the difficulties of their integration.



**Figure 1.** Estimated number of Roma population in Hungary between 1893 and 2004 (people)  
(Source: Edited by the authors, data from censuses and from other sources<sup>1</sup>)

### MINORITY (ETHNIC) LOCAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN HUNGARY

In the modern international law the principle of minority local governments occurred in the 1990s (Majtényi, 2003). However, these documents (UN General Assembly decisions, Copenhagen Document of the OSCE) due to their character involved only recommendations in relation to minorities (Kállai, 2005). The UN framework convention on the Rights of National Minorities protects minority rights directly while the European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages does the same indirectly (Kardos, 2007).

The Parliament General Assembly of the European Council accepted the famous Recommendation No. 1201 in its 44th meeting on 1st February 1993 and it appeared also in Hungarian legislation with the definition of national minority.

In Hungary the Act LXXVII of 1993 on the rights of national and ethnic minorities declared the right of forming local governments for national minorities.

Minority local governments can be formed by direct election by the voters. According to the act of 1993 the number of representatives in the minority local government board in a settlement is 5 people while it is 5 and 9 people at the county and capital levels respectively (Kemenczky-Farkas 1998).

Changes in the law took place first on 13th June 2005 when act CXIV on minority local government representative elections and on modifying certain acts related to national and ethnic minorities was accepted after a long debate. This was aimed primarily to define the authority of minority local governments and to enable them to establish their institutional network. This act ordered already on the three levels of minority local governments: settlement, capital and county (regional and national minority local governments).

Another significant change was brought by act LXII of 2010 on modifying the acts required by the reduction of the number of minority local government representatives. According to the modification the number of representatives is 4

<sup>1</sup> By the works of Cserti Csapó (2010), Hablicsek (2007), Kocsis-Kovács (1999)

people per settlement and 7 people in the county and capital minority local governments. National minority local governments are elected by the electors, who are the members of the settlement minority local governments in charge on the day of the election.

In order to hold minority elections at a settlement at least 30 people have to be registered in the election register in the given settlement.

The Hungarian Parliament accepted the act determining the next election on 19th December 2011. The new cardinal act replaced the act of 1993 on the rights of national and ethnic minorities modified in several times and the new act is in harmony with the new Constitution of Hungary. It defines as new definitions the ethnic cultural autonomy and the ethnic organisation related to the general ethnic elections missing from the law before (Mayer, 2011).

Changes occur in the title of the act as well as the term minorities are replaced by nationals (although in the case of Roma people nationality – due to the lack of an individual home country – is not correct. The application of the term ethnic would be correct).

In the next local government elections (2014) the number of voters in the ethnic register will determine the number of representatives. In case the number of voters in the ethnic register does not reach a hundred people the number of the representatives will be three. If the number of voters is above a hundred then four representatives can be elected.

The act determined the number of regional (county) ethnic local government representatives to be seven people while the number of national ethnic local government representatives is between 15 and 47 people based on the number of voters (Belügyi Közlöny, 2010).

Ethnic local governments will operate as independent legal entities in the future making their budget planning and management transparent. With the occurrence of legal remedy guarantees their legal and financial control is solved as well (Mayer, 2011).

### **NUMBER OF GYPSY MINORITY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN HUNGARY BETWEEN 1994 AND 2010**

Number of minority and Gypsy minority local governments increased continually in Hungary in the studied period (Figure 2).


In 1994 and 1995<sup>2</sup> when the first local minority government elections were held 817 local minority governments of twelve minorities were formed in Hungary. 477 out of these were Gypsy local minority governments. Regarding the Gypsy local minority governments 415 local governments were formed in 1994 and 61 were formed as the result of the by-elections in 1995.

Interesting characteristic of the first elections was that the number of candidates was significantly higher in the county centres than in the smaller settlements, almost double compared to settlements with population less than 1000 people. This can be assessed as those living in greater towns obtained information on the possibilities offered by the minority act earlier (Kállai, 2005). Due to terminations, however, only 738 minority local governments were in operation in October 1998. One of the reasons for the closures of these local

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<sup>2</sup> If no minority local government was formed in the first election in 1994 it was possible to hold new election, so called by-election for the initiation of 5 voters declaring themselves to belong to the same minority and residing in the given settlement. The appointed date for this by-election was 19th November 1995 and it had to be initiated by 19th September 1995.

governments was the lack of appropriate public administration practice of the elected representatives (Doncsev, 2001).



**Figure 2.** Number of minority and Gypsy minority local governments in Hungary between 1994/95 and 2010 (pieces)

(Source: own construction based on data from [www.valasztas.hu](http://www.valasztas.hu))

The following elections were held on 18th October 1998. The number of gypsy minority local governments formed at this time was 766. It was interesting that in settlements where Gypsies were the majority already they were passive politically therefore no minority local governments were formed in several cases.

Following the elections in 2002, 1841 minority local governments, 1004 Gypsy minority local governments among them were formed in Hungary (Molnár-Schafft, 2003). Associated with the 2002 elections a hot issue was that the most important factor in the results of the election was the place of the surname of the candidates in the alphabet. Another phenomena – the ethnic business – was revealed. As the list of voters was not supervised, anyone could have stated himself/herself belonging to a given minority group in the hope of making profit of it (Rátkai, 2003).

Minority local governments were formed in settlements and regions where nobody declared himself/herself of any minority identity and it is provable that these represented no minorities, their legality, however, could not have been questioned (Karácsony, 2005). These made it clear that the legal conditions of local government election have to be regulated (Eiler, 2005).

Despite low modifications the number of minority local governments was still increased. This resulted in the formation of 2045 minority local governments in 2006 out of which 1113 were related to Gypsy population.

1106 333 and 133 492 people were registered as Roma voters in 2006 and 2010 respectively. This means an increase in the number of those willing to participate in the minority local government elections by 20%. In 2010 1248 Gypsy local governments were formed in settlements.

Number of voters of Roma minority increased in Budapest and in every county as well. Greatest increase was in Fejér (36%), Csongrád (33%) and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (30%) counties. Number of Roma voters increased in the settlements where Roma local governments were formed already in 2006 and in

almost everywhere – except for 10 settlements (Magicz, 2010). Almost all of the 13 recognised nationalities increased the number of their minority local governments – except for the Slovenians and Polish – significantly in the studied period (Table 1).

**Table 1.** Total data of the local governments of recognised minorities in Hungary between 1994/1995 and 2010 (pieces)

(Data source: own construction based on [www.valasztas.hu](http://www.valasztas.hu) and Kállai, 2011)

Minority	1994/1995	1998	2002	2006	2010
Bulgarian	4	14	30	38	41
Roma	477	771	1004	1113	1248
Greek	6	18	30	34	37
Croat	57	73	107	115	127
Polish	7	32	50	47	49
German	162	268	335	378	424
Armenian	16	25	30	31	39
Romanian	11	32	44	46	71
Ruthenian	1	9	31	52	75
Serb	19	34	43	40	48
Slovak	51	73	112	116	122
Slovenian	6	10	13	11	11
Ukrainian	0	4	12	19	23
Total	817	1363	1841	2040	2315

Minority communities themselves, however, feel this rate of increase in voter activity unjustified and in their opinion, a part of the formed local governments cannot be regarded as a real organization of minority self-administration.

Regarding the minority voter lists composed of at least 30 names prepared at the elections in 2010 215 of them can be questioned whether they are really composed of member of the given minority communities based on the data of the latest census.


### **GYPSY MINORITY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN THE NORTH GREAT PLAIN REGION**

In Hungary the North Great Plain Region is one of the areas where the number of Roma inhabitants increases intensely. Based on our own research results (Pásztor–Pénzes–Bántó 2012) around 200 thousand Roma people live in the region giving 13.1% of the total population in 2010. Besides the number of inhabitants the fact that Gypsy minority local governments were formed in 109 and 232 settlements in 1994/95 and at the time of the last elections respectively also justifies the study of the issue in more detail (Figure 3).

Regarding the by-elections in 1995 as well the number of the newly formed Gypsy minority local governments was varying in different counties (29 in Hajdú-Bihar county while 30 in Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county and 50 in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county). Spatial distribution of the local governments was not in accordance with the spatial distribution of the Gypsies. In smaller settlements where the ratio of Gypsies was higher local governments occurred only after later elections. This is proved by the fact that there were hardly any Gypsy minority local governments in the eastern part of Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county characterised by tiny villages.




governments could be formed in 25-30 settlements in the future. In the other two counties of the region Gypsy minority local governments have already been formed in accordance with the ethnic ratios.



**Figure 4.** Number of Gypsy minority local governments in the counties of the North Great Plain Region until 2010

(Source: Own construction based on the data of [www.valasztas.hu](http://www.valasztas.hu))



**Figure 5.** Spatial distribution of Gypsy minority local governments in the North Great Plain Region in 2010

(Source: Own construction based on the data of [www.valasztas.hu](http://www.valasztas.hu))



As mid-term election is not possible in the case of minority local governments it happened several times that local governments were closed due to various types of conflicts and local Roma people remained without representation.

### SUMMARY

In our study the tendencies of the number of the Roma population in Hungary were given based on scientific literature and databases. The changes in minority legislation in Hungary and the number of Gypsy minority local governments associated with them were also discussed. Analysing the elections in 1994/95 and in 2010 the changes in the spatial distribution of Gypsy minority local governments in the North Great Plain Region were also studied.

The analysis declared that the number and ratio of Roma people increased significantly in recent decades. Demographic processes – higher natural increase characteristic for the Roma population and migration of the non Roma population away from certain settlements – suggest further increase in the ratio of the Roma population in certain settlements.

The first minority act accepted in 1993 has been modified at several times, however, the increasing trend in the number of Gypsy minority local government is constant. Based on the example of the North Great Plain Region it was proved that the increase of the number of Gypsy minority local governments was basically in accordance with the ethnic ratios and even the increasing tendency is expected to continue in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county.

Gypsy minority local governments – due to, among others, their spatial extent – may have key role in the social integration of the Roma population. In order to achieve success, however, wide social co-operation with the active participation of minority local governments is essential together with government measures more effective and integrated than before for improving the living conditions, education and employment of Roma people without which the integration of them and the successful handling of social problems are hard to imagine.

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## **ISTRO-ROMANIANS – A FADING FLAME**

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**Abstract:** The Istro-Romanians are seen today as a very interesting relic of the tumultuous millennial history of the Balkans. They represent the remotest, the smallest, the least studied and the most threatened branch of the Balkan Romanity. Paradoxically, in the recent years, these negative features have attracted the world's attention upon them, and now, the factors that brought them to the brink of extinction could turn into the main factors for their resuscitation.

**Key words:** Istro-Romanians, Vlachs, assimilation, revival, cultural patrimony, preservation

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### **INTRODUCTION**

Istro-Romanians are the most western branch of the southern Romanians or Balkan Romanians, generally known as Istro-Vlachs. Although in terms of their origin, the opinions are divided among scientists, according to the historical and political interest, going on from Latinized Slavs to Romanized indigenous population theories, yet they have a certain consciousness of their identity, different from the mass majority. Although their national consciousness is almost nonexistent, their belonging to the Balkan Romanity is attested in particular by their idiom, the most part of Latin origin.

Through the present article, we intend to bring to the attention of those interested, a ripple of light on the history of this branch of the Romanian people, with such a cruel destiny and so neglected by the history, pulling a warning signal on the danger of their total assimilation, but also to stress the duty of the national and European authorities to keep this population alive, which represent a first class European cultural patrimony.

### **ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION**

About Istro-Romanians' origin, different opinions have been expressed, in relation to the overall outlook of various historians, linguists, geographers on the formation of this Romanian people and its language.

Theories about Istro-Romanians according to which they would be an indigenous Roman population, from the early Roman Empire, were supported first

by Italian scientists. This view was supported also by Ion Maiorescu, who made the first studies on Istro-Romanian lands in 1857. Currently, most of researchers refute this view, based on several arguments such as their language and customs similarities with the Romanians from western Romania and Timoc region.

Two main opposed theories about their origins have the most followers today:

The first one belonging to Ovid Densusianu says that the Istro-Romanians are Daco-Romanians from the southwestern part of the ancient Dacian territory, namely Banat, Apuseni Mountains and Crișana regions and the Istro-Romanian dialect came off, consequently from Dacoromanian, first as a subdialect, developing then an independent dialect (Lozovanu, 2008).

Densusianu's argument is based on linguistics and relies on the similarities between the Istro-Romanian dialect and the Romanian dialects from Banat and Southwestern Transylvania. This theory was taken up and refined by Joseph Popovich, Al. Rosetti and Nicolae Drăganu, which identifies two layers: first from tenth century to thirteenth century, represented by a common Romanian and Megleno-Romanian layer, over would be overlapped in fourteenth and fifteenth centuries a Macedo-Romanian layer (Gafu et al., 2007).

The second theory belongs to Sextil Puscariu. He believes that Istro-Romanians came in Croatia during the era of common Romanian language, spread in the north of the Balkan Peninsula, on the territory of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia, and their reminiscence is found today in these regions of the peninsula. They have formed a single group with Dacoromanians, and then this common ethnic space was fragmented by Slavic invasions (Lozovanu, 2008).

A special mention in this context, it is worth Petrovici Emil's conception, based on arguments of historical phonetics, that Istro-Romanian Slavic loans that were made in an earlier era prior to the manifestation of influence the Istrian Croatian dialects have south Slavic origin, Bulgarian type and not Slavic south-western type (Serbian, Croatian) missing in northwest Balkan Peninsula. Therefore, he advances the hypothesis that the medieval ancestors of Istro-Romanians were originally from south of the Danube, namely from Timoc area.

Trying to find a middle way that would reconcile the controversies aroused about Istro-Romanians' origin, Elena Scărlătoiu (1991) says that "the great mass of Istro-Romanians' ancestors came from northern regions of the Balkan Peninsula" and that "there were many" nuclei "located both in the central, west and north-west of Transylvania and south of the Danube, particularly in the Timoc - Prizren area". As we can see, in the absence of a widely accepted theory, the question about Istro-Romanians' origin remains open.

### **ISTRO-ROMANIANS IN HISTORICAL SOURCES**

The most important sources regarding the Western Vlachs group consists of diplomatic sources. They have the huge advantage of being recorded acts of administrative decisions, legal regulations and court decisions or policy measures imposed by their issuers' direct contact with this missing Romanity. If we think of living conditions and how the archives of medieval Balkans have been preserved, the number of acts of this type we have today is impressive. Western Balkan Vlachs group, spread over a relatively large geographical area, stretching from the Dalmatian coast to the Stara Planina Mountains and from the Danube to Macedonia, shared the fate of the area, changing object of rivalry and confrontation between different powers: Serbian medieval state, Croatia,

Hungarian Kingdom, Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire, and the Venetian Republic (Tanașoca, 2004).

Note that, although in the former Yugoslavia, other sources recorded Vlachs (Aromanians and Megleno, coming from the southern Balkan peninsula or Dacoromanians come across the Danube), we deal here only local Vlachs, designated by the term Istro-Vlach and Morlacs, which formed a separate group in Danubian Romania, Romanians fully Slavicized today and, in all likelihood, didn't survive, except by few Istro-Romanians (Tanașoca, 2004).

However, the presence of Romanians on the space of Istrian peninsula is very old. In 1321 there was mentioned a Country of Vlachs. Later, these Romanians were mentioned in some acts of the Croatian and the Hungarian kings such as Sigismund of Luxembourg, Matthias etc. After some feedback based on names and other historical items, it was issued the opinion that in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Istrian Romanians constituted about 15% of the population. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries under the Ottoman rule, there has been a migration of Romanian elements from the central parts of the Balkan Peninsula to the northwest, especially in Croatia, in the areas of Dalmatia and Istria. But the distinction between Aromanians and Istro-Romanians, descendants of Western Romanians, was kept long enough. (Zbucea, 1999).

Venetian documents, like the Croatian ones, captured a shift of Velebit and Vinodol Vlachs (the part of the coast between Rijeka and Senj) to the island of Krk (Veglia) and to Istria. The penetration is slow and this movement was due to the depopulation of the Istrian peninsula, in second half of the fifteenth century, after repeated outbreaks of plague. These Vlachs were called *Morlacs* and *Cici* but they called themselves *Rumeri* (Tanașoca, 2004).

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, began an action in the area, from the Romanian media. Thus in the newspaper "Giovine pensiero" from Oct. 27, 1887, there was an appeal, signed by the Istro-Romanians from several villages, for the approving of several Romanian school establishments (Zbucea, 1999).

In this context entered the early activity of Andrew Glavina, considered an emblematic figure of the Istro-Romanian culture and Istro-Romanian nationalism. Andrew Glavina was born on 30 March 1881 at Susnievita and died at Pola on 9 February 1925. He had the initiative for composition and publication of a work in Istro-Romanian dialect for the first time, as a calendar print and the establishment of the first, and so far, the only, school with teaching in Romanian literary language and in dialect, in the village of Val d'Arsa, between 1921-1925 (Zbucea, 1999).

## **ISTRO-ROMANIANS IN RECENT TIMES AND TODAY. NUMBER AND GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION**

Istro-Romanians today, totalizing several hundred speakers, live in the Istrian peninsula in the northern Adriatic Sea into two groups. The first group of Istro-Romanians inhabit the village of Žejane (Jeiani), located northwest of the city of Rijeka and north of the Mount Učka (The Big Mountain). This village located north east of the mountain, in Cicarija region, has a marginal position in Istria. Here Istro-Romanians form an isolated ethnic community, being close to the border with Slovenia (Lozovanu, 2008).

Today, the village of Žejane (Jeiani) has the largest number of Istro-Romanian dialect speakers (about 400), and it is the locality where this minority represents almost 100% of the whole village population (figure 1).




**Figure 1.** The village of Žejane (Jeiani)

(Source: <http://www.meteo-europ.com/en/hr/primorsko-goranska/zejane-pictures.html>)

The second group of Istro-Romanians inhabits the area south-west of Učka Mountain, living in several villages located in the Valley of Boljuncica (Boliuncița) crossed by the Raša river (Lozovanu, 2008).

In the past their living area was much larger. By the nineteenth century there were other parts of Istria peninsula where traces of Istro-Romanian population were evident (figure 2).




**Figure 2.** Villages with Istro-Romanian speakers from 1800 till today

(Source <http://cruciutul.blogspot.ro/2008/03/istro-romanii.html>)

The work of dialectology find, however, that in 1846 there were 6,000 Istro-Romanians, 4850, 1904 (Sextil Puscariu, 1926), and especially lately, in a relatively short time, there was a drastic decrease in the number of dialect speakers in 1994 totaling 400 speakers, and now their number does not exceed 300 speakers. (Sârbu, 2012)

Nowadays, especially because of the urbanization, modernization, migration from villages to cities, and the under the most diverse forms emphasized process of emigration, especially to Italy, Trieste particular, but also in other areas, it is considered that the area New York – USA. There are about 500 Istro-Romanians settled there after 1945 (Zbucnea, 1999), the Istro-Romanians and their culture are more exposed than ever to the assimilation process and their number is decreasing artificially because of this process, and, if there are no quick measures taken, within ten years from now, this relic of the western Romanity will be completely assimilated.

However, even if they no longer know their mother dialect, by their descent and some preserved ethnographic traditions and elements, it is estimated that their current number stands at around 1,500 people, which is a drastic decrease if we think that at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century most sources gave number of over 3,000 people (figure 3).



**Figure 3.** The numerical evolution of Istro-Romanian according to historical sources between 1847 and 1991  
(Source: Lozovanu, 2008)

### THE PROBLEM OF ETHNONYM AND THE NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

It should be emphasized that although the Istro-Romanians belong to the Balkan branch of Romanian people, together with Megleno-Romanians and Aromanians, speaking a Romanian dialect, they are the only ones of Roman Catholic religion.

Regarding their ethnonym, *Istro-Romanians*, it is a recently scientific creation, based more on geography criteria than on the ethnic one, they being known since the ancient times with the ethnonym of *Vlachs*, like the rest of Romanians and, they called each other *Rumâri*, derived from the Latin *Romanus*.

In villages south of Istria, they call themselves *Vlas*, plural and singular *Vlach* and their language call *Vlaška*. They also use different terms and names derived from their localities, most commonly in the form of the ethnonym; for

example they use the name *šušnevići* and *šušnevski* language, referring to Istro-Romanians from *Šusneviće* (*Sušnevița*) and *novosani*, *novosanski* the language of the Noselo village. In *Žejane*, they call themselves *jeianći*, after the name of the village, and language call *jeianski* ("po jeianski cuvinta"). The Croats call them the most frequently with the word *Jeianci* or *Vlachs* (*Vlaski*). Istro-Romanians from *Žejane* (*Žejane*) do not use the name *Vlas* or *Vlach* (Lozovanu, 2008).

However, this small community is known in the area by many more names: *Vlahs*, *Cici* or *Ciribiri*, *Mavrovlachs* or *Morlachs* to mention just a few<sup>1</sup>.

Istro-Romanians have only a very vague national feeling. From their linguistic peculiarity in contact with strangers they are pleased to emphasize their difference from Croatian, often saying they are *Rumunia* or only those in the south, *Vlach*, *Vlas*. But at least officially, probably because of their bitter experiences in this respect, in the past, in the era of violent political clashes between national and rural masses, they prefer to say that they are Romanians speaking Croatian. Even fewer are those who consider themselves Italians, only in Istro-Romanian villages of the south of Istria (Lozovanu, 2008).

On the other hand, given the lack of contacts between the South and those from *Žejane*, between these two groups there is no ethnic or linguistic sense of community. Many had no idea of the existence of the other group, until the intervention of the Romanian researchers who visited them, because when they met at local fairs they all spoke Croatian (Lozovanu, 2008).

Unlike Aromanians, in the case of Istro-Romanians didn't appeared elements of a national renaissance in the early modern era. Traditional lifestyle, their continuous reducing number through assimilation, may be the explanation of this fact. (Zbucnea, 1999)

### **ISTRO-ROMANIAN TRADITIONAL OCCUPATIONS**

The historical documents are attesting the Istro-Romanians as a pastor people, practicing even the transhumance; a feature of the Romanian people everywhere, an occupation disappeared over time.

They have also dealt with the wood exploitation. One of their typical occupations that provided them with a stable income for a long time, was making wood burning coal (in 1994 there were registered last coalmen, this occupation being practiced only for tourists). Also a time they have practiced mining, but recently mining was subsequently closed. A few people left away their places of origin becoming sailors, continuing a tradition widespread among West Romanians near the Adriatic Sea during the Middle Ages. Because of the geographical conditions, they have practiced agriculture only on a very small scale and just for personal needs. (Zbucnea, 1999).

### **QVO VADIS ISTRO-ROMANIANS?**

Lately, the Croatian authorities shown some interest for the conservation of this idiom, officially considered "a cultural property". This interest in minority languages or "regional" is actually required by the decisions of the Council of Europe in relation to these languages, and is motivated by the forthcoming entry of Croatia into the EU.

We consider recent cultural and scientific events - occurred between 10 and 12 July 2008, in *Žejane* and organized by residents and local authorities

<sup>1</sup> <http://www.theapricity.com/forum/showthread.php?46370-Istro-Romanians>



under the title "Days of Žejane Vlach language and honesty," dedicated to the project initiated by Zvezdan Vrzic, originating from Istria, a professor at New York University, entitled "Conservation Vlach language or jeienene". The event started in two locations, with a scientific session, attended by linguists and ethnologists from Romania, FYR Macedonia and Croatia, local officials and community members of Istrians Vlach language. (Sârbu, 2012)

According to UNESCO, the Istro-Romanian language is the most endangered throughout Europe, so, it was included on the Red Book of Endangered Languages and Croatia has pledged to do everything possible to preserve the intangible heritage and the bearers of good, but so far all have remained level commitments and statements.

In 2008, the Bessarabian Deputy Vlad Cubreacov as a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe was the initiator of the draft resolution presented in Strasbourg, entitled "Istro-Romanians must be saved"<sup>2</sup>, which brought the Istro-Romanian issue on the European agenda. In this project, saving Istro-Romanian identity is considered to be a high priority, requiring the Croatian and Romanian state involvement and effective financial and institutional support.

After 1990 there was a slight revival of the Istro-Romanian community, from cultural point of view, by creating several organizations that advocate for the preservation of their language and culture, such as The Istro-Romanian Association "Andrei Glavina", founded in Trieste, Italy in 1994, where an important Diaspora is located, then The Istro-Romanian Union "Soboru lu Istrorumeri", founded in 1995 and the most famous folk group called The Žejane Bells, "Zejanski Zvonciari", founded by Mauro Doric, becoming a sort of Cirque du Soleil of the Istro-Romanians (figure 4).



**Figure 4.** The famous folk group "Zejanski Zvonciari", Pola, 2006  
(Source: [http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The\\_Carnival\\_of\\_the\\_Istro-Romanians\\_from\\_Jeian,\\_2006.jpg](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Carnival_of_the_Istro-Romanians_from_Jeian,_2006.jpg))

The biggest goal of this endangered minority is its recognition by the Croatian State as a national minority in Croatia and the establishment of schools teaching in Istro-Romanian dialect and Romanian, the support by the authorities of the founding of newspapers, radio and TV broadcasting in dialect.

<sup>2</sup> <http://cubreacov.wordpress.com/2008/05/08/istro-romanii-trebuie-salvati/>

Last but not least, a great importance will have assistance received from the Diaspora, the Romanian and European authorities and all organizations who wish to contribute to saving this cultural heritage of all humanity.

## CONCLUSIONS

Istro-Romanians or Histrian Vlachs is presented today as an ethnic and cultural community isolated and threatened with extinction, but now that the threat of their disappearance caught the attention of Europe, they have a chance to be saved.

Their rural and isolated world was the one that allowed them to survive in an aloglot environment so many centuries and, by exploiting these traditions might revive them again stronger and may endure for another centuries yet.

Through language, traditions and their way of being, they are Romanians and this should determine our authorities to support them especially at cultural and educational level.

Istro-Romanians provide an example of resistance, to the whole world, through language and culture of a millennial people and demonstrates our strength and brings us once more, if proof were needed, our Latin vigorously as a Roman people, the only one who lasted from all Latin East and the only one with consciousness of descent from the ancient Romans.

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## **POLITICAL-GEOGRAPHICAL FEATURES OF THE UKRAINIAN-ROMANIAN MARINE BORDER DEFINITION AND ESTABLISHMENT WITHIN THE BLACK SEA**

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**Abstract:** The political-geographical features of the Ukrainian-Romanian marine border formation are considered. The normative framework in the establishment of the Ukrainian-Romanian maritime border is studied. The basic problems which in the process of the Ukrainian-Romanian marine border delimitation and demarcation arised are analyzed. The features of the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone between Ukraine and Romania are researched. The effect of the decision of the International Court in The Hague for the further conduct of bilateral relations between Ukraine and Romania within the Black Sea is studied.

**Key words:** Ukraine, Romania, normative framework, continental shelf, exclusive economic marine zone, delimitation, demarcation

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### **INTRODUCTION**

With the announcement of independence of Ukraine in 1991 the area which included marine internal waters and territorial sea of the total area of 40 thousand sq. km. became part of Ukraine. Besides marine waters, on which the full sovereignty of Ukraine extended, the country got right on the exclusive (marine) economic zone, located in outer limits of the territorial sea, the economic sovereignty of the country exteneded on it in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982. Together with marine territory Ukraine received from the Soviet Union the legal basis of its management which didn't fulfill the contemporary political and socio-economic conditions and peculiarities of Ukraine. This resulted the emergence of a number of problems associated with the marine borders of the state formation. Therefore, political-geographical study about the problems associated with the marine borders of Ukraine formation in terms of national security, marine safety, the delimitation of the continental shelf, the protection of the economic rights and interests in the Azov-Black Sea region is important nowadays.

Ukraine is a marine country, has access to the Black and Azov Seas. However, the north-western part of the Black Sea (the distinction between Ukraine and Romania) has the particular interest of the delimitation procedures. Geographical conditions in the area absorbed almost all the possible problems in terms of delimitation. The situation is also complicated by a number of additional circumstances that affect the determination of approaches to the determination of the boundary line. The question about Ukrainian-Romanian border determination was not so complicated, as the question about the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones delimitation.

### **THE HISTORY OF THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE**

The territorial dispute with Romania was inherited from the Soviet times. On September 15, 1947 the Paris Peace Treaty between the USSR and Romania, which established the land Soviet-Romanian border (incl. border on the river Tisza, Prut and Danube) came into force (Копачинська Г. В., 2010). This agreement summarized the Second World War and established bases postwar territorial division in Europe. For its delimitation on large-scale maps and demarcation on the ground, on February 4, 1948 the Protocol on the passing of the Soviet-Romanian border between the Governments of the USSR and Romania was signed. On May 23, 1948 the Soviet Union and Romania signed another protocol, whereby Snake Island "was returned to the Soviet Union by the Romanian People's Republic and was comprised into the USSR." On February 27, 1949 as a result of mixed Demarcation Commission, the Act of demarcation and the protocol-description of the tract of the Soviet-Romanian border was signed. On February 27, 1961 in Bucharest the Treaty on the regime of the Soviet-Romanian border, cooperation and mutual assistance on border issues was signed.

This document completed formation of the legal framework of the Soviet-Romanian border. The process of the Soviet-Romanian marine border in the northwestern part of the Black Sea was more complex and controversial, lasted twenty years - from 1967 to 1987, moreover it was not completed at the beginning of 90<sup>th</sup>. The Romanian side claimed on several islands in the mouth of the Danube and the Snake Island (0.17 sq. km.), what contradicted to the visions of the USSR. The situation about the establishment of the marine border in the north-western part of the Black Sea changed after the fall of the communist regime in Romania and when Ukraine gained independence.

### **THE FEATURES OF UKRAINIAN-ROMANIAN MARINE BORDER DEFINITION AND ESTABLISHMENT**

Ukraine's independence was recognized by Romania in early 1992. On February 1, 1992 in Davos (Switzerland) presidents and foreign ministers of Ukraine and Romania met, there the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations was signed.

However, territorial issues have not been removed from the agenda of bilateral relations. Romanian diplomacy has chosen a policy of constant reminding about the existence of unresolved territorial issues with Ukraine, addressing these messages as Ukraine itself and the international community as well. Such persistent behavior and pressure on official Kyiv undoubtedly exacerbated relations between the two countries, evidence of which was delaying the signing of the Ukrainian-Romanian border. During 1993-1995, the Romanian side sent to the MFA of Ukraine several notes, declaring unilaterally

that the Treaty about the Soviet-Romanian border regime from 1961 and the Protocol about the Soviet-Romanian border line specification from 1948 lost validity (Караман І., 2007).

In November-December 1995, the Ukrainian-Romanian relations deteriorated due to the new applications from the Romanian side about Snake Island belonging to her. However, the active negotiations that took place in Europe in the French initiative about the European Stability Pact development forced European countries to recognize the existing borders and abide to European standards of national minorities rights abidance. Therefore, Romania agreed on a compromise solution: do not consider in the agreement the number of articles dealing with the Ukrainian-Romanian borders. However, as a result of NATO's decision to review Romania nominations for membership, Romania agreed to conclude the main basic agreement in the new version.

In 1997 the base Ukrainian-Romanian Treaty, which confirmed legally existing border between the two countries was signed, but the agreement about the description of border delimitation lasted until 2003. This event took place in 2003 when the President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma and the President of Romania I. Iliescu signed in Chernivtsi the Treaty on the Ukrainian-Romanian border. This agreement provided the final legal registration of the Ukrainian-Romanian border with the fixing the exact geographical coordinates of its extreme point in the sector of the Black Sea.

The question concerning the delimitation of the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of the Black Sea, including Snake Island was the controversial point in the Ukraine-Romanian border determining. On December 12, 2004 in Romania the second round of the presidential elections took place, the results were won by the candidate from the opposition alliance of the National Liberal Party-Democratic Party mayor of Bucharest, Traian Basescu. In welcoming the newly elected President the President of Ukraine expressed the hope that relations between Ukraine and Romania would open a new page, which must be marked by solving the "problem" of Ukrainian-Romanian bilateral relations in the spirit of partnership and friendship. Also the new Romanian government had to revise foreign policy, the basic principles of which were to intensify relations with her neighbors.

However, on 16 September 2004 despite government statements about the intensification of relations with neighbors Romania addressed the International Court of Justice to hear the case about the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone between Ukraine and Romania in the Black Sea delimitation. On October 25, 2004 in The Hague (Netherlands) at the Peace Palace (seat of the International Court of Justice) the Commissioner of Ukraine (from MFA) with the Commissioner of Romania (from MFA) met. The meeting discussed the procedure of the Memorandum of Romania and counter-memorandum of Ukraine sending in the International Court of Justice. Preparation of these documents was an important stage because they contained detailed justification for the positions of each party (Бойко О. С., Николаенко Д. В., 2010).

In parallel in Kiev on April 14-15, 2005 and in Constanta on June 2-3, 2005 bilateral consultations about the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea were held. The sides discussed a number of issues of hydrographic and geodetic nature what was necessary for resolving the problem of marine spaces delimitation and for the International Court of Justice consideration.

The suggested delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone between Ukraine and Romania in the Black Sea are depicted in Figure 1.



**Figure 1.** Ukrainian and Romanian versions of delimitation

(Source: БОЙКО О. С., НИКОЛАЕНКО Д. В., (2010), *Проблеми делимитації спорних акваторій та освоєння шельфа*, in *Науковий вісник Волин. нац. ун-ту ім. Лесі Українки. Серія: Географічні наук*, № 3, 76-93, Вежа, Луцьк)

On May 6, 2006 after reviewing the memorandum of Romanian, Ukraine sent counter-memorandum to the International Court of Justice. After that, the parties started the court side of the dispute. The cornerstone of the dispute was the status of Snake Island. Romania insisted on the wording "rock", which proved useless territory for residence and business. Ukraine also argued that Snake is an island with the population of 30 persons and with active development of tourism infrastructure. Island status had to consolidate the Ukraine's right to the Sea area next to the disputed territory, shelf of which was rich in natural resources (in 2001, 40 km from Snake deposits of 10 million tons of oil and 10 billion cubic meters of gas were found) (Николаєнко Д. В., Бойко О. С., 2009).

There are no geographical or scientific criteria of differentiation of the island or the rock. Yet the difference between them exists. According to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982 the international legal regime of islands is governed by a single article - art. 121 "regime of islands", which specifies the basic requirements that relate to the island. Snake Island fully

satisfies all the three requirements of the position 1 article 121: 1) island really is naturally created part of land with a rich cultural, archaeological, geological, and biological heritage, 2) island is surrounded by the Black Sea, and 3) it always rises to several tens of meters above the ordinary level of the Black Sea.

With geographic and environmental attitudes island is full of all ecosystem components. It has a certain relief, geological structure, geostructural features, largely covered with sedimentary layer, on which soil develops, is inhabited by island complex animals, undergoes significant effect of the atmosphere and the sea.

In addition, for Snake as Island recognition, the Ukrainian authorities have built around it the lighthouse, standing there for 150 years, border crossing, mail, church, etc., and settled on the island 53 residents, calling it the village White of Kili area in Odessa region.

It was the most important for Ukraine to confirm the status of an island and incorporate it into its coastline. This had to provide increasing of the territory of the Ukrainian exclusive economic zone, in which the state could safely conduct business activities. Action and legal justification for Ukraine were made by the famous British lawyer Sir Arthur Oatess. Ukrainian representatives also were advised by British lawyer Michael Wood, Frenchman Jean-Paul Kennedek and the representative of one of the largest law firms Eversheds Rothman Band.

Romanian side tried to prove that Snake Island was the "rock" in accordance with Art. 121 (3) of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea from 1982. If the Romanian side could prove it, the "rock" couldn't have the exclusive economic zone and the shelf, but only the territorial sea and contiguous zone around it. In addition to the minimal impact of this "rock" on the delimitation of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of the two countries, there would not be necessary any Ukrainian permit for exploration and production of natural resources of shelf around the island, as well as licenses to conduct fishing activities in its exclusive economic zone (Хілякевич В. І., 2009).

Together with concern about the legality of Snake Island the exclusive (maritime) economic zone and its continental shelf presence, Ukraine faced another problem connected with international legal delimitation of marine spaces between Ukraine and Romania. A number of issues about this problem were necessary to be taken into account, some of them are:

- the choice of the starting point for the beginning of the boundary line of exclusive (maritime) economic zone of Ukraine and Romania, and hence the separation of their continental shelf;
- the choice of marine spaces separating method;
- the question about characterization of the general coast configuration of Ukraine and Romania in the area of division.

The whole problem solving depended upon these issues.

In September 2008, the hearing of the marine border between Ukraine and Romania establishment began. It should be noted that there was no decision on the delimitation of marine spaces between states in international practice, which would not have been built on the basis of compromise.

Always the Court accepts compromise decision, so any of the party can be satisfied for 100%. This decision which concerned the question of the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of Romania and Ukraine delimitation was not an exception (Копачинська Г. В., 2010).

## THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE DECISION ABOUT THE UKRAINIAN-ROMANIAN MARINE BORDER DELIMITATION

On February 3, 2009 the decision was adopted by the Court and had the following meaning: "From the point 1, as the Parties agreed in Article 1 of the Treaty on the Ukrainian-Romanian border in 2004, the lines of a single marine border of the continental shelf delimitation and the exclusive economic zones of Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea will be held in the territorial sea of Ukraine, covering 12 nautical miles around Snake Island, to a point 2 (coordinates: 45°03'18.5" N. Lat. to 30°09'24.6" E. Lon.), and the zone crosses the line equidistant from the adjacent coasts of Romania and Ukraine. From point 2 the delimitation line will be equidistant, passing through point 3 (coordinates: 44°46'38.7" N. Lat., And 30°58'37.3" E. Lang.) and point 4 (coordinates: 44°44'13.4" N. Lat., and 31°10'27.7" E. Long.) to point 5 (coordinates: 44°02'53.0" N. lat., and 31°24'35.0" E. Long.). With point 5 the marine border line runs along the line equidistant from the opposite coasts of Romania and Ukraine to the south, since the geodetic azimuth of 185°23'54.5" to areas where they can touch the interests of third parties" (figure 2). The court determined the marine border that divided the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zones of Romania and Ukraine in the Black Sea. This border almost recreated the line offered by the Soviet side in the negotiations about the delimitation with Romania in 1987.



**Figure 2.** The line of delimitation in accordance with the decision of the Hague Court (Source: КОПАЧИНСЬКА Г. В., (2010), *Проблеми формування морських кордонів України*, in *Науковий вісник Волин. нац. ун-ту ім. Лесі Українки. Серія : Географічні науки*, № 15, 78–85, Вежа, Луцьк)



The Hague Court decided the status of the island favorably for the Ukrainian side, but the decision about the coastal area was profitable for the Romania side. Ukraine wanted to divide the dispute territories in the ratio of 1 to 3: 53.3 thousand sq. km for Ukraine, 21.9 thousand sq. km for Romania. But the court decided the opposite. Delimitation line drawn by the court showed that Ukraine got 12-mile area that included a territorial sea. However, outside of this line around the Snake Island the exclusive economic zone was. "The exclusive economic zone of Ukraine" is a marine zone, width of it is 200 miles (370.4 km), it is measured from the same baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

The exclusive economic zone is wider than the territorial sea (which is up to 12 miles), so it goes beyond the outer boundary of the territorial sea and is not part of the state.

Therefore, the court's decision was a compromise for both states.

### CONCLUSIONS

The study of the political-geographical features of the marine borders of Ukraine definition and establishment is extremely important at the present stage of its development as an independent European state. After all, Ukraine is a sea state and its active and effective marine policy is one of the important conditions for ensuring economic, military, political, and national security. Since independence, Ukraine had to decide the definition and establishment of marine borders with two neighboring states Russia and Romania. However, the Ukrainian-Romanian section of the marine border has the particular interest in terms of delimitation procedures and approaches of its determination. Moreover, the territorial dispute with Romania concerning distinctions in the Black Sea was inherited from the Soviet times. It was not solved when Ukraine got independence and the communist regime in Romania was overthrown. The identification and establishment of the Ukrainian-Romanian marine border was settled as a result of a decision by the International Court of Justice on the delimitation of the marine boundary between Romania and Ukraine on February 3, 2009. As a result of the adoption of this decision two neighboring states were able to establish and develop bilateral relations within the Black Sea, to continue to develop the Black Sea shelf belonging to them which was closed at the time of this case in court and to concentrate their efforts on the problems of security and stability in the Black Sea region. Hence this decision had a positive impact on the Ukrainian-Romanian bilateral cooperation and further development as active actors of international relations, including marine.

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## **DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ROMA POPULATION IN BELGRADE AS AN INDICATOR OF THEIR SOCIAL INTEGRATION**

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**Abstract:** The paper deals with the connection between indicators of the demographic development of Roma population in Belgrade and their level of social integration. Roma in Belgrade are the ethnic group that is most vulnerable, segregated, living mostly in slums and showing no interest in improving their social position. Lack of social integration has a direct impact on Roma's various aspects of life in Belgrade, and in particular on their demographic development. Statistical monitoring of demographic and socio-economical changes within the Roma population is especially difficult on the basis of census data and vital statistics because of Roma tendency to change national declaration. Therefore, we must take into account that statistics provide only information about the population consider themselves "Roma population", which allows the study of only Roma "declared" population. Crude birth rate of 23 ‰, rate of natural increase of 17.8‰ and very good age structure put Roma population among the most vibrant and youngest ethnic groups in Belgrade. Demographic indicators of Roma in Belgrade such as age fertility towards rate, the average age of primogeniture, the average number of children, age structure and Roma household structure by number of members, in a direct way, point out the level of social integration.

**Key words:** Roma, ethnic hiding, census, demographic development, social integration

\* \* \* \* \*

### **INTRODUCTION**

There are no direct statistical sources that confirm a significant presence of Roma in Serbia before 15th century. Roma in Belgrade for the first time are officially recorded as a permanent resident Gypsies-Muslims and Gypsies-Christian in 1536th during of Ottoman occupation of Serbia. It was quoted for Gypsies-Muslims that their settlement consisted of 12 adult males and they lived in the city since the time of the Ottoman conquest. The second group of Gypsies-Christians is believed that they were inhabited in Belgrade before Turks had come, because most of them had Slavic folk or Christian names. Gypsies-Christians lived in separate settlement that had 20 people (Vukanović, 1983, 23-45).

More statistical information on the number of Roma in Belgrade can be found in census lists in the Principality and Kingdom of Serbia in the period 1834-1910. Even Gypsies were not fully entered at censuses until 1866, there are some information about 79 Orthodox Gypsies in Belgrade in 1853 (Group of authors, 1953, 76). The issue of ethnicity of the population in Serbian census, for the first time was set in the 1866, when the Principality of Serbia, listed a total number of 25,527 Gypsies, accounting for 2.1% of the total population. According to the census from 1890, The Kingdom of Serbia had 37,572 residents whose mother tongue was Romani (or 1.7% of the total population), and 46,212 or 2% of the total population in the 1895. In 1890 there were 399 Gypsies listed in Belgrade, while presented to the census list from in 1895, there were listed 400 Gypsies (Knežević, 2010, 18-19) in Belgrade.

Between the Two Worlds Wars (1921 and 1931) censuses were taken and there wasn't any question asking about ethnicity, so ethnic structure of the population could get only indirectly, or through their mother tongue and religion. However, both of these lists there was no Gypsy language in statistical classifications of the languages, so it is impossible to determine the number of Gypsies in Belgrade during this period. But, there are other sources from this period, which can give us some information on the number and distribution of Roma in Belgrade. For example, from 1929-1934 three surveys were conducted in Belgrade slums. At that time, it was recorded that Gypsies lived in Belgrade, were originally from nowadays Romania, lived as nomads, and lived in the settlement called "Jatagan settlement". The results of this survey it was found that in the slums inhabited around 26,000 citizens (Belgrade had about 300,000 inhabitants). The worst situation was in the Jatagan settlement area of about 9,000 square meters, which was built 673 object of bad material, with 2355 rooms, or 1.73 m<sup>2</sup> of built space per citizen of Jatagan settlement (Vidaković, 1935, 539).

Although the Roma community in Belgrade today is the most vulnerable, it is not yet known the true extent of the economic backwardness in which they live. Social segregation, life in the slums and lack of interest for social progress directly reflect on the different aspects of Roma life, especially in their demographic development. According to all demographic indicators, Roma in Belgrade are very young population, and have reproductive norms which are significantly different from the rest of the population. So the main idea of this article is to show the comparative analysis of various indicators of the demographic development and to show level of social integration of Roma in Belgrade. The study covers the period from 1948-2011 and the main sources are the official census data (mostly from the period 1948-2002, because census data of 2011 are not available yet entirely) and vital statistics. In the period of 1948-2011 there were eight censuses held in Serbia, but the obtained data on Roma population must be taken with great caution. Statistical monitoring of demographic and socio-economical changes within the Roma population is especially difficult on the basis of data census and vital statistics because of Roma tendency to hide their ethnic identity, and thus conceals the true demographic situation.

Demographic data about the Roma on the basis of official statistics often show oscillations that don't have demographic explanation, and usually dependent on the level of socio-economic integration and the intensity of "ethnic transfer" of the Roma into ethnic majority of certain population. Lack of official reliable statistics on Roma requires extra caution in their use also points to the

use of other sources. Thus in order to obtain an objective demographic situation, in addition to official statistics, we use the results of field ethno-demographic researches conducted in 2006 in seven Roma slums in the territory of the five municipalities of Belgrade (Čukarica, Savski venac, Novi Beograd, Voždovac and Zvezdara). This survey included 294 Roma people (1.5% of the total number of Roma in Belgrade, according to 2002 census) living in 52 households, where 100 respondents aged 18-54 years are polled.

According to the Census of population, households and dwellings in 2011 total number of declared Roma in Serbia (excluding Kosovo and Metohija) was 147,604 which shares of 2.05% of the total population of Serbia, and ranks them in third place in the number of ethnic minorities ( behind Bosniaks/Muslims and Hungarians). Of the total number of declared Roma in Serbia, 71.3% live in Central Serbia and 28.7% in Vojvodina. The highest concentration of declared Roma is in Belgrade, where there are 27,325, or 18.5% of their total number, and 1.6% in total population of Belgrade. According to census results from 2002, number of Roma households in Belgrade was 4,986, with an average number of approximately 4 members (3.8), where 38.8% of Roma households had five or more members.


### **POPULATION DYNAMICS OF ROMA IN BELGRADE – FROM ETHNIC CONCEALMENT TO SOCIAL INTEGRATION**

Since World War II until 2011, eight censuses were conducted. When we talk about the ethnic structure of Serbia by the census results, we have to bear in mind that we only have the number of “national declared” population, which may not always correspond with the objective ethnic origin. This indicates the influence of various factors on the national orientation such as socio-cultural, political, social integration, economical, but in the former Yugoslavia and religious factor too. Categorical use of subjective criteria in the national declaration had, to some extent, the negative impact on the accuracy of the census results, because it allowed visible oscillations in the number of ethnic communities. So, if we talk about changes in the number of Roma in Belgrade, we have to consider that statistics provide information about the population consider themselves “Roma declared” at a given moment, and because of that we consider the possibility that only a number of “declared Roma” could be scientifically observed. However, the existing statistical data on number, demographic and social characteristics of the Roma can be used very efficiently, if the content is fully recognized and properly understood the concept of nationality. Population statistics recognize ethnicity as a personal preference, but disagreement of objective ethnicity and declared nationality need a clear separation of the concepts of “ethnic commitment” and “ethnicity “ in the cultural-civilization terms. Serbian population statistics uses only the first term, and often leads to equalize the ethnic origin and the ethnic orientation that causes many problems in the use of available data. This is particularly evident among the Roma in Serbia where the real disagreement of ethnic identity and ethnic orientation is the largest in population censuses, while in vital statistics this divergence is in some way lower at birth than at registration of death, where the informant often return dead person in a group of real ethnic origin. Roma tendency to conceal the ethnicity in the censuses complicate study of many difficult issues such as spatial distribution of the Roma population, changes in the ethnic composition of the local and regional entities, changes in socio-economic structure of the population, and so on.

**Table 1.** Number of declared Roma in Serbia and Belgrade and the share of Roma in Belgrade in the total number of Roma in Serbia (1948-2011)

(Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Census results, 1948-2011)

	1948	1953*	1961	1971	1981	1991	2002	2011**
Total population of Serbia	6,527,966	6,979,154	7,642,227	8,446,591	9,313,677	9,778,991	7,498,001	7,186,862
Number of Roma in Serbia	52,181	58,800	9,826	49,894	110,959	138,645	108,193	147,604
%	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>0.1</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>2.0</b>
Total population of Belgrade	634,003	731,837	942,190	1,209,360	1,470,073	1,602,226	1,576,124	1,659,440
Number of Roma in Belgrade	378	/	186	3,348	9,086	14,220	19,191	27,325
%	<b>0.06</b>	/	<b>0.02</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.9</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.6</b>
Share of Roma in Belgrade in the total number of Roma in Serbia	<b>0.7</b>	/	<b>1.9</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>8.2</b>	<b>10.3</b>	<b>17.7</b>	<b>18.5</b>

**Figure 1.** Trend of declared Roma in Belgrade and Serbia (1948-2011)

As can be seen from Table 1, the trend of declared Roma in Belgrade (and Serbia) shows explicit irregularities that have no demographic explanation. According to census results from 1948, there was 378 Roma in Belgrade, and their number by 2011 has increased over 70 times. During the same period, the number of declared Roma in Serbia tripled. The oscillations in trend of Roma population is especially visible in their share in total population of Serbia, but regardless of the large fluctuations, the proportion of Roma in Belgrade in total number of Roma in Serbia was on the rise during the period Table 1, Figure 1.

There are several approaches to the causes of these shifts in the population dynamics of the Roma censuses population in the period 1948-2011, with special reference to data from 1961.

The first is related to the proper understanding of the census questions on ethnicity of the population, and its methodology development. In comparison to other censuses, only in 1953 and 1961 the practice was that on questionnaire was given a brief explanation for writing the answer on the question on ethnicity.

\* Data on the number of Roma in Belgrade was not published for 1953

\*\* Data for 2002 and 2011 without Kosovo and Metohia

The essential difference between these explanations consisted in the fact that in the questionnaire and instructions for census in 1961 the Roma were not included in the exhaustive enumeration of names of ethnic groups that had already been given to the questionnaire and instructions for census in 1953. Since the methodology of the census was identical in all parts of SFR Yugoslavia, it is interesting, for example, that in Macedonia census data on the number of Roma from 1961 was relatively "reliable", and there was not recorded significant decrease or increase in their number in comparison to the data from the previous census, so it could be concluded that methodological flaws may only partially influence this fact. However, the fact is that the Roma were not the only ethnic group in Serbia with a large drop in the numerical results of the census of 1961. A similar phenomenon was noted for the ethnic communities of Vlachs in Serbia, which were, according to the Census in 1953, about 28,047, while in 1961 the listed only 1,368.

Another aspect of the study of the causes of variation in the ethnic declaration of Roma is in connection with the assumption of the assimilation influences. Some authors believe that the process of assimilation of Gypsies, in the contemporary Balkan nations, was not only inherent, but also very important. "The first traces of symbiosis followed by the assimilation took place in the late Middle Ages, when the assimilation transfer of Gypsy population led to their social equality. It is also known example of Gypsy Traveler, who has been living for in five hundred years in the Balkan countries, creating an assimilated ethnic groups such as Karavlahs (Gypsies who became Romanians), Madjupi (Gypsies who became Albanians), Đorgovci-Ardanovci (Gypsies who became Serbians), Edjupci (Gypsies who became Macedonians, Bulgarians and Turks). All of them have retained certain anthropological Gypsy character, Gypsy patriarchal mentality and culture (upgraded with the culture of modern Balkan nations), but mostly lost their mother tongue as an ethnic objective marker" (Vukanović, 1983, 95). However, assimilation is a long term process and cannot be the cause of the Roma population oscillations in a short period of time, and an explanation of the rapid drop in the number of Roma in 1961 should be found in their social status and the level of social integration of the Roma in this period (Knezević, 2007, 75).

The third question should be related to the census difficulties in the field that may affect the insufficient closure of Roma population. Skepticism of the Roma population according to the census enumerators, reliability of data, frequent changes of residence and overproduction slums are the most common problems faced by enumerators. However, there are some socio-psychological problems of the enumerators, which are manifested by various forms of social prejudices such as ethnic stereotypes and ethnic distance. According to researches of psychologists in Serbia "ethnic distance towards Roma is quite evident" (Kuzmanović, 1992, 155). The result of this phenomenon is avoiding of some enumerators to enter the slums, or a partial listing of the Roma on the basis of information given by one person for more households. However, there is a belief that this is not a widespread phenomenon among the enumerators, and as one of the solutions to the problem of insufficient closure of Roma it is suggested Roma engagement as census enumerators.

However, declarative abandoning their own ethnic group after the first post-war decade can be interpreted by the desire of Roma to be integrated as social favored nation, but not really deny their ethnic identity. Therefore,

increase in the number of Roma in the census in 1971 explains beginning of a Roma national awakening at the end of the sixties of the XX century. The growth of national self-confidence of Roma in particular have contributed factors such as: going to work abroad, the popularization of Gypsy music and musicians, and the increase in the number of high school students among Roma youth, the establishment of the first Roma associations, and so on.

### INDICATORS OF REPRODUCTION AND DEMOGRAPHIC AGING OF ROMA IN BELGRADE

Demographic changes of the Roma population in Belgrade are closely associated with the level achieved in their social integration. In terms of Demographic Transition Theory Roma in Belgrade approximately belong to a late stage of the expansion of the population, when reduced mortality is joined by a slight decline in the birth rate and natural increase. Compared to the demographic development of the entire population of Belgrade, this represents a significant time delay in the demographic transformation, that is, except the Roma population, is observed only among the Albanian population. The largest number of ethnic communities in Belgrade is placed in post-transitional stage of demographic transition, with low or negative rate of natural increase.

Variations in indicators of birth rate, death rate and natural growth of Roma in Belgrade indicate that the statistical records of vital events in the Roma population, also, are under the influence of subjective national declarations. This is especially evident in births registering and less during deaths registration, where the informant often returning to a group of ethnic origin.

In the period of 1986-2002 the rate of natural increase of Roma in Belgrade declined by 16.5 ‰; crude birth rate had milder decline, which has declined by 15 ‰, and the slightest drop in general had a crude death rate that is with certain oscillations decreased by 1.5 ‰. But, for the total population in Belgrade, the crude birth rate has also declined and crude death rate increased, which drew a marked decrease rate of natural increase (Table 2, Figure 2).

**Table 2.** Crude birth rate (n), crude death rate (m) and rate of natural increase (j) of Roma in Belgrade and the total population of Belgrade 1986-2002 (‰)  
(Source: Calculation based on data from vital statistics and census data (1986-2002))

	1986		1991		1996		2002	
	Roma	Belgrade	Roma	Belgrade	Roma	Belgrade	Roma	Belgrade
<b>n</b>	39,5	12	35,4	10,6	27,9	9,9	23	10,4
<b>m</b>	6,7	8	5,5	9,2	5,9	11,2	5,2	12,4
<b>j</b>	32,8	3,9	29,9	1,4	22	-1,3	17,8	-2

The tabular and graphical representations approved significant decrease of crude birth rate of Roma in Belgrade in the period 1986-2002, although in 2002 it still was high (23 ‰) compared to the crude birth rate of the total population of Belgrade (10.4 ‰).


The crude death rate of Roma in Belgrade in the period observed, with slight oscillations, was stabilized at around 6 ‰. The crude death rate of the population in Belgrade during the same period has increased up to 12.4 ‰, what indicates the fact that the Roma population is much younger age structure than the total population of Belgrade.

Compared with the total population of Belgrade, which in 1992 was a negative rate of natural increase, the rate of natural increase of Roma in



Belgrade in 2002 was nearly halved (17.8 ‰), but its value was still high, compared to the rest of the population.

According to census data from 2002 the share of female Roma population in Belgrade over the age of 50, who have emerged from the fertile and not given birth, was only 6.6% of the total number of female Roma in Belgrade over the age of 50 years. Same year, the share of overall woman in Belgrade over the age of 50 years who have not given birth was 13.1%. Twice a lower proportion of Belgrade female Roma older than 50 who have not given birth in the same contingent of women in the total population of Belgrade, is clear indication of the high fertility of female Roma cause by holding the traditional reproductive norms, which among other things, include early entry of female Roma in common-law marriage and high fertility in non common-law marriage.



**Figure 2.** Crude birth rate (n), crude death rate (m) and rate of population increase (j) of Roma in Belgrade and the total population of Belgrade (1986-2002)

Participation or non-participation in the reproduction of the early reproductive age (15-19 years), show even greater deviation of Roma women in relation to the total population of Belgrade. The share of female Roma in Belgrade aged 15-19 who have not given birth is 22.9%, only one in five of the female Roma has not given birth, while the total population of Belgrade, the share of women, aged 15-49, who have not given birth is 98.3%.

There is an interesting fact about a share of Belgrade female Roma aged 15-19 who gave birth to one or two children. The share of female Roma in Belgrade who gave birth to a child in this contingent was 15.6%, while the share of those who gave birth to two children 6.7%.

Share of women aged 15-19 in the total population of Belgrade who gave birth to a child is 1.3%, while the share of women in Belgrade in this contingent who gave birth to two children only 0.29%.

An average number of children living in slums, by Roma females, are 3, but there is a difference in the average number of children of female Roma in relation to religion. Thus we see that the change in reproductive norms of Islamic female Roma is still a significant delay in relation to the Christian female Roma (Table 3).

**Table 3.** Average age, average number of children and the primogeniture average age of the female Roma in the slums of in Belgrade  
(Source: Knežević, A: (2006), Results of field studies of Roma in Belgrade)

Religion – creed	Average age	Average number of children	Primogeniture average age
Christian– orthodox	38.8	2.7	17.3
Islamic	32.2	4.7	15.6

Comparison of demographic indicators of the aging of Roma in Belgrade and the total population of Belgrade in the period of 1981-2002 indicate the continuous process of aging, which took place, in both populations from the base of population pyramid, but it was different in intensity. Roma aging process took much more slowly than the total population of Belgrade. During the observed period, share of young Roma to 19 years decreased from 52.9% to 44.1%, while this ratio decreased from 26.4% to 20.9% in the total population of Belgrade. The main difference in the aging process of Belgrade Roma and the total population of Belgrade is visible in the population contingent from 20-59 years old, and it just shows the aging characteristics of the Roma in relation to the total population of Belgrade (Table 4).

**Table 4.** Indicators of the demographic aging of Belgrade population and Roma in Belgrade 1981-2011  
(Source: Calculation based on Census (1981-2011))

	Average age (years)	Total share in the population			Index of aging 60+ / 0-19
		0-19	20-59	60+	
<b>1981</b>					
Population of Belgrade	34,9	26,4	62,3	11,3	0,43
Roma in Belgrade	21,0	52,9	42,9	4,2	0,08
<b>1991</b>					
Population of Belgrade	37,3	25,3	57,9	16,8	0,66
Roma in Belgrade	22,5	48,6	44,7	3,8	0,08
<b>2002</b>					
Population of Belgrade	40,4	20,9	57,5	21,6	1,03
Roma in Belgrade	25,8	44,1	49,1	5,4	0,12
<b>2011</b>					
Population of Belgrade	41,8	19,1	57,1	23,8	1,24
Roma in Belgrade	26,7	43,3	50,9	5,8	0,16

In the period 1981-2011 the total population of the Belgrade obvious decline in the share of middle-aged population, while the contingent of Belgrade Roma at this age, is evident at the increasing share of 42.9% to 50.9%. Increasing the share of middle-aged population in the Roma population suggests that the aging process of this ethnic community is directly affected by declining of the birth rates. In the same period, it is recorded drop in the birth rate of the total population of Belgrade, but decreased the share of middle-aged population, indicating that the aging process is more advanced in the total population of Belgrade.

Although the period of 1981-2011 the average age of Roma in Belgrade increased, Roma continued to be considered as the youngest ethnic group in Belgrade and Serbia. The average age of the total population of Serbia in 2011 was 42.24 years. Broken down by ethnicity, the lowest average age had Roma (28.3), Albanians (29.6-census data from 2002), Bosniaks/Muslims (33.5), while the oldest were Slovenians (57.8), Germans (53.5), Vlachs (51.3). The average age of the Serbs in 2011 was 42.6 years (*Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia*, 2013, 36).

### **HOUSING PROBLEM AND ROMA HOUSEHOLDS STRUCTURE IN BELGRADE**

The problem of social integration of Roma in Belgrade is in close connection with the severe housing deficit. The housing situation of Roma is the most visible form of their poverty. The social status of Roma as an ethnic minority determines both their housing and settlement standard, which is related to the problem of their integration in the local community, their cultural identity and multiethnic coexistence in the city area.

Roma in Belgrade are populated in the minor areas, with the exception of those who have survived due to the expansion of the urban area. There are very few examples of Roma housing in urban apartment buildings and blocks. Such examples are evident, for example, where the settlements were built on the site of former slums and where there are Roma who were given apartments in exchange for a destroyed house, but their number has declined significantly over the past 20 years. However it is obvious that the majority of Roma from such settlements sold their newly built homes, while those who have chosen to remain in the new residential blocks, an insufficient adaptation can be seen in the new environment in which they no longer constitute a majority. They, therefore, separate themselves in their ethnically homogeneous settlements even when they have solved their housing conditions. But, the spatial distance is in two-ways because non-Roma population in Belgrade does not want to live in the Roma neighborhood. On this circumstance we can talk about the "spatial stereotypes", which are formed on Roma perception of their settlement, as well as with perception of that settlement by non-Roma population.

The collapse of the former Yugoslavia, among other things, resulted in the moving of a large number of people in Belgrade, among who were Roma. The arrival of Roma refugees has caused the appearance of new slums around Belgrade whose records it was almost impossible to keep. Many of these slums have sprouted up quickly and rapidly disappeared or change the location. The main characteristic is that slum settlements were that they were built on the so-called public land without permission and approval of the city authorities. The size of the slum settlements was just a couple of shacks in some cases, to the settlements where several hundred people lived.

According to the research, which was published by the Center for the Study of Ethnicity in 2002 in Serbia (excluding Kosovo-Metohija) existed 593 Roma slums (where at least 15 families or 100 people lived), of which were 102 in Belgrade. In five Belgrade suburban municipalities it was recorded 30 slums from which most of Obrenovac 14, then Mladenovac 6, and Lazarevac and Barajevo 5 and 4. In the municipality of Sopot one Roma settlement was evidenced. Among the Belgrade municipalities, the most of Roma settlements were in Palilula- 15, in the municipalities of Čukarica (13), Zemun (12), Novi Beograd (9) and Vozdovac (10 settlements). In municipalities and Zvezdara and Rakovica 5 settlements was built, in central city districts Vračar, Old Town and Savski Venac one Roma settlement located with more than 15 houses. A suburban municipality Grocka is the only one in Belgrade, where there is no single Roma settlement more than 15 families (*Jakšić, Bašić, 2002*).


In large urban areas such as Belgrade, is very clear impact of society modernization to the transformation of households, primarily in terms of their composition and size. Large urban centers leading household transformation process to reduce an average size due process of reducing family organization and decreasing number of the children in the family. To changes in the structure

of households by number of members in the contemporary urban centers also influence changes in marital behavior, process of aging of population and longer life expectancy, resulting evident increase in the share of single-person and two-person households, a slight increase of three-members households and stagnation or slight decline in four-members households, declining share of households with five or more members. In most developed European countries, the share of single-person and two-person households is 50%, and in some cities only single households reach this ratio (Petrović, 1999).

However, changes in the structure of households are not equal in all societies and are dependent on several factors, among which is a leading economical factor. In societies with advanced economies a greater share is of households with fewer members. The same applies to households within a society, but in addition to economic, cultural factors can have an important role, especially in multi-ethnic societies. According to the Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in 2002 the average household size in Belgrade was about 3 members (2.7), while the average size of Roma households in Belgrade was approximately 4 members (3.8), of which 38.8% of Roma households had five or more members (Table 5 and Figure 3).

**Table 5.** Structure of households by members- Total population in Belgrade, Roma in Belgrade (2002) and Roma in Belgrade slums (2006)  
(Source: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia - specific processing; Census of population, households and dwellings, 2002; Knežević (2006). The field study)

Huousehold members	Households in Belgrade (2002)	Households of Roma in Belgrade (2002)	Households in slums (2006)
	100%	100%	100%
1	22,5%	9,7%	3,8%
2	24,5%	15,7%	11,5%
3	20,4%	15,3%	7,7%
4	20,6%	20,3%	3,8%
5	6,5%	15,7%	23,1%
6	2,7%	10,5%	15,4%
7	0,8%	5,7%	15,4%
8	0,2%	3,2%	3,8%
9	0,1%	1,8%	11,5%
10 and more	0,08%	1,9%	3,8%



**Figure 3.** Structure of households by members- Total population in Belgrade, Roma in Belgrade and Roma in Belgrade slums

However, the results of field surveys from 20-30 August 2006, in seven Roma slums on the territory of the five Belgrade municipalities, show significant differences in comparison to the official statistical data regarding the structure of Roma households in Belgrade by number of members. According to these results, share of single and two-member Roma households was 15.3%, but the largest share was five-member households (23.1%). It is also a visible difference in the share of households with five or more members (*Knežević*, 2010, 274). According to the census of 2002 that share was 38.8%, while the result of the field survey was 73% (Chart 3). Such a large difference is expected in the structure of households by number of members as the field survey household covers most of the Roma slums, where economically weakest layers of Roma population in Belgrade live, while the census results are included in the Roma households that are partial, or complete transformation in the process of integration.

### CONCLUSION

Although the Roma ethnic community is the most vulnerable in Belgrade, it is not yet known the true extent of the economic backwardness in which they live. Social segregation, a district type of life and lack of interest for social progress of Roma directly reflect on the different aspects of their lives, especially their demographic development. In spite of the fact that Roma population is largely marginalized, on the sidelines of the society, there have been significant demographic and other changes that would lead from traditional to modern Roma society.

These changes are not of the same intensity in all of Roma in Belgrade and depend on several direct and indirect factors such as the degree of social integration, economic conditions, time of immigration of Roma in Belgrade, etc. Statistical monitoring of the dynamics of these changes has been significantly hard by the tendency of the Roma in certain circumstances to change their opinions on declaring the national declaration (ethnic hiding). The consequences of ethnic hiding of Roma are particularly clear in the census results in 1961 when the number of declared Roma in Serbia was six times lower in comparison to the number in 1953 or in 1971 when the number of Roma in Belgrade was 18 times higher compared to the number in Belgrade in 1961. Although and variations in indicators of natural movement of the Roma population show the influence of subjective criteria for the registration of vital events, however, we observe slight changes in the reproductive behavior of Roma from Belgrade, especially in the period 1986-2002 when it was recorded decline in the crude birth rate and the rate of natural increase.

Influence of marginal social position of Roma in Belgrade, is most clearly reflected in their difficult housing problems that are not able to solve any relevant city and state institutions. The slow changes in structure of Roma households, especially concerning its size, are under the strong influence of housing deficit of Roma population. Significant expansion of Belgrade housing in the period since the World War II to the end of the eighties of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, had only a partial impact on the Roma population for several reasons, one of it was poor socio-economic situation of Roma and specific concept of living culture that derives from the characteristic and approach of Roma population.

Extremely positive age structure and high value birth rate and rate of natural increase ranked Roma population as the most vital and the youngest ethnic group in Belgrade, but also influence the critical structure of households by member number. In the post-World War II period increase in the number of households in Belgrade took place at a faster rate than population growth took place, which was

not the case with the Roma population. On the contrary, the process of fragmentation and increase the number of households is an indicator of modernization and social integration of Roma in Belgrade flowed much more slowly.

Traditional family life frames were more present the Roma who have been settled or were born in Belgrade than Roma who have recently moved to Belgrade. Separating themselves from their own ethnic background and ethnic changes characteristic is largely part of the Roma population. Often change of ethnic orientation (ethnic hiding) is characteristics of those Roma who managed to get out of the typical physical and life borders within the Roma community such as educational, professional status, and integrated into the community. Sense of ethnic identity the most consistently is kept the Roma living in relatively lonely and isolated communities (slums). This means that statistical studies only partially cover the Roma population where the most massive social change happened, which directly reflect the intensity and speed of demographic change and the level of social integration.

### SUMMARY

Existing statistical records on demographic and social Roma characteristics can be very effectively used if content is fully appreciated, and concept of the ethnicity properly understood. Population statistics treats ethnicity as a personal preference, but disagreement between objective ethnicity and declared nationality needs a clear separation of concepts "ethnic orientation" and "ethnic origin", in (the sense of) cultural-civilization sense.

Roma ethnic hiding in Belgrade can be understood as their desire to integrate into the social favored nation, but not in real need for the negation of their ethnic identity.

Statistical data must be considered as the information on population "that considers themselves as Roma", at the time of the census, therefore only the declared Roma can be scientifically regarded.

Therefore, a change in the number of Roma in Belgrade shows exceptional irregularities in the absence of any linearity, and without being able to determine the explanatory demographic trend. Demographic analysis we found that the Roma population in Belgrade, even though, under the influence of strong traditional framework, is affected by slight changes in reproduction, which is one of the indicators of social emancipation.

Unlike recorded positive changes in reproductive behavior, official statistics and field surveys indicate that there hasn't been fragmentation of Roma households, and household structures, especially in Belgrade Roma slums is extremely bad. The level of social integration of Roma in Belgrade is in a positive correlation with the length of their stay in Belgrade and quality of housing. It is also evident that traditional family life frames are more open with Roma who have been settled or were born in Belgrade than Roma who have recently moved.

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## INTEGRATION DIFFICULTIES OR THE CONSEQUENCES OF IDEOLOGICAL EXTREMISM: ORADEA 1927

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**Abstract:** Even though there were extremist organizations, Oradea seldom knew situations that proved the intolerance of the people. Such an incident took place on December 4-6 1927, during the National Student Congress, when several shops and Jewish places were devastated. The incidents were extensively presented by the media of that time. It even had a negative international echo. About what happened in Oradea with this occasion, we find out more from the Municipal Monitor and from the media of that time.

**Key words:** Oradea, Roumanians, Jewish, Students, Disorder

\* \* \* \* \*

During the first decade of the interwar period, the population of Oradea, encountered a constant growth. If in December 1920 Oradea had 68,081 inhabitants, in 1927 there were 81,123 inhabitants and in 1930 Oradea had 82,653 inhabitants, so the result was an annual growth of the population with about 1,450 people<sup>1</sup>.

Under the new circumstances given by the creation of the Romanian united national state, and according to the numbers given by the 1930 census, the number of the Romanian inhabitants had reached 22,945 (27.7 %), that is a considerable growth, taking into account that in 1918 there were only 5,734 Romanian inhabitants<sup>2</sup>, and in December 1920, 8,441 inhabitants<sup>3</sup>. Spite all this things, the Hungarian population was still the majority – 42,200 inhabitants (51%) in 1930. In 1920's the Jewish population was also numerous: 20,262 people registered in 1927 and 14,640 (17,7%) in 1930. Apparently the massive decrease of the Jewish population between the two censuses would seem odd, if we didn't take into account the fact that the 5,500 people difference, can be found almost completely in the difference given by the registration of the Hungarian population: 36.779 people in 1927 and 42.200 people in 1930<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> L. Borcea, Gh. Gorun (coordonatori), *Istoria oraşului Oradea*, Oradea, Editura Cogito 1995, p. 356 (to continue *Istoria...*)

<sup>2</sup> Gh. Tulbure, *Problema oraşelor*, in „Familia”, no. 1, 1929, p. 2-4

<sup>3</sup> A. Horváth, *Ghidul oraşului Oradea Mare*, Oradea Mare, 1923, p. 243

<sup>4</sup> *Istoria...*, p. 356



Oradea also had other nationalities. The only ones who outrun the 1% of the city population, were the Germans with 910 people, followed by the Roma population (595 people), the Ruthenes and the Ukrainians were 410 people, the Russians were 317 people, the Czechs and the Slovaks were 232 people and other nationalities such as Armenians, Italians, French, Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarian, Turkish, Polish were about 404 people.

Each and every nationality that inhabited the city, used freely their mother tongue. The civil servants had to know the official language of the state. The local authorities prepared themselves for this kind of situation, so since the summer 1919, they organized courses to learn the Romanian language<sup>5</sup>.

In a religious classification, according to the census from 1927, the majority of the people were Protestants – 21,079 (25.9%). The Mosaic community were following the Protestants, with almost a quarter of the city population – 20,261 people. The Roman-Catholic community also had an important role with 21.5% from the city population, which meant a number of 17,462 people in 1927. The Orthodox community (13,914 people) were only 17.1 % from the city population in 1927. And finally, the last religious community that was important in the city from the numeric point of view was the Greek –Catholic community – 7,659 people (9.4%). In the 1920's the first Baptist communities appeared in Oradea too. In 1930 this communities had no less than 2,800 members.

After the Great Union, the political life in Bihor County suffered some substantial changes, absolutely necessary so they can fit better in the new administrative structure of the Great Romania. Under the political aspect, from the beginning of the 1920's, the majority of the Romanian population from Bihor were members of the most important Transylvanian political party, the Romanian National Party, while the Hungarian population adopted immediately after the Union a passive political attitude. After this period, the political life will diversify very much, due to the offensive of the political parties from the Old Kingdom in Ardeal, while the Hungarians will interfere step by step in the political matters of the city and country.

If at the end of the second decade of the last century and at the beginning of the third decade the political spectrum from Oradea and Bihor County was pretty much polarized<sup>6</sup>. After that period things took an interesting turn for the Romanian community. The involvement of the political parties from outside the Carpathian arc, gave birth to different organizations, with different political beliefs. This thing contaminated the local political class with political ideas that came over the Carpathians, ideas that lead to a dissociation and a division of the Romanians from the Bihor County and through this the national cause was put in danger<sup>7</sup>. In spite of all these, with few exceptions: Romanian National Party, National Peasant Party and Hungarian Party, the new political organizations could not make up a solid electoral base in Bihor.

The Hungarian Community from Oradea and Bihor had a different political characteristic. First of all we have to say that the Hungarian and the Jewish population from Oradea, could not get accustomed to this new situation that easily. After a period in which they refused to interfere in the political life, in the

<sup>5</sup> P. Dejeu, *Așezămintele culturale din municipiul Oradea și județul Bihor*, Oradea, 1926, p.53

<sup>6</sup> L. Borcea, *Partidele politice din Oradea până la sfârșitul primului război mondial*, in "Familia", no. 12, 1994, p. 63-71

<sup>7</sup> I. Zăine, *Spectrul politic bihorean în primul deceniu al perioadei interbelice (1919-1930)*, in "Crisia", an XXVIII, p. 95 (to continue I. Zăine, *Spectrul...*)

20's they adopted a new attitude. They started an offensive activity, looking to take advantage of the demographical growth that took place during the old regime, in order to monopolise the local administrative structures. They presented Oradea as a Hungarian town, which was unjust given to Romania after the Peace Conference in Paris<sup>8</sup>. During this decade the Hungarian and Jewish Community put a mark on the political life in Oradea, making it harder for the Romanian administrative structures to establish here.

Against this state of affairs many Romanian politicians took an action trying to get things to normal between the Romanian and the Hungarian politicians. Aurel Lazar was one of these politicians. He thought that passivity shown by the Hungarian politicians, alters the good relations between the Romanians and the Hungarians. Seldom, Aurel Lazar addressed to the Hungarians and to the Jews from Oradea, telling them to give up this state of passivity and to try to integrate in the new state<sup>9</sup>, assuring them that they have no reason to fear for their future in Big Romania.

After the Union, the most powerful local political organization continued to be the Romanian National Party, lead by Aurel Lazar. The local body press was first *Tribuna*, then *Glasul Bihorului* and finally *Dreptatea*. In 1926 the Romanian National Party merged with the Peasant party, which lead to the disintegration of this political structure on the local ground. In 1927, an important part set up the organization the National Peasant Party, with Aurel Lazar as it's leader. This organization dominated many years the local political life. Another important local political organization that was formed because it's president Octavian Goga insisted to, since the first months of the year 1920, was the People Party. The members of this organization were important local people. Gheorghe Tulbure was one of them. His left from the Romanian National Party was a big stroke, since he took with him the paper *Tribuna* <sup>10</sup>.

Another party that tried to form a local organization in Oradea in 1920's, was the Liberal National Party. Nicolae Zigre had an important role in founding the P.N.L. organization in Bihor County in 1921. He was also the resident of the organization during the 1921-1924<sup>11</sup>. He was also part of the Ion I.C. Brateanu Government, in 1922, as an undersecretary of state for minority problemes in Ministry of Interior<sup>12</sup>. The Peasant Party organization was also part of the political spectrum in Oradea. The professor Andrei Craciun founded this organization in 1925. Teachers and professors were the election base. Victor Felea, Ioan Silaghi, Gheorghe Popescu – Ceica, Iuliu Kurutz and others were the important members of the organization.

National Peasant Party was founded in 1926, from the merge of the Peasant Party with Romanian National Party, and became one of the most important party in Oradea and Bihor, from the political point of view. With an election base inherited from the Romanian National Party, the new organization proved that its roots were very well anchored in the everyday reality, especially of that in Transylvania. The president of the national-peasant organization from Oradea and Bihor, between 1926-1930, was of course Aurel Lazar. The same

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>9</sup> "Nagyvárad", no. 37, 31 august 1920, p. 1

<sup>10</sup> I. Zainea, *Spectrul...*, p. 93

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 204

<sup>12</sup> S. Neagoe, *Istoria guvernelor României de la începuturi, 1859, până în zilele noastre*, București, Editura Machiavelli, 1995, p. 88

Aurel Lazar, who led the local organization of the Romanian National Party, until 1926. From 1930, the lawyer Gheorghe Crisan<sup>13</sup> will become the president of the National Peasant Party from Oradea. He was an important local person, known since 1918-1918.

In the third decade of the last century Oradea, had numerous political organizations from the left side and the extreme left. Social Democratic Party, which was part of the first category, was a grouping of syndicated workers. The leader of the organization was Emil Bösörményi, and Lajos Jordaky, Stefan Raffay, Francisc Újhelyi, I. Hubschenberger, Ludovic Lenkey etc, were also members of the organization. The Workers Block was part of the second category. This was a communist organization with legal activity even after 1924, the year when the Romanian Communist Party became illegal. The leader of this organization was the lawyer Eugen Rozvan, and Alexandru Szenkovits, Alexandru Ullman, Eugen Kovacs, Nicolae Gyarmati, Francisc David, Artmin Reder etc<sup>14</sup> were some of the members.

In 1920's in Oradea were also parties that were organized on ethnic bases. The most important was the Hungarian Party. Until 1922, the Hungarians from Oradea and Bihor, did not have a political life, being under the sign of passivism. The local organization of the Hungarian Party was founded in 1925, and the leader was the lawyer I Kocsán János<sup>15</sup>, followed in 1929 by the lawyer Soós István. Even after the Hungarian Party entered the political life, there were political leaders that sustained the idea of passivism. During the years of the economical crisis, on this topic was born a new debate. The moderate wing being a supporter of a more malleable attitude towards the state and the Romanian authorities, won this debate<sup>16</sup>.

Immediately after the Great Union, at the beginning of the 1919, in Oradea was founded the Zionist Movement. At the beginning it was shy, but after a while was more and more free<sup>17</sup>. The exact name of the organization was *A Nagyvarady Chevrót Jisuv Erec Jiszráel Palesztinai Telepitő*<sup>18</sup>. At the beginning the soul of the movement was Simion Fuchs, the son of the last rabbi of Oradea and the brother of the rabbi depending, Fuchs Benjamin, the one who sustained the movement. For a while this organization even had its own paper called *Jövendő*, and the first issue was published in March 1919.

Concerning the national problem, the movement had a position similar to that of the Hungarian Parties. The movement was militating for keeping the integrity of the great Hungary. In Oradea's case they considered that it was absolutely necessary that the border settled by the Peace Conference from Paris should leave the town to the Hungarian part. This thing was strongly sustained even by the Fuchs Benjamin, the rabbi of Oradea, at the World Conference of Jews, in the matter of Zionism, at Zürich in 1919<sup>19</sup>.

There was a local branch of the Hebrew Party in Oradea. This was founded in 1923, and I. Mittelman and the lawyer Bárdos Imre were the presidents,

<sup>13</sup> "Steagul Nostru", no. 24, 26<sup>th</sup> of January, 1930, p. 1

<sup>14</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 93-94

<sup>15</sup> "Nagyvárad", 26<sup>th</sup> of January 1926, p. 1

<sup>16</sup> I. Zăineanu, *Spectrul* ..., p. 93

<sup>17</sup> Schön Dezső. *A Tegnap Városa: A Nagyvárad Zsidóság Emlékkönyve*, Tel-Aviv: Kiadta a Nagyváradról Elszármazottak Egyesülete Izraelben, 1981, p. 103

<sup>18</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 104

while the doctor Klein Ernós was the general secretary<sup>20</sup>. As a general political orientation, the Hebrew Party was pretty much just like the Hungarian Party, but still with a more pragmatic and realistic attitude<sup>21</sup>. Both minority parties were aware that their political option could favour the balance for one or the other of the parties.

As all over in Romania, local organizations of the extreme right were founded in Oradea too in the '20. Anti-Semitic League was one of them, and the professor Ioan Busita from Beius and Petru Popa, Mihai Gherlan, Coriolan Maniu, Gavril Bardoş were among the leaders. The professor Petru Fodor from Oradea, one of its members founded the local organization of the League of National Christian Defence, lead at the central level by the A.C. Cuza<sup>22</sup>.

During this period in Oradea and Bihor there were even publications with serious anti-Semitic accents. One of these publications was *Acțiunea românească*, which was published at Valea lui Mihai, and the lawyer Liviu Mihali was the director and Dimitrie Bob the editor. The paper tackled various problems regarding the economy, the trade the justice, all of these being of a high interest for the locals, but the articles were written most of the times from the anti-Semitic point of view.

Even though there were extremist organizations, Oradea seldom knew situations that proved the intolerance of the people. Such an incident took place on December 4-6 1927, during the National Student Congress, when several shops and Jewish places were devastated. The incidents were extensively presented by the media of that time<sup>23</sup>. It even had a negative international echo<sup>24</sup>.

About what happened in Oradea with this occasion, we find out more from the Municipal Monitor and from the media of that time. In Oradea, during the days of 4-6 of December 1927 took place the National Student Congress in the big hall of the theatre and it was approved by the Council of Minister of Romania<sup>25</sup>. Most of those who were present at Oradea, were members of the Orthodox Christian Students' Association of Romania<sup>26</sup>. According to the information given by the media of that time, at the event there were approximately 5,000 students from the important universities all over Romania. The great number of the participants made Eugen Rozavan, the municipal councillor, member of the Communist Party from Romania, a party that was illegal, during the meeting of the Municipal Council from December 19<sup>th</sup> 1927, say that: „... to debate students' problems it was no need for those 5000 students. One can easily see from this that they are planning something...”<sup>27</sup>. At his turn, municipal councillor Schwartz wondered „... which is the reason why they agreed to held the 5000 students congress at the theatre, since the maximum capacity is of 1000 sits and so 4000 students had to stay home?”<sup>28</sup>. On this occasion they found out that the City hall Of Oradea was pretty much involved in organizing

<sup>20</sup> *Bihorul strajă la hotare*, Oradea, 1933, p. 145-146

<sup>21</sup> I. Zainea, *Spectrul...*, p. 93

<sup>22</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 94

<sup>23</sup> “Frontiera de Vest”, Ist year, no. 1, 1927, Ist year, no. 2, 1927, Ist year, no. 3, 1927; “Dreptatea poporului”, IIIrd year, no. 37, 1928, etc.

<sup>24</sup> A. Călinescu, *Memorii*, Bucureşti, Editura Humanitas, p. 76

<sup>25</sup> “Monitorul Comunal”, Ist year, no. 6-7, 1927, p. 5

<sup>26</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 8

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 4

<sup>28</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 2

the event. Accommodation for students from different universities from all over Romania, was possible due to the intervention of the local administration, individually to different inhabitants of the city.

Everything started in a calm and normal atmosphere, *“they discussed different and interesting things about the students’ needs, in the hall of the theatre”*<sup>29</sup>. On the 4<sup>th</sup> of December 1927, congress debates were very constructive. Things have developed in the same way and the next day through to night. Then, after the end of the meeting from the hall of the theatre, students came out and were still discussions on the plateau in front of the institution and the Astoria Hotel, located across the street from the theatre. This is the moment when *“students were ginger up, a rock fell in the middle of students playing Romanian round dance .... She fell from the top floor of the Astoria, disposed of the Jew Keller”*<sup>30</sup>. After that challenge students reacted bitterly whereas *“ according to a new tradition from the students’ life after the war, they took their revenge and while revenging they broke everything and they even bit some Jewish citizens”*<sup>31</sup>. Even the students admitted that besides the event told earlier, they were *“provoked, insulted and even hit by the Jewish communists”*<sup>32</sup>. This was the moment that have triggered violence against Jews from Oradea, the latter showing, in the opinion of the local media of that time, a defying attitude towards students since the first day of student congress.

Nicolae Cristofir, director of the *Frontiera de Vest* weekly, who reported as complete as possible what happened in Oradea, highlighted: *“But on this occasion happened blamable and absolutely regrettable things. In the middle of the winter and in the middle of the night, stones and bats were flying in towards the heavy windows of the cafe shops and luxurious shops. They even broke windows from the private houses. During this time Oradea lived days of great panic”*<sup>33</sup>. About those days even the municipal councillor George Bota, talks as an eye witness. He says that: *“there were 5000 students, and at the devastation took part about 300 plus all the tramps from the suburbs. I saw those who devastated, but most of all I heard them shouting, and I honestly confess that they were shouting a lot in Hungarian too. Which proves that the devastators were not only students and not only Romanians. The rage was so big as it was continuously inflamed by those who had all the interest to do so. The students had truncheons, but I saw tramps with hammers and bats in their hands. Let’s not say that they were communists, but they weren’t students either”*<sup>34</sup>.

The city of Oradea and the county were in the course of events along with the prefect Emil Lobonțiu, who *“with a lot of cadence tried to calm down the spirits that were so agitated”*<sup>35</sup>, while the police prefect Bunescu *“acted heroic. With his body he covered the bodies of some Jews. He received some buffets, but he definitely saved the life of those Jews. Also safety leaders, General Gusi, Maimuca and Rodovici have watched with great skill the movements, giving orders to prevent other disorders. The army also did her job, Colonel Badescu and Major Caragea defended with their bodies the crowd of Jews escaping them from the arms of the*

<sup>29</sup> “Frontiera de Vest”, 1st year, no. 1, 1927, p. 1

<sup>30</sup> “Monitorul Comunal”, 1st year, no. 6-7, 1927, p. 3

<sup>31</sup> “Frontiera de Vest”, 1st year, no. 1, 1927, p. 1

<sup>32</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>34</sup> “Monitorul Comunal”, 1st year, no. 6-7, 1927, p. 3

<sup>35</sup> “Frontiera de Vest”, 1st year, no. 1, 1927, p. 3

*students*"<sup>36</sup>. The violences started in the evening of the 5<sup>th</sup> of December 1927 and they continued until evening next day, when the local authorities and the army calmed down the troublemakers. Student leaders who have devastated synagogues, homes and Jewish shops were detained. They estimated the damages. They were made by a committee headed by the minister of cults and arts himself, Alexandru Lepadatu<sup>37</sup>. The damages were in value of approximately 7,000,000 lei. Following discussions held with leaders of the Jewish community from Oradea, was decided that the damage should be paid by the Romanian state.<sup>38</sup>. The leaders of the Jewish community from Oradea, were not satisfied with the money they were to receive, and through the voice of municipal councillor, Schwartz, they requested neither more nor less than 100,000,000. lei damages. Obviously the demand was very high and on 16<sup>th</sup> of December 1927, in spite of the discontent, sustained even by the leaders of the Hungarian community from Oradea, the minister Lepadatu announced that 2,000,000,000 lei will be given to them, the rest amount will be allocated in the budget year 1928<sup>39</sup>.

Events have not left without trace. The first who paid for this, was police prefect Bunescu, even though he tried to quiet down the conflict. In the order of dismissal that came in from Bucharest he was charged that he was not able to prevent the incidents from Oradea<sup>40</sup>. On December 17<sup>th</sup> 1927, Bunescu was replaced by the former police prefect from Satu Mare, Traian Puticiu. The same day, the Mayor Gelu Egvy has convoked an extraordinary session of the Council on 19 December 1927. The mayor's statement underlined that "*during the Council he expects to be clashes between the moderate majority and the ultranationalist right*"<sup>41</sup>.

On December 19<sup>th</sup> 1927, took place the extraordinary session of the Council. There were 37 councillors out of 50, as such assembling the absolute majority in order to declare the meeting open. There have been intense discussions between the representatives of the Jews from Oradea, supported by the Hungarians and Romanians members of the board. Invariably, the Jew and Hungarian councillors criticized harshly the government from Bucharest, because he approved holding this conference in Oradea, a city near the border, where according to them, there are large groups of co-inhabiting nationalities. The mayor Gelu Egvy was also attacked because he was not able to assure the safety measurements, as "*the quarterage between the students was artificial*"<sup>42</sup>. According to the representatives of the Jewish and Hungarian community, 5000 people, that were in Oradea for that congress, were too many for just a congress. Both councillor Bardos, the spokesman for National Union of Jewish, and especially Schwartz, who spoke on behalf of Jewish traders and industrialists, proposed granting a vote of confidence for the mayor and the permanent delegation. A similar position had the councillor Ioan Kocsan, the representative of the Hungarian Party. He "*protest against insinuations that either the Hungarian minority, or Jewish minority caused the event*"<sup>43</sup>, such rally to

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<sup>36</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>40</sup> "Frontiera de Vest", Ist year, no. 2, 1927, nr. 3

<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>42</sup> "Monitorul Comunal", Ist year, no. 6-7, 1927, p. 2

<sup>43</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 3

communist councillor Eugen Rozvan who drew attention to the fact that not the workers have been guilty of what happened as claimed Oradea City Hall secretary, Ioan Voștinari. The rest of the councillors who have taken the floor had moderate positions fearing to be trenchant in a matter so sensitive.

Romanian councillors: George Bota, Dragomir, Aurel Lazăr, Anastase Mavrodin or arch-priest Maier, drew attention to the deliberate exaggeration of Jewish and Hungarian councillors stressing that good as the others were guilty of what happened in Oradea, not students. Still they accept the evidence that shows that about 2-300 students were part of the rabblement, but at the same time, the councillors, most of the eye witnesses, were saying that the majority of those trouble makers were not students and they were talking especially Hungarian.

They released a call to ask the Jews and the Hungarians from Oradea to give up on making such a big fuss on the events, since there were not by far as big as those provoked by the Jews and by the Hungarians in 1877, 1893 and 1918 at the moment of three important historical moments. Finally, it was suggested to the Jewish and Hungarian press that there is no need to exaggerate on the events, because they *"give water to die to the enemies of our country"*<sup>44</sup>.

The echoes of the events from 4-6 of December 1927, have long dwelling in the local press. Sever Delacerna, a publicist from Oradea, was wondering in one of the numbers of the magazine *Frontiera de Vest*, if they found the true guilty of what happened in Oradea: *"I wonder if the true guilty were found? Were determined precisely the responsibilities?"*<sup>45</sup>, still he came to the conclusion that *"is it possible that without any reason, without any instigation, but only in its impulse, that army of students with great souls and endowed with clean souls, to manifest in such a way. It must have been a gangrene that influenced and poisoned the souls of the Romanian people. There were the challenges of our enemies that stock us at every moment and that reached the climax. Romanians are sweet-tempered, hospitable, friendly, bided, sees and shuts up, but when the knife has reached the bone he knows to answer to the enemy. Forgive us because we play fair (...), because it is appropriate for the minority population of Oradea, to express itself, when they heard that a general student congress will be held: what will the student be looking for in Oradea, which is a Jewish and Hungarian city"*<sup>46</sup>. From Sever Delacerna's point of view, the guilty ones were those who led them to devastation, because *"...there's no smoke without the fire! And those ones couldn't be but communist Jews with the help of Hungarians"*<sup>47</sup>.

In the pages of the same magazine from Oradea, *Frontiera de Vest*, is published a very acid article regarding what happened. The author, who signed with the penname Nicriș the article entitled: *"What external investigators do in our country"*<sup>48</sup>, criticizes very harshly the attitude of the Romanian government who allowed to some strangers to come and investigate what happened in Oradea, on request of the Jewish and Hungarian community from here. Nicriș was not completely against these things, but, he was saying that *"it's not right to allow some middleman with monitorist ideas, or to some ten hand politicians, who outside the borders mean nothing, and to some journalist with freckles (...) to come*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>45</sup> *"Frontiera de Vest"*, Ist year, no. 2, 1927, p. 3

<sup>46</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>48</sup> *"Frontiera de Vest"*, Ist year, no. 3, 1927, p. 2

to our country and investigate every time a flea bites somebody. The case of some journalist from our neighbour country (Hungary) is quite illustrating. In the case of the student congress, happened what happened. After some days, a few journalists send by some daily Hungarian newspapers, (...) those knaves, who were treated with respect and kindness, when they went back home they started to tell in their country the most horrified imaginary things: carnage, dead, wounded, revolution and the most trivial insults never missed columns of the press in Budapest<sup>49</sup>.

At the beginning of the February 1928, it was published a album with photos representing the consequences of the events that took place on December 4-6, 1927. As we find out from the weekly newspaper *Dreptatea poporului* the album was the work of the Jewish community from Oradea, since on the cover of it one could clearly see the ritual signs of this community. The album contained 7 photos taken in the interior of the devastate synagogue. One picture in particular leaves a special impression to the viewer. The picture contains some books of worship destroyed and a rabbi with clothes torn by students, according to author the article<sup>50</sup>.

With the "help" of the media controlled by the Jewish and Hungarian community from Oradea and with the "help" of the journalists from Hungary, who presented what happened here, falsified information reached several European newspapers. They increased the consequences of those events. So, some of the newspapers from Hungary called Romanians barbarian and ill-behaved, sustaining, against the reality, that the Hungarian journalist were not allowed to enter Oradea during those three days of the students congress and even the following days. The same Sever Delacerna underlined the lack of honesty of those sustaining this point of view, drawing attention to the fact that:

*"hundreds of packages with daily Hungarian newspapers like: Magyar Hirlap, Esti Kurir, the magazine Panorama, edited by hyenas like Rossay Karoly, editor at Esti Kurir, who as a member of the Hungarian parliament, who through an interpellation, compared the disorder from Oradea with the massacres against Armenians and Hungarian Bolshevism in 1919, requiring the Romanian government to protest in Geneva"*<sup>51</sup>. Echoes of the events in Oradea had reached other European countries, through the same media channel: the Hungarian newspapers. We talk here about several newspapers from Italy, but especially from England. The last one is part of the trust *"owned by Rothermere"*<sup>52</sup>.

Over the time, the echoes of the events from Oradea were extinguished, both in Romanian and in international media. Still, the image of Romania outside the borders suffered a lot. Armand Călinescu, himself admitted later in his memoirs that: *"the events had a painful repercussion abroad"*<sup>53</sup>. Romania was in process to chose with Hungary and the moment Oradea 1927, was fully used by the Hungarian propaganda against Romania, in the context of that process and in general with the revisionist policy of the neighbour state.

As regards those who were guilty of the devastation produced, they were identified and sent to justice, and so: *"the government gave the biggest satisfaction to those who suffered material and moral damages during the*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>50</sup> "Dreptatea poporului", 3<sup>rd</sup> year, no. 37, 1928, p. 1

<sup>51</sup> "Frontiera de Vest", 1<sup>st</sup> year, no. 2, 1927, p. 1

<sup>52</sup> *Idem*, 1<sup>st</sup> year, no. 3, 1927, p. 3

<sup>53</sup> A. Călinescu, *Memorii*, București, Editura Humanitas, 1991, p. 76



*regrettable incidents that took place in Oradea during the students congress*<sup>54</sup>. We talk here especially about Jews, since they were the target of the attacks, besides the moral satisfaction given to them by sending to prison the leaders of the disorders from Oradea.

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<sup>54</sup> "Dreptatea poporului", 3<sup>rd</sup> year, no. 37, 1928, p. 2

## URBAN PATTERNS OF A COMMUNIST INDUSTRY. CASE STUDY: THE NEW TOWNS OF BEIUS LAND, ROMANIA

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**Abstract:** Defining the urbanization process in Beius Land, one of the most representative mental spaces in Romania is maybe the best way to deconstruct the *glorious urban future* myth. The present paper highlights urban issues linked to the communist heritage and the post-communist present of the three new towns in this area. The central idea of the study is to show if the three towns are engaged in a restructuring process or they are just going along with a spatial inertia, generated by the local development pole, which is the city of Beius.

**Key words:** small towns, forced urbanisation, industrialisation policies, Beius Land,

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### INTRODUCTION

Probably the most powerful catalyst, industry played a major role in the urban spaces production mechanism. The old boroughs, which often appeared beside an abbey, became towns, with the factory for central attraction, surrounded by workers slums. Although this is a general 19<sup>th</sup> Century urban Western Europe image, it is not until the mid-20<sup>th</sup> Century that this image arrives to Eastern Europe, replacing a mostly agriculture based economy. Leaning on different political ideas, the East has created a new giant urban network relaying not on population growth scenarios, but on the presence of raw materials. Thus, it has completely altered the spatial structure of the old traditional urban network.


Two of the three towns analyzed here, Stei and Vascau were born from the very heart of the namesake communes (parish like structures) in 1956. The third one, Nucet was built from scratch in 1952 beside the Baita uranium mine. Along with the territories and the resources of the communes, the new towns had to take over their administrative structure too, meaning that they had to govern the belonging villages. Meanwhile, the local population, mostly occupied in agriculture was trained within the industrial schools to become industry workers

and staff. Physically, transforming Stei and Vascau communes into towns meant the rise of new *civic centres*, with modern concrete buildings and large boulevards, maintaining however a rural pattern for the outskirts. Concerning Nucet, the urban pattern seems to have followed a very austere plan, showing a central zone reserved for the public institutions, a block of flats neighbourhood and some two story building streets. In the three cases, one can observe a loss of the local identity in terms of architecture, occupation and culture.

The economical breakdown which followed after the fall of the system seriously affected the three towns. Even nowadays, 22 years later, the old regime's mark is deeply printed in their development pattern. This fact makes us wonder if the regime really had a great plan for the new towns inhabitants' welfare, or was it all just a measure of enrolling the local people in the proletariat's lines, for an optimal capitalization of the local resources.

### **ECONOMIC POLICIES VERSUS SOCIAL POLICIES. FROM RURAL COMMUNITIES TO COMMUNIST TOWNS**

The studied cities are located in the southern part of Bihor County and of Beius Land (figure 1), in catchment area of Crisul Negru river. Stei and Vascau are located along the European road E79 and Nucet along the national road DN75. The three towns represent 3 of the 4 urban settlements within Beius Land. The choice of analysing them together relies on their common origins - all appeared in 1956 in the same context as a result of socialist industrialization, unlike Beius, true polarizing centre of Beius Land which was dated as urban settlement already in the 15th century (Țucra, 2000).



**Figure 1.** Location of the analysed towns

In the second half of the 20th century, social and economic development of Romania registered radical changes as a result of development policies promoted, with two major periods of transition: 1950-1962 transition from capitalist to the

socialist economy based on centralized planning system and post-communist period after 1989, when the market economy took over the obsolete socialist (Ianoș, 1987). The effects of these socio-economic major changes are reflected primarily in the spatial configuration of cities, fact noticeable especially in case of small towns resulted from the implementation of massive programs of industrialization and urbanization that led to the transformation of peasants into workers in newly established factories and mines.

Measures of socialist development policies generally caused the increase of the number of people, but without shaping an identity for the newly formed cities (Tălângă, 2008). These new towns were facing also problems with the transport infrastructure, the insufficiency of sewerage networks and water supply networks and low comfort specific to newly built apartment blocks, and all these problems became acute in the post-communist period after the shut-down of the most industrial activities.

In 1951, when rare mineral deposits were discovered in Bihor Mountains, following the prospections made by the Ministry of Geology from USSR (SDL Nucet), in 1952 the Romanian-Soviet society Kvartit starts the exploitation of uranium deposit (the largest in the world located on the surface). At that time, according to statistics, beside Soviet workers and specialists, 17,000 Romanians worked along (PUG Stei, 2009).

Thus, to solve the problem of accommodation for thousands of people from all over the country and from Soviet Union, the villages of Vascau and Stei were transformed into towns in 1956, and a brand new dormitory town –Nucet– has been built close to the Baita mine during 1952-1956. The three new towns of Beius Land, as well as other small towns (56 in total) that appeared in Romania in the period 1945-1968 are a result of the soviet socialist policies (Sageata, 2010), they having a Soviet-inspired urban typology.

Soviet influence manifested on the urban landscape is evident in case of Stei town, by the considerable size of new buildings, the lack of private space, apartment buildings with a high height regime, but with minimal apartments and also the rectangular shape of the streets in order to make space and to reduce maintenance costs (Cooke, 1997). Given the conditions at the time, in a period of four years, Stei village (figure 2), a small linear village (less than 1000 inhabitants), famous for growing vegetables was transformed in a town, dozens of blocks, an administrative palace, five cinemas, three dance floors, two schools, one in Romanian and one in Russian, clinics, a sports complex, restaurants and shops being constructed ([www.scrieliber.ro](http://www.scrieliber.ro), 2012). Thus, Stei becomes the administrative centre of mining exploitation, the place of residence for the management staff of the mine and also the main link point with Russia, reaching 6,000 inhabitants in 1956 (Filimon, 2007).


Nucet was built from scratch between 1952-1956, as a dormitory town and a socio-cultural center of uranium exploitation miners from Baita and Baita Plai (figure 3). In these four years the number of population increased from 772 to 9878 inhabitants, but later in 1966 (after the withdrawal of soviet population) the exploitation activity was reduced and in the town remains only in the local population and some people who came from neighbouring villages, a total amount of 2768 people (SDL Nucet).

Because the forced industrialization led to acceleration of urbanization process, the living conditions available to workers were not among the best, new created urban landscape being far from the standards of healthy urban spaces.



In case of Vascau, the locality keeps its predominantly rural character even after 1956, interventions on the structure and the shape of the town being not major (figure 4). Prevails individual dwellings and a low height regime, also the number of population did not registered significant growth, remaining constant between 1930 and 1956, to approximately 4500 inhabitants. (INS)

Rural character is given also by the fact that to the town itself were added some rural localities situated at long distances (up to 8 km), in order to gather a large number of people and thus to corresponds to demographic urban standards (Ianoș, 1994).



**Figure 4.** Cartographic representations of Vascau on the 1924 Alignment Plans (left) and on the 1976 Russian Maps (right)  
(Source: <http://earth.unibuc.ro>)

After the '70s, with the withdrawal of the Russian population the need and the urban influence of the soviet model will be reduced, but the legacy remains: three new towns, including two mono-industrial cities - Nucet and Vascau - (with over 50% of the active population employed in the extractive industry) (Dumitrescu, 2007). Since 1974, the continuity of socialist development policies is ensured through the implementation of the Systematization Planning Law for urban and rural localities. Regarding the studied towns, the law supports an urban development based on the same principles as in case of the Soviet model (restriction of the building areas, more complete use of built-up area, high height regime, and high density of built surfaces). Implementation of urban development policies were made on the basis of general plans and sketches of systematization, the Popular Councils through the Local Commissions of Systematization being responsible with the achievement of these documents

(Law 59/1974). However, since the 80s Nucet and Vascau have faced a demographic and economic decline, which translates into a minimum of intervention on their spatial configuration. Stei on the other side saw a certain dynamic of urban form and structure, due to its function mix.

It is noted that the emergence and development of the three towns, especially of Nucet and Stei is due to the resources of rare metals and to their exploitation, but because the major transformations were carried out in a relatively short period of time (1955-1975), their impact was a brutal one on short term and with negative effects on long term. Mono-industrial character is arising problems regarding the conversion of these areas, even 20 years after the fall of the communist regime.

### **CONTEMPORARY READING OF THE THREE TOWNS' URBAN PATTERNS**

Analyzing the urban patterns of the three new towns in Beius Land might not clear up entirely the whole philosophy that stood behind the communist urbanization and industrialization policies, but might however give us a clue about what the tremendous change meant to the local communities.


The after WWII urban development must be seen as a natural attempt to move on from war economy to peace economy. The territorial pattern imprinted by the industrial take-off is most obvious when talking about the urban network. Mining and processing of raw materials the heavy industry was relaying on demanded a hastened process of inadequate rural settlements transformation and the rise of new, industrial towns in the immediate vicinity of the mining areas.

Hardly neglectable, the international urban context becomes more and more standardized on both sides of the Iron Curtain. We are talking here of an era where urban planners like Le Corbusier and architects like Oscar Niemeyer were giving a lead on both the major restructuring of existing urban areas, and the planning of new towns and cities.

Shortly after the war, when both winners and beaten had to reconstruct their cities – some of them entirely destroyed by the bombings (Warsaw, Dresden, Stalingrad), very little attention was paid to urban planning. The main reason of this is due to the shortage of manpower and especially urban planners. By the beginning of the 50s however, a new way of thinking has taken over the old planning principles. In fact, this new planning seems quite similar to the ideas of the Marxist urbanism school, which was opposing the expansion of existing cities, advocating instead the building of brand new cities. The new cities were supposed to be located in the vicinity of industrial equipments and not exceed 50 000 inhabitants (French, 1995). The rationale behind the location and the limited size of new cities lies on the attempt to achieve the highest degree of efficiency on both land and energy consumption. Thereby the land-use zoning should ensure walkable distances between housing and industry areas. The residential area would be inevitably shared by the proletarians within collective housing (mostly blocks of flats) and common public spaces such as parks and civic centres.

Concerning the three new towns in Beius Land, the most representative for the aforementioned model is definitely the town of Stei. The issues we considered for analysing were *initial urban structure*, *development pattern* and *actual urban fabric* as primary indicators. In terms of secondary indicators we considered some issues regarding the actual urban fabric such as *land-use zoning*, *built form* and *residential-industrial land ratio*.

The physical shape defining the initial urban structure of Stei was linear development alongside the main road (fig. 5a). Considering the simple structure of the village, the incoming works didn't affect the existing housing. However, all the adjacent lands used for horticultural purposes were occupied by the new development. On both sides of the old village new shapes are featuring different development patterns. The west side of the main road (fig. 5b) was reserved for the residential area with housing, cultural, educational and social facilities, whereas the east side (fig. 5c) was intended for industrial use. The resulting structure (fig. 5d) is hence a mix of the traditional countryside households, a new 'modern' residential area and a fully operational large scale industrial area.



**Figure 5.** Stei's urban structure

Coming to the issues regarding the actual urban fabric has hardly changed. The land use zoning is featuring 13 distinctive uses, such as: public services and commerce central zone, special destination zone (fire brigade), low and medium (up to 4 storeys) collective housing, commerce and services mixed zone, low (up to 2 storeys) individual and collective housing with adjoining gardens (the pre-existing village), low and medium (up to 4 storeys) collective housing zone, high (up to 8 storeys) collective housing zone, industry and store-house zone, green spaces, sports and leisure zone, forest zone, railway zone, communal husbandry zone, water supply and waste water facilities zone and water courses zone.

The built form of the towns (fig. 6) reveals a mixed urban silhouette limited by industrial buildings at the fringe (fig. 6a). Walking from west to east, one can distinguish administrative buildings (fig. 6b), tall blocks of flats (fig. 6c) and low blocks of flats (fig. 6d). The street pattern consists of a rectangular grid which dictates uniform land parcels. Although this kind of pattern provides for good connectivity, it does not allow the slightest intimacy, the land plots being exposed on the four sides. On the other hand, the straight, large streets do allow a simplified water supply and sewage system, as well as tree rows. Moving on eastwards, one can see the traditional households on the main road (fig. 6e), placed perpendicularly to the street which is quite narrow (12 m) if we take into account that it is a national interest road (DN 76).



**Figure 6.** Stei's urban silhouette

The key figures (figure 7) of the built environment are the town-hall building (up left), the tall and medium height blocks of flats (up right), the two storeys blocks of flats (down left), the wooden two-family houses (down right)



and the industrial buildings. Maybe the most representative of indicators that we analysed here, the *residential-industrial land ratio* is showing an almost balancing situation of 1.13:1.



**Figure 7.** Stei's built environment key figures

### **LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE: STRATEGIC OPTIONS, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INITIATIVES.**

The strategic planning process in the three towns had only started in 2006. Intended for the 2007-2013 period, the plans are perceived more like an imperative of the EU integration than a commitment to the communities' future. The scarcity of preliminary analyses and the low level of expertise, besides the fully understanding of the process' importance are the main reasons of the unrealistic and incomplete visions and objectives of the strategies, especially for Nucet and Vascau. The main guidelines of the plans are targeting infrastructural actions, and some declarative objectives like *enhancing local activity and competitiveness, HR development, increasing the use of EU funding, encouraging tourism, increasing community involvement* etc., without the slightest attempt of local tuning.

Regarding the land use planning, the new documents were issued some years after the regime change (1995 Stei, 1996 PUG Nucet and 1997 Vascau). Shortly after (2000) they were all revised, but only Stei redid it lately (2009). The meaning of these facts is that neither Nucet, nor Stei included into their land-use plans any of the strategic options they exposed in their development strategies.

## CONCLUSIONS

The transition process from planned to market economy in the 90's Romania is casting the shadow of incertitude on the industrial small town's future. The long period of forced industrialization and urbanization policies that produced them is acting like a brake when trying to implement whatever restructuring initiatives.

The large scale industrialization process lead to dramatic long term effects, 20 years after they are still straining to make a future. The socio-economic decline due the functional shift and the declining urban landscape strongly contrasting the natural surroundings represents implacable doubts on their urban attributes. This is mainly the case of Nucet and Vascau in our study, which are facing more and more ruralising tendencies. Only the blocks of flats in the central areas and the industrial platforms are witnessing the industrial past of the two so called towns. The fact that the town-hall's planning office isn't issuing planning permits shows that there's no demand for new housing, on the contrary, one can notice a pronounced migration pattern.

On the contrary, Stei had the opportunity to pass from the mining and processing to food industry. This fact guaranteed a somewhat smoother passage to the market economy, although the prevalence of a single food chain can be perceived as a weakness on a long time span.

Regarding the demographical changes, only Stei has reached a maximum after the 90's, although it's actually facing a slight decrease. However the enlargement of the built-up area shows a clear need for extra housing, which is a positive indicator if not too extensive.

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## MAYORAL ELECTION IN HARGHITA COUNTY, ROMANIA, JUNE 2012

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**Abstract:** On 10th June 2012, Romania held local elections, in order to elect local and county counsellors, mayors and county council presidents. In Harghita County, elections took place in 67 territorial-administrative units: the cities of Miercurea-Ciuc, Gheorgheni, Toplița and Odorheiul Secuiesc, the towns of Băile Tușnad, Bălan, Borsec, Cristuru Secuiesc and Vlăhița and 58 communes. According to official data provided by the Central Electoral Bureau, a number of 67 mayors were elected, belonging to the following political parties: Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DUHR, with 51 mandates, or 76.1%), independent candidates (IC, 6 and 9%), Hungarian Civic Party (HCP, 4 and 6%), Social Liberal Union (SLU, 3 and 4.4%), Democratic Liberal Party (DLP, 1 and 1.5%), National Liberal Party (NLP, 1 and 1.5%) and Social Democrat Party (SDP, 1 and 1.5%). Even though the Social Liberal Union (SLU) was founded in February 2012, being a parliamentary and pre-electoral political alliance, comprised of the *Center-Left Alliance*, containing the National Union for the Progress of Romania and the Social Democrat Party and the *Center-Right Alliance*, made of the National Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, in two localities (Bilbor and Gălăușas), each party nominated its own candidate, while DLP kept its only mandate (Corbu) and won two more mandates in Tulgheș and Sărmaș, through independent candidates backed by the party. This county stands out due to the large number of the mandates won by DUHR in 51 localities: 49 mandates for their own members and two mandates for independent candidates (in Bălan and Vlăhița), backed by the party.

**Key words:** Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, mayors, political parties

\* \* \* \* \*

### INTRODUCTION

In comparison to 2008, according to Law no. 144/2012 regarding the measures employed for the organisation of elections for local administrative authorities, mayors must be elected in the first round, with the exception of ballots.

In Harghita County, in its 67 territorial-administrative units, 181 candidates ran for office, out of which seven were women. According to official data, out of the 3,183 mayor mandates, at country level, 67 (2.1%) are assigned to this county (Pop, Bodocan, 2009). In comparison to other counties, where

dozen of cases were investigated by police, a single person was investigated in Harghita, for a multiple vote attempt ([www.informatiahr.go.ro](http://www.informatiahr.go.ro)).

I point out that in some localities like Corund, Cozmeni, Dănești, Dealu, Frumoasa, Lelicieni, Lueta, Mădăraș, Merești, Ocand, Plăieșii de Jos, Porumbeni, Racu, Sâncrăieni, Șimonești, there was a single candidate for the mayoral seat.

### WORK METHODOLOGY


In terms of work methodology, for this study, the synthetical analysis and interpretation of the data from the Central Electoral Bureau were taken into account, this bureau gathering the results of the 2012 elections for the local public administrations, the scientific endeavour focusing on Harghita County.

The second stage involved a deep study of legislation regarding the activities taking place during the organization and the elections proper, followed by identifying the numbers of the electoral circumscriptions from the 67 administrative-territorial units within the county. Moreover, the lists of the electoral competitors were consulted, in order to gather data on the political affiliations and age group structure of the mayors that were validated for the 2012-2016 terms.

The last stage, which is interpreting and designing a general view in regards to this action, meant the creation of a data base which allowed for a rich table, graphical and cartographical material, thus rounding the text.

### POLITICAL DISTRIBUTION OF MAYORS IN HARGHITA COUNTY

The results from 21<sup>st</sup> Electoral Circumscription - Harghita County, comprised of 67 electoral circumscriptions (272 polling stations), show a 54.23% voting attendancy, out of 153,992 registered voters.



**Figure 1.** The distribution of mayor mandates per political parties, at the June 2012 Elections, Harghita County, Romania

(Data source: [www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html](http://www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html))

The number of validly expressed votes was 144,670, out of which the Romanian Alliance Party obtained 354 votes (0.24%), the EMNP-MPP Electoral

Alliance, 468 votes (0.32%), The People's Hungarian Party of Transylvania, 11,824 votes (8.17%), Hungarian Civic Party, 25,453 votes (17.59%, and 6% of the total number of mandates), the Conservative Party, 113 votes (0.07%), The Democratic Liberal Party, 2,670 votes (1.84% and 1.5% of mandates), the National Liberal Party, 886 voturi (0.61%, and 1.5% of mandates), the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party, 15 voturi (0.01%), the New Generation Party, 148 votes (0.10%), People's Party-Dan Diaconescu, 2,054 votes (1.41%), România Mare Party, 392 votes (0.27%), the Social Democratic Party, 819 votes (0.56%, and 1.5% of mandates), the Green Party, 227 votes (0.15%), the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, 80 941 votes (55.94%, and 76.11% of mandates), the National Union for the Progress of Romania, 126 votes (0.08%), the People's Social Christian Union, 62 votes (0.04%), the Social Liberal Union, 7,847 votes (5.42%, and 4.47% of mandates) and independent candidates, 10,271 votes (7.09%, and 9% of mandates).

As one can see from the data presented in table 1 and figure 1, the highest number of mandates was obtained by DUHR (76.1%), followed by IC (9%), HCP (6%), SLU (4.4%), and only 1.5% LDP, NLP și SDP.

**Table 1.** Validly expressed votes and mandates per party at the local elections, Harghita County, June 2012

(Data source: [www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html](http://www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html))

Parties	Votes		Mandates	%
	No.	% in county		
DUHR	80,941	55.94	51	76.1
LDP	2,670	1.84	1 (Corbu)	1.5
NLP	886	0.61	1 (Gălăuțaș)	1.5
SDP	819	0.56	1 (Bilbor)	1.5
SLU	7,847	5.42	3 (Toplița, Subcetate, Voșlăbeni)	4.4
HCP	25,453	17.59	4 (Gheorgheni, Băile Tușnad, Căpâlnița, Suseni)	6.0
IC	10,271	7.09	6 (Bălan, Vlăhița, Dârjiu. Joseni, Sărmaș, Tulgheș)	9.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>128,887</b>	<b>89.0</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>100.0</b>

DUHR = Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; NLP = National Liberal Party; SDP = Social Democrat Party; SLU = Social Liberal Union; HCP = Hungarian Civic Party; IC = Independent candidate.

## ASPECTS REGARDING THE TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION AND THE GEODEMOGRAPHIC STRUCTURES OF MAYORS

In order to have a better image on the situation of the mayoral elections in Harghita County, the study at hand attempts to synthetically present some aspects regarding the percentages from rural and urban areas, the percentages regarding ethnic background and age of mayors (Pop, 2001, 2006).

### Mayors according to their type of residence

According to table 2, regarding the mandate structure per types of habitat, out of the nine urban settlements (13.4% of mandates, of the total of 37,192 valid votes), four are DUHR: Miercurea-Ciuc (63.7%, 10,404 total number of expressed votes), Odorheiu Secuiesc (53.6%, 9,106 total number of expressed votes), Borsec (83.9%, 1 254 total number of expressed votes), Cristuru Secuiesc (72.8%, 3,303 total number of expressed votes), two from HCP: Gheorgheni (71.2%, 5,768 total number of expressed votes) and Băile Tușnad (68.8%, 593 total number of expressed votes), two mandates for independent candidates:

Bălan (29.5%, 827 total number of expressed votes) and Vlăhița (36.1%, 1,313 total number of expressed votes) and only one from SLU: Toplița (75.4%, 4,624 total number of expressed votes).

**Table 2.** Mayoral elections in Harghita County, Romania, June 2012

(Data source: [www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html](http://www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html))

No.	City, town, commune	Total no. of valid votes	Name of candidate	Political party	Valid votes	%	Age Of mayor	Number of polling stations
1	Miercurea-Ciuc	16,324	Kálmán Ráduly Róbert	DUHR	10,404	63.73	44	19
2	Gheorgheni	8,094	János Mezei	HCP	5,768	71.26	36	9
3	Toplița	6,130	Stelu Platon	SLU	4,624	75.43	58	11
4	Odorheiu-Secuiesc	16,977	Levente Zoltán Bunta	DUHR	9,106	53.63	49	22
5	Băile Tușnad	861	Tibor Albert	HCP	593	68.87	49	1
6	Bălan	2,086	Brezovszky Gheorghe Adam	IC	827	29.58	65	5
7	Borsec	1,494	József Mik	DUHR	1,254	83.93	37	2
8	Cristuru-Secuiesc	4,531	Emil Rafai	DUHR	3,303	72.89	41	7
9	Vlăhița	3,636	Sándor Rus	IC	1,313	36.11	54	5
10	Atid	1,079	László Szöcs	DUHR	942	87.30	28	5
11	Avrămești	1,142	Béla Szöcs	DUHR	811	71.02	53	4
12	Bilbor	1,425	Ilie Trif	SDP	462	32.42	60	1
13	Brădești	1,068	Botond Bokor	DUHR	961	89.98	35	2
14	Căpâlnița	1,036	László Benedek	HCP	554	53.47	35	1
15	Cârța	1,251	Gábor Tibor	DUHR	946	75.61	45	2
16	Ciceu	1,401	Attila Becze	DUHR	807	57.60	38	2
17	Ciucsîngeorgiu	2,034	József György	DUHR	1,572	77.28	46	6
18	Ciumani	2,222	László Szilard Márton	DUHR	1,376	61.92	37	2
19	Corbu	795	Nicușor Drugă	LDP	558	70.18	56	2
20	Corund	2,571	Mihály Katona	DUHR	2,571	100	47	5
21	Cozmeni	888	David Bodo	DUHR	888	100	65	2
22	Dănești	942	Csongor Ernő Bőjte	DUHR	942	100	32	1
23	Dârjiu	549	Csaba Zoltáni	IC	337	61.38	32	2
24	Dealul	1,591	Elemér Imre Balint	DUHR	1,591	100	50	2
25	Ditrău	2,814	Elemér Puskás	DUHR	2,457	87.31	44	5
26	Felicești	1,720	József Sándor	DUHR	826	48.02	51	6
27	Frumoasa	1,147	Tibor Ferencz	DUHR	1,147	100	52	3
28	Gălbăuș	1,197	Radu Țăran	NLP	668	55.80	50	2
29	Joseni	2,865	Szabolcs Gáll	IC	1,913	66.77	33	3
30	Lăzarea	1,718	Ladislau Gábor	DUHR	928	54.01	48	4
31	Lelicești	768	Péter Pál	DUHR	768	100	35	3
32	Lueta	998	Zoltán Lázár	DUHR	998	100	46	2
33	Lunca de Jos	2,570	Péter Mihok	DUHR	1,333	51.86	49	5

34	Lunca de Sus	1,533	Zsombor László Timár	DUHR	977	63.73	41	3
35	Lupeni	2,497	Lehel Kovács	DUHR	1,364	54.62	33	6
36	Mădăraş	755	László Biró	DUHR	755	100	37	2
37	Mărtiniş	1,380	Péter Tivadar Kerekes	DUHR	514	37.24	59	12
38	Mereşti	471	Mihály Rigó	DUHR	471	100	42	1
39	Mihăileni	1,116	Petru Kosa	DUHR	755	67.65	51	4
40	Mugeni	1,842	Mózes Farkas	DUHR	1,006	54.61	49	8
41	Ocland	500	Miklós Cseke	DUHR	500	100	56	3
42	Păuleni-Ciuc	933	Csaba Ferencz	DUHR	757	81.13	42	3
43	Plăieşii de Jos	1,123	Zoltán András	DUHR	1,123	100	43	4
44	Porumbeni	987	Levente Gyerkó	DUHR	987	100	45	2
45	Praid	3,228	Alexandru Bokor	DUHR	1,812	56.13	62	5
46	Racu	817	Attila Császár	DUHR	817	100	28	2
47	Remetea	3,414	Elemér Laczkó Albert	DUHR	3,003	87.96	43	4
48	Săcel	567	Lajos Nagy	DUHR	381	67.19	42	4
49	Săncrăieni	1,134	Székely Ernő	DUHR	1,134	100	54	2
50	Săndominic	2,011	Alajos Ferencz	DUHR	1,446	71.90	58	3
51	Sănmartin	1,068	András Gergely	DUHR	705	66.01	47	1
52	Sânsimion	1,912	László Fábíán	DUHR	1,011	52.87	47	3
53	Sântimbru	1,122	Előd Kencse	DUHR	805	71.74	34	1
54	Sărmaş	1,972	Valentin Mándru	IC	1,138	57.70	50	3
55	Satu Mare	890	Lajos Dávid	DUHR	654	73.48	33	1
56	Secuieni	1,170	Zoltán Bálo	DUHR	414	35.38	39	3
57	Siculeni	1,525	Csaba Szentés	DUHR	1,500	98.36	32	2
58	Şimoneşti	1,548	Zoltán Péter	DUHR	1,548	100	56	8
59	Subcetate	927	Ion Rizea	SLU	343	34.47	62	1
60	Suseni	2,333	József Egyed	HCP	1,345	57.65	36	5
61	Tomeşti	1,061	Tiberiu Mark	DUHR	738	69.55	64	1
62	Tulgheş	1,833	Marcel Vancu	IC	878	47.89	45	4
63	Tuşnad	1,147	Endre Rafain	DUHR	425	37.05	46	3
64	Ulieş	636	Sándor György	DUHR	353	55.50	37	5
65	Vârşag	790	Ernő Tamás	DUHR	540	68.35	54	2
66	Voşlăbeni	1,212	Mihail Dumitru Tinca	SLU	624	51.48	58	2
67	Zetea	2,515	Attila Nagy	DUHR	1,806	71.80	35	5


DUHR = Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; NLP = National Liberal Party; SDP = Social Democrat Party; SLU = Social Liberal Union; HCP = Hungarian Civic Party; IC = Independent candidate.

In the 58 communes of the county, the same political party stands out - DUHR, with the most wins, in 47 communes (81% of their total number), followed by independent candidates with four communes, HCP and SLU with two communes each, and SDP, NLP, LDP, each with one commune.

Even though nine women ran for office (out of 181 candidates - 3.8%), none managed to gain a mayoral seat. By analysing the mayors' age structure, one may see that Atid and Racu have the youngest mayors (28 years), and the




oldest ones are in Bălan and Cozmeni (65 years), but at county level most mayors are between 46-51 years old (figure 2).



**Figure 2.** Age structure of mayors for the 2012-2016 mandate, Harghita County  
(Data source: [www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html](http://www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html))

### Territorial distribution of mandates

At county level, the territorial distribution of mayoral halls, according to their political affiliation, as one can see in figure 3, is extremely homogenous, due to the dominance of DUHR, owing to the large percentage of Hungarians (84%), while in the settlements with a Romanian majority, situated in the northern part of the county (Bilbor, Toplița, Tulgheș, Gălăuțaș, Sărmaș, Subcetate) SLU achieved a clear victory.



**Figure 3.** The territorial distribution of mayors, according to party affiliation and territorial-administrative unit, in Harghita County, at the 2012 local elections  
(Data source: [www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html](http://www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html))

## CONCLUSIONS

Harghita is a county with a certain kind of particularity, where Romanians represents only 13.2% of the total population, while an increasing presence of Romania parties within the county council willlead to a more efficient resolution of administrative problems for the northern areas, inhabited primarily by Romanians.

Voting attendancy in Harghita County was below the country average, being slightly higher in urban areas. More exactly, at 9 pm, the attendancy reached 54.23%, while the national average was 56.39%.

The presence of two Hungarian parties (DUHR și HCP) contributed to the partition of the Hungarian electoral crowd, which lead to a significant and extremely important victory for Romanian parties, now represented in the Harghita County Council.

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## THE MILITARY FUNCTION OF THE RELIEF FROM CRIȘ BASIN

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**Abstract:** In this article I try to present a different side of geography, the military geography. Military geography role is to study the characteristics of land in military terms and relief the importance of knowledge elements in organizing the fight. Knowledge of the field strengths can make the difference between victory and defeat, and applying appropriate tactics can change the tide of battle.

**Key words:** defense war, patriotic war

\* \* \* \* \*

### INTRODUCTION

The notion of gate<sup>1</sup> is defined in dictionaries as:

- a loop in a wall, fence which allows the entrance from the inside to the outside an vice versa;
- the access point in a fortress, city, which together with the mobile panels and other accessories form an ensemble;

Geographically, the notion of *gate*<sup>2</sup> designates an alley between two rows of mountains.

From a geographic and military point of view, the gate can be defined as an ensemble of geographic and planimetry details, crossed by a relative long valley which forms an opening towards the inside of the territory, situated especially on an (strategic, operational) entry path which from a military perspective is an strategy of non-entry/attack which enables the action of military force and means.

Bearing in mind the statement made by a great politician and military man who said that 'no war can be carried outside the means of communication', the military practice focuses on the battle in the mountains and in this setting the battle for passes is of utmost importance. For always the action carried in the mountains had in view the battle around passes, the battle for their opening or defense being the major purpose, the essence itself of the military confrontations in the mountain areas.

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<sup>1</sup> Dictionary of Contemporary Romanian Language, The Scientific and Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, page 618

<sup>2</sup> Idem, page 618


### THE HISTORY OF THE SUBJECT IN FOCUS

The military phenomenon in the study area started with the first human settlements which evolved with the modification of climate, socio-economic, sometimes political factors, but always favoured by the proper conditions that the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic space offered and will always do.

In Antiquity, the system of fortifications was spread across all the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic space, highly present in the study area. Almost all the settlements in this area were fortified with defensive ditches and large ramparts. As for example the ones in Andrid, Carei, Pir ( Satu Mare county), Girișu de Criș, Otomani, Vășad (Bihor county), Gilău (Cluj county) and so on.

From the military point of view, the fortified settlements were a component of the military defense system of the Geto-Dacian territories, representing the local base of an effort to defend the whole population, being points of support of the military power of the Geto-Dacian state.

After the conquest of Dacia by the Romans, these established the north west boundary of the empire on the north and west limit of the Apuseni Mountains, with a predominant focus on fortifying the borders. Thus, there appeared a large fortified line in the western part of the Apuseni Mountains, as shown in figure 1.



**Figure 1.** The line advanced by towers. District 1: The Roman camp from Bologa and its area of observation towers and signaling  
(source: Gudea, N., (1997), *The Limes from the Meses Mountains*, pag. 102).

In all this military effort, the resistance that the Romanian principalities opposed to the Hungarian tribes in the first decades after their arrival in the Pannonian Plain and then, after founding the medieval Hungarian state stood promptly to its trends of eastern expansion. The direct result of this firm and long opposition was the uninterrupted ensuring of existence and preservation of the Romanian character of the political structures from the entire Carpathian – Danubian – Pontic area.

The attack on the Carpathian arch marked a new phase of the aggression of the Hungarian war tribes. It started under the leadership of Tuhutum, who tried to enter the Transylvanian basin.

The demographic concentrations and the ascending evolution of the organization of the Romanian states, created new superior resources for developing the fortification works, whose execution involves hiring significant workforce, a certain specialization and a capable leadership to exercise its authority over a larger territory. One could identify an increasing number of fortifications, of which, the most important from the area of study is Biharea fortress.

Without completely replacing the earthen and wooden fortresses, gradually a series of small fortifications appeared, intended for small groups of feudal lords or being residences for the leaders of some social and political structures. In some situations, such fortifications were surveillance and resistance points at boarder or in certain areas of special military importance (fords to big streams of water, communication nodes, mountain passes, etc.)

The value of fortification was seen on the occasion of heroic defense fights fought by the principalities of Menumorut, Gelu, Glad, Ahtum, Jula, when fortresses such as Biharea, Satu Mare, Dăbâca, Arad – Vladimirescu, Morisena (Cenad) held out for a long time against heavy sieges.

The main form of warfare practiced by the natives was defense where they used, according to circumstances, harassment, evacuation of people and goods out of the main directions of the enemy, attacks made by surprise, ambushes, especially at passing points, combined with the resistance of fortresses or natural barriers. Under the pressure of necessity to execute military operations, the Romanians also executed offensive actions with decisive character.

At the beginning of the Hungarian invasion (in the Xth century) on the East of Tisa, the area of study presented as a genuine political, economic and military power, being led by prince Menumorut.

He developed the strategic defense on an appreciable depth, on passages, using the benefits of the field, fortifications and rise to fight of the whole population. The defense actions took place on directions, with the effort directed against the southern group to diminish its forces and to ban its advance towards Biharea fortress. Putting up resistance to obstacles with formations of relatively low value, combined with violent offensive retaliation, the army of the Romanian prince managed to thwart the attempts of the Hungarians to open the way to the strategic objective pursued by the southern group. Finally, the intervention of the main forces deployed along the alignment of The Crișul Repede, restrain the invasion towards the vital center of the principality, rejecting the southern group.

The Hungarian attack against Menumorut's territories started again in the years 906-907. Powerful invading Hungarian forces joined by an important draft of troops of Seklers entered the principality. Facing this new and dangerous invasion, Menumorut decided that part of his forces to protect Bihor fortress, while the other, under the personal leadership of the prince, to regroup in the mountains area between Crișul Repede and Barcău, favorable to a lengthy defense to which the whole population able to bear arms could participate. The soldiers from Bihor have put up resistance for the first time to the invaders on Iozășel river, and then they tenaciously defended themselves inside Biharea fortress. The heroic resistance of the Romanian soldiers under siege lasted 13 days, during which they produced heavy losses to the invaders. They could not get a decisive success in the siege.

Several conclusions can be drawn from these wars: the first conclusion refers to the nature of predatory expeditions which the actions of the Hungarian

warlike tribes had from the beginning; another conclusion is that those expeditions had not had serious, immediate or perspective consequences, upon the natives and their social and political organizations. Finally, we can talk about the bravery of the local population as well as the most important feature, that, he who seeks external factors (weather and terrain) wins.

In the second half of the XVI<sup>th</sup> century, were built the fortresses from Carei, Săcuieni and Oradea, the last one being of irregular form, slightly oval, located in a flooded marsh area, fed by the waters of Crișul Repede and those of Petea brook (brook with war water), to which the experts of that time changed the course through underground galleries, so that the water around the fortress to not freeze, reducing its vulnerability; these fortresses were considered “pond fortresses”, aimed mainly to stop the attacks of the western enemy.

Until the XX<sup>th</sup> century, in the region of Criș Basin, no other spectacular event took place, so that to deserve a special attention to be studied. The events from 1784, the peasant rebellion led by Horea, Cloșca and Crișan cannot be omitted, this was a nationwide event, started outside the study area but propagated in the entire territory of Transilvania and the revolution from 1848, of which we could say it was a propagation of the French Revolution, which echoed and caused movements throughout Europe.

During World War I, although the officers of staff have developed an action hypothesis, the “Z” hypothesis with a brave conception on the preparations and execution of the strategic, operational military actions, due to the underestimation of the enemy’s forces, in the study area nothing spectacular to draw attention took place.



**Figure 2.** The battles fought by the Romanian Army in the Second World War in Crișurle Basin  
(source: *Romanian Army in the Anti-Hitlerism War*, page 82)

In the Second World War, however, the study area was the scene of extremely bloody confrontations, where the spirit of sacrifice, bravery and heroism of the Romanian soldiers wrote in the book of honor of our nation a

glorious history page. Thus, September 1944 found the Romanian army in offensive in the area of study, to free the country from the hortist-fascist occupation. After a strong offensive until the exit from the passes of Crișurile Basin, the Romanian army had to pass to such a manner of defense on alignments, favorable to the, with the aim to prohibit the opponent to restore a favorable alignment located on the alignment of the Apuseni Mountains to the Iron Gates.

On account of the bravery of the Romanian soldiers, the hortist-fascist troops have been thwarted these plans, causing them huge losses of personnel and combat technique, which has enabled their own troops to go on to offensive for the liberation of the whole surface of the national territory.

As it can be seen, since antiquity the principle to secure the strong points of the territory, developed so that to protect the population, respectively own troops against an aggressive and more numerous and better equipped aggressor from the point of view of the technique of combat. Some elements of the military strategy were maintained from antiquity even today, some were changed and renewed, so the place and role of the bystanders incumbent to the system of the military actions fought in the mountains make from these one of the main elements of the geographic-military, tactical-operative analysis, which takes place at the level of military commands, both in peace and war time.

Knowing in detail their characteristics, the commendation with realistic spirit of the consequences and implications they have in preparing and executing the actions up in the mountains are likely to focus on commanders to adopt fair judgment and to establish appropriate measures for their fulfillment.

### THE AREA OF STUDY

**The Gurahonț – Vașcău Corridor** begins from Gurahonț and ends at Criștioru de Jos. It has 40 km, and spreads on the area of the counties of Arad (the vast majority of the land) and Bihor and enters the valley of the Crișul Alb (the White Criș), then about 3 km East of the city Plescuta, on the Tăcășele valley, passing through Virfurile, then climbs the valley from Lazuri to Criștior passage (located on the borderline between the counties of Arad and Bihor) and continues up to Criștioru de Jos. It links Zarand depression and the southern limit of Beiuș depression, separating Zarandului and Bihor Mountains from Codru-Moma mountains.

Crișul Alb<sup>3</sup> river passes through a defile, on a distance of about 8 km, the pass between Gurahonț and immediately southwest of the place Gura Văii. Wading the river is not recommended, and forcing this sector is not advised. The bottom of the river consists of mountain blocks, in some places rocks. Crișul Alb (the White Criș) passes the communication even at the eastern edge of the place Gurahonț, where there is a reinforced concrete bridge with a length of 26 m and a width of 6 m. Over the stream of the river one can only lay small bridges specific to mountain hunters.

At the exit from the western part of the place Gurahonț there is a flooded area of 443 ha. The danger of flooding is higher in April-May and September, especially when it rains frequently.

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<sup>3</sup> The average width is of about 38 m, depth of 0,50 m and a flow rate of 10 m<sup>3</sup>/ second. The banks of the rivers are steep, sometimes abrupt, with great heights of 6 – 10 m from the river.



Tăcășele brook and Valea de la Lazuri brook pose particular problems only in the conditions of heavy rain or when the snow melts, when the flow of the brooks can be three time higher.

The fog persists longer between Gura Văii und Vidra. In the seasons of heavy rainfall, Tăcășele brook can bring high floods which cover road sections or damage the communication. From Avram Iancu to Criștioru de Jos the pass is crossed by the national road 76. Along this communication, all asphalted, one can travel in both directions. The bridges can withstand the maximum loading mass, being made of reinforced concrete. The radius of curves and the declivity pose no problems regarding travelling.

Possibilities of variants: If the sector between Gurahonț and Criștior pass is closed, the pass can be passed using the variant: Gurahonț – Zimbru – Avram Iancu – Criștioru de Jos, road in good conditions almost all year round, with two lanes, with a distance of about 38 km.

If the place Virfurile is blocked, one can make a detour on the direction: the western edge of the place Vidra-Magulicea – 2,5 km NE from Virfurile. The detour route is of about 5 km and is mainly made of a gravel road, generally in good condition, with two-lanes.





Figure 3. The Gurahonț-Vaşcău Corridor

**The pass Moldovenеști (Arieșeni) – Cîmpeni – Nucet** ( on the valley of the river Arieș), begins at 2 km North of the place Moldovenеști and ends North-West of Nucet. The pass follows the Arieș Valley, up to the locality Botesti (confluence between Arieșul Mare (Big Arieș) and Arieșul Mic (Small Arieș) ), then enters the Valley of Arieșul Mare up to Vîrtop pass (1160 m), located on the borderline between the counties of Alba and Bihor, then it continues on the Valley of Crișul Băița, passes through the pass located at an altitude of 1296 m, which is 7 km NE of Nucet and reaches the Northeastern entrance of Nucet locality.



**Figure 4.** The pass Moldovenеști (Arieșeni) – Cîmpeni – Nucet

It is the longest pass in the country, measuring 141 km, crossing the counties of Cluj, Alba and Bihor, separating the Big Mountain and Pades Plateau from the Trascau and Bihor Mountains. It also connects the Transilvania Plateau and Beiuș depression, crossing the Apuseni Mountains.

The Arieș river has a length of 133 km in the pass, its route passes almost entirely through this valley, it spring from the Bihor Mountains and follows the southern slopes of the Big Mountain and the northern ones of the Metaliferi and Trascaului Mountains.

The pass is crossed, along its entire route, by the national road 75, asphalted and modernized, with two lanes, which does not raise any problems regarding the travelling of any category of technique, the curves have a minimum radius of 25 meters, the slope is between 7 and 9%, which allows the travelling of all types of machinery at an average speed of about 30 km/h.

Between Moldoveneşti and Cîmpeni (on a distance of 72 km) there is the narrow section of railway which links Turda and Abrud, but the transport possibilities are almost insignificant.

There are no detour possibilities of the pass with auto columns in the vicinity of its axis, the only possibilities being the hypo columns with samarized materials and by walking, but the routs are very long and impose long marches to make a detour of some short sectors of the pass.

**Bucea – Budureasa pass**, with a length of 51 km, which places itself in the area of Bihor county, separates the Vlădeasa Mountains from Pădurea Craiului Mountains and links Vadului depression to Beiuşului depression, it starts on the south of Bulz, takes the Iadului valley to Stâna de Vale and ends at the eastern edge of Budureasa locality.




Figure 5. Bucea – Budureasa pass

The pass is crossed by Iad river, whose springs start from the south-west of Piatra Craiului Peak (1463 m). On its upper flow, several waterfalls form, the most important is Iadolina, located at about 7 km upstream from Leșu lake<sup>4</sup>.

The Iad River, under normal circumstances, in terms of rainfall, does not raise problems regarding displacement along the pass, but in spring and autumn, on rainy weather, the floods, brought especially by its tribute Arieș, can cause significant disturbance to travelling, moving columns, and destroying roads. Obstructions with snow are possible on some sections of roads located about 5 km East from Budureasa locality, up to Stâna de Vale resort, and along the entire route between Iadolina waterfall and Bulz locality.

Crossing Iadolina river is possible on the whole route, with small facilities, except for the waterfall sectors, and Lesu accumulation area, where, understandably, this can not be done. The route which forms along the valley of the Iad river, paved road, crosses once the stream near Iadolina waterfall.

The roads along the pass are as follows: between Bulz and Remeti, asphalted road, with two lanes; between Budureasa and Stâna de Vale, for 12 km, also asphalted road, with two lanes; between Stâna de Vale and Remeti, with a length of 28 km, paved forest road, with the width of 2,75 – 3 m, which provides one lane. The minimum radius of the curves is of 15 m, with maximum declivities of 9%.

Taking into consideration its characteristics, the road allows the movement of the columns of vehicles at an average speed of 20 km/h.

The communication road along the pass: after leaving Budureasa until Stâna de Vale, this leads directly towards East, then suddenly changes the direction to North until it reaches the Crișul Repede valley. Between Budureasa and Stâna de Vale the communication is made on the ridge and in the lowland Stâna de Vale it becomes valley road, following the course of the river Iad.

In case the pass or part of it is closed/blocked, there are several options such as:

a). *in case the sector between Bulz and Remeti* is closed the alternative through the Eastern part of the pass is along Ciucea, Valea Drăganului, Lunca Vișagului, Remeti, 44 km long. The road is completely paved with asphalt and the existing curves allow the circulation of any type of technical convoys pertaining to all kind of units, with a single exception in the sector Dealul Caprei, at 1232 m, especially during winter, where the maximum steepness of 11% requires special precautions related to powerful traction vehicles and strong road grip.

b). *in case the area of the Leșu Lake dam* does not offer the possibility to cross the pass, the entire itinerary between Bucea and Budureasa can be redirected towards Borod – Bratca – Damiș, then on the Sohodol valley until Roșia, reaching Beiuș hollow. This mean of communication is 35 km long, 10 of which are paved with asphalt, the rest being gravel road with only one lane, allowing the access through the pass but at a low speed, resulting in few vehicles in a long time span.

The pass allows debusing from Crișul Negru valley in Crișul Repede valley and vice versa, area where are found 11 caves which can be used in need for military purposes.

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<sup>4</sup> Through the dam built about 5 km south-west from Remeti locality, Lesu lake developed, with an approximate surface of 1,5 km<sup>2</sup> and a volume of 28.300.00 cubic meters of water, at a normal level of retention. If the Lesu dam would tear apart, the flood wave would propagate to the Valley of Crișul Negru, with devastating effects along the entire route

From the point of view of military actions, the Bucea – Budureasa pass offers a lot of manoeuver possibilities inside its own apparatus or of the enemy, in case it enters the national territory. At the same time, this pass connects the two main operational directions: Oradea –

Ciucea – Huedin – Cluj-Napoca and Salonta – Beiuș – Virfurile, enabling to take action over the enemy who launches its defensive in Pădurea Craiului and Vlădeasa Mountains.

**Huedin – Albac Pass** starts South of Călățele (15 km South of Huedin) and ends at Albac. It follows the valley of Călata river and one of its tributary until Dealul Negru Pass (1099 m) in Gilău Mountains, turning round through the Eastern part of Fintinele Lake, then winds up on the valley of Beliș river until Poiana Horea, from which it continues on Apa Caldă valley, until the pass at 1294 m (Biharia Massif) and down, on the valley of Albac river, until the locality with the same name. The entrance in the pass from North-East can be also made on the direction: Gilău, Someșul Rece, the Eastern bank of Fintinele Lake. On this direction, the course takes the Southern bank of Gilău Lake, then on Someșul Cald valley, until the Western border of Tarnița Lake, it continues approximately 7 km on the Southern bank of the lake, it reaches Mărișel, then enters the main course of the pass.

The pass crosses over Gilău Mountains and separates Vlădeasa Mountains of Muntele Mare, then crosses over Biharia Massif. Between Călățele and Albac it measures 60 km, and between the localities Gilău and Albac, 89 km.

Along the pass, on the direction Huedin – Beliș run Călata river, having its stream near Dealul Negru Pass, and its tributary, crossing several times through the pass for 13 km. The average width of the river is between 15 and 30 m, in good weather conditions, its depth not exceeding 60 cm, during summer, in normal rainy conditions, and the speed of the water course is of 1,5 – 1,6 m/s, on the bottom of the river being only rocks. The annual average river flow is of approximately 1 mc/s. Along the pass there is only one ford which enables river crossing near the locality Călățele, where the river has a width of 25 m, a depth of 30 cm, steep banks and its bottom is made of rocks. In the same area of Călățele, Călata river has a regular course for a distance of almost 1,5 km, through a mud and stone dam, 3 m high.


Entering the pass from Gilău, the itinerary goes on along the Someșul Mic valley, for 3 km, until the dam of Gilău Lake. On this distance, the river is 45 meters wide, the average depth (in normal weather conditions) is of approximately 1 m and the annual average flow is of 19,3 m<sup>3</sup>/s, the speed of the water being of 1,2 m/s. In this section there are no fords to cross over. It continues with Someșul Cald river which on a distance of almost 12 km connects the lakes Gilău and Fintinele. The depth of Someșul Cald river is of almost 30 cm, with a width of approximately 40 m.

Also in the pass, starting from the South-Western part of Fintinele Lake, runs the Beliș river with an average width of 15 m, a depth of 60 cm, a flow of 2,3 m/s and a water speed of approximately 1,5 m/s, having on its bottom only rocks. Crossing over this river is possible in certain sectors.

The locality Poiana Horea represents the junction area of the rivers Ticău, Apa Caldă and Beliș. From this sector, the course of the pass is crossed by Apa Caldă river for a distance of approximately 7 km, not representing though any military importance.



The Albac river runs from the Southern gorge of the pass near the refuge, in the area which practically separates Alba and Cluj counties, at approximately 3 km North of Mătișești, until Albac, where it flows into Arieșul Mare river. On this distance, the width of the river is between 7 and 15 m, the average width is of approximately 30 cm, and the speed of the current is between 1,3 – 1,5 m/s.



**Figure 6.** Huedin – Albac pass

There are several of natural and artificial lakes along the pass and the most important are:

- Gilău Lake, by blocking the watercourse of Someșul Cald, South of Gilău, approximately 1,8 km long, between 50 and 1100 m wide, runs on a surface of approximately 90 hectares, with an average depth of 4,5 m and an accumulation of water of approximately 4.000.000 m<sup>3</sup>, the dam being 11 m high was made of reinforced concrete and generally used to supply with water the city of Cluj-Napoca;

- Tarnița Lake, by blocking the same watercourse, upstream of its junction with Râșca river. The lake is almost 7 km long, with a maximum width of almost 350 m, over a surface of more than 320 hectares, 33 m deep and a water accumulation of more than 74.000.000 m<sup>3</sup>, the height of the dam being of 92

meters and 236 m long, is made of reinforced concrete and it is mainly used in the production of energy.

- Fîntinele Lake, is the biggest accumulation lake in the area, being built in the South-Western part of Beliș, by blocking Someșul Cald and Beliș rivers. This lake splits into two accumulations: one along Someșul Cald valley, East to Smida (approximately 15 km), and the other one along Beliș river (approximately 95, km), the maximum width of the lake being a little bit over 4 km. The total surface of this lake is of approximately 815 hectares, having the depth of approximately 27 meters, accumulating almost 220.000.000 m<sup>3</sup> of water. The dam is 410 m long and 92 m wide. It is made of rockfill and reinforced concrete, being mainly a defense against floods and used in the production of energy.

The three big, natural lakes can be used especially in campaigns in order to decontaminate the personnel, ammunition, battle techniques and materials.

The pass is crossed, between Călățele and Albac, by the county road 108, long of 80 km, of which approximately 60 de km are paved with asphalt, the rest being gravel road in a good state. The steepness and angle of the curves allow the circulation of mixed convoys. Problems may appear while crossing the pass at the border between Alba and Cluj counties, where the slopes have a minimum radius under 20 m and the maximum steepness is 10 % on the entire sector of the pass. The communication sector is crossed by the county road 107 P, between Gilău and the Eastern bank of Fîntinele Lake, where it merges with the country road 108, being paved with asphalt on its entire length (approximately 50 km), having curves with minimum radius of 20 m. The bridges are built of reinforced concrete and can support the maximum weight of 60 tons.

The most frequent snow-bounds are produced on the road sectors between Someșul Rece and Fîntinele Lake, also on the sectors Poiana Horea and Mățișești. Due to its characteristics along the pass, it is useful for convoys from the existing military equipment.


Along the pass the road ensures only one lane on the unpaved sectors, which allow the circulation at an average speed of approximately 20 km/h, on the sector Călățele, Beliș, Poiana Horea, Albac, and on the sector Someșul Rece – Fîntinele Lake, at an average speed of 30 km/h .

The travel itinerary along the pass can be varied as follows:

a) *in case the road sector between Călățele and Dealul Negru Pass (1099 m) is closed by blocking Dealul Negru Pass or the communications near Fîntinele Lake, an alternative to be considered is Călata, Buteni, Mărgău, Scind-Frăsinet, Răchițele, Muncelul Mare Pass (1542 m), along Firei stream, the valley of Someșul Cald river, Poiana Horea. This section measures 60 km, using in this purpose the county road 108 C, paved with asphalt on a distance of approximately 20 km, the rest being gravel road. The rest of the itinerary until Poiana Horea is crossed by a single roadway. On this section can pass convoys with maximum weight of 10 tons.*

b) *in case the road sector between Someșul Cald and Mărișel is closed, it can be varied on the direction: Someșul Rece locality, Valea Someșului Rece, Mărișel, along the county road 107 N, then on the communal road 110 A, until Mărișel. This itinerary allows the circulation of convoys with an average speed of 15-25 km/h, but it poses difficulties on the sector Măguri, Răcătau, Mărișel, where the curves have the minimum radius under 20 m, and the steepness exceeds 11%.*

**Ciucea Pass**<sup>5</sup> between the localities Poieni and Borod (approximately 30 km) runs along the valley of Crișul Repede until Bucea, then through Piatra Craiului pass at the height of 512 m and reaches the locality Borod.



**Figure 7.** Ciucea pass

The pass crosses over Cluj and Bihor counties, separating Șes Mountain and Meseș Mountains from Pădurea Craiului and Vlădeasa Mountains by making the connection between Huedin and Vadului hollow.

In the pass, Crișul Repede river has an average width of 65 m, a depth until 1 meter and a flow of 12,5 m<sup>3</sup>/s. The main fords are at Bologa (70 m wide, 0,40 m deep, the bottom is of ballast, the speed of the current is of 1,2 m/s and the bank is smooth, without beaches) and Negreni (50 m wide, 0,50 m deep, the bottom of the ford is of rocks, the speed of the current is of 1,1 m/s and the banks are smooth). On the above mentioned fords can pass, after some small adjustments are made, the entire military technique on wheels and caterpillars.

<sup>5</sup> Specialists consider to be more appropriate this denomination instead of Borod – Brăișoru, because Brăișoru locality is not positioned on the trajectory of the pass, but adjacent to it, and the pass does not practically start from that point.



The Borod river crosses over the pass for a length of only 6 km and does not present difficulties for military convoys.

The itinerary along the pass favours the movement of troops in secret and the defensive against air assaults from the enemy is made especially through the spreading of the subunits and usage of the natural shelters existing in the area.

The pass is crossed by the national road 1 which is modernized, paved with asphalt, with the width of the roadway of 7 m and 2 lanes along it. In the pass are 5 bridges with a total length of 120 m, 3 of which are made of reinforced concrete and the other of stone, all supporting the total weight established for vehicles within units and bigger tactical units.

Along the road are 21 curves with the radius of 35-50 m, all being between Ciucea and Borod. The maximum steepness is of 7% and it can be found at 56 + 440 and 57 + 200 kilometers. Snow-bounds frequently produce between km 56 and km 57.

On this route can pass the technique of the unities and bigger tactical and operational units, in every weather conditions.

Due to its characteristics, the communication in the pass allows an average speed of 25 km per hour and a capacity of 185 vehicles per hour (4440 vehicles in 24 hours).

The pass is crossed by a simple railway with a normal gauge, which between Poieni and Bucea runs parallel with the national road1. From Bucea point, the railway enters Crișul Repede strait, crossing it until Vadu Crișului, where it runs closer to the road. Between the two localities, the railway measures 38 km and runs through 2 tunnels, the first long of 270 m, and the second one of 185 m.

The possible routes of the pass or some of its sectors:

a) *in case the sector between Ciucea and Cornișel* (21 km long) is closed (blocked), this can be redirected 3 km South-West of Ciucea, Valea Drăganului, Remeți, Bulz. Bratca, 1 km West of Cornișel. The route measures 60 km, 55 km of which are paved with asphalt. On the entire itinerary, the circulation can be simultaneously made on 2 lanes, with an average speed of 20 km per hour, enabling a capacity of almost 175 vehicles per hour (4200 vehicles in 24 hours).

b) *in case the sector 2 km North-West of Bucea and Cornișel* (6 km long) is closed due to the blockage of Piatra Craiului Pass (512 m), it can be redirected towards Valea Crișului, Delureni, 2 km North-Est of Borod, on a distance of 12 km, 7 km of which are unpaved.

The characteristics of the terrain, the width and depth of the pass, the viability status of communication along the pass and the access possibilities outside communications, determine that this pass ensures the battle actions of a big tactical unity.

The Ciucea Pass is on one of the main directions of enemy penetration in the Somes Gate, well individualized, the peaks of Șes Mountains in the North and Pădurea Craiului in the South, channeling, mandatory, the action from West through this pass. It can be, thus, traced a new direction starting West from Oradea, through this pass and reaching Cluj, where it has multiple possibilities to spread in Transilvania Plateau.

The common elements for all the passes are the industrial and drinking water sources, because along the passes are several wells of small depth and we can also find construction materials in abundance such as rock, ballast, sand and wood, necessary especially for construction campaigns.

The defense of the passes, as in the case of the other passes, is made at the entrance, on the third most important alignment from the border which crosses on the Meseș and Vlădeasa Mountains, being a strong line, on solid terrain, allowing the enemy few manoeuvre possibilities, especially due to the Șes and Pădurea Craiului Mountains.

In case the enemy manages to enter in the pass, our own troops can fight back along it until the exit in Huedin hollow, where they have defensive possibilities from the adjacent heights.

Attacking the enemy penetrating the Ciucea pass can be made on the direction Cluj-Napoca, Huedin, Oradea, Borș, strongly connected to the other directions from the Someș Gate.

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