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## THE HISTORY OF REGIONALIZATION IN FRANCE

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
**Abstract:** France is still the example of a centralized state for everyday people. Indeed, high rate of centralization has been a constant element of the French state and public administration for centuries. Regional efforts observable in the Middle Ages were always suppressed by the central power of France.

**Key words:** regeneration, decentralization, region, history

\* \* \* \* \*

### THE MIDDLE AGES / ANCIEN RÉGIME

The French state has been strongly centralized since its formation. Many French researchers think that survival of France has been helped by the strong centralization of the power (Duby, 1968; Mandrou, 1999; Pinchemel, 1980).



**Figure 1.** The Provinces of the Ancien Régime

France was formed following the partition of the Frank Empire in 843 around the centre of the royal estates of the Capeting House in Paris and its surroundings drawing in this way the silhouette of the later France. One of the main characteristic of royal administration was that it ceased nothing even if a new public administration system was created the old one remained untouched. This caused that until the Revolution several public administration systems in force simultaneously in France (*Province, Rate province, Electoral province, different tax districts/Jurisdictional districts*).

### THE REVOLUTION / LA REVOLUTION

As early as 1787 a tax reform organised the county network that had the task to determine tax shares. One of the major achievements of the Revolution was the formation of the *département*, i.e. the county. Several unsuccessful attempts were performed in the 1770s and 1780s. Principle blocks in the way of reforms were the privileges of provinces that were swept away by the declaration of resigning the rights issued on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1789. In this way creation of the county network became possible. Constituent National Assembly established 83 *départements* (counties) in the country. Large historical provinces – maybe not accidentally – were cut into several parts and around 2-5 *départements* in average were formed in their area in accordance to the principle that any settlements of the county should be reached there and back by a day's continuous ride (Revel, J. 1992).




Figure 2. Counties of France in 1791

Boundaries of historical provinces were respected when counties were formed. The aim was to establish a modern administration. The act issued on 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1789 established 75-83 counties in the country and then the act issued on 26<sup>th</sup> February 1790 created 83 counties and the constitution issued in 1791

consecrated them and thus the public administration chaos so characteristic in France was swept away by the Constituent National Assembly (Sobul, 1961).

They established system decentralized the power to some extent and the original aim creating the counties was to establish a real local self-administration according to the requirements of the age. According to the original plans, a council elected for 2 years would have led the counties. Representatives of the central power could have not sentence the counties but the Jacobins started and Napoleon completed the centralization of the counties. The act issued on 17<sup>th</sup> February 1800 stated that the central government names all the administrative organizations of the county. (Federalist revolution in 1793 was not against the county system but the overgrowth of the power of Paris.) This act served as the basis for the public administration system of France until the end of the III republic.


Region disappeared from France for 150 years and although numerous regionalist tendencies occurred, their ability to enforce interests against the centralist state was very limited.

### **BEGINNING OF REGIONALIZATION (XVIII CENTURY)**

In this strongly centralized situation occurrence of regionalism was postponed until the time of World War I. Regionalism was induced by the demand for economic development in France therefore it advanced haltingly. Regionalism in modern sense occurred only in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century in France. First steps towards regionalism were taken at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century. In 1871 the inter-county conference was institutionalized with the aim to give more effective solutions to problems occurring in several counties. This conference was voluntary as counties were not obligated to take part. However, the county system serving the central power became exploded gradually. In 1900 the Fédération Régional France (Regional Federation of France) was founded (Marignier-Oozuf, 1992). Its founder and leader, Charles Brun recommended to create 20 regions with retaining the republic. These regions would have a certain extent of separateness (would have elected general assembly). He imagined the creation of regions with the elimination of the counties. Central power would have been represented by the prefect who would have supervised the decisions and measures of the regions as well. His ideas were not realized. Occurrence of regionalism was prolonged until the end of World War I.

### **FIRST HALF OF THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY (1900-1944)**

In April 1919 the French government established a regional economic organization for fulfilling the tasks of military management. This alignment of 17 regional economic groups was based on the union of trade chambers of the counties forming the county. These regions are named Clémentel regions after their creator (Minister Etienne Clémentel). Their main task was to develop industry, trade and the economic life, they were not legal entities, they had no separate organization and they had no adequate financial support to meet the requirements of their tasks thus they cannot be regarded as real regions. In 1922 based on the 17 Clémentel regions, 19 economic regions were created that were legal entities and their responsibility in industry and trade was extended (associations of counties founded in 1926 were substituted by inter-county institutions in 1930 and this system was operated parallel to regions).



**Figure 3.** The Region of Clementel (1922)

In 1938 twenty economic regions were established with uniting the trade chambers forming the regions into a public institution (act issued on 14<sup>th</sup> June). Their task was to enforce regional interests by public power (Sipos, 1993; Navracscics, 1996). During World War II the majority of regionalists backed the Petain system against insubordinates therefore after 1945 regionalism as a political trend turned out to be “unpopular”. Unsuccessful regionalization attempt of the Vichy republic wished to form twenty regions based on the old French provinces (act issued on 19<sup>th</sup> April 1941). Despite its lack of success the act established the institute of region prefect. Economic, police and public functions were covered for several counties by the region prefects who were chosen from the county prefects (12 in the obsessed and 6 in the “free” areas). Police and economic intendants helped the work of region prefects. Undoubted benefit of the Petain system was that certain regions – even if for only a short time period – broke away from the influence of Paris. Certain level of separateness developed that was not lost following liberation either.

### **SECOND HALF OF THE 20<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY (1944-1982)**

Successor of the region prefect system was the system of republic commissioners established by the decree of 10<sup>th</sup> January – 6<sup>th</sup> June 1944. Task of republic commissioners was to co-ordinate and control the work of region prefects. In 1947 an act was prepared on handing the rights of prefects over to elected representatives but it was not submitted when as a result of a strike series throughout the country the institute of emergency administrative major inspectorate (21<sup>st</sup> March 1948 → I.G.A.M.E) the task of which was to keep order (Gravier J.F. 1970). From 1964 this task was covered by the region prefects. In the 1950s changes happened in economic development that had major influence on French regionalism and on creating the later French regions. The idea was raised to perform regional development in the framework of economic planning – control. As a result it was necessary to create regional economic control districts

and their regional institutions. In 1955 counties were squeezed into 22 program regions in accordance with regional development policy (decree of 30<sup>th</sup> June 1955 → 21 regions + Paris). In the case of regional institutions, inter-county conferences (meeting of the prefects of the counties that formed the region) were established (decree of 7<sup>th</sup> January 1959) but there was no harmony in this regional dissection of the country. In 1958 the new constitution acknowledges the region, however, only as means of economic development (4<sup>th</sup> September 1958). In 1960 program regions of 1955 were substituted by 21 regional operational (action) districts (21 regions + Paris). Between 1955 and 1960 regions were formed mainly as a result of pressure from the EEC. These were organised on economic basis and every other aspects important in regionalization were subordinate. To the recommendation of Charles deGaulle the DATAR was established in 1963 in order to eliminate economic differences and to harmonize regional development (Noin, 1984, 1996; Merlin & Choay, 2010).



**Figure 4.** The program regions



**Figure 5.** The action districts

This was an organization between ministries and it was lead directly by the Prime Minister. Then decree No. 64/251 was issued entitled “*on the structure of state administration in the regional district*” (14<sup>th</sup> March 1964) (Fonyó, 1976; Balázs, 1981). This public administration reform established 22 regional public administration districts. The region was lead by the prefect, he was the only one with decision rights and he was the representative of the state. The prefect enforces economic policy of the state and has control and governing rights as well. Prefect of the central county of the region was also the prefect of the region itself. This reform forms no new regional authority with legal entity rights. This is in reality an administration deconcentration and not decentralization. Three new agencies were formed: The region prefect who is the representative of the state power and has decision and control rights; the regional administration conference that is the assistant organization of the region prefect, its task was to help and co-ordinate the work of state public service in the region; and the regional economic and development committee that represent local interests in regional economic development (CODER)

(Joseph, 1967). It has consultation rights and is entitled to submit recommendations for regional planning (decree No. 64/252). The region of Paris was reorganised in 1964 (decree of 10<sup>th</sup> July 1964). The new region was formed from 8 counties located in 3 areas along the Seine and Oise, the Seine and the Seine – Marne rivers: Paris Seine et Marne, Ivelines, Essonne, Hauts-de Seine, Seine-Saint Denis, Val-de-Marne, Val d'oise. Then from 1964 Paris have a special right as it becomes a county and a city together. (1932: Planning and development borders of the Paris region were 35km away from the city 1941: Planning and development area of the Paris region were extended and transformed into county and district borders as well 1961: Paris capital region is established (Gravier J. F. 1972) (decree of 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1961 that is transformed into the Île de France region (decree 6<sup>th</sup> May 1976) in 1976).

In 1969 president deGaulle submitted a reform plan that would have made the regions real administration units. The reform plan was rejected by a referendum (46.83%) and deGaulle resigned. Thus significant changes did not occur in the history of French regions until 1972. Except for the separation of Corsica from the region Provence Cote d'Azur. In 1972 at the time of president Georges Pompidou the region becomes a legal entity in the status of a public institution (act No. 1962/6. 5.). Its authority remained mainly economic and regional development (regional development and economic issues affecting the region). This measure can be regarded only as deconcentration as executive power remained in the hands of the prefect but he has to consider the consultation right of the newly formed Regional Council as well. Economic and social committee was also established that included the tasks of the regional economic development committee as well formed in 1964 (CODER). Regional administration conference became a consultation organization after 1972. The region was an economic-administration agency controlled by the state. Its tasks were preparing and executing economic plans. The region as a public institution has an own budget voted by the regional council.


### **DECENTRALIZATION AND REGIONALIZATION – DEFERRE REFORMS**

In the program of the socialist party winning the elections in 1981 reforming public administration had an important role. One aim was to start decentralization for which further three aims were set. Regions have to be transformed into territorial communities; elected executive boards have to be formed in the regions and in the states and state supervision has to be ceased. This reform package reformed all of the regional governments.

Regions became fully territorial local government authorities as a result of decentralization but they operated as public institutions until the first regional election in 1986. Regions as a result of reforms became “adults”, i.e. had free self administration similarly to counties and settlements. Regional councils formed in 1972 were elected for 6 years by general and direct elections. Rights of county and regional general assemblies were extended in 1982, executive rights were handed to the presidents of these bodies therefore prefects had only control rights (act of 2<sup>nd</sup> March 1982).

As a consequence of the Deferre reforms regions were transformed from public institutions into “regional governments”. In July 1982 role of regions in the field of technological research development was decided and public administration classification of Paris, Marseille and Lyon was reorganised, i.e. districts were formed. Authority share among settlements-county-region was regulated by an act in 1983 (acts of 7<sup>th</sup> January 1983 and of 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1983). Regions' responsibility: continuous professional training, skilled worker training, public education

(lyceums), onshore fishing and the issue of marine cultures company (Vital-Durand E. 2004). In 1984 the region receives rights regarding physical education and sport management (act of 16<sup>th</sup> July 1984). In 1985 reform of the election system planned long before was performed – changing the act of election was necessary due to the first regional election in 1986. Decrees regulated the issuing of mandates for members of the regional council. Regions have an authority block including all authorities regarding economic planning, economic activity and education \*\*\*.



**Figure 6.** The reigons of France in 2010

### **NEW MOMENTUM FOR DECENTRALIZATION (2002-2003)**

In 2002, 20 years after the Deferre reforms the opinion was that French decentralization has to have a new direction. For this the basis was prepared by several acts on regional planning and regional development in the 1990s involving inhabitants as much as possible. These were topped by the modifications of the constitution in 2002-2003. Constitutional review act plan of 2002 wished to create a specific state model in order to intensify decentralization that declares decentralized organizations while it differs from both regionalized and federal states with that a decision making centre remains although decentralization is declared. This declaration has two important elements: subsidiarity and regional co-operation of equal parties. It was ensured that no public administration unit controls another one. The plan was accepted on 6<sup>th</sup> November 2002 and the constitution was modified in 2003\*\*\*\*. The first paragraph involved that the state was decentralized. Paragraph 72 was modified in several points (principle of subsidiarity was included into the constitution, situation of the representative of the state was solved, principle of not establishing authority without adequate financial measures was included in paragraph 72/2, no local government can regulate another one, however, co-operation is possible, i.e. this contained the right of trial and right of citizen petition was introduced as well). The part regarding overseas territories was also modified in chapter XII. Modifications were

accepted on 17<sup>th</sup> March 2003. In that year further four constitutional acts were accepted and regions received new authorities regarding economic development and professional training. However, the issue of Corsica still waits for settlement.

### SUMMARY

Regionalization and parallel decentralization in France achieved significant success in the past 50 years as not only economy but political power was decentralized as well. However, central power still remains strong. Cities in the French hexagon function as counter balances against Paris regarding economy. Role of départements was reduced in the favour of regions both in public administration and in economy. The region has proved to be successful as a separate regional unit. Way of successful future for France is in a regionalized state therefore continuing regionalization is necessary considering both economic-social-cultural and political aspects.

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## **MAKING AN EUROPEAN COUNTRY IN THE CAUCASUS: THE GEORGIAN EXPERIENCE**

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**Abstract:** The aim of the article is to investigate and explain the Georgian aspiration to join the European Union. The research is divided into three parts: 1) exploring the European identity of Georgia; 2) describing the process of consolidation of Georgian democracy needed for the integration into EU; 3) investigating the new developments in the geopolitical scenario and looking at some obstacles to the Georgian "europeanization". It was clear from the very first moment that independent Georgia had a strong will to move toward the West and after the collapse of Soviet Union it gradually changed its identity from Post-Soviet to European. Georgians consider themselves as Europeans, especially when it comes to identity. The results of this research show that, despite the new developments in the international geopolitical scenario and in the Georgian government and presidency, the idea that Georgia's will to continue its path to the European Union is lower than before doesn't reflect accurately the country's reality. This indeed is a myth and needs to be dispelled. On the contrary, judging from the latest developments of the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, Georgia remains by far the most motivated country, in its geographical area, to join European institutions.

**Key words:** Georgia, European Eastern Partnership, Vilnius Summit, Eurasian Union

\* \* \* \* \*

### **INTRODUCTION**

The following paper is about the "European identity" of Georgia and the process of Europeanization in the Country. The Georgian path to European culture and institutions seemed to be consolidated at least until the elections of October 2012. As soon as the new Prime Minister Bdzina Ivanishvili came into power, it has been said that Georgia would not continue in its previously defined pro-European, pro-democracy and pro-reform orientation. Furthermore, the creation of a new Eurasian Customs Union lead by Russia – that wants to transform it into an Eurasian Union by 2015 as a political counterpart to the European Union –, as well as its recourse to the consistent tactic of boycotting the neighbors to gain political leverage or its pressure to the former Soviet

republic included in the European Eastern Partnerships, increased the fear that Georgia would end its way toward European Union.

The research is divided into three parts. The first part is about the process of nation-building in order to construct a European identity in Georgia, starting with an overview of the geographical position of the country and its belonging to the European or Asian continent. Later, the study follows with analyzing the presence in Georgia of European culture since ancient times and focuses on the importance to feel and to be European for Georgian people. The second part of the paper continues the discussion about European identity and shows the power of this identity in implementing and building a democratic European country. The final goal of this process is the integration into EU institutions, a top political priority since Georgia regained its independence after the collapse of Soviet Union. This part discusses the history of relationships between European Union and Georgia and the process of consolidation of democracy in the country. The last part aims to investigate and to describe the current geopolitical scenario around Georgia, focusing on the creation of the Eurasian Customs Union and on the recent developments of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius on 28- 29 November, 2013.

Most of the research for this paper is based on fieldworks in Georgia (2009, 2010 and 2013) and open sources, also embracing innovative methodological approaches to very substantive content analyses of journalistic texts. Sections of it are based on extended interviews the author took with political actors, diplomats and members of the local scientific community in Georgia. In most cases, these interviews were conducted on the record and published. Sometimes there were multiple interviews with the same individuals. In particular, official and recorded interviews were held with the ex-President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze (2009), with Mr. Irakli Alasania, Minister of Defense since 2012 (in 2010 and in 2013), with the Minister for Integration in EU and Nato Alexi Petriashvili (2013), with the Georgian Ambassador in Italy Mr. Konstantine Gabashvili (2011) and several times with the Georgian Ambassador to the Holy See, Ketevan Bagrationi de Moukhrani. Part of the materials used for this paper is contained in the author's Doctorate Thesis: *"La Georgia nell'attuale scenario internazionale: una analisi geopolitica e geoeconomica"* (Georgia in the new international scenario: a geopolitical and geo-economics analysis).

### **GEORGIA: EUROPE OR ASIA?**

From the historical and cultural perspectives Georgia considers itself – and is partly considered – as a European country. More controversial is whether it is a European country also from a geographical point of view. In this regard, debate is still open among scholars in Physical Geography and Geology.

The eastern borders of Europe have been defined in various ways since ancient times. Herodotus believed that Europe was extended till the Oriental Ocean. Bonacci (1923, 5) believed that: "Europe has well-defined boundaries of three parts - the Arctic Sea, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean - but uncertain in the East, where as extreme points are indicated the rivers Manych and Ural and the Ural Mountains, beyond them Asia stretches out". Today there is a consensus in defining as eastern borders of Europe the Aegean Sea, the Black Sea and the Ural mountain range, but the confines between these last two are uncertain: for the limit between the Ural mountains and the Black sea have been proposed, for instance, the Don, the depression of the Kuma-Manych, the

Caucasus, Russia's borders or the river Rioni in Georgia. One of the official definitions proposed in 1730 by the geographer Philip Johan von Strahlenberg and adopted by Tsarina Anna I of Russia, considers the Euro-Asiatic borders going from Baydaratskaya Guba, on the Kara sea, following the eastern side of the Ural mountains and then the Ural river south until the Mugodzhar hills; following the Emba river to the Caspian sea; from the Caspian sea through the Kuma-Manych depression to the tip of the sea of Azov, joining with the Black sea. In this case Georgia is not included in the European part of Eurasia.

Professor Thomas V. Gamkrelidze, a member of Parliament in Tbilisi, in 2009 presented to the Parliament a scientific document<sup>1</sup> in which the question of the geographical belonging of Georgia at the European continent was exactly addressed. This question is extremely important and frequently debated, especially as far as the accession of Georgia to the European Union, as well as its increasing integration into European structures, are concerned. In this document Gamkrelidze, starting from the classical Greek mythology, according to which the boundary between Europe and Asia was along the river Phasis in Cochide (that can be identified with the modern Rioni in Georgia or with even southernmost Georgian rivers, such as Chorocki or Kura), concludes that a large part of Georgia belongs to the European continent (although – Gamkrelidze adds – it would not be incorrect to refer to Europe and Asia as a single continent: the Eurasia). Considering, in fact, the Euro-Asiatic border along the crossing point of Surami (the Caucasian watershed) or on the line of the rivers Kura and Rioni, then a large part of Georgian territory would fall into Europe.

Indeed, one of the unofficial definitions proposes the following eastern border of Europe: from Baydaratskaya Guba, on the Kara Sea, following the eastern side of the Ural mountains and then the Ural river south until the Mugodzhar hills; following the Emba river to the Caspian sea; following the Kura river from its mouth on the Caspian sea, through the Surami passage to the Qvirila river; following the Qvirila river to its mouth by Poti on the Black sea. In this case about 70% of Georgia is located within Europe (Table 1, Figure 1).

**Table 1.** European trans-continental states considering the eastern border of Europe through Surami passage

(Source: Author's elaboration based on World Gazetteer, Statistics of administrative units, towns and cities)


Country	Total area (kmq)	Area in Asia (kmq)	Area in Asia (%)	Area in Europe (kmq)	Area in Europe (%)
<b>Georgia</b>	69.700	20.460	29,35	49.240	70,65
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	86.600	46.870	54,12	39.730	45,88
<b>Russia</b>	17.075.200	13.115.200	76,81	3.960.000	23,19
<b>Kazakhstan</b>	2.717.300	2.346.927	86,37	370.373	13,63
<b>Turchia</b>	780.580	756.768	96,95	23.812	3,05
<b>Armenia</b>	29.800	29.800	100	0	0
<b>Cyprus</b>	9.251	9.251	100	0	0

Apart from geographical considerations, Georgia claims to be European especially from social and political standpoints. As it will be better described in the following section, historically Kartvelian people (the ancient Georgians) were strongly influenced by Hellenistic culture, considered the cradle of European culture and civilization. In addition, the eastern Christianity, including the

<sup>1</sup> Gamkrelidze T.V., Georgia: Europe or Asia?,

[http://www.parliament.ge/pages/archive\\_en/C\\_D/europe.htm](http://www.parliament.ge/pages/archive_en/C_D/europe.htm), last visit 22 October 2013.

Georgian one, came into contact with the cultural and religious traditions related to the Byzantine period. Then, as Professor Gamkrelidze concludes in his document, “Georgia's accession into European institutions serves as a corroboration of the Georgian state always included into the European part of the Eurasian continent, in other words, recognition of our traditional *Europeanness*” (Gamkrelidze, 2009, 2).




**Figure 1.** Geographical and political boundaries of Europe considering the eastern border of Europe through Surami passage.  
(Source: Alinor, Electionworld, Wikimedia.org)

### **GEORGIA: EUROPE STARTED HERE**

Georgians claim their “Europeanness” and believe they have the right to join the European institutions much more than other countries such as Turkey and Moldova. Since the proclamation of Georgia as an independent and sovereign state, Kartvelian scholars could freely search and find the roots of their own people in order to reaffirm Georgian identity that the Soviet Union unsuccessfully tried to choke and to confirm to the world that European culture has deep roots in the country. Their aim is also to assume that Europe - both physically and culturally - originates in Georgia. One of the most popular tourist headline - with strong political implications - says: “Georgia: Europe started here” (Figure 2).

Georgians consider themselves as Europeans at least from three different points of view:

- from a geographical standpoint, if we place the border between Europe and Asia on the pass of Surami, as described in the previous section, about the 70% of Georgian territory would fall into Europe;



**Figure 2.** Slogan: “Europe started here”

(Source: main slogan of [www.georgia.travel.ge](http://www.georgia.travel.ge), official tourism web-site in Georgia, 2011).

- from a religious point of view Georgia developed into one of the major Christian states and cultural centers. Georgia is a Christian nation since 327, although surrounded by Muslim states, except for Armenia. “Byzantine cultural traditions took shape through a merger of this symbolic culture with eastern Christianity, embracing the countries exposed to the eastern Christianity area, including Georgia” (Gamkrelidze, 2009, 2);

- from an historical and cultural perspective, in Georgia are located the old territories of Iberia and Colchis (the latter linked to the myth of the Argonauts and the Golden Fleece), which in ancient times belonged to - or at least, in the case of easternmost territories, were strongly influenced for commercial and cultural reasons by - Magna Grecia (cradle of European culture and civilization) and, later, the Byzantine Empire.

We can also add the recent discovery of the Dmanisi hominids which, for some scientists, shows how migration from Africa to Europe of the primordial man passed through the lands that now belong to Georgia before moving to the West.<sup>2</sup>

Beyond the way Georgians have built their European identity, what is striking is the determination of these people – and sometimes the obstinacy – with which they feel part of the European culture and the equally strong will to be integrated into European Union. In no other country of the former Soviet Union (with the exception, of course, of Baltic countries) there is such a strong political and popular motivation. In Tbilisi European Union flags are raised alongside Georgian ones on practically every public building - from schools to Parliament. The local population is almost unanimous in saying: “We are Georgians, then we are Europeans”. A questionnaire administered by the author in September 2009 to 77 students of the University “I. Javakhishvili” of Tbilisi, asking to identify their

<sup>2</sup> Although, following more recent studies published on Science (<http://www.sciencemag.org/content/342/6156/326>) on October 18, 2013 the skull fossils discovered in the Republic of Georgia suggests simpler human lineage and may rewrite the evolutionary history of our human genus Homo. In other words, just as today people look different from one another, so did early hominids, and the dissimilarity of the bones they left behind may have fooled scientists into thinking they came from different species.

identity in an international cultural context, showed that almost half (43%) of the interviewees, along with the unanimous identification as Georgian (two answers could be given), indicated to feel European, while no one identified himself as Asian (Figure 3). This result, although high, has been decreasing after the war with Russia; in a previous interview in June 2008 (two months before the war), commissioned by the European Union to the Faculty of Political and Social Sciences of the "I. Javakhishvili" and administered by Prof. Giorgi Gogsadze, the percentage of students who identified themselves as Europeans was up to 51% (Figure 4). Moreover, after the war the sense of belonging to the Georgian nation in terms of absoluteness has substantially increased: while in the first questionnaire each respondent flanked a second option next to the answer "Georgian", in the interview of 2009 many students, instead of adding a second answer, often made comments like "only Georgian" or "forever Georgian" (also demonstrated by the fact that only 47 out of 77 students had scored 2 replies).

**Figure 3.** One of the question from the author's questionnaire, September 2009 (77 students, absolute values)

(Source: author's questionnaire administrated at students "I. Javakhishvili" of Tbilisi, September 2009)

Would you identify yourself as:	Closed (2 answers possible)
European	33
Asian	0
CIS	2
Caucasian	10
Georgian	77
Middle East	2

**Figure 4.** One of the question from G. Gogsadze's questionnaire, June, 2008 (47 students, absolute values).

(Source: Prof. Giorgi Gogsadze's questionnaire administrated at students "I. Javakhishvili" of Tbilisi, June 2008).

Would you identify yourself as:	Closed (2 answers possible)
European	24
Asian	3
CIS	0
Caucasian	20
Georgian	47
Middle East	0

This different inclination can be partly explained, on the one hand by the strong nationalistic propaganda that followed the war and, on the other hand, by the disappointment of not seeing the European institutions alongside Georgia in the war against Russia. In fact, Georgia was expecting a greater involvement in the resolution of the conflict by NATO, the EU and international organizations. In this regard, the Georgian ex-President Saakashvili repeatedly accused the European parliament to be afraid of Russia and, for that reason, avoided dealing with it openly.

In fact – although the European Union moved for the benefit of Georgia during the war of August 2008, asking the cease-fire and not recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as Russia and very few other countries did – it moved always with great diplomacy and without hurting too much the Kremlin because of energetic and economic interests. Mr. Saakashvili,

during his visit in Italy on May 2009 for the launch of his book-interview “I speak of freedom”, said: “It is an “old ” habit of the West after the end of the Soviet empire. After the Cold War, Westerners have had only one idea in mind: to apologize for having beaten the USSR”.<sup>3</sup>

But why do Georgians feel they are Europeans and what does it means for them? As new Minister for Integration into EU and Nato, Mr. Alexi Petriashvili explained:

*“We do feel we are Europeans. For Georgians and for me personally it means that you have the freedom of expression, freedom of movement, and basic values which give you the chance of competitiveness with other Europeans or competitiveness inside of our country. It means to have democratic institutions needed in civil society in controlling the government and to have a strong government overseen by the parliament. It means also the distribution of the power between the branches. And, of course, the freedom of the individuals; every individual of my Country has his/her own rights protected by the State. But what is most important is our feeling when you go to Europe: people are free! Especially after the changes in the government. Nine out of ten will tell you that things has changed dramatically since last October elections.”<sup>4</sup>*

#### **INTEGRATION INTO THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE TOP POLITICAL PRIORITY SINCE THE INDEPENDENCE**

The integration into Europe and developing towards Europe has always been a priority for independent Georgia. Even during the first independent period (1918-1921), the orientation of the Government was towards integration into the political European world. The Head of the first independent Georgian Government, the journalist Noe Zhordania, dreamed of Europe for his country and – referring to Russia – declared: “...*We have taken different paths, they are heading for the East and we for the West*” (Kirkhick, 2010). He also tried to establish closer cooperation with European states. The first Republic of Georgia lasted only for three years, until 1921, when the Red Army invaded the territory of Georgia and a period, now called “Russian occupation and oppression of Georgia”, started for the country; this last message is evident when you visit the Georgian National Museum on Rustaveli Avenue: part of the permanent exhibition is called Museum of Soviet Occupation and it documents the history of the anti-occupational, national-liberation movement of Georgia, along with the victims of the Soviet political repressions throughout seven decades of Russian occupation.

When in 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Georgia finally regained its independence, it was again possible to take back the European dream in the wake of the break-up of the Soviet Union. The first step was the establishment of diplomatic relations between EU member states and Georgia in 1992, but at that time there was little room for external aid to state-building because of the profound instability in the country.

It was Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Georgia from 1995 to 2003, in the attempt to implement the creation of a “New Silk Route” as a principal East-

<sup>3</sup> S. Magni, “Saakashvili deluso dall’Occidente: ha paura della Russia” in “L’Occidentale”, 30 maggio 2009, <http://www.loccidentale.it/>

<sup>4</sup> Author’s interview with Mr. Alexi Petriashvili, Minister of Integration in EU and Nato, Tbilisi, September 17, 2013.

West artery through Georgia and through a “Peaceful Caucasus”, who put forward the conception of being closer to European Institutions.

Still in October 2009, Shevardnadze – by that time already ex-President since 6 years – answering our questions on relations between Georgia and Western institutions (EU and NATO), said:

*“...Years ago, during one diplomatic meeting in Brussels, I knocked the door of the European Union. Well, from then we are still knocking! And this obviously irritates Russia. For Georgia this (integration in European Union) would represent a decisive turning-point for its present problematic situation, but we could not enter either in the EU or in Nato before 4 or 5 years. Unfortunately, after the war with Russia, our prospects are even worse, and probably we should wait much longer before we realize our wish.”<sup>5</sup>*

With Shevardnadze a political stabilization started in Georgia that favored cooperation with the EU. In 1999 Georgia became a full member of the Council of Europe and a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between Georgia and EU entered into force during the same year. “This opened a new opportunity for its (Georgia) participation in European integration, particularly as regards democratization, the rule of law and minority rights.” (IIFFM on the Conflict in Georgia, 2009, II, 51)

However, it can be said that in Shevardnadze’s period the mentality of Georgians was still (post)soviet as the Russian influence was yet strong – first of all because it is not easy to eradicate 70 years of soviet rules and, except for a few countries (Baltic states for instance), the transition is a long and complex process; at that time Shevardnadze himself, as former USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, was very close to Russia. As a result, by 2003 “political power was increasingly fragmented, corruption and crime were rampant, there were massive arrears in pension payments and teachers’ salaries, and infrastructure was in a state of near collapse...” (World Bank, 2009, 1).

Bilateral relations with the EU had further intensified after the 2003 “Rose Revolution” which brought to power a young and pro-Western government lead by Mikheil Saakashvili, who committed to an ambitious program of political and economic reforms; this raised great expectations in EU countries. From the first day after coming into power, Mr. Saakashvili and his government have been pointing out that the main goal of the country was to join the European community and develop towards the West (Georgiev, 2008, pp. 34-51). The new government was effective not only in modernizing the economy and establishing the role of law but also in reforming civil service and fighting corruption. As a result investments started to flow in and the country’s economic situation started to improve: in the first half of 2008 real GDP growth reached 9%. (IIFFM on the Conflict in Georgia, 2009, II, 55).

A new basis for EU-Georgia relations were created in June 2004 with the inclusion of South Caucasus in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This policy aims at bringing Georgia and another 15 countries<sup>6</sup> close to the EU in

<sup>5</sup> Cappucci M., “La Georgia non è schiava né di Washington né di Mosca: intervista ad Eduard Shevardnadze” on <http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/la-georgia-non-e-schiava-ne-di-washington-ne-di-mosca/9635?h=0>

<sup>6</sup> Countries included in ENP: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine.

legislative, economic and political terms. The ENP offered perspectives for economic integration, financial assistance and political dialogue in order to stabilize neighboring countries.

“One of the tasks of the new Georgian government was also to shift the identity of Georgia from post-Soviet to European, following the example of other former socialist states.” (Cochia & Troitiño, 2011, 90). The main foreign language studied and spoken in the country became English instead of Russian and developing and moving towards West and particularly towards Europe became both the government – including the opposition parties – and society’s priority.

As Head of the opposition political party “Our Georgia – Free Democrats”, Irakli Alasania – now Minister of Defense – in an interview with the author in May 2010 said:<sup>7</sup>

*“Georgian society’s mentality is European and we want to join the European family. Our final goal is the integration into the European Union...To achieve this it will be of course a very long process of transformation based on the creation of truly and stable democratic institutions.”*<sup>8</sup>

In particular, the stability of institutions and democracy are considered core elements in order to join the EU: the applicant country must adhere to the principles of Article 6(1) of Treaty of European Union (TUE) which all the Member States subscribe to and on which the EU is based: freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.<sup>9</sup>

In 10 years of Saakashvili’s government there were concerns with regards to the above mentioned principles. “...Conditions of the opposition and freedom of the media stay as points to be concerned and worried about” (Cecire, 2001, 2).

Emblematic was the lack of media independence and the media manipulation to influence elections. In this regard a few days before the local elections in Tbilisi again Mr. Irakli Alasania – at that time mayoral candidate – explained:

*“In my opinion those of the President to influence the mass media are the most serious crimes in our country. The simulation of a Russian attack on Georgia, which appeared on IMEDI TV on 13 March 2010, was a psychological trauma for most of the population. The whole thing was orchestrated to frighten the voters and to make clear to citizens that, once the polls will be closed, it was not the case to protest against the President. As, according to the President, the opposition was with Russia.”*<sup>10</sup>

The popularity of Saakashvili fell sharply after a heavy defeat in the war of August 2008 against Russia over Georgia’s small breakaway region of South

<sup>7</sup> Cappucci M., Tosi C., “La Georgia alle urne: intervista con Irakli Alasania”, on <http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/la-georgia-alle-urne-intervista-con-irakli-alasania/12960>.

<sup>8</sup> Cappucci M., Tosi C., (2010) “Un’altra Georgia è possibile, in Left avvenimenti, n. 21, p. 42, 28 May 2010, p. 28

<sup>9</sup> Art. 6(1) TEU: the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.

<sup>10</sup> Cappucci M., Tosi C., (2010) “La Georgia alle urne: intervista con Irakli Alasania”, on <http://temi.repubblica.it/limes/la-georgia-alle-urne-intervista-con-irakli-alasania/12960>.

Ossetia. The war almost destroyed the country's economy and caused the loss of Georgian territorial integrity and its sovereignty over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The much promoted European orientation of the country suffered a setback in terms of politics as, on that occasion, the government felt abandoned by the European institutions. From their side the EU and Western organizations offered a prompt assistance: the EU provided money in humanitarian aid for people affected by the conflict and for economic recovery. Then, a civilian European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) was deployed in Georgia on 1 October 2008.

Citizens became fed up with the government and started to demonstrate asking Saakhashvili's resignation. Nevertheless, he remained in power, which was mainly due to the disunity and the incompetence of the opposition.

In the October 2012 parliamentary elections, held with a reformed electoral system, the opposition *Georgian Dream* coalition, of billionaire businessman Bidzina Ivanishvili (who managed to unite the fragmented opposition parties), won the majority of seats and a new government was formed as envisaged by the 2010 constitutional amendments that include a significant reduction of the president's powers in favor of the Prime Minister.

As soon as the new Prime Minister Ivanishvili came into power, it has been said that Georgia would not continue in its previously defined pro-European, pro-democracy and pro-reform orientation. This is due to many factors. First of all, Mr. Ivanishvili is a businessman very close to Russians as he became a billionaire in the metals, real estate and banking sectors in Russia in the 1990s. Almost for the same reasons – and because of the change of rhetoric in the new government – Georgia has now better relationships with Russia, at least in terms of trade and in terms of mobility: after a 7 year ban on Georgian products, imposed by Russia since 2006, now some Georgian agricultural products are again exported to the Russian Federation; furthermore, people to people relationships and exchanges have improved and Russians enjoy a free visa regime to enter Georgia for business or tourism.

The author, in September, 2013 met Mr. Alexi Petriashvili, Georgian Minister for Integration into European Union and asked him to explain how Georgia can both improve relations with Russia while remaining on the path to EU and NATO. He answered:

*"It's our foreign policy priority: it is defined that Georgia will become a NATO member. Georgia is moving in the direction of the European Integration and the end goal for Georgia is becoming a member of the EU. We have neighbors like the Russian Federation who wish geography will not be changed, we cannot do so and we are not willing to do so. We would like to normalize the relationship with the Russian Federation but it needs time, it needs talks and negotiations between the two. The rhetoric after the change of the government in Georgia has changed on both sides, in Russia and in Georgia as well. We are negotiating the separate channel of communication. In particular the Special Representative of the Prime Minister Zurab Abashidze, is negotiating the return of Georgian goods, Georgian wine, Georgian mineral waters, Georgian agricultural goods, to the Russian market. Now there will be another round, we will talk on the permanent flights between Russia and Georgia and the facilitation of the Visa regime for Georgians because*

*we have unilaterally waved the visas for the Russian citizens... Russians themselves are also very keen to see the steps forward in normalization between Georgia and Russia but there is the so called redline for Georgians; this is the territorial integrity and sovereignty, this is the occupied territories. And the de-occupation and non-recognition policy is remaining number one priority for Georgian strategic interests and it will never be changed unless they return the territories and the territories are free from the foreign occupation of forces. Russia in my believe made a mistake when it first occupied Georgian territories and second recognizing Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region as independent states. It was a mistake, it was an emotional, very pragmatic mistake but it was a mistake. It was their fault but we cannot change it, they have to change it. It's hard for them to change it, we understand, we realized this but it needs time and it needs negotiation. Abckhazians and Ossetians can see that they are isolated and not independent, there are some talks that maybe they become part of the Russian Federation and they (Abkhazians in particular) do not like this. They also see that only the Russian Federation and one or two other islands and States have recognized their sovereignty... So they failed! And Georgia has to demonstrate that the economy is prospering in the country, human rights are protected in the country and basic principles of freedom and human rights are guaranteed in Georgia. Otherwise they (Abkhazia and Ossetia) are maybe thinking about staying alone. They have to see what is attractive in living together with a Georgia that is integrated in European systems of values, travelling in Europe like Georgian citizens, having the jobs across Europe like the Georgian citizens and not staying in the part of a Russian controlled regime.”<sup>11</sup>*

On the same topic Minister Alasania explained: “We need to have better relationships with Russians in order to oversmart them.”<sup>12</sup>

New government's priority of improving and normalize relationships with Russia seems to be even more consolidated from the recent presidential elections. Last 27 October, 2013 with elections declared to be "clean" and "transparent" by international observers, the government's candidate, Mr. Giorgi Margvelashvili, became the new President of Georgia. The result was considered to be a consolidation of Ivanishvili's power and political priorities.

### **MORE DEMOCRACY, MORE EUROPE: EU DEEP AND COMPREHENSIVE FREE TRADE AREA**

Apart from Georgian Dream's foreign policy priorities, it has been said that the recent elections (government in 2012 and new President in 2013) are the demonstration of Georgia's stronger democratic credentials. In this regards EU Commission's President Barroso stated:

*“I believe we can say that Georgia is today a more stable democracy than before. We have seen this in last weekend's presidential election.”<sup>13</sup>*

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<sup>11</sup> Author's interview with Mr. Alexi Petriashvili, Georgian Minister of Integration in EU and Nato, Tbilisi, September 17, 2013.

<sup>12</sup> Author's interview with Mr. Irakli Alasania, Georgian Minister of Defense, Tbilisi, September 11, 2013.

This gives to Georgia more qualifications to move forward in the process of integration into the European Union. Georgia and EU, after 17 months and seven rounds, on July 2013 successfully concluded negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (Dcfta), as part of the Association Agreement between them. The Association Agreement, together with the Dcfta, aims to provide for the close political association and economic integration of Georgia with the EU. The comprehensive FTA would ensure Georgia's access to a stable and reliable market of over 500 million consumers and, more importantly, it will open the door to Georgia's future integration into the European Community.

On November 28-29, 2013, the Lithuanian capital Vilnius hosted the third Eastern Partnership Summit (the first was in Brussels 2009, the second in Warsaw 2011). The high officials from EU and its member states, as well as their counterparts from the six Eastern Partners, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus assembled to discuss the achieved progress and set the future priorities. The summit was of crucial geopolitical significance not only for Eastern Partners, but also for Europe in general and for Russia. Some important issues were on the table; it was initially expected signing the Association Agreement with Ukraine, finalizing talks on the Deep and Comprehensive Trade and Association Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Armenia (after having completed negotiations with the three countries in June-July 2013), as well as discussing the visa facilitation and readmission agreements with Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Two months before EaP Summit the Georgian Minister for integration into EU (A. Petriashvili) said strongly:

*"Vilnius Summit will be a success. We expect that Ukraine will be signing the Association Agreement with EU, this is very important for Europe, for the Euro-Atlantic developments and for Ukraine itself. It will be a success also for Georgia and Moldova that are going to initial the Dcfta as part of forthcoming Association Agreement. These 3 countries made very clear that they want to be the part of the EU. So, Europe has to make steps forward and we have to move into the same direction but we need to work in order to build the democratic institutions... This is because we are not ready for the membership for the moment...Georgia in particular will be ready in a few years, 3, 5 or maybe 7 but no more than that."*<sup>14</sup>

When Mr. Petriashvili made this forecast, in the end of September 2013, the Armenian President Serž Sargsyan, had already taken his decision (on 3th September) to break with the EU and to join the new Eurasian Customs Union. *"This is a sovereign choice of Armenia, they decided to become part of the Customs Union and they have applied for the membership of the Eurasian Economic Union. Unfortunately Eurasian Customs Union and the Dcfta or the association agreement are not compatible to each other. But I am sure that in the future we will meet again Armenia in the process of integration into EU."*<sup>15</sup> With these words again Mr. Petriashvili commented the Armenian decision.

<sup>13</sup> EU Commission's President SPEECH/13/870 29/10/2013). [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-13-870\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-870_en.htm).

<sup>14</sup> Author's interview with Mr. Alexi Petriashvili, Georgian Minister of Integration in EU and NATO, Tbilisi, September 17, 2013.

<sup>15</sup> Ibidem.

The project of a “new” Eurasian Union was launched in June 2009 when Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin surprised everybody stating that Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan would enter the WTO as a custom union. These three countries agreed to unify their customs tariffs. In 2010 the Eurasian Customs Union came into existence with the implementation of a common customs tariff and joint Customs Code. In January 2012 customs controls were abolished. A joint Secretariat, the Eurasian Economic Commission (designed as the European Commission) was set up in Moscow with a staff of more than 1.000 people. *“The ostensible purpose of this initiative is economic. Its primary objectives, however, are geopolitical, and these are to be achieved in large part by economic means”*(Adomeit, H., 2012, 8). The ultimate Customs Union’s goal is the creation of a “Eurasian Union” by 2015! This Union *“can be considered to be the organizational and institutional counterparts to the EU’s European Neighborhood Policy and its eastern dimension, the Eastern Partnership* (Adomeit, H., 2012, 8).

Before the EaP Summit in Vilnius, Moscow did everything possible to intimidate the countries in the EU’s Eastern Partnership to keep them from signing new trade, economic, and political accords with Brussels.

The pressure points are well known: from threatening impoverished EU eastern partners with higher energy prices to stopping exports of certain products to Russia.

As a result Moscow had already some pre-Vilnius victories. Except for Belarus, inside of the Customs Union from the very beginning, and partly from Azerbaijan that does not meet the basic requirements defined by the EU – most probably because they don’t make any efforts in this direction, as it is contrary at their energetic and strategic priorities – Armenia and Ukraine before the EaP Summit had already decided not to sign any agreements with EU for not compromising their trade and commercial relationships with Russia. Despite pro-European rhetoric and active participation in EU talks, *“Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich snubbed EU leaders by not signing a painstakingly negotiated association agreement at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius.”*<sup>16</sup>

After Ukraine’s decision (about 10 days before the EaP Summit) Georgia and Moldova were then faced with a very tough choice: either they could stick to their commitment to move closer to Europe and risk a fierce economic and trade backlash from Russia, or they could also ditch an association deal with the EU.

*“Russia would close its borders to goods from any country signing the EU association agreements. Migrant workers would be banned from finding jobs in Russia.” Both countries “are very much aware that Russia can use its energy sources and its big markets as weapons to make them toe the line, too. Their economies are not sufficiently independent of Russia, nor are their energy resources diverse enough to be able to deflect Russian blackmail.”*<sup>17</sup>

In Georgia, Russia has considerable leverage, especially through its support for the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which have proclaimed their independence since the 2008 Russia-Georgia war. These are

<sup>16</sup> Kateryna Pishchikova, Richard Youngs, Ukraine’s European Future: How the EU Can Make a Difference, in Carnegie Europe, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=53779>.

<sup>17</sup> J. Dempsey, Vilnius: Now what for Georgia and Moldova? in Carnegie Europe, <http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=53696>.

similar to the problems that Moldova has with its breakaway region of Transnistria. Despite the recent relaxation of Russia's economic sanctions against Georgia and the ongoing dialogue between the two countries – after the election of Mr. Javashvili – it has been observed *“the continued and increasing activities by Russian security forces to erect fences and other obstacles along administrative boundary lines in Georgia between the territory administered by the government in Tbilisi and the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.”*<sup>18</sup>

Actually the instrumentalization of protracted conflicts, together with the possible misuse of energy pricing and artificial trade obstacles were some of the threats from Russia to the possible signing of agreements between Georgia and the European Union.

Also, as we have observed before, the new Georgian political coalition could raise doubts during the interim between initialing and signing its agreement, as has happened with the Ukraine. The current government insists its choice “for Europe” is firm, and there isn't any tilt away from a Western orientation. On this topic Mr. Alasania confirmed:

*“The integration of Georgia into the Eurasian Customs Union is absolutely out of questions. It's neither been discussed in Georgian parliament of government. More than 75% of our citizens supports Georgia to be part of the European family. We don't even take into consideration the emerging Eurasian Union as we see it is founded on the ideology of Soviet Union.”*<sup>19</sup>

“In contrast to its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Armenia, who are constantly trying to keep the balance between their relations with the EU and Russia, in Georgia, not only the government and the ruling party but also the opposition are united behind the pro-European way of the Country” (Cornell & Nilsson, 2009:262). Nevertheless, eyebrows were raised when the – now former – Prime Minister Ivanishvili pondered aloud whether the Eurasian Union might be an attractive alternative for Georgia, and only when the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, Maia Panjikidze, finally signed the initialling of an Association Agreement including a Dcfta during the EU Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, any residue of uncertainty had disappeared. The Summit was not as successful as EU expected because there were only the initialling of the Association Agreement with Georgia and the Republic of Moldova– except for a signature of a visa facilitation agreement with Azerbaijan and the initialling of a civil aviation agreement with Ukraine – but at least Georgia entered a very important stage of integration with the European Union.

## CONCLUSIONS

Making a European Country in Georgia is a difficult developing process which involves the social sphere in building a European identity. Georgians began their way toward West and particularly to Europe for cultural reasons, but most of all because they wish to break their Soviet past, shaking off Russian oppression. The gravitation towards the EU and its standard appears to Georgia as the principal way to overcome the corruption and the absence of rule of law that are

<sup>18</sup> EEAS Statement n. 131001/02, 1 October 2013.

[http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131001\\_02\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131001_02_en.pdf)

<sup>19</sup> Author's interview with Mr. Irakli Alasania (2013).

still hindering Post-Soviet countries' development after twenty years of transition. On the other side Russia considers former Soviet countries as its natural sphere of interest and influence and does not allow them to move to the West. This is one of the reasons why Moscow started a process of building the Eurasian Union – which can be considered to be the organizational and institutional counterpart to the EU's European Neighbourhood Policy and its eastern dimension – and is pressuring the EU eastern partners in order to push them into the Customs Union, the first stage of this new Russia's project. Russian pressure – consisting mostly in trade obstacles, increasing of energy price and instrumentalization of protracted conflicts – became particularly strong before the Eastern Partnership Summit held in Vilnius in late November 2013. Georgia, together with the Republic of Moldova, did not succumb to the Russian threats and, unlike Ukraine and Armenia, initialed an Association Agreement with the EU and will ratify the accord during the next EaP Summit in Riga in 2015.

Will Georgia change its European priority between initialing and signing this agreement, as it happened with Ukraine?

The same day in which the Georgian Minister Maia Panjikidze was signing the Dcfta in Vilnius (29/11/2013), the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) noted that, following a reduction in 'borderisation' since September, installation of fences along the breakaway South Ossetia's administrative boundary line were resumed.

The main issue between Russia and Georgia is about the status of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and, as also Mr. Petriashvili asserted, "*no Georgian citizen would accept the loss of these territories in exchange of integration in European Union.*"

Also, it has to be considered the geographical isolation of the country in European terms. If Ukraine joins the EU it could represent a strong ally for Georgia both in countering Russian threats and in being the vehicle to approach Europe easily. The future of Georgia in Europe also depends, in a way, on the relations between Turkey and the EU because of obvious geographical reasons; unfortunately for the moment the enlargement to Turkey is in a stand-by phase.

One thing is certain: despite the volatile and vulnerable scenario all around and its internal problems, Georgia seems to be the most pro-European country in its geographical area and is taking all the right steps in order to become the easternmost member of the European Union.

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## **RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HUNGARY**

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**Abstract:** Rural development policy of the European Union is intended to ensure European rural areas to meet the challenges facing them and to utilize their available potential. This called the European Network of Rural Development, the organization for rural policy of the community connecting the national rural development networks and having an organizing, co-ordinating role in developing the co-operation of national networks contributing to the effective utilization of resources for rural development. Major step forward in the Hungarian rural policy is indicated by the establishment of the National Rural Strategy – the constitution of the Hungarian rural areas and the Darányi Ignác Plan helping its realization.

**Key words:** Rural policy, European Network for Rural Development, Hungarian National Rural Network, National Rural Strategy, Darányi Ignác Plan

\* \* \* \* \*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Rural space has many functions and many meanings. Rural areas produce most of world's food, and capture most of its water supply. They are the source of most of our energy – whether from fossil fuels or renewable resources – and the origin of most of the minerals that feed industry. Historically, at least, rural areas have provided society with fibre for clothing, stone and timber for building, and wood pulp to make paper. Rural areas have also become our playground – a place to walk, ride, cycle, sightsee, or simply escape in search of a slice of tranquillity. They are valued for their scenic landscapes and for their natural environments – rural areas host the vast majority of the globe's plant and animal species. Rural areas are also home to diverse indigenous cultures, and can be venerated as places where elements of traditional, pre-industrial ways of life may be glimpsed. As such, rural areas are frequently endowed with symbolic importance as signifiers of national identity, or as the counterpoint to modernity. Rural areas are celebrated variously both as wilderness and as a bucolic idyll. Yet, they can also be portrayed as remote, backward, under-developed places, in need of modernization (Woods, 2011).

## **RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

Strengthening the European rural development policy is of priority for all member states of the European Union helping the realization of Union aims highly important regarding the people live and work in rural areas (around 56% if the inhabitants of Europe). Rural areas have important role in shaping the aspect and identity of the EU therefore rural development is of high priority. Geographically 91% of the total area of the EU belong to the competence of rural development.

Numerous rural areas have to face serious challenges in today's Europe hit by economic crisis. Agriculture will play a decisive role in the rural areas of the EU in the future as well, however, part of the companies in rural areas must improve their competitiveness. Overall the average income per capita, grade of qualification and the development of the service sector in rural areas are smaller compared to that in towns and cities. Although the protection of the rural environment is truly an important issue it falls into the background ever so often as it seems to be relatively costly. European rural areas have significant values though. Fundamental raw-materials are found in such areas and they offer innumerable natural beauties for all of us. Issues of rural development cross the borders of counties or regions frequently affecting distant communities (e.g. environmental contaminations, ensuring sustainable development). More than half of the population of the 27 member states live in rural regions and many more are attracted by the idea to live or work in rural areas. For them the existence of service and infrastructure of appropriate quality is an important aspect ([ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rurdev/index\\_hu.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rurdev/index_hu.htm)).


## **STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY (2007-2013)**

Fundamental rules and the measures to be taken by the member states and regions regarding rural development policy between 2007 and 2013 are determined by the EC decree 1698/2005. Rural development is based on the three axes of the European Agricultural and Rural Development Fund (EARDF). (Axis 1: competitiveness of agriculture and the food industry, Axis 2: agricultural environmental protection and land-use, Axis 3: increasing employment and diversifying activities in rural areas). These are completed by a transverse methodical axis, the LEADER axis (Axis 4: development of local communities) (figure 1). Rural development programmes carried out with EU support have to be financed from the EARDF with joint leadership of the member states and the Community between 2007-2013. The Community contributes to the development of rural areas by supporting measures described in rural development plans prepared and submitted by the member states (Buday-Sántha, 2011).

In order to establish the appropriate equilibrium all three fields have to be financed by the member states and regions from their rural development budget. A further requirement is to support projects in which experiences gained during the realization of LEADER programmes are applied. In the framework of the LEADER completely unique projects are formulated planned and executed by local partnerships in order to handle local problems characteristic for the particular area.

Rural development policy of the EU aims to improve competitiveness and sustainable development day-to-day. European decision makers were motivated

to involve the inhabitants and public institutions of rural areas in the process at various levels as much as possible (Fehér, 2009).



**Figure 1.** Political structure of rural development  
(Source: European Union Commission)

### **RURAL DEVELOPMENT NETWORKS: EUROPEAN NETWORK FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT (ENRD)**

The initiation of the European Union at a conference organized by the member states in Cyprus in the summer of 2008 gave a new chance for rural areas to inspire “bottom-up” initiations and to utilize better the capacities of the inhabitants incorporated into rural development programmes.


































This can be achieved through the new rural development institute that can be regarded as a true innovation in realizing rural policy considering its structure, operation and philosophy. Its important elements are co-operation at international and national levels and free flow of information connected to the spreading and realization of good practices. Establishing new partnerships and sharing good practices will hopefully dynamize the successful realization of rural development programmes, will refresh and give momentum to the diversity of European solutions and promote the application of integrated rural development (Fehér-Kujáni, 2011).


Decision of the European Council was published in February 2008 describing the necessity and operation conditions of the European Network for Rural Development and of the National Rural Development Networks. Until 31<sup>st</sup> December 2008 in total 31 national networks were established (table 1) in Europe. The European Network for Rural Development started its operation in October 2008. This network is aimed not only to organize meetings for those interested in the European rural development policy but to apply real and significant incentives and measures that contribute to the realization of the rural development strategy formulated in the framework of the European Commission.

Its operation started a new chapter in the rural development policy of the EU despite the fact that in this the EU can record results back for several years.

**Table 1.** National Rural Development Networks  
of the member states of the European Union  
(Source: [http://enrd.ec.europa.eu/en/home-page\\_en](http://enrd.ec.europa.eu/en/home-page_en); own structuring)

01. Austria		Netzwerk Land
02. Belgium		
• <i>Flemish</i>		Vlaams Ruraal Network
• <i>Walloon</i>		Réseau Wallon de Développement Rural
03. Bulgaria		Национална селска мрежа
04. Cyprus		Εθνικό Αγροτικό Δίκτυο Κύπρου
05. Czech Republic		Celostátní síť pro venkov
06. Denmark		Det Nationale Netværk for Udvikling i Landdistrikter
07. Estonia		Eesti maaeluvõrgustiku üksus
08. Finland		Maaseutuverkosto - Landsbygdsnätverket
09. France		Le réseau rural français
10. Germany		Deutsche Vernetzungsstelle ländliche Räume
11. Greece		Εθνικό Αγροτικό Δίκτυο Ελλάδας
12. Hungary		Magyar Nemzeti Vidéki Hálózat
13. Ireland		National Rural Network
14. Italy		Rete di reti nel Network Europeo dello Sviluppo Rurale
15. Latvia		Valsts Lauku tīkls
16. Lithuania		Lietuvos kaimo tinklas
17. Luxembourg		Réseau rural du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg
18. Malta		National Rural Network Malta
19. Netherlands		Nationaal Netwerk Platteland
20. Poland		Krajowa Sieć Obszarów Wiejskich
21. Portugal		Rede Rural Nacional
22. Romania		Romanian NRN
23. Slovakia		Národná sieť rozvoja vidieka
24. Slovenia		Nacionalna mreža za podeželje
25. Spain		Red Rural Nacional
26. Sweden		Svenska Landsbygdsnätverket
27. United Kingdom		
• <i>England</i>		Rural Development Programme for England Network
• <i>Northern Ireland</i>		Rural Network for Northern Ireland
• <i>Scotland</i>		Scottish National Rural Network
• <i>Wales</i>		Wales Rural Network

Rural development networks became rural policy measures of European dimension. They provide information for the 27 member states and for third party countries. Rural companies and institutions, various expert groups, agricultural and forestry organizations co-operate in the networks on partnership basis.



**Figure 2.** The original OECD urban-rural typology applied to NUTS 3 regions (left) and a new urban-rural typology<sup>1</sup> for NUTS 3 regions (right)  
(Source: Eurostat, 2010)

The aim is the successful development of *rural areas*<sup>2</sup> (figure 2). National networks were established in not uniform ways. Most of the member states operate one network, two countries (Belgium, United Kingdom), however, developed several networks (table 1). No uniform practice was developed for the operation of the networks. In most of the member states the national rural development network is operated in the organization of the ministry. In seven countries the national network is operated as an independent organization separate from the ministry while in the case of three countries the organization is shared, i.e. part of the activities is operated by the ministry and the rest are organized outside the ministry in contractual form.

The European Network for Rural Development is an open network which any organization operating in rural areas and interested in the rural


<sup>1</sup> The OECD approach classifies regions as predominantly urban, intermediate or predominantly rural, based on the percentage of population living in local rural units. A NUTS 3 region is classified as: predominantly urban (PU), if the share of population living in rural LAU2 is below 15%; intermediate (IN), if the share of population living in rural LAU2 is between 15 % and 50 %; predominantly rural (PR), if the share of population living in rural LAU2 is higher than 50 %.

<sup>2</sup> Rural areas in the EU member states give 90% of the total area where 56% of the population live, 43% of the national product is produced and 55% of those employed live. Majority of the natural resources is found in these rural areas and they are a mixture of cultural and landscape heritage.

development policy can join. They can use the services and information measures of the national and European rural development networks. The new organizational philosophy regards partnership between the civil society and the representatives of the private sector as an important element in networking. Everyday experiences in practice reveal that decision makers and executors have to be helped in making decisions that contribute to the realization of the strategic targets of the rural development programmes (Fehér, 2009).

In the institutional system of the rural development policy of the European Union a significant innovation is made in the current budget period as a National Rural Development Network is established in every member states and two European networks have been established as well. Furthermore, the demand of applying the *LEADER-method* was also introduced as a new aspect in the field of all of the four axes.

The European Union allocates 225 billion Euros for financing rural development projects in the period between 2007 and 2013 in the framework of 94 Rural Development Programmes. From this amount the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development receives 90.8 billion Euros that is completed with 70.1 billion Euros by the national budget of the member states. Planned contribution of the project recipients is 64.8 billion Euros (figure 3).



**Figure 3.** Financing of rural development projects, 2007-2013 (billion Euros)  
(Source: Fehér I., 2009; own construction)

These significant planned financial commitments prove that the rural development policy of the European Union give significant support to the rural areas of the 27 member states in the interest of long-term development. The four closely integrated priorities can be noted in all of the 94 Rural Development Programmes in which the specifics and demands of the member states considered in the composition of the programme can be clearly identified. Significance of the four priority axes is reflected in that they contribute to the joint aims of the EU, the economic growth, the improvement of employment, the establishment of sustainable environment and society (Fehér, 2009).

### **HUNGARIAN NATIONAL RURAL NETWORK**

Professional beginning of the Hungarian National Rural Network dates back to the years prior to the country joining the European Union. At that time the ECOVAST (European Council of Villages and Settlements and its Hungarian group) and others (Village Parliament, National Association of Village and Farm Stewards, etc.) tried to establish professional rural development civil organizations that were operated as a network in other countries with successful rural programmes already in the early and middle 1990s. These had significant role in Europe in the acceptance of the famous Cork declaration<sup>3</sup> and in the elaboration of the European rural development methods and programmes called today simply as LEADER type. The Hungarian National Rural Network – based on the Union decree affecting the entire rural Europe – was established in December 2008 to ensure better professional-social acceptance for the currently valid uniformized agricultural and rural development resources with the demand of spreading good rural practice (Csatári, 2011).

In June 2010 the decree (Rural Development Ministry Decree 36/2010 (XI. 30.) on the Hungarian National Rural Network) on the HNRN was modified involving new structures and action plans in order to operate the network more effectively. New priorities also appeared for the period between 2011 and 2013 besides former aims placing emphasis on multi-level discussions and international relations (Fehér-Kujáni, 2011). Task of the HNRN includes the joining of all interested in rural development into one co-operation network, i.e. joining local government, civil, farmer and social organizations, professional boards into information and co-operation networks harmonizing their activities. Its targets are the social-economic development of rural areas and the effective utilization of support resources. Further aims are the establishment of practice centred inter-regional and international relations, European representation of Hungarian national interests and values. Activity of the HNRN enables the 27 member states co-operating in the European Network for Rural Development to receive information on the Hungarian development results and the Hungarian rural development communities can learn from the foreign models as well ([mnvh.eu/szervezet-celja](http://mnvh.eu/szervezet-celja)).

### **RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN HUNGARY – NEW HUNGARIAN RURAL POLICY**

Giving new definition to rural areas and the reformation of rural policy have been started in Hungary transforming rural areas into liveable places again and targeting the closing-up of rural areas. The time period when Hungarian rural areas were characterised by migration and hopelessness has to be overcome. In the heart of Europe we, Hungarians have the task to bridge between east and west, north and south so that we remain to be Hungarians and to establish the economic and cultural possibilities for following generations necessary for growth. Rural development is regarded to be a highly important strategic sector across Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Countries of the region have to co-operate along the idea of the European unity if all of us want to belong to the successful nations (Fazekas, 2010). Hungary in this way can become a

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<sup>3</sup> Respect for the cultural and natural values of rural areas was demanded by various campaigns and civil communities so consistently throughout Europe that even the European Council put it on the agenda organizing a two-day conference in the autumn 1996 in order to advance in rural development. This conference was closed with the acceptance of a declaration (The Cork Declaration – The living countryside) in which principles of rural policy were summarized in 10 points (Kovács, 2012).

country where European multi functional quality agriculture, environmental management and land management are universal. These produce valuable, healthy and safe food products and local energy and other raw-material preserving in the meantime our soils, drinking water bases, flora and fauna, the landscape and man, our communities and culture in it. Providing also work, living and reasonable income for as many people as possible (Ángyán, 2010).

### **NEW HUNGARY RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (2007-2013)**

The European Union focuses on the realization of consistent rural development strategies throughout the EU. Realization of the aim can be achieved via the national strategy plans that were worked out by the member states on the basis of the strategic guidance of the EU. The system enables:

- The determination of those fields where Union rural development support produces the greatest value at Union level;
- The identification of connection points to the high priority Union aims (e.g. aims determined in the Lisbon and Göteborg timetables);
- Ensuring harmonization with other Union professional policies regarding especially economic cohesion and environmental protection;
- Accomplishment of the new market-oriented agricultural policy and the execution of the associated structural transformation in the old and the new member states as well.

All member states have to submit to the Committee their national strategy plan (in the case of Hungary: New Hungary Rural Development Programme) that contribute to the realization of the national strategy plan between 2007 and 2013.

43.1% (371.2 billion Euros) of the total budget of the 7-year planned time period can be allocated for agricultural and rural development. 79% of the agricultural budget can be used for direct and market support, 19% for rural development and 2% can be used for fishing, life quality improvement and other targets. Financial support for agricultural and rural development decreases from 55 billion Euros to 51.1 billion Euros between 2007 and 2013. Therefore in 2013 financial resources are less by 7% and 12% for agricultural support and rural development respectively compared to 2006 (Buday-Sántha, 2011).

In the framework of the New Hungary Rural Development Programme (NHRDP) Hungary is entitled to use 1 300 billion forints of support between 2007 and 2013 that can be allocated entirely for agricultural and rural development. The NHRDP involves the priorities of agricultural and rural development for the above mentioned period at the level of actions. These priorities can be summarized in the list below:

- Improving the competitiveness of the agriculture, forestry and food processing sectors, helping the transformation of the production structure;
- Establishing the human conditions of competitive agriculture with special regard to the spreading of the innovation and market-oriented attitude;
- Strengthening the guarantees of sustainable management;
- Easing rural unemployment, extending the possibilities of earning an income, improving the quality of life, making the availability of services better;
- Developing local communities.

The NHRDP contains the measures related to rural development. The programme is based on four axes:

1. Improving the competitiveness of agriculture and forestry
2. Developing the environment and rural areas
3. Diversifying the quality of rural life and economy
4. LEADER programme

### **NATIONAL RURAL STRATEGY 2020**

The National Rural Strategy (NRS) planned until 2020 has started. General long-term concept like this has not been composed for decades. Its aim is to define the targets, principles of the rural policy of Hungary together with the programmes and execution framework of measures ensuring the achievement of the aims on the basis of a view of the future focusing on sustainability and the values of rural life reversing the disadvantageous processes characteristic for the majority of our rural areas. The National Rural Strategy determines tasks related to rural development, agriculture and food industry, sustainable utilization of natural resources, preservation of natural values and environmental protection.

Adjusted to the Europe 2020 Strategy<sup>4</sup>, of the European Union and to the time period of the programme financing of the EU between 2014 and 2020, the programmes of the measures of the National Rural Strategy targets the improvement of the social and economic processes and the quality of life in rural areas by 2020 tangible for local inhabitants as well. Most important fields of this include the increase of employment, balanced and diverse agriculture and production structure based on small and medium sized farms and their associations strengthening of local food production and food markets, strengthening of the local communities of rural areas, improvement of their demographic parameters and the preservation of biological diversity and healthy natural systems.

The overall aim of the Strategy is the improvement of the population retaining capacity of the rural areas of the country. In order to achieving this, five strategy goals are determined (*videkstrategia.kormany.hu*):

- preserving the natural values and resources of our landscapes;
- diverse and liveable agricultural production;
- catering and food safety;
- ensuring the financial basis of rural farms, increasing rural employment;
- strengthening rural communities;
- improving the quality of life in rural areas.

### **THE DARÁNYI IGNÁC PLAN**

The execution programme of the National Rural Strategy is the Darányi Ignác Plan for the support of which 300 billion forints are available by the end of 2013. This amount can be used for the support of several goals including the higher level of food processing, food industrial developments, indigenous animal and plant species, afforestation, micro-enterprises, starting young farmsteads, and young farmers. The 2.5 years long programme is harmonized with the

<sup>4</sup> *Europe 2020* is a European Union strategy of growth for the upcoming decade. Its goal is to make the economy of the EU intelligent, sustainable and inclusive in our changing World. These three priorities strengthening each other can help higher employment, productivity and stronger social cohesion in the Union and in the member states ([ec.europa.eu/europe2020](http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020)).

European Union budget and is continued in the next European Union budget cycle. The farm programme has been started with 1.5 billion forints in order to regenerate farmsteads. The target is to bring healthy, locally produced food into public catering by supporting butcheries and opening farmer markets with simple rules. Renewing village-halls also contain economic function, e.g. internet access. Furthermore, various office service points help the farmers to receive services quite natural in towns ([kormany.hu/hu/vidékfejlesztési-minisztérium/hirek/daranyi-ignac-program](http://kormany.hu/hu/vidékfejlesztési-minisztérium/hirek/daranyi-ignac-program)).

- Overall aim:
  - Improving the population retaining capacity of our rural areas
- Strategic aims:
  - Preserving the natural values and resources of our landscapes
  - Diverse and viable agriculture
  - Catering and food safety
  - Ensuring the financial basis for rural economy, increasing rural employment
  - Strengthening rural communities, improving the life quality of rural population
- Horizontal aspects:
  - Sustainability
  - Spatial and social cohesion
  - Town – rural area relationships

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## **POPULATION BEHAVIOR STUDY IN GEOGRAPHY APPLYING BEHAVIORAL APPROACH**

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**Abstract:** Complex social and geographical processes of today are changing human place in society. The social conduct of individual is formed from spatial information and is a part of geoinformative environment of man. In the process of studying of human behavior behavioral theory is becoming increasingly important (the origin of the word comes from English for "behavior" – manner of behaving or conducting oneself), the essence of which lies in studying antisocial manifestations phenomena by means of personality and social groups investigation under demographic crisis. The behavioral problem of youth culture is very actual. It is at this age group that social norms, values and lifestyle are finally formed and established. And it is at this age that most of moral values deformation occurs, which leads to antisocial behavior, namely to smoking, alcoholism, drug use, sexual promiscuity. Behavioral environment is behavioral in nature that is made up of images which are the basis of human behavior but the process of perception of behavioral environment is realized by perception and cognition.

**Key words:** relation and interaction, perception, stereotype of space

\* \* \* \* \*

### **OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY**

The relationship of human and modern information environment largely determines human behavior. And it is behaviorism as a research method that considers people as beings whose actions are mediated by cognitive processes, i.e. with the combination of mental processes by which people acquire and use knowledge and information. The purpose of behaviorism is to replace simplified and mechanical concepts typical of many theories previously existed on the relations of man and the environment and new ideas, which openly acknowledge the complexity of human behavior.

The practice of behavioral approach application to population geography is not yet widespread, but definitely has its own prospects, creating a more complete and objective representation of the state of affairs than traditional approaches. Considering this, it will be possible to create viable concepts of youth policy development in the future, elaborating theories of efficient use of labor resources potential and implement them in practice.

### **THE STAGE OF ELABORATION IN SCIENTIFIC LITERATURE**

Behaviorism as a trend emerged in the 60-70s of the twentieth century in the works of western scholars:

A. Beck, H. Spencer, Edward C. Tolman and Clark Hall. Among domestic scholars this theory was used by V. Preobrazhensky, Y. Vyedyenin, M. Grodzinsky, O. Savytska and others. Among geographers this theory is applied by M. Bagrov, K. Mezencev, K. Nyemets, L. Nyemets, Ja. Olijnyk, A. Topchiev, A. Chabliij and so on.

Despite the increase in social phenomena research and the processes in geographical science through behavioral theory methodology of environmental perception of an individual and impact on his behavior is not sufficiently elaborated. Unfortunately, today the state of the problem studying remains insufficient and its methodology is contradictory.

### **THE PRESENTATION OF MATERIAL**

The behaviorism theory was founded in 1964 by English scientist D. Volpert and it emerged at the intersection of psychology and sociology, and in the late twentieth century behaviorism came through the geographical science and became the basis for human spatial behavior geography. As a field of social geography, it is "occupied with building a geographical theory on the basis of human behavior..., focusing its attention on social and psychological mechanisms that have a strongly pronounced spatial component and operate on the spatial structure" (Shabliij, 2003, 276).

Due to complexity of different social and geographical processes taking place in present conditions, man's place in society is changing as well as its social role (an expected typical behavior). To understand the basis of such behavior one should apply directly to sociology that studies "human problems in order to understand and study out thoroughly and deeply social reality, social relation and interaction" (Andruschenko, 1998, 178).

Sociologists define man as a product of nature (*homo sapiens*) and the product of society (*homo socius*). To characterize a man as a social being the term "personality" is used that defines a set " of altogether qualities and properties of a human which are acquired under the influence of a corresponding culture of society and specific social communities to which it belongs and to whose livelihoods it is included (O. Jacub). Personalities remain constantly in the system of social relations, which largely determine their behavior and certain social functions.

Human behavior – is a totality of acts and other social actions of an individual which constitute motives and social status reaction (Andruschenko, 1998, 273). The peculiarity of human behavior depends on the nature of his relationship with the social community to which an individual belongs, from common norms and value orientations. Man is greatly influenced by relationship between the biological and the social which is in him and between the individual and social principles.

Human behavior in space and in time also depends on his general culture, his knowledge and his experience. The human evaluates his place in society and his environment herewith.

External factors of human behavior under which it realizes certain acts may differ from the real environment of human existence. Behavioral environment is a basis in decision making and action implementing. Images and ideas are fundamental cognitive elements that mediate behavior.

It is through the prism of human perception of the world that human behavior is explained by behaviorists (D. Gould, K. Bowling, K. Lynch, etc). In their opinion not the objective environment but only perceived by the individual and transformed by cognitive activity part is the basis of human behavior. As Sorokin states that personality is formed in the system of defined social coordinates, but since each individual belongs not to one but to multiple different social groups, so it is their original combination that defines social image and social status of such an individual (Chernish, 2003, 188). Each of such social groups allegedly dictates behavior imperatives to its members. Thus, with the change of man's place in social relations will inevitably change his position in the society and his behavior.

Human behavior is largely formed by social settings, which refer to "individual psychological experience of values, the meaning and sense of social object, the state of consciousness of the individual in relation to a particular value" (Chernish, 2003, 190). Such settings are created by society by means of day-to-day act factor on the individual, a human collects such settings for all his life and his behavior is formed under their influence. Herewith there is a certain predisposition of an individual to setting perception and to a certain behavior in such circumstances (i.e. "disposition of a person", according to V. Jadov) in a particular environment.

Behavioral environment is a perceived by a human and transformed by human activity part of the environment. Largely it is formed by social settings and diverse social communities influenced by geo - informative environment which in turn is the result of interpenetration of information fields of natural, anthropogenic and mental origin.

Behavioral approach covers the perception of society as an image, which is formed in human mind. The process of individual perception of the environment (behavioral environment) is materialized through perception and cognition. M. Grodzinsky interprets perception as a sensory perception of stimuli from the environment, and cognition as a set of mental (cognitive) procedures of stimuli processing (Grodzinsky, 2005, 431). Herewith the environment perceived by human activities may significantly differ from the real one.

As a result of human perception of the environment certain images that are formed constitute the basis of individual behavior. Here significant role is given to education and experience level of a human, his emotional state of living in a community. According to behavioral theory, human behavior is realized in a community that is in the environment. It can be real and behavioral. The central, according to O. Shabli, is behavioral, that is, as such "perceived by a human with certain culture, with a stereotype of space ("earth's surface"), etc. (Shabli, 2003, 277).

Performing an act that shapes behavior, an individual becomes self-expressed and self-asserted in the most essential way. Therefore, regarding the behavior of the individual, we must consider a wide range of its determinants their role in a particular time of the act realizing as an external manifestation of human behavior.

According to the doctrine introduced by an American psychologist A. Maslow, the basic social need of a human is to realize his potential possibilities, abilities and talents. He classified needs in a hierarchical way: primarily a man satisfies physiological needs but the needs of higher level are available to financially provided. Such hierarchical structure determines human behavior

and to some extent explains spreading and growth of antisocial phenomena, especially among the young. Smoking, alcoholism, drug addiction, social diseases (tuberculosis, HIV and AIDS), crime etc. we attribute to antisocial manifestation of population behaviors in modern Ukrainian society.

The personality of the individual, in terms of behaviorism, is a collection of subjective behavioral responses. An individual interacts with the environment which he wants to cognize but spatial environment is always associated with social environment and influences his behavior.

Due to socialization individual is involved into society, learns the customs, traditions and norms of a certain social community, appropriate ways of thinking inherent to the given culture, patterns of behavior, forms of rationality and sensibility (Gorodyanenko, 2003, 195).

Requiring a need, an individual is looking for a set of attributes that would satisfy this need. Taking into account the attributes of "successful life" one can more effectively direct commercials, appealing to the specific needs which an individual may not be aware of.

Exogenous subjective factors of behavior motivation differ among others by the fact that they are difficult to assess, but it is the administrative influence over them that is the most available and effective.

The only influential instrument over subjective factors is the formation of certain images by means of transformation of geoinformative environment or community in which an individual is found.

Under the influence of science and technology in today's conditions, space changes its structure: compression of the geographic space and expansion of the informative space is reflected in the nature of social relations and processes.

By compression of the geographical space regional self-awareness of people on the contrary is expanding. Spatial information as representation of geoinformative space has instrumental influence over human behavior, its subjective ideas and perception of decisions concerning their own behavior.

Thus, an individual is not only consequence but also cause of socially important acts in a specific environment. Economic, political, ideological and social relations of certain historical types of society come out differently, determining the social quality of each individual, the content and the nature of his practical activity. It is in the process of functioning of a person, on one hand, integrates social relations of the environment and on the other hand elaborates his special behavior to the outside world. They are found in human activity as a personal behavior to reality. Social relations are defined as a stable system of relations of individuals that has developed in the course of their interaction in specific social environment (Gorodyanenko, 2003, 191).

## CONCLUSIONS

The study of human behavior has been largely a concern of sociologists. It is them who brought basic concept interpretation related to human behavior, they defined main types of this behavior, factors causing it. But there still remain unexplored manifestations of this behavior in different local communities, among different social groups, the impact of regional factors over the formation of deviant behavior in different geographical conditions.

The use of behavioral approach in the study of human behavior in geography allows for perception of society as an image, which is formed in human mind. Studying the behavior of young people in the region by behavioral

approach application enabled to use sociological methods widely to determine the causes of unequal behavior of humans, distribution of asocial phenomena among the young.

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## **PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN HARGHITA, COVASNA AND MUREŞ COUNTIES (9<sup>TH</sup> DECEMBER 2012)**

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**Abstract:** The study at hand intends to synthetically analyze aspects regarding the organization and the results of the 2012 parliamentary elections, for the designation of members of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, using Covasna, Harghita and Mureş counties as study cases, for the 2012-2016 time period. According to Romanian Government's Decision no. 888/1<sup>st</sup> September 2012, these elections were set on Sunday, 9<sup>th</sup> December 2012. The turnout was higher than the national average, the highest percentages being found in 21<sup>st</sup> electoral circumscription, Harghita County (44.34% of the total of 270,744 voters), followed by 28<sup>th</sup> electoral circumscription, Mureş County (41.62% of the total 484 889 voters), while 15<sup>th</sup> electoral circumscription from Covasna County registered a lower turnout than 39.38% of the total 185,680 voters. Taking into account the 5% electoral threshold for parties and 8% for alliances, solely one party, People's Party-Dan Diaconescu (PP-DD), one alliance - Right Romania Alliance (DLP+CDNPP+DF) and two unions, the Social-Liberal Union (SDP+NLP+CP+NUPR) and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, managed to fulfill the legal requirements to gain entrance in the parliament. The high percentage of Hungarians in the three counties meant that most mandates went to DUHR (three deputies and two senators, in Covasna; four deputies and two senators in Harghita; and three deputies and only one senator in Mureş). This region contains a total number of 29 lawmakers, out of which 17 deputies (4.1% of their total number), and 9 senators (5.1% of their total number).

**Key words:** deputies, senators, parliamentary elections, counties, parliamentary groups

\* \* \* \* \*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Using the model provided by Gr. P. Pop, regarding the study of the 2008 parliamentary elections (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), I consider useful the in depth research of the results of the December 2012 parliamentary elections, using three counties as case studies (Covasna, Harghita and Mureş), with the highest percentages of Hungarians in the country. Just like in the previous

elections, deputy and senator selection was conducted through single vote, according to the proportional representation principle.

For the analysed area, 17 deputy colleges were set up (four in Covasna, out of which only two were set up during phase I; five in Harghita, with four seats assigned during phase I; and eight in Mureş, out of which only five were assigned in phase I) and 9 senator colleges (three in Covasna and two in Harghita (one seat each assigned in phase I), and four colleges in Mureş (two seats assigned in phase I).

The total number of listed voters was 185,680 in Covasna (out of which 183,321 on permanent electoral lists, 1,374 on suplimentary lists and 985 voters on special lists), while in Harghita, the total number of listed voters was 270,744 (out of which 267,755 on permanent lists, 1,767 on suplimentary lists and 1,222 on special lists). Mureş County had a total number of registered voters was 484,889 (out of which 479,309 on permanent electoral lists, 3,496 on suplimentary lists and 2,084 on special lists). Of the total number of registered voters in Covasna (185,680 people), the turnout was lower, in comparison with the other counties, that is 73,126 voters (39.38%), with 38.12% (70,783 people) being registered voters on permanent lists, 0.73% (1,374) on suplimentary lists and 0.52% (969) that voted on special lists.

In Mureş County, the turnout was slightly higher, of the total number of registered voters (484,889 people), 201,836 people turned out to vote (41.62%), 40.48% (196,307) being those who voted on permanent lists, 0.72% (3,496) on suplimentary lists and 0.41% (2,033) with the help of the special box.

The highest turnout was registered in Harghita County, of the total number of registered voters (270,744 people), 44.34%, (120,057) turned out to vote, with 43.24% (117,080) on permanent lists, 0.65% (1,767) on suplimentary lists and 0.44% (1,210 people) on special lists. In general, rural areas had a higher turnout than urban areas.

The total number of votes obtained by all parties registered in the *Unique Party Nomenclature* (alliances, associations, communities, federations, forums, parties, unions, etc), in Covasna County there were 70,230 valid votes, for the Chamber of Deputies and 69,537 valid votes, for the Senate; in Harghita County, 116,084 valid votes, for the Chamber of Deputies and 116,410 valid votes, for the Senate; while in Mureş Counties there were 193,290 valid votes, for the Chamber of Deputies and 194,714 valid votes, for Senate.

### **ELECTIONS FOR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES**

In regards to this topic, based on the data provided by the Central Electoral Bureau, I was able to view the results for the Chamber of Deputies, for the three counties mentioned above.

By analysing the data from table 1, regarding the number of seats assigned per political parties, citizen associations belonging to national minorities, political alliances and electoral alliances, in descending order depending on the number of valid votes, several aspects must be emphasized:

- in Covasna County, out of the total 70,230 valid votes, *DUHR* won most of them (57.46%), thus obtaining three deputy seats (*Markó Attila-Gabor*, no. 1 college; *Márton Árpád-Francisc*, no. 2 college; *Fejér László-Ödön*, no. 3 college) followed by *SLU* (14.30%), with one deputy seat (*Grams Horia*, no. 4 college), while *HPPT*, although claiming a high percentage of votes (15.40%), did not gain any seats, due to the fact that the party did not exceed the 5% threshold at national level;

**Table 1.** The results of the parliamentary elections of December 9<sup>th</sup> 2012 in the counties of Harghita, Covasna and Mureș, for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, per political party

Political party	Chamber of Deputies			Senate			Total deputies and senators
	No. of votes	%	No. of deputies	No. of votes	%	No. of senators	
DUHR	40,352	57.46	3	41,025	59.00	2	5
HPPT	10,812	15.40	0	10,907	15.67	0	0
SLU	10,046	14.30	1	10,961	15.76	1	2
PP-DD	2,936	4.18	0	1,791	2.58	0	0
RRA	2,819	4.01	0	2,783	4.00	0	0
Minorities	2,231	3.18	0	-	-	-	-
GRP	574	0.82	0	1,184	1.70	0	0
REP	460	0.65	0	886	1.29	0	0
<b>Total Covasna</b>	<b>70,230</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>69,537</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>
DUHR	82,814	71.34	4	83,097	71.38	2	6
HPPT	17,069	14.70	0	17,749	15.25	0	0
SLU	10,683	9.20	1	10,219	8.78	0	1
RRA	2,507	2.16	0	2,633	2.26	0	0
Minorities	1,744	1.50	0	-	-	-	-
PP-DD	724	0.62	0	2,712	2.33	0	0
GRP	405	0.35	0	-	-	-	-
PP	138	0.13	0	-	-	-	-
<b>Total Harghita</b>	<b>116,084</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>116,410</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>
SLU	74,398	38.49	3	75,263	38.65	2	5
DUHR	66,447	34.38	3	67,519	34.68	1	4
RRA	22,499	11.64	1	23,358	12.00	1	2
PP-DD	16,833	8.71	1	18,300	9.40	0	1
HPPT	5,610	2.90	0	7,153	3.67	0	0
Minorities	5,570	2.88	0	-	-	-	-
GRP	1,859	0.96	0	3,121	1.60	0	0
REP	74	0.04	0	-	-	-	-
<b>Total Mureș</b>	<b>193,290</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>194,714</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>379,604</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>380,661</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>26</b>

DUHR = Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; SLU = Social Liberal Union (Political alliance made up of the Social Democratic Party + the National Liberal Party + the Conservative Party + National Union for the Progress of Romania); PP-DD = People's Party-Dan Diaconescu; RRA = Right Romania Alliance (Political alliance made up of the Liberal Democratic Party + Christian Democratic National Peasants' Party + Civic Force); HPPT = Hungarian People's Party of Transylvania; PP = People's Party; GRP = Greater Romania Party; REP = Romania Ecologist Party.


- with percentages between 0.65-4.18%: *People's Party-Dan Diaconescu* (4.18% of the total number of valid votes), *Right Romania Alliance* (4.01%), *national minorities* (with their 18 representatives), acquired, in Covasna, a total number of 2231 votes, representing 3.18% of the total number of valid votes, while *Greater Romania Party* and *the Romanian Ecologist Party*, got less than 1% of votes, with 0.82% and 0.65%;
- in Harghita, the situation was similar to that of Covasna, from the total number of 116048 valid votes, *DUHR* won 71.34%, gaining four deputy mandates (*Korodi Attila*, no. 1 college; *Kelemen Hunor*, no. 2 college; *Antal István*, no. 3 college; *Moldovan Iosif*, no. 4 college), while college no. 5, the northern part of the county, where, according to the 2002 census, Romanians had a majority of 62.3%, was won by *Mircea Dușa*, a *SLU* representative, with 9.20%;
- *HPPT* obtained percentages of 14.70% of the total number of valid votes, but did not manage to secure a seat; with percentages between 1-2% there were *RRA* (2.16%) and *national minorities* (1.47%), the rest of the

participants scoring below 1% (*People's Party-Dan Diaconescu*, 0.62%; *Greater Romania Party*, 0.35%; and the *People's Party*, with a single candidate, in college no. 5, obtaining just 0.13%);

- in the last county, Mureş, out of the total number of 193 290 valid votes, the relatively close percentages, in terms of ethnic structure (53.3% Romanians, and 39.3% Hungarians), according to the 2002 census, lead to a balanced situation in regards to deputy seats, the second, seventh and eighth colleges being won by *SLU* (*Buicu Corneliu-Florin*, *Chirteş Ioan-Cristian* and *Gluga Vasile-Ghiorghe*), with 38.49%, while the first, third and fifth colleges, being won by *DUHR* (*Kerekes Karoly*, *Kelemen Attila-Béla-László* and *Borbély László*), with 34.38%;

- special situations were found in the fourth college, where the deputy seat was awarded, after vote redistribution, to an *RRA representative*, *Urcan Ionaş-Florin*, who obtained 11.64% of the total number of valid votes, and in the sixth college, won by *Sefer Cristian-George*, also through redistribution, a candidate supported by the *People's Party-Dan Diaconescu*, with 8.71%;

- percentages of almost 3% were won by *HPPT* (2.90%) and *national minorities* (2.88%), while *GRP* took 0.96% and the *REP*, just 0.04%.



**Figure 1.** Deputy distribution per political parties at 9<sup>th</sup> December 2012 elections

According to the reglementations regarding the election of the *Chamber of Deputies and the Senate*, of 9<sup>th</sup> December 2012, the deputy number rose from 334 to 412 people, out of which 17 deputies (4.1%), are from Covasna, Harghita and Mureş, members of the two political alliances (SLU and RRA), and also of DUHR and PP-DD.

### **Deputy distribution per political parties at college level**

Numerically, the presence of deputies from the above mentioned counties is determined by their population number, which is presented in table no. 2.

The number of inhabitants taken into account, at these elections, according to Law no. 35 of 13th March 2008, regarding the elections of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, paragraph 4, is taken from the 2002 census, since the data from the 2011 census were not yet published by the National Statistics Institute.

#### **a. The deputies of the uninominal colleges of Covasna**

In terms of deputy distribution per political parties at college level, in Covasna, one can observe the following:

**Table 2.** The list of candidates who received a mandate of deputy or senator, grouped per electoral circumscription and uninominal colleges

No.	Name of candidate	Political party	No.	Circ. name	Senate college	Deputy college	Total number of votes per college	Total number of present voters	Votes won	Assigned mandate	%
1	Markó Attila Gabor	DUHR	15	CV	-	1	21,461	21,947	11,297	1	52.64
2	Márton Árpád-Francisc	DUHR	15	CV	-	2	16,511	17,455	9,875	1	59.81
3	Fejér László-Ödön	DUHR	15	CV	-	3	17,462	18,210	13,018	1	74.55
4	Grama Horia	SLU	15	CV		4	14,796	15,514	4,579	1	30.95
5	Klárík László-Attila	DUHR	15	CV	1	-	37,642	39,402	21,314	1	56.62
6	Obreja Marius Lucian	SLU	15	CV	2	-	31,895	33,724	5,953	1	18.66
7	Olosz Gergely	DUHR	15	CV	2	-	31,895	33,724	19,711	1	61.80
8	Korodi Attila	DUHR	21	HR	-	1	29,437	30,405	21510	1	73.07
9	Kelemen Hunor	DUHR	21	HR	-	2	20,231	20,948	16063	1	79.40
10	Antal István	DUHR	21	HR	-	3	26,279	27,069	19390	1	73.79
11	Moldovan Iosif	DUHR	21	HR	-	4	27,804	28,931	22005	1	79.14
12	Dușa Mircea	SLU	21	HR	-	5	12,333	12,704	5855	1	47.47
13	Tánczos Barna	DUHR	21	HR	1	-	49,830	51,353	37625	1	75.51
14	Verestóy Attila	DUHR	21	HR	2	-	66,580	68,704	45472	1	68.30
15	Kerekes Karoly	DUHR	28	MS	-	1	27,822	28,383	12209	1	43.88
16	Buicu Corneliu Florin	SLU	28	MS	-	2	29,530	30,279	11980	1	40.57
17	Kelemen Atilla Béla-László	DUHR	28	MS	-	3	23,606	24,959	13528	1	57.31
18	Urcan Ionaș-Florin	RRA	28	MS	-	4	24,386	25,472	4204	1	17.24
19	Borbély László	DUHR	28	MS	-	5	21,826	22,890	15925	1	72.96
20	Sefer Cristian-George	PP-DD	28	MS	-	6	21,632	23,014	3519	1	16.27
21	Chirteș Ioan-Cristian	SLU	28	MS	-	7	22,111	23,374	11572	1	52.34
22	Gliga Vasile-Ghiorghie	SLU	28	MS	-	8	22,377	23,465	13145	1	58.74
23	Pașcan Emil-Marius	RRA	28	MS	1	-	57,410	58,662	8,611	1	15.00
24	Markó Béla	DUHR	28	MS	2	-	46,028	47,849	30,144	1	65.49
25	Mora Ákos-Daniel	SLU	28	MS	3	-	46,430	48,486	22,536	1	48.54
26	Frătean Petru-Alexandru	SLU	28	MS	4	-	44,846	46,839	24,153	1	53.86

- Covasna County, with a population of 222,449 (according to the 2002 census), is represented by three DUHR deputies and one SLU deputy;

- *Markó Attila-Gabor* was elected deputy in the *no.1 uninominal college*, which encompasses the City of Sfântu Gheorghe, together with its component settlements (Chilieni and Coșeni), representing *DUHR*, with 11,297 votes (52.64% of the total number of valid votes), third position on the ballot, thus obtaining the first parliamentary seat. Currently, he is a secretary in the Permanent Commission for Human Rights, Religions and National Minorities;

- *no. 2 uninominal college*, comprised of 19 territorial-administrative units, was won by *Márton Árpád-Francisc*, *DUHR* deputy, with 9,875 votes (59.81%), member of the Commission for Culture, Arts and Media, member of the Rule Commission, and also of the Permanent Commission regarding deputies and senators Statute, and the organisation of joint meetings;

- out of a total of 9,875 voters, I would like to present, in descending order, the situation of gained votes for every settlement belonging to the second uninominal college, as following: Baraolt 15.5% (1,535 in absolute values), Bodoc 9.7% (961), Brăduț 8.7% (864), Valea Crișului 7.7% (762), Ozun 7.6% (760), Bățani 7.4% (734), Reci 6.2% (613), Arcuș 5.3% (524), Ghidfalău 4.7% (466), Micfalău 3.9% (388), Ilieni 3.5% (353),

Bixad 3.4% (338), Vârghiş 3.1% (309), Aita Mare 3.1% (309), Vâlcele 2.8% (279), Malnaş 2.7% (267), Chichiş 2.0% (198), Belin 1.4% and Haghigh with 0.7% (74);

- the third DUHR deputy, in the third *uninominal college*, *Fejér László-Ödön*, was validated with 13,018 votes (74.55%).

- the votes from the 14 territorial-administrative units comprising the college were as follows: the City of Târgu Secuiesc (together with Lunga) 30.0% (3,913), Sânzieni 11.5% (1,506), Turia 9.0% (1,172), Catalina 8.7% (1,138), Gheliţa 7.8% (1,019), Cernat 7.0% (922), Breţcu 5.0% (653), Ojdula 4.2% (559), Poian 3.6% (475), Mereni 3.6% (473), Estelnic 3.1% (405), Lemnia 2.9% (384), Dalnic 1.6% (209) and Moacşa with 1.4% (190);

- the fourth uninominal college of Covasna County, where there is a Romanian majority, was awarded, after vote redistribution, to a USL representative (more exactly *the Social Democratic Party*), *Grama Horia*, elected with 4,579 votes (30.95%);

- the situation of the 11 territorial-administrative units of this college was the following: Întorsura Buzăului (also comprising Brădet, Floroara, Scrădoasa) 25.7% (1 177), Covasna (with Chiuruş) 19.6% (901), Sita Buzăului 16.1% (740), Barcani 12.6% (579), Zagon 9.4% (434), Dobârlău 6.3% (291), Valea Mare 4.3% (201), Zăbala 4.0% (186), Boroşneu Mare 1.0% (48), Brateş 0.2% (13) and Comandău with 0.1% (9);

- the deputy for this college is a member of the Commission for Economic Policy, Reform and Privatisation.

#### **b. The deputies from the uninominal colleges of Harghita County**

According to population size (326,222 inhabitants in 2002), this county is represented by four DUHR deputies and one from SLU.

At uninominal college level, the situation is as follows:

- uninominal college no. 1, was won, with an overwhelming majority, 21,510 voturi (73.07%) by *Korodi Attila*, from *DUHR*, which gained his second deputy term, being a member of the Commission for European Affairs;

- in terms of the percentage representation of the 21,510 votes from the 14 territorial administrative units that compose the college, the following situation arose: the City of Miercurea Ciuc (with Ciba, Harghita-Băi, Jigodin-Băi) 49.3% (10,625), Ciucsângeorgiu 6.2% (1,351), Vlăhiţa (with Băile Homorod, Minele Lueta) 6.1% (1,317), Sâncrăieni 4.8% (1,034), Sânsimion 4.6% (990), Lelicieni 4.2% (910), Plăieşii de Jos 3.9% (855), Lueta 3.5% (766), Sântimbru 3.4% (746), Cozmeni 3.1% (680), Tuşnad 3.1% (671), Sânmartin 2.7% (600), Păuleni-Ciuc 2.6% (572) and Băile Tuşnad (with Carpitus) 1.8% (393);

- the second uninominal college was also awarded to a *DUHR representative*, *Kelemen Hunor*, at his fourth mandate, with 16,063 votes (79.40%), out of a total of 20,231 votes in the entire college, him being appointed member in the Commission for Culture, Arts and Media;

- with two more territorial units than the first college, out of a total of 16,063 votes, the situation is as follows: Sândominic 12.6% (2,037), Lunca de Jos 9.3% (1,497), Ciumani 8.6% (1,392), Suseni 8.2% (1,330), Siculeni 7.9% (1,272), Cârţa 7.6% (1,232), Frumoasa 7.2% (1,166), Dăneşti 5.5% (885), Tomeşti 5.1% (834), Mădăraş 4.8% (774), Lunca de Sus 4.7% (755), Ciceu 4.6% (747), Mihăileni 4.1% (670), Racu 4.0% (649), Bălan 3.6% (583) and Voşlăbeni 1.4% (240);

- *the third uninominal college*, also won by a *DUHR* representative, *Antal István*, voted by 19,390 (73.79%), out of a total of 26,279 votes per college, thus ensuring his continuous presence in Romania's parliament, him being a secretary in the Commission for Industries and Services and a member of the Permanent Commission for UNESCO Relations;

- out of the total votes obtained by the candidate (19,390), we have the following situation: the City of Odorheiu Secuiesc 49.8% (9 664), Zetea 9.5% (1,845), Mugeni 6.8% (1,326), Dealu 5.4% (1 058), Feliceni 4.3% (835), Brădești 4.1% (796), Mărtiniș 3.7% (726), Satu Mare 3.7% (721), Căpâlnița 3.1% (618), Merești 2.4% (470), Vârșag 1.8% (365), Ulieș 1.7% (335), Dârjiu 1.6% (322) and Ocna 1.5% (309);

- the former secretary in the Communications Ministry, *Moldovan Iosif* won the fourth uninominal college, being voted by 22,005 (79.14%) of the voters, him being a member in the Commission for IT and Communications;

- the highest number of votes was in Gheorgheni (together with Covaciș, Lacu Roșu, Vargatac, Visafolcu) 18.2% (4,018), followed by Cristuru Secuiesc (with Betești și Filiaș) 12.8% (2 835), Remetea 12.1% (2,664), Corund 9.2% (2,027), Joseni 9.0% (1,986), Praid 8.1% (1,787), Lupeni 7.9% (1,739), Șimonești 5.1% (1,124), Porumbeni 3.9% (860), Atid 3.8% (851), Lăzarea 3.5% (786), Secuieni 2.6% (592), Avrâmești 2.5% (572) and Săcel with 0.7% (164);

- after vote redistribution, *the fifth college (Toplița)*, in the northern part of the county, was won, for a third term, (started in 2004), by the sole Romanian deputy in Harghita, *Mircea Dușa*, a representative of *USL (Social Democratic Party)*, claiming 5,855 votes (47.47%), out of a total of 12,333 votes;

- the representation of these 5,855 votes from the nine territorial-administrative units is the following: the City of Toplița (with Călimănel, Luncani, Moglănești, Secu, Vale, Văgani, Zencani) 48.7% (2,854 absolute value), Sărmaș 13.5% (794), Tulgheș 10.1% (596), Bilbor 7.8% (457), Gălăuț 7.3% (429), Subcetate 362 (6.1%), Corbu 3.2% (192), Borsec 2.3% (139), and Ditrău with just 0.5% (32);

- *Mircea Dușa* is a member in the Commission for Public Administration, Territorial Planning and Ecological Balance, in the current executive, after being Delegate Minister for the Relation with the Parliament, followed by Minister of Internal Affairs and Minister of National Defence.

### **c. The deputies from the uninominal colleges of Mureș County**

In Mureș County, eight uninominal colleges were designated (580,851 people, in 2002), the winner for the Chamber of Deputies *SLU* with 38.49% of the votes, more exactly 74,398 of the total of 193,290 valid votes, gaining three seats, while *DUHR* came second, with 34.38% of the votes, meaning 66,447 (three seats), while *RRA* gaining 11.64% of the total number of votes, that is 22,499 (one deputy seat, the fourth uninominal college), and *People's Party-Dan Diaconescu* with 8.71% of the total number of votes, meaning 16,833 (one deputy seat, the sixth uninominal college).

I would like to emphasize the following:

- *the first uninominal college (Târgu Mureș, with Mureșeni and Remetea)* is held by *DUHR* representative, *Kerekes Karoly*, who received 12,209 votes (43.88%), after vote redistribution;

- *Kerekes Karoly* has been a deputy since 1990, and is a member of the Commission for Work and Social Protection;

- *the second uninominal college*, corresponding to the same area, was also awarded after the redistribution of votes, but to a *SLU representative*, *Buicu Corneliu-Florin*, (SDP), with 11,980 votes (40.57%), secretary of the Commission for Health and Family;
- *the third uninominal college*, comprised of 16 territorial-administrative units, was won by *Kelemen Attila-Béla-László* (DUHR), with 13,528 votes (57.31%), deputy since 1996, vicepresident in the Commission for Agriculture, Forestry, Food Industry and Specific Services,
- the 13,528 votes were distributed as follows: Acăţari 14.4% (1,960), Pănet 13.7% (1,855), Gorneşti 10.1% (1 368), Crăciuneşti 8.7% (1,181), Ceauşu de Câmpie 7.2% (983), Sânpaul 6.6% (905), Glodeni 6.0% (819), Gheorghe Doja 5.8% (795), Sântana de Mureş 5.6% (764), Sâncraiu de Mureş 4.8% (655), Păsăreni 4.8% (650), Cristeşti 4.7% (644), Mădăraş 3.1% (428), Voivodeni 1.4% (196), Ungheni (with Cerghid, Cerghizel, Moreşti, Recea, Şăulia, Vidrasău) 1.2% (165) and Şincai 1.2% (160);
- *the fourth uninominal college* was awarded after vote redistribution to an *RRA representative*, *Urcan Ionaş-Florin*, with 4,204 votes (17.24%), member of the Commission for Public Administration, Territorial Planning and Ecological Balance;
- for the 13 territorial-administrative units comprising the college the distribution of the 4204 votes was the following: Luduş (with Avrămeşti, Cioarga, Ciurgău, Fundătura, Gheja, Roşiori) 47.2% (1,987), Târnăveni (with Botorca, Bobohalma, Cuştelnic) 16.9% (714), Iernut (with Cipău, Deag, Lechinţa, Oarba de Mureş, Porumbac, Racameţ, Sălcud, Sfântu Gheorghe), 16.3% (686), Cheţani 3.8% (162), Aţintiş 2.9% (126), Cucerdea 2.8% (119), Bogata 2.7% (117), Cuci 2.0% (85), Adămuş 1.9% (83), Găneşti 1.0% (43), Ogra 0.9% (42), Tăureni 0.5% (25) and Bichiş 0.3% (15);
- represented by 19 territorial-administrative units, *the fifth uninominal college* was won by *Borbély László* (DUHR), with 15,925 votes (72.96%), out of the 21,826 votes, deputy since 1990, president of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, minister in several governments (delegate minister, Minister of Transportation-2004-2007; Minister of Development, Public Works and Housing-2007-2008; Minister of Environment and Forests during 2010-2012);
- vote situation (out of 15,925), for the entire uninominal college, is the following: Sovata (with Căpeţi, Ilieşi, Săcădat) 14.6% (2,330), Sângeorgiu de Mureş 11.3% (1,803), Fântânele 9.3% (1,489), Miercurea Nirajului (with Beu, Dumitreştii, Lăureni, Moşuni, Şardu Nirajului, Tâmpa, Veţa) 8.9% (1 429), Ernei 8.6% (1,372), Sângeorgiu de Pădure (with Bezid, Bezidu Nou, Lotu) 5.2% (841), Eremitu 4.9% (787), Neaua 3.7% (598), Ghindari 3.7% (593), Găleşti 3.5% (565), Vărgata 3.4% (546), Corunca 3.3% (537), Bereni 3.2% (515), Hodoşa 3.1% (509), Măgherani 3.0% (479), Chibed 2.9% (462), Sărăţeni 2.7% (442), Livezeni 2.3% (373) and Veţca 1.6% (255);
- *the sixth uninominal college* (*Sighişoara*) was won after vote redistribution by a *PP-DD representative*, *Sefer Cristian-George*, with 3,519 votes (16.27%), member of the Commission for Work and Social Protection, and president of the Parliamentary Commission for the Revolutionaries of December 1989;
- the 15 territorial-administrative units (out of 3,519 votes) had the following vote distribution: Sighişoara (with Angofa, Aurel Vlaicu, Rora,

Șoromiclea, Venchi, Viilor, Hetiur) 33.0% (1,164), Daneș 8.2% (292), Bahnea 6.8% (242), Nadeș 6.4% (227), Albești 6.0% (213), Vișoara 5.7% (202), Mica 5.6% (198), Vânători 5.6% (198), Apold 4.4% (155), Suplac 3.5% (124), Zagăr 3.4% (122), Bălăușeri 3.3% (119), Băgaciu 3.0% (109), Saschiz 2.2% (80) and Coroisânmartin 2.1% (74);

- the seventh uninominal college, the largest of Mureș County (27 settlements) was won by *Chirteș Ioan-Cristian* (SLU), NLP representative, with 11,572 votes (52.34%), of the total number of 22,111 votes, member of the Commission for Agriculture, Forestry, Food Industry and Specific Services;

- the total of 11,572 votes, were distributed as follows: Sărmașu (with Balda, Larga, Moruș, Sărmășel, Sărmășel-Gară, Titiana, Vișinelu) 9.3% (1,080), Band 9.0% (1,052), Deda 8.6% (996), Batoș 5.7% (671), Lunca 5.6% (652), Ruși Munți 5.5% (648), Zau de Câmpie 5.1% (593), Vătava 4.5% (523), Fărăgău 3.9% (456), Valea Largă 3.5% (410), Sânpetru de Câmpie 3.2% (379), Sânger 3.0% (351), Săulia 2.9% (346), Grebenișu de Câmpie 2.9% (339), Miheșu de Câmpie 2.9% (338), Iclânzul 2.9% (337), Stânceni 2.6% (301), Râciu 2.4% (286), Brâncovenești 2.4% (279), Crăiești 2.0% (232), Lunca Bradului 1.8% (219), Răstolița 1.7% (199), Pogăceaua 1.3% (158), Aluniș 1.2% (143), Băla 1.1% (131), Cozma 0.8% (93) and Papiu Ilarian 0.3%;

- the last uninominal college (no. 8) is held by *SLU*, namely *Gliga Vasile Ghiorghe* (SDP), elected with 13,145 votes (58.74%), of a total of 22,377 votes, a dignitary which was also elected for the 2008-2012 term, vicepresident of the Commission for IT and Communications;

- out of the 10 units, the highest number of votes was in Reghin 53.7% (7,069), followed by Ibănești 9.9% (1,307), Gurghiu 9.3% (1,233), Solovăstru 5.7% (760), Hodac 5.3% (697), Idecu de Jos 3.9% (520), Beica de Jos 3.1% (420), Petelea 3.0% (398), Breaza 2.9% (387) and Chiheru de Jos 2.6% (354).

## PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS FOR THE SENATE

Of the total 176 senator seats, the three mentioned counties have nine seats (5.1%), with the following distribution: 5 (55.5%) for DUHR, 3 (33.3%) for SLU and 1 (11.2%) for RRA.


### Senator distribution per political parties and administrative units

The territorial distribution of the nine senators, as representatives of the three analysed counties, is as follows:

- in Covasna, the turnout was 73,126 people (39,402 for the first uninominal college and 33,724 voters for the second college), out of which 69,537 were valid votes (37,642 votes for the first college and 31,895 for the second college), being won by UDMR with 59.00% of the total number of votes (41,025 votes, absolute value). The first college was awarded to *Klárík László-Attila*, (56.62%), member in the Commission for Regulations, Public Administration, Territorial Planning and Environmental Protection; in the second college, the voters elected *Olosz Gergely* (DUHR), with 61.80%, (vicepresident of the Commission for Privatisation and State Administration, and also member of the Judicial Commission, and member of the Validation Commission) and *Obreja Marius-Lucian* (SLU, NLP member), with 18.66%

(member of the Special Commission of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for Parliamentary Control over the External Intelligence Service);

- in Harghita, both senator seats were won by DUHR, the turnout being 120,057 people (51,353 voters present in the first uninominal college and 68,704 voters in the second college), while the total number of valid votes was 116,410 (49,830 votes in the first college and 66,580 votes in the second college), awarded to *Tánczos Barna*, with 75.51%, for the first college (secretary of the Commission for Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development), and *Verestóy Attila*, with 68.30%, in the second uninominal college (questor in the Permanent Bureau and member of the Joint Commission for Parliamentary Control over the External Intelligence Service);
- in Mureş, there were four colleges, the turnout being 201,836 (58,662 for the first college, 47,849 people for the second college, 48,486 people for the third college and 46,839 people for the fourth college), with a total number of 194,714 valid votes (57,410 votes for the first college, 46,028 votes in the second, 46,430 votes in the third and 44,846 votes in the fourth);
- the first college was won (through vote redistribution) by the RRA representative (DLP), *Paşcan Emil Marius*, with 15.0%, while the second one by *Markó Béla*, with 65.49%, leader of the DUHR parliamentary group, senator since 1992, member in the Commission for Education, Science, Youth and Sports;
- the last two colleges (the third and the fourth) were won by SLU representatives, *Mora Ákos-Daniel* (NLP representative, third college, with 48.54%, after vote redistribution, member of the Commission for Budget, Finances, Banking and Capital) and *Frătean Petru-Alexandru* (SDP representative, fourth college, with 53.86%, member of the Commission for Work, Family and Social Protection).



**Figure 2.** The distribution of senators per political parties at 9<sup>th</sup> December 2012 elections

## CONCLUSIONS

In order to get an overview on the formation of Romania's Parliament for 2012-2016 time frame, for the three counties, some aspects must be emphasized:

- the number of registered voters, for the Chamber of Deputies, as well as for the Senate, was 941,313, out of which 395,019 voters (41.96%), and 760,265 valid votes, plus 18,625 null votes and 11,125 blank votes (table 1);
- carefully following the minutes regarding the voting results for the election of the Chamber of Deputies from 9<sup>th</sup> December 2012, DUHR

representatives of Covasna and Harghita held the no. 3 spot on the ballots, while in Mureş, no. 1 position; the SLU representatives of Covasna and Mureş held the no. 2 position on the ballots, while in Harghita the first one, RRA representatives, the no. 3 and PP-DD the no. 4 position, found only in Mureş;

- the same situation can be found at the Senate level: DUHR, no. 3 position on the ballot, in Covasna and Harghita, and no. 1 position in Mureş, SLU, no. 2 position in Covasna and Mureş, while RRA (solely in Mureş), no. 3 position;

- *the Chamber of Deputies* is represented by 17 deputies, out of which 10 (58.9%) are DUHR representatives, five (29.5%) from SLU, one (5.8%) from RRA and one (5.8%) from PP-DD;

- in the same conditions for result and vote redistribution towards the parties that reached the 5% electoral threshold, *the Romanian Senate* was constituted, the analysed counties being represented by nine MPs, out of which five (55.5%) are DUHR representatives, three (33.4%) SLU representatives and one (11.1%) from RRA.

The atypical character of the analysed electoral pool is due to the ethnic structure of the area at hand. If usually electoral campaigns are aimed at certain types of voters, I would like to bring forth a special electoral pool, the *ethnic electorate*, this category being a constant block of voters which will always vote solely based on ethnic reasons. This aspect is also obvious from the results of the presidential elections, when, during the first tour, Hungarians voted, almost exclusively, with the DUHR representative, while during the second tour, when the Hungarian representative was no longer in the race, their votes split in different directions.

Therefore, the result of the 2012 parliamentary elections is influenced by the ethnic component of the area. Even though, at national level, SLU won the elections with an overwhelming majority, the representatives of the Hungarian parties won the electoral race in the three counties mentioned above.

For example, in Covasna County, DUHR won 57.46% of the seats in the Chamber of Deputies, while HPPT obtained 15.40%, SLU 14.30%, the remaining votes going to other parties.

One might expect for Romanian parties to gain more votes in this region, but GRP only managed 1% of the votes. In Harghita County, for the Chamber of Deputies, DUHR won 71.34% of the votes, HPPT 14.70%, SLU 9.20%, RRA 2.16%, the rest of the votes being divided between the rest of the parties.

In Mureş County, SLU reached 38.49%, DUHR 34.38%, RRA 11.64%, PP-DD 8.7%, HPPT 3%, while other parties 2.88%. One must take into account the ethnic structure of Mureş County, comprised of 53.3% Romanians and 39.3% Hungarians, in contrast with Covasna County, where Hungarians have a percentage of 73.8%, while Romanians only 23.2%, and in Harghita County, with 84.6% Hungarians, while the Romanian population only reaches 14%, according to the 2002 census.

The electoral behaviour is determined by the candidates' discourse and their degree of implication, not to mention the work of the campaign staff. Regarding the parties representing the Hungarian population, DUMR and HPPT, the difference in votes is clearly determined by the former's experience on the political stage, HPPT being a new party, the sum of the percentages won by the two parties being the percentage of Hungarians in the area.

Romanians, however, divide their votes among the Romanian parties.

In Harghita and Covasna counties, they remain faithful to the Romanian deputies who also won in 2008, the voters cautious behaviour being caused by the political discourse and by mathematical calculations. If the votes are more and more divided, the chances for a Romanian to gain a deputy seat are smaller.

Thus, in the above mentioned counties, in 2008 as well as in 2012, one college per county was won by a Romanian politician, Mircea Duşa (SDP) in the fifth Harghita college and Horia Grama (SDP) in the second Covasna college.

A senator interacts less with the citizens than a deputy, during the term, as well as during the campaign, due to the larger geographical extent of the senatorial college, but also due to the citizen's degree of civic education who generally are interested in voting what they understand and what affects them more in their relation with the authorities.

Therefore, even though they will vote, especially in rural areas, they will elect the deputy, but will not show the same interest for the senator ballot, a phenomenon also noticed at local elections, where the election of the mayor will arouse the most interest, followed by the interest in the election of the local council, while the least interest is aroused by the county council and its president. Due to this circumstance, the senatorial colleges of Harghita and Covasna counties are held exclusively by DUHR representatives. One exception of the 2012 elections is that one electoral college in Covasna County was won by a SLU representative.

We can deduce that the turnout and the voting results heavily depend on education levels, on the implication of political parties in the electoral campaign, and also on population awareness, as well as on the ethnic structure, which means that the areas with a specific ethnic structure must be approached differently and analysed accordingly.

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## GEOGRAPHICAL STUDY ON THE STRUCTURE BY SEXES AND AGE GROUPS IN THE PARISHES LOCATED IN THE BIRDA-MORAVIȚA PLAIN

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**Abstract:** The article entitled *"Geographical study on the structure by sexes and age groups in the parishes located in the Birda-Moravita Plain"* aims to present the main aspects of the consequences the lack of balance between the three structures by age may have on the social, economic and cultural development in this region. Equally useful, the quantitative indicators that have been used in the text are designed to present the evolution of the two types of structures in the studied period and the features and their influence in securing employment across the region. The regional system of the Plain Birda-Moravia is a territorial unit fairly homogeneous in terms of gender structure, and the slightly higher percentage of female population is mainly due to the two World Wars. However, on the age structure of the population, the major differences between the group of young people, adults or the elderly are felt in the entire regional system during the period considered in this analysis. Starting with 1930, the share of young population decreases, while the adult age group increase. But the most acute demographic risk that will affect the entire area in the near future, is the increase in percentage of the elderly group which will make it very difficult to provide local employment.

**Key words:** the female population rate, age pyramid, the demographic dependency rate

\* \* \* \* \*

### THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL BASES

The analysis of the socio-economic impact evaluation on a region represents a frequently used modality in the geography of the human population. I used the Anglo-Saxon literature specialized in this field as a starting point, especially the works of Taylor, N.C., Bryan, C.H., Goodrich, C.G., Canter, Larry W, 1996, Barrow, 2000, Goodman 2004, importing these theoretical elements in the areal of the Birda Plane. The main purpose was to achieve a well-researched, pertinent study on the impact the differentia in the gender and age groups can have at a regional level. I also shown the consequences of the demographical dependency and of a quite high rate of aging.

To make my study even more solidly documented, I also used some commonly met theories in the specialized Romanian literature. A good example is the given by the works of C. Vert from 1996 and 2001. According to the opinion expressed by the author, the gender-based structure represents a fundamental element in establishing the evolution of certain demographic phenomena such as the rhythm of the natality and the intensity of the migrations. In the same time, the age groups-based structure is regarded as being as a crucial element for the organization and further development of the society. To make the presentation of the situation even more pertinent, I also used some social impact indicators such as: rates of femininity, of dependency and the aging rate of population, their role being to highlight the consequences of the prevailing aging population in the social, cultural and economic structures or a high demographic dependency rate. Equally, the use of classical methods is essential because the analysis, comparison, synthesis and mapping methods are useful tools in achieving any geographical study.

The analysis method – the detailed analysis of the specific of the population on sexes, and groups of age starting with the year 1900 until 2006 to establish the main tendencies of the two sexes and of the age groups. Equally an important role has the calculated analysis of some demographical indicators such as the depend ency rate of population, the aging rate, the femininity rate, the gravity of feminine population as a whole.

The comparison method – the emphasis of the main differences and similarities that can be found in the analised census to discuss the main changes that took place in the structures on sexes and aging groups.

The synthesis method – the bringing in of information concerning the structure on sexes and aging groups. In an complex assembly that refers to the geodemographical structure of population from the studied regional system.

The catrographical method – the used documents and the graphic tabels have the role to offer a cclear image concerning particularities on sexes and agin groups, the analised teritory in one or more censuses.


## **POPULATION BY SEXES**

When studying the demographic characteristics of a region, the geodemographic structure plays a fundamental role. Analyzing the geodemographic structure, we understand the implications of certain segments of the population in the social, economic and cultural life of a region.


The population structure by sex is a major geodemographic type of structure, emphasizing therein the male and female population. The reason why the study this type of structure is important is to see how these segments of the population may influence birth rates, migration for work or local labor. Equally, knowledge about the population structure by sex is needed in order to characterize sexual dimorphism, gender balance, and to substantiate demographic policy measures based on observance of the rights of people and communities. (Vert, 2001, 118).

According to the analysis carried out at regional level, in 1900 the male population had a higher proportion than the female in all the villages (except Deta where the female share reached 51.27%). But in 1930, 2002 and 2006, the number of men decreases, the female population recording higher rates (Figure 2). Among the causes that led to these changes, we can mention the two World Wars, where a large number of men lost their lives on the battlefield, the opening

of furnaces in Reșita after 1900, which led to a significant increase in percentage of the male population, as well as the migration abroad of the male population.




**Figure 1.** Population structure by sexes at regional level in the years 1900, 1930, 2002 and 2006  
(Source: Department of Statistic Timiș)



**Figure 2.** Population by sexes in 1900 (a) 1930 (b) 2002 (c) and 2006 (d)  
(Source: Department of Statistics Timiș)

To present as an accurate statement as possible regarding any disparity between the sexes, I estimated the female population rate. Thus, in the figure we can see slight fluctuations at parish level at 1900, 1930, 2002 and 2005. If in 1900 the percentage of female population had an average between 49-50, starting

with 1930 and to 2006 there has been a significant increase in the female population up to 54%. The highest rate over time have been recorded in Deta.



**Figure 3.** Share of women in the total population from 1900 (a) 1930 (b) 2002 (c) and 2006 (d) in the Plain Birda-Moravița (Source: Processing by data provided by the Department of Statistics Timiș)

The female population rate was calculated from the ratio between men and women, Chart 1 highlighting the relatively high rates for the entire regional system, which, with the exception of 1900, almost all villages have recorded female rate population above 100.

**Table 1.** Female population rate in the parishes from the Plain Birda-Moravița (%) (Source: Department of Statistics Timiș)

Nr. crt	Parish/Town	1900	1930	2002	2006
1	Banloc	98.06	101.64	101.37	97.13
2	Birda	92.86	104.78	95.97	98.02
3	Ciacova	99.10	99.26	109.91	110.34
4	Denta	99.39	105.46	101.77	103.35
5	Deta	105.09	109.67	112.16	113.11
6	Giera	97.29	97.24	105.90	107.03
7	Ghilad	-	-	-	106.96
8	Jamu Mare	100.19	102.78	102.06	103.37
9	Jebel	98.17	106.67	100.29	103.44


Table 1 (continued)

Nr. crt	Parish/Town	1900	1930	2002	2006
10	Liebling	94.12	106.31	99.36	100.05
11	Moravița	99.32	99.36	101.94	101.42
12	Parța	95.09	101.14	103.48	100.11
13	Pădureni	-	-	-	104.39
14	Voiteg	98.04	111.08	99.17	100.08

### 3. POPULATION STRUCTURE BY AGE

In addition to population structure by sex, another important type of geodemographic structure is the structure by age. This element is of major importance because the planning of educational activities, the planning and forecasting of labor use, the work organization, the health care, and generally, the consumption depends both on the number and structure by age of the population (Vert, 2001, p 121).

The graph in Chart 4 shows the general situation of age groups in the settlements from Plain Birda-Moravia in 1900, 1930 and 2006. Thus, throughout the region there is a predominance of adult population (20-64 years old) than the younger age group (0-19 years old) and the group with those over 65 years old, which provides employment and the socio-economic development of the entire area. However, in the period studied, there was a decrease in adult and young population, along with the increasing aging population (from 5000 to 1900 and 1930 to over 7000 in 2006). These changes are due primarily to a trend in declining birth rates, a rapidly increasing mortality rate and the intensification of national and international migration. The advancement of this phenomenon in the future will result in the inability of people to ensure the necessary workforce in the region. It should be noted that the region of the Plain Birda-Moravita shows a similar tendency to the one taking place at a national level, i.e. a pronounced tendency towards the aging population and geodemographic dependency.




**Figure 4.** Population structure by age in the Censuses of 1900, 1930, 2006  
(Source: Processing by data provided by the Department of Statistics Timiș)


The analyses conducted at parish level in 1900, 1930 and 2006 reveal some changes in the prevalence of a certain age:

Thus, in 1900 (Figure 5) there were parishes where the younger age group recorded the highest share (in the eastern part of Plain Birda: Denta and Birda;

in the south Moravița; in the north Liebling; in the east Deta and Jamu Mare; in the center Jebel and in the south Banloc and Giera), or an almost equal share with the adult population (Ciacova and Parta). The rate for the adult population was slightly lower in Jamu Mare, Deta, Ciacova, while the population 65 years old showed low rates (between 5-7%) due to the high birth rate.




**Figure 5.** Population structure by age group in 1900  
(Source: Processing by data provided by the Department of Statistics Timiș)



**Figure 6.** Population structure by age in 1930  
(Source: Processing by data provided by the Department of Statistics Timiș)

The years 1930 (Figure 6) and 2006 (Figure 7) are characterized by a continuous decrease in the share of young population and an increase in the share of the adult and old population. Thus, in 1930 all parishes recorded a majority of the adult population (rates between 51% - Birda and 59% - Jebel), followed, however, by the young population (between 33% - Jebel and 42% - Birda). In 2006 the younger age group weight reduction is increasing, the highest value recorded in Liebling common. Simultaneously with this increase the share of the adult group (between 55% - Jamu Mare and 63% - Deta) and the share of the elderly (12% - Liebling and 21% - Jamu Mare).

Thus, we find the same phenomenon of demographic aging at parish level, a phenomenon that, if increases, in future it could lead to a decline in the region's socio-economic development.



**Figure 7.** Population structure by age in 2006


(Source: Processing by data provided by the Department of Statistics Timiș)

The same conclusion can be drawn also from the realization of age pyramids by sex for 1930 and 2006. If we look at both interwar and postwar model, we observe a predominance of adult population for both sexes, compared to the old and young population as a result of low birth rates after abortion is declared legal and the characteristic mentality of the people from Banat to have only one child. Equally, due to the same cause, the year 2006 brought an increase in the old population, a phenomenon experienced throughout the area.


The large share of young population in 1900, and its sharp decrease and the increase of the old population, leads to the possibility of geodemographic risks in the studied area. In this respect, indicators such as the demographic dependency rate or rate of aging are of major importance when analyzing the structure by age.

The demographic dependency ratio means the pressure that the inactive population (young and old) has on the working population (adults) (Ianăș, 2011, 258), i.e. the demographic dependency expresses the ability or inability of the

adult population to provide power work required by the other two population groups. As the share of the adult population is lower than the two, the demographic dependency ratio increases. This demographic indicator is calculated from the ratio between young and old population on the one hand, and adults on the other.



**Figure 8.** Age pyramid for Deta (a) and Jebel (b) (1930)  
(Source: Processing by data provided by the Department of Statistics Timiș)




**Figure 9.** Age pyramid in Banloc (a) and Ciacova (b) (2006)  
(Source: Processing by data provided by the Department of Statistics Timiș)

In what Plain Birda-Moravita is concerned, the demographic dependency ratio presented rates above 100 in all parishes in 1900 (the highest rate was recorded in the village of Moravita) due, primarily, to a very large proportion of young population.

The years 1930 and 2006 coincide with a decline in the dependency ratio in the entire region as a result of the increasing number of adults, compared with young and old population in 2006, there were recorded rates under 60% (Chart 2, Figure 10).

**Table 2.** The demographic dependency rate (%)  
(Source: The Department of Statistics Timiș)

Nr. crt.	Parish/Town	1900	1930	2006
1	Banloc	115.38	83.76	71.08
2	Birda	114.95	94.69	64.69
3	Ciacova	104.99	81.30	73.23
4	Denta	111.97	86.99	66.93
5	Deta	121.69	85.88	58.60
6	Giera	119.00	85.43	66.42
7	Ghilad	-	-	71.65
8	Jamu Mare	117.91	76.70	81.76
9	Jebel	107.46	70.98	71.05
10	Liebling	123.16	83.30	67.18
11	Moravița	124.12	74.96	60.85
12	Parța	112.94	75.18	70.00
13	Pădureni	-	-	69.70
14	Voiteg	115.25	83.84	63.18



**Figure 10.** The demographic dependency ratio in the Plain Birda- Moravita, in 1900 (a) 1930 (b) and 2006 (c)

(Source: Processing by data provided by the Department of Statistics Timiș)

The aging rate is calculated by the ratio of extreme age groups and it reflects the share of the old population in relation to adults and young. (Vert, 1995, 39).

$$\frac{P_{65+}}{P_{0-19}} \cdot 100$$


As for the Plain Birda-Moravița, there was a significant increase in the rate of the aging population, particularly in the postwar period (2006) from the prewar and interwar periods, when all the villages showed rates below 0.42. (The highest rates were recorded in 1900 in Denta and Jebel -0.16 and in 1930 in Jebel -0.25, Liebling and Parta 0.22). But due to the reasons already presented

and owing to increased migration, nationally or internationally, all the villages in the Plain Birda-Moravita showed rates exceeding the threshold of 0.42 (rates below 50 being recorded in the parish of Moravia -0.47). (Chart 3, Figure 11).

**Table 3.** The rate of population aging (%)

(Source: Department of Statistics Timiș)

Nr. crt.	Parish/Town	1900	1930	2006
1.	Banloc	15.48	17.31	63.65
2.	Birda	11.15	15.57	51.43
3.	Ciacova	23.03	21.27	77.62
4.	Denta	16.81	20.00	70.61
5.	Deta	13.45	17.88	62.75
6.	Giera	14.69	18.15	64.28
7.	Ghilad	-	-	82.00
8.	Jamu Mare	14.20	23.01	85.53
9.	Jebel	14.22	25.32	69.78
10.	Liebling	13.11	22.16	39.14
11.	Moravița	12.68	20.98	47.74
12.	Parța	15.12	22.16	71.53
13.	Pădureni	-	-	75.88
14.	Voiteg	14.22	17.95	69.10



**Figure 11.** The aging rate in 1900 (a) 1930 (b) and 2006 (c)  
(Source: Processing by data provided by the Department of Statistics Timiș)

## CONCLUSIONS

With the mentioned works of the Anglo-Saxon (Taylor, N.C., Bryan, C.H., Goodrich, C.G., Canter, Larry W, 1996, Barrow, 2000, Goodman 2004) and Romanian (Vert C.,1995/2001) authors as a starting point, we can draw some conclusions that point out the consequences the discrepancies that exist to the level of the demographic structures analysed in the article produced in the territory.

The Birda-Moravita Plain represents one of the most interesting areas from Banat in terms of structure by sex and age groups, general trend of demographic aging and the feminization of population leading to a general decline of the economy in this area. The increasing share of the maintained persons (especially pensioners) will generate a significant jump to the unemployment rate, thus endangering the region's socio-economic growth.

The performed analysis upon the level of the structure by sex and age group of the population represents the small differences between the share of male and female population. A feminization of the population has been noted in this area after the year 1900 because of the wars and the male labor migration in other regions of the country or in foreign states.

The entire region is also facing major changes in the structure by age groups. The year 1900 is distinguished by the predominance of younger age group compared to the adult and aging groups, the years 1930 and 2006 distinguishing themselves by an increase of the share adulthood and aging group. The demographic dependency ratio of the population has experienced significant changes within the studied censuses, recording high values in 1900 due to the high proportion of young people in order to decrease in 1930 and 2006, by reducing the proportion of the maintained population and increasing the share of the adult age group.

As a consequence of demographic trends specific to the area, the studied region is distinguished by the rate of aging increasing since 1930 and ending with 2006, fapt care va duce la diminuarea posibilitatii de ocupare a locurilor de munca producand astfel o sub-dezvoltare a economiei la nivel regional.

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
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## BANKRUPTING NATURE, DENYING OUR PLANETARY BOUNDARIES

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Published under the aegis of Compania Publishing House, in 2013, it is intended to generate shockwaves in society. The authors Anders Wijkman and Johan Rockstrom bring, on the 320 pages of the book a clear signal concerning the way we thought and still we think, and the way we *should* think if we intend to create another society, aiming to wake up an atrophied society which is unconscious about its own future...

It has found open gates in Romanian publishing landscape, through the benevolence of Compania publishing house, this being one of the first translations. In fact, this is a report for the Club of Rome, and it continues the same direction established few decades ago by the founder of this prestigious international scientific organism, Aurelio Peccei – it is a sign of mutiny

against humankind's ignorance, and a way to a responsible amelioration of humankind's condition on the solely Planet which offers shelter for it.

The clear signals which the authors put forefront regarding the natural boundaries and the real danger of crossing over the maximal supportive capacity of Planet Earth underscore the following idea: the urgent need to come out from the damaging paradigm of irresponsible consumerism, which forgets that the main objective of development has to be the *man in a functional harmony with nature*.

Even the book has 19 chapters all are interconnected and carries the reader through the same main theme: human behavior through the sins of pride and greed brought humanity near collapse; but there are some ways out from

the path to total collapse, but they require determined and sustained actions both at governmental level, and at the individual level, too – this means a new type of economy, of society, and finally of humankind.

Even the book debates the subject of climate changes, its covering area is much larger; it examines critically the relationship between humankind and nature, and the *threat* mankind poses for the complex Earth's natural systems, which are the fundamentals for all living organisms. It aims to change the old paradigm – that social development and the environment are separate phenomena – to a new perspective, one that aims to show that biosphere and natural resources are fundamentals for the future human development and prosperity.

The myth of unstoppable materialistic development is due to the fact that humanity lives much over its normal possibilities, while the indicator of Gross Domestic Product misrepresents in fact the welfare and development of a given society. The authors are confident that a paradigm's changing is possible, but for this to become reality, there are necessary to be fulfilled three conditions: we need an acceptable consensus regarding the menaces and the problems we are facing and *will* face; we need a coherent vision and a strategy over the long-haul about the society which we intend to create; we need a strategy for a transition period, from nowadays to the new society we intend to create.

The situation we are facing is at least a concerning one and the reason is not only the narrow geographical perspective. What there's missing the most is the absence of a *vision*; today's politics suffers from short-sightedness, being focused only on short term aims, while the problems humanity is facing impose urgently a policy with long and very long term perspective. Today's politics is a symbolic one while in the same time its content has become more and more diluted. Mass-media has concentrated more and more on people instead on ideas, the personality of spokesman becoming more important than the message he provides... The entertainment is becoming more important than strong analysis and than the debates over the key-elements of society. The current crisis which affects much of the Western world has the roots in the unsustainable use of resources of resources in both, the financial economy, and in the economy based on natural resources. Ignoring the signals coming from reputed scientists (some of them Nobel Prize winners) regarding the nature's fundamentals, and promoting the economic theories emanating from old economic school cannot bring the so much desired sustainable development.

The scientific evidences and science in general have a decisive role in the way negotiations are carried on in areas connected to the environment and natural capital. In order to influence the way negotiations evolve, the science should present its facts and finding with integrity, impartiality, and a great respect. The climate change is a good example of compromise we make with the planet Earth and with the scientific evidences... There is no scientific evidence telling us that a lower concentration than 450 ppm CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere is enough in order to avoid dangerous climate changes; while in negotiations concerning climate, this level is considered as not dangerous. It is noteworthy to be mentioned that the threshold considered dangerous from climate change point of view is based on political compromise, and not on scientific evidence, and its limit established at maximum 2 Celsius degrees over the temperature of preindustrial period is only a "political" aim, and not a scientific proof. Furthermore, there is a question concerning the fact that keeping CO<sub>2</sub>

concentration under the 450 ppm level means a temperature rising under 2 Celsius degrees. Present science is missing and cannot answer the complex question regarding the way our planet system regulates itself, and doesn't know how it would react to our intervention which injects into the system disequilibrium through greenhouse gases emissions. A reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 2050 is considered by worldwide leaders as necessary target for keeping the temperature rising under the limit of 2 Celsius degrees. More recent scientific data indicate that for keeping the rise of temperature in the limit of 2 Celsius degrees, there is needed a more ambitious target in curbing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions: in 2009 IPCC shown that halving emissions in 2050 means the probability on only 0,5 of the risk regarding a rising in temperature lower than 2 degrees; those researches bring a cautionary tone concerning curbing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions: there is needed a 100% reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in 2050 for a chance of only 0,7 to avoid a rising lower than 2 Celsius degrees. As Johan Rockstrom points, the politics and science are at odds, one of them trying to signal the dangerous route we are heading in the long run, while the other trying to minimize, or even to negate altogether the role emissions and human activity have upon nature and climate change. Sometimes, even policymakers try to use scientific data in order to sustain their position; but the key to solve this uncomfortable situation is to create the framework for a complete independent science from external influences, while keeping science far from political process. An interdisciplinary analysis is more than welcome in order to bring the desired results.

Chapter four presents the evolution of debates concerning climate changes from Copenhagen to Durban. It starts presenting the way negotiations regarding climate changes has been carried on, signaling that they have moved desperately slowly; there are over 20 years since it was signed in 1992 at Rio de Janeiro the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and the appearance of a binding international agreement isn't very close to be signed, while the greenhouse gasses' emission have been rising, and the negotiations for fighting climate changes are moving extremely slow.

The authors took part in the conference at Copenhagen in 2009, a conference whose outcomes were full of great hopes, the main one being a binding agreement relating to climate changes. But the result was well under all expectations – only a political declaration which didn't pleased anyone. A little progress was made, however; it was convened by developed economies to create a fund to protect climate in the lowest developed economies (USD 10 bn./year between 2010-2012), and the intention to rise this amount to USD 100 bn./year between 2013-2020. Another strong point at Copenhagen concerned deforestation's limitation. The main point was the one upon which all countries confirmed their ambition to fight for: avoiding temperature's rising with more than 2 C degrees, but nothing was said about how to hit this target. Instead of a binding agreement, most of the participating countries pushed forward to UN only intention declarations concerning the quantity of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions which would be reduced until 2020. Then followed Cancun, in 2010 – where there was postponed the problem's solving concerning curbing emissions. But there were reiterated the target of 2 C degrees, the promised emissions' curbing at Copenhagen would be integrated in an United Nations international treaty, it was decided to create a Fund for Climate to finance efforts in climate area in lower income countries, and there was established a framework to reduce deforestation in developing countries.

But after that there came Durban, with a leap forward; in Durban there was agreed by the national governments that the future negotiations' objective shall be a binding treaty, starting with 2020 – the deadlock was over. Even China, India and USA which previously refused to discuss about binding agreements, agreed to this principle – a remarkable progress. The Kyoto Protocol remains valid until 2017, or until 2020. It was created the Ecological Found for Climate aiming at providing financial help to sustain investments aimed at adaptive measures in developing countries. This result was due to a last minute coalition among EU, lowest developed countries and island-states. But all these reaffirm the rising gap between what science tells us about what has to be done, and what is politically acceptable. The main challenge resides in the fact that the tender Durban agreement has to be the cornerstone for a future global environment agreement, in the mean time pushing for the actions aimed at a decarbonized economy in as much countries as possible.

Chapter 5<sup>th</sup> – The Respect for Planetary Limits – is a enlightening presentation of how the Earth works; how natural systems such as natural resources, biophysical processes and living ecosystems function and interact. It is important to understand that the ecology contains economy, and to leave for ever the paradigm that economy is over ecology. The aspects of climate, ecosystems, natural resources and *economic* prosperity cannot be separated. Due to human greed, natural systems are under great pressure and there is needed a radical change in our attitudes related to how economy should be organized in order to prevent an accelerating erosion of much of the most important ecosystems.

Human activity, and especial economic activity, creates an ecological footprint – the area needed to a population in order to provide row materials and to administrate its wastes – and it's very important to recall that in time this surface has been rising, especially after Second World War. Human greed is big, but the Earth is limited. Mankind is the biggest geological force on Earth.

As humankind exploits in an unsustainable manner the forests, land, water, fisheries, the risks of loosing arable lands, fresh water resources, and finally of reducing biodiversity is now bigger than ever... Already 75% of biodiversity in agriculture is lost, and 70% of animals and plants are on the way to disappearance. The habitat which facilitated humankind to become the dominant specie on Earth is menaced by its greed, in this way humanity being the biggest mortal enemy of itself, because this situation would bring such changes in vital resources availableness while people's number is rising; in the same time, there are possible wars to create access to resources and, taking account of what weapons and technologies exist, these wars could put, in an extreme case, an end even to human history...

Human activity affects in a negative manner all earthly systems, because it generates a higher temperature, and this brings with it a lower biodiversity. That for, it is necessary to rethink the way how the result of human activity is evaluated, introducing in the analysis the way natural capital is affected by this activity. There are borders of Earth, and if some thresholds are crossed over, there could be generated *non-linear evolutions* and interactions among different elements of the ecosystem. Human development is in close correlation with biophysical process and the planetary limits such as climate stability, ozone layer, oceans' water acidity are true global ones, while there are four biophysical global processes which determine the Earth resilience capacity to future shocks

and threshold effects: the cycle of nitrogen and phosphorus, biodiversity reduction, earthly resources degradation, and drinkable water resources' overexploitation.

As a consequence, the *political* objectives in climate related area have to embrace over CO<sub>2</sub> emissions control, the administration of oceans, and of earthly ecosystems.

The greatest challenge humanity faces comes from the rising number of world population, whereas agriculture is the economic sector which contributes the most to climate changes... one third of the greenhouse gas emissions is due to agricultural process, while the agriculture is the most affected sector by climate changes. Today at least 1 bn. people suffer from chronic malnutrition, while the agriculture should provide live stocks for additional 2-3 more bn. people in the decades ahead. But a warmer climate means lower quantity of water which could be used for agricultural purposes. And this in the context of great quantities of nitrates found in the ground, exhaustion of biodiversity and water reserves, and of excessive amount of ozone close to the Earth's surface.

The agriculture's resilience and force are based on biodiversity. The agriculture's aim in the coming decades is to provide what humankind needs, and to be resilient to catastrophes and climate instability. An interesting solution concerns the creation of seeds which, once seeded in the ground, they can generate multiple and repeated harvests few years, without the need to plow.

But all these in the perspective of rising world food production with over 50% in four decades from now; and this can be obtained through productivity's *rising* of lands used nowadays in agricultural purposes. The authors mention even the fact that we need to keep on the table the options offered by biotechnology, and to remain open to genetic modified products – an aspect which could generate very hot debates in some parts of the world such as in European Union member countries, in the future. Greater productivity and greater resilience during new epidemics, climate instability, fresh water resources' missing and the shortage of agricultural lands push humankind to rethink all its traditional views about agriculture. As a consequence, there are needed more changes in fields such as: plants' harvesting, soils' administration, fresh water's using, the use of pesticides and landscape's administration.

There is another chapter specially dedicated to energy, and oil. Oil has had a tremendously impact upon economic and social development. Since 1950 oil production rose over 10 times; the world population 2,5 times bigger, while the world economy is 10 times bigger. These things and all their consequences are the result of oil using, and of cheap oil. As one can easy note, any evolution in transportation brings with it development, and power, and since over 90% of oil used is used in transportation, the consequences of this is that economy is globalized now exactly due to cheap oil. In the same time, agriculture has become deeper dependent on oil. Last two centuries witnessed the productivity's rising 20 times, and this is due to the same cause: cheap oil. *But* one of the greatest transformations due to oil using by human society is to be found in agricultural production: the agricultural exploitations have become fewer and on a greater surfaces, and more mechanized, being situated at remote places from one another. This change is felt all over food production chain: milk factories, gross-sellers, deposits, slaughter-houses, mills – all are now bigger and are situated very far from one another. New types of seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, intensive irrigations determined a 2.5 rising of agricultural production in the

first three decades after WW2, and world population met the proper conditions for its rising. But we recall here that oil is the main cause for all these things... There is a direct causal link between energy and poorness: nowadays over 1.6 bn. people don't have access to electricity, the majority being located in Africa and South-Asia. In this context, the report brings to our attention the fact that – as the role of governments is to mobilize the buying capacity of poor households – and as oil will become more expensive and hard to be found in the future, in order to avoid negative consequences due to emissions resulted from oil's burning and to eliminate fossil fuel in house using in poorest societies, there is a good solution to create a worldwide fund which would provide financing for the quick extension of renewable electricity in poor countries. As soon as this measure is implemented, the pressure on oil resources, which become less and less accessible, would be less intense, the possible negative impact of peak oil being in this way attenuated. If measures to reduce oil dependence are not taken seriously, the consequences will be such as: oil exporting countries will consolidate their international position from economic and *political* view point, oil price will register a dramatic rising, while economy will enter the recession phase and finally the collapse one, all these bringing political crises in a numerous countries, which already have a lot of chronic and social problems.

It is noteworthy to bring to the reader's attention the fact that military staff in some countries signal the menaces looming over humanity due to peak oil; while *politics* is focused on short term aims, *strategic* thinking – which is found in military and security apparatus – is focused on long term possible evolution and menaces... They are focused on risk's evaluation, and since the menaces peculiar to Cold War politics has disappeared, the world is changing and will face other types of menaces: terrorist, ecological, climate changes, vital resources acute and then chronic shortages. As we can see, there are other menaces, which are dealing in a way or the other with *oil*. The solution is to fight for oil dependency's reduction, and to promote renewable for energy production, and recycling and reusing for materials which have the needed characteristics.

Even there are some new elements which could bring in some way a better supply of fuels – namely tar sands, shale gas, or even liquid coal – all of them have great inconvenience in connection with CO<sub>2</sub> emissions; that for, there is needed a *transition* to a green energetic system. But the transition will not be easy: there are a lot of hindrances along the way: political, financial, and technical, adding a great reluctance of a great number of big producer companies of conventional energy. They control nowadays the energy market, looking with skepticism both at renewable sources, and at a decentralized energy infrastructure in the future. Here could be added the institutional inertial impulse of old style institutions and organizations involved in energy market. But there is a hope in the long run: EU intends to cut off CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 85% and 90% in 2050 in comparison with 2010. This is an achievable aim, in case renewable energies represent 80% in electricity production in 2050, coupled before with an efficiency rising of energy use, and the cut off of subsidies for fossil fuels (during 2010, 37 governments subsidized together energy use with USD 409 bn., which brought an artificial lower price for fossil fuels).

Another aspect which is a key-point in the Club of Rome report is world population, and its evolution; its importance is so great that UN has it on its agenda – it is a humankind problem, asking for global solutions. In 1994, there took place a UN conference in Cairo, concerning world population and its

possible trends. Global population trend has registered a spectacular evolution in the last century, rising from 2 bn. (1928) to 5,7 bn. (in 1994) and 7 bn. nowadays, and this only contributed to the rising complexities in the world today... In 2050, there are expected to be some 9 bn. people on Earth, all of them having the right to a decent life... But this aspect will put a lot of pressure upon ecosystem, resources, living space, and finally upon CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and climate changes. That for, the authors signal that there cannot be found a solution to climate changes decoupled of world population; they are two facets of the same complex global problem. After Cairo, there were registered significant progresses in connection with world population's evolution. Limiting population's rising, reducing poverty, rising welfare, and reducing the human impact upon environment are all intertwined and have the greatest influence upon one another. Each year world population adds to its number another 80 millions new incomers, and this poses a great challenge upon humankind: as there are some 3 bn. peoples without access to energy and needed resources for a decent life, in 2050 there will be added another 2-3 bn. peoples which will demand their access to a decent life. But there is a key-aspect which should be regarded as the cornerstone for humankind's evolution in the long run: there is needed a stable, of better, a reducing number of people in order to provide good living condition for all humans, on a limited Earth. It is important to note that some countries such as Afghanistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Guatemala, Bolivia, and a most of the African countries register a medium birth/woman between 4 and 8, showing that in the long run there will be a rising of complexity of the problems these countries already have. The main cause for this trend is *poorness*, the role of women in society, and woman's discrimination. But past experience shows that rising income per capita contributes to lowering the birth rate, and rising school rate for the girls is the best mean to reduce birth rate, and to diminish children death rate in poor societies.

Taking account of these trends, there are needed measures aimed at reducing birth's number, and as a consequence there will be registered a lower impact upon the environment. The rise of world population is not sustainable from environmental, climate, and resources points of view, and if there will not be taken earlier some measures concerning reducing the birthrates, later there will be some human or natural aspects which will bring a rise in mortality's rate. Solutions which are already proved concern facilitating access to school for girls, and providing access to modern energy (!). Almost all countries which have a high level of birth rate, have great deficiencies regarding access to energy.

But there are some voices which only seed doubt concerning humankind present and especially future problems. They have the aim of denying the scientific truths concerning humankind contribution to environmental degradation. They are climate-deniers which say that there are other influences which could contribute to climate changes (from Earth's position in comparison with the Sun, natural cycles on the Earth, the evolution of solar radiation, and others). But as collected data prove, there is an accelerating rise in medium temperature in the last century, which is due especially to human activity – especially that activity which involves burning fossil fuels for producing energy. The press has a crucial role in spreading the message of climate-deniers, while in the US the problem is seen through ideological lens – and this is a huge problem because US has the biggest economy. But backyard the climate-deniers,

there are opaque interests which push them to speak against ecological movements, and especially against scientific community involved in climate science. These are narrow corporative interests connected to oil industry and classic energy capacities, and to financial and bank institutions which see with anger the possibility to create a new energy system, and as a consequence, a new economy and a new type of society...

These people are grouped in foundation – especially in the US – all of them being partisans of free competition and of free market, and all of them contesting the scientific results arrived at by IPCC and main discoveries in climate science. They see only the market and its mechanisms, and do not accept at all any economical instruments such as taxes, subsidies, or any intervention made by state in economy. The climate-deniers believe in the reduced role for the governments and a small role for the state. But the truth is this: there are pumped USD hundreds millions for lobbying US Congress, in order to finance the opposition at any legislation concerning energy and climate change, some congressmen receiving big subsidies from fossil fuels industry. But they are focused only on short term aspects and profits, denying a good future even for their own children...

There is a good proof proving the dangers which stay ahead – the ice cap in the Arctic area. It behaves like a canary in a mine. The health of the Earth is indicated by ice cap's surface and its thickness. It is a very remote area for most people, but for climate scientists it is a key-element for study. And as the measurements taken in 2007 had shown, in few months the Arctic ice lost 30% of its volume – which could be regarded as a very dramatic event. In the period of five years, between 2004 and 2008 the multiyear marine ice lost 42%. And this is an alarming phenomenon because it destroys a unique economic and social system, and endangers the way life conditions on entire planet are regulated. And the impossibility to predict accurately the evolution in the Arctic area, and as a consequence at global level, is complicated by the fact that the changes take place in a framework with a non-linear evolution. It is due principally to human activities. A lower surface of ice means that solar radiations are much better absorbed, instead of being reflected back in the space, which means a greater acceleration of global warming. This is coupled with higher acidification of ocean waters, which in its turn changes the equilibrium of carbonates in the oceans, menacing all beings with shells, and the corals. Recent evolutions in the Arctic area give us serious reasons which should concern us. The most alarming data connected to climate changes are those which explain the alarming changes which has taken place in the Arctic region, and that for it is needed more than ever an urgent and comprehensive program which should be assumed by political leaders, globally. The Arctic is the proof that climate changes will push humankind to take radical measures regarding the way it lives and behaves.

The Swedish authors bring in the forefront the case of Sweden: is she a world champion in climate policies? Even this country is recognized as leader in climate policies, the authors go further, and bring evidences that this country is not as clean as one could expect. But the way they think differs from the classical thought – they see the Swedish imports from different countries as elements which generated emissions in their country of origin, even they didn't polluted Sweden; and a lot of developed countries are in a similar position. Over 30% of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are "incorporated" in final products which are imported from other countries; for important exporting countries such as China, the

situation in opposed: between 25% and 30% of Chinese emissions are due to their exports, which go especially to EU and USA. And even that Sweden implemented a tax on fossil fuels beginning with 1991, reducing in this way the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions due to house heating to a modest percentage of 5%, while the situation in other EU countries this sector contributes with 30-40% to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, the total Swedish carbon footprint has risen in the same time span. And this is a clear sign concerning the fact that humankind should change its way of behavior, especially economic behavior. Looking through this angle, Sweden is not a world climate champion anymore. That for, it is compulsory to change our direction, in order to create the necessary conditions where economy and ecology can go hand in hand.

It is necessary for us to understand the right way the new economy works. We have in this historical moment three crises: one global financial crisis, economic crises of some countries which generate budgetary deficits, a great public debt and rising unemployment rate, and of course the crisis in the administration of the *environment*. The conclusion is that our economic model is not good anymore. The rapid erosion of natural capital is not the main focus for the most economists, which regard the nature as a constant and stable base for economic activities – which is not the case. What is more and more regarded as important is not the economic development, but the economic progress. Recently United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) indicated in a report that the ecology of economic activities is not a luxury reserved exclusively to rich countries, meaning that a “green economy” is an essential factor for poverty’s reduction and eradication. The ecological footprint of rich countries is a high one, and the life styles and the consumerism they encourage is in a great part responsible for the situation we face as humankind.

As a consequence, the GDP is not a good indicator for welfare measurement anymore. The sustainability of conventional economic activity becomes more and more unsustainable, because the negative aspects are greater than benefits, and the GDP doesn’t distinguish between the activities which generate positive or negative effects upon the environment. We should regard the natural capital a great subsidizer of our economic activity, and this is not mentioned in GDP. And the natural capital is already crossed over due to economic activity.

That for, it is necessary to rethink the way we activate in economic and social areas, and a key-aspect is the creation of such type of development which would facilitate us to use more efficiently energy and other natural resources. The problem of access to resources should be posed both at nationally and internationally levels. *If* we don’t start to use more efficiently and equitably the resources of our unique planet, the consequences over the long run would be: hindrances in access to resources which will generate tensions and military confrontations, and death due to starving for some bn. of people. Instead of GDP, another indicator is more fitted in the new economy: it is HDI (Human Development Index), which focuses not only on incomes and purchasing power, but on life expectancy and education level, too. This is a more fitted indicator, because as DGP/capita rose, it brings a rising in welfare. But when it crosses a certain level it doesn’t bring anymore benefits; contrary, it can generate *negative* effects.

Old economic model – based on GDP’s evolution – has a lot of deficiencies: it is unsustainable from climate, environment, and resources point of view; it is unsustainable from equity point of view; it is unstable; it cannot create the

working places for the unemployed; has low efficiency in providing public goods; doesn't create the necessary conditions which bring welfare's rising. What matters the most in the new type of economy is not GDP/capita, but welfare's rising and human prosperity. The measures to be taken in order to go in the right direction regard the necessity to give the right value for natural capital, to understand that it has limits, and technical evolution is not a definitive solution to human problems; and we should correctly appreciate the high quality energy, which is not based on fossil fuels. The authors wish to signal that we *must* rethink the way economy is organized, and we should give up the unsustainable way we live nowadays, heading to a new type of *circular economy*, with a premium on reusing, recycling, and reconditioning. The producers should focus in this new type of economy on services and services providing instead on manufacturing products, and on administrating these products, instead in selling as much as they can to their clients. Furthermore the old economy – which is an economy of fiscal type – bites the natural capital and “eats” it, destabilizing the ecosystems, and even menacing the life on Earth. That for, the politicians should assume their responsibility: a lot of our present problems – which are systemic – could be solved by politicians using some, taxes, tariffs, or subsidies. But this means a greater role for the states, and a lesser role for “free hand” in economy. But these types of solutions are necessary, and they must be fitted in new economic theories, and new regularization measures. A comprehensive solution should embrace a *new way of thinking* and a new *attitude*. Signals from Arctic and Africa prove that there is a serious matter humankind faces; and traditional economic scientists should reinvent their discipline connecting it to understanding the way nature works, and how important it is for entire economic activity.

Not only the economic thought must be totally reformed, but financial institutions should face the reality that they cannot deny the risks of the future anymore. The assuming of great risks by financial institutions and by financial markets brought our present world crisis, while the governments tacitly accepted financial practices which caused these malfunctions. Deregulation by governments starting with '80s means that they played a role in this context. And the extraction of the profits which account over 40% of the total profits gained in the US is against the interests of the real economy.

That for, it is urgently needed to *restructure* the global financial system, aiming at providing credits to small and medium size companies, and especially if they concentrate upon investments in a green infrastructure and sustainable energy. Living on credit – as Americans did a lot in the past – in unsustainable from financial, economic, and ecological points of view; and a new look to financing economic activities should be the way banks work: they should focus on long term trends and benefits, and move away from short term perspective. The reform in financial sector is a much needed one; in can become a benefic force sustaining the efforts aimed at a sustainable society. It is a fatal error to ignore the inherent risks in continuing to finance the investments in fossil fuels projects or those projects which determine an unsustainable use of the biosphere. And such a negative trend will hurt the common man because economic activity will loose its force to provide the needed things in a sustainable manner, while the pension funds would be affected, as a direct consequence.

The conventional rising models policies will surely hurt more and more the ecosystems, biodiversity, climate stability, non-renewable resources such as oil,

phosphorus and arable lands. The real challenge is connected to natural resource base. The classical model sees the parallel rising of GDP and demand, while this is based on natural resources' and energy consumption. While a rising in purchasing power in a specific country brings a greater pressure upon the environment. The key for the future has to do directly with a model involving a social development in such a way that it would permit decent living conditions, and in the same time, ecological sustainability. One aspect is that energy efficiency doubles in 56 years, while energy demand doubles in 37 years, meaning that consumption has a greater pace in rising. While the carbon proportion in world economy has lowered from 1 kg CO<sub>2</sub>/USD 1 value of production (1980) to 770 g/USD 1 value of production (2008), CO<sub>2</sub> emissions has risen with a greater pace (with 80% in comparison with 1970). Greenhouse gases rise in the same time with the income. And a better efficiency in energy and resources use only accelerates the economic rising, meaning that households have greater means to satisfy greater and more diversified needs, which means a greater rate of consumption, and a greater pressure upon the limited resources. But a society efficient from energy point of view is far better prepared for recessions, energy shocks, and fuel's rising prices.

The present economic model has at its base the myth that material wealth is the best measure for prosperity; which in fact is not true. We are obsessed with GDP's rising, hoping that a little more will put all things at their proper place. But it is a non-sense – this model undermines human happiness and causes even “social recession”. The greatest problem we face is that society thinks about itself as being based on a sustainable rising, which is not true at all. It is unsustainable and creates unstable situations in the future. Until the end of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, if we do not change our way we live and create welfare, the humankind will meet a hostile climate, resources' exhaustion, species' disappearance, food deficits, mass migrations, and almost inevitable, will face war. That for there are needed changes such as: implementation of new indicators for a better use of resources; making a fiscal reform aimed at reducing taxes on work, while rising them on consumption of fossil fuels and raw materials; identifying the signs announcing scarcity of resources (water, land); and one of the most important aspects – the remaking of energy system, with a more ecological and sustainable infrastructure.

The authors focus then of the solutions concerning the way economy should work: they present the type of new economy which is more sustainable from energy, resources, and climate change points of view. *It is the circular economy*. Rising population, natural resources exploitation, climate changes, and other factors push the world toward an unsustainable path. If we do not change our models for production and consumption, sure we will face a dangerous future. And this will be only amplified by the fact that humans' capacity to make things is far greater than their capacity to understand what they have done. If human society will face overpopulation, overconsumption in wealthy societies, using some technologies, would only create havoc to environment, and dangerous differences in society. Rising efficiency is not sufficient for providing a more sustainable future for our children; a more intensive recycling is needed, while reducing raw materials exploitation to a minimum. And recycling is a promising business: only electronic wastes rose to a huge quantity of 50 mil. tones/year, while only 15-20% of this quantity is recycled. We should move from a linear world economy towards a circular

regional economy, reducing the consumption of natural resources and recycling rate's rising. If we can reach the point where there will be no wastes as a consequence of social and economic activities, then we can say that we meet the point where the economy has a circular character. And the welfare's rising can be reached by reducing material consumption, and focusing upon recycling, reusing, and reconditioning.

Present economic models praise the amount of sold products, looking for its maximization, while the new type of circular economy praises services provision in connection to the products created by companies. Some instruments must be used in order to have such an effect: establishing compulsory levels for an efficient use of resources; sustainable innovation, promoting sustainable projects involving resources' using in a closed circuit; fiscal reform, aimed at reducing taxes levied on work, while rising them on consumption.

All these things will create the conditions for a better world to live in, with lower rate of pollution, with better use of natural capital, and with greater happiness for humans.

The economic type of the past brought humankind on the disaster threshold, and there are needed some radical social transformations which will prove to be difficult and painful. There is needed a better and fitted administration of natural capital, and missing it will mean the impossibility of satisfying the needs of world population, whose number is on a rising path. It is crucial to start working globally at different levels simultaneously: at household level, companies, and governments. *On the long run, there is needed new and radical idea and concepts concerning the way society is organized and functions;* and in order to arrive at that point, we should start with economy and international cooperation; while educational policies should be coupled to these trends, too. The authors say that there will surely take place *radical changes in global governance*, with a reformed and reinforced new world organization which will have the aim of working for humankind common interest. Some aspects, such as reducing meat consumption/capita, reducing oil consumption, a more rational use of buildings, producing goods with a better quality and a longer life, and even suppression of private car ownership – which as we live today, is a very radical change – are expected.

A total restructuring of political framework is needed, too. And as a consequence, there is needed, and it will surely take place, a peaceful but a painful *revolution, both in attitudes, and in socio-economical organization, too*. The economic rising doesn't mean economic wealth, and the message of *the Club of Rome Report – Denying Our Planetary Boundaries – is focused on starting a debate at social level with the aim of creating a new economic paradigm, while in the same time, the authors signaling that the main hindrances are not of technological character, but they depend on political will*.

They end their report with some advices for a world with 9 bn. of people. Their conclusions focused on radical solutions for present production and consumption systems, a new infrastructure with minimum CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, looking always on the whole, and not on the parts, the changing of producers' activity which would focus on services rather than selling products. But an institutional reform is needed, too; the institutional reform must take place both at national level, and at international (global) level, too. All solution connected to the mankind's future should have a global vision – and we should reconnect all human communities and through them the world economy to the biosphere.

That for what is most needed, argue the authors, *is a global type of government*, which should generate planetary solutions in order to overcome the problems humanity will face in the future. And there are needed strategies aimed at creating the fitted framework for the administration of the whole planet. The steps in that direction should start with the common effort of key-players which would promote the needed framework for a future global administration, with the aim of creation of *a planetary integrative management system*.

And as the authors of the Report's main aim was to use it in order to generate global debate concerning viable solution for the future, the reviewer aims only to bring to the Romanian public opinion's attention their desire, and he hopes it will do it.

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