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TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE TOURISM INDUSTRY

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Abstract: The tourism industry is considered one of the most important cogged wheels of the global economy. Numerous countries – specially emerging and least developed - have benefited from the growing number of tourists that visit them. Ironically, in these countries, terrorist acts generated by local groups and organizations have scared off tourists and have created a negative image for specific destinations. The present paper tries to verify the existence of a connection between tourism and terrorism and to present the responses of the industry toward these acts focusing on the US market.

Key words: terror, travel, hospitality, Bali, USA

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INTRODUCTION

Tourism represents for many countries - especially emerging ones - the main source of income. It is strange that in the case of many countries of this type, the local tourist industry is adversely affected by the terrorist actions of some political or ethnic groups (Niyaz, 2010; Wynne-Hughes, 2012).

Terrorism has been a tool of politics throughout history and modern terrorism began in the second half of the twentieth century (Figure 1. International terrorism 1968-2000).

In the 60s and early 70s the frequency of terrorist attacks recorded a sharp increase. The most shoking attacks in this period were: Bloody Friday in Belfast and the Munich Olympic Massacre in 1972, and the hijacking at the Rome airport in 1973 (Davidson, 2009).

After a brief period of peace, the 80s began and ended with violence generated by terrorism (Sonmez et. al., 1999).

During the 90s terrorist attacks took place all over the world, from the United States (the Oklahoma City Bombing in 1995) to Israel and Columbia (Al-Hamarneh, 2005).

The begining of the XXI century has seen a flurry of terrorist attacks in different parts of the world, some of which were coordinated with the help of technology and mass-media. Advertising and psychology are important components of terrorism. The attacks listed in Table 1.

Table 1. The most significant terrorist attacks in the 2001-2015 period
(Data source: Kipp, 2004:62-63, www.reuters.com/news/world,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/, http://edition.cnn.com/)

Date	Country	Town	No. of victims	No. of casualties
September 11, 2001	USA	New York	2977	3000+
October 12, 2002	Indonesia	Bali	202	240
November 15-20, 2003	Turkey	Istanbul	56	100
March 11, 2004	Spain	Madrid	191	2050
July 7, 2005	UK	London	56	700
July 11, 2006	India	Mumbai	209	714
October 18, 2007	Pakistan	Karachi	136	387
November 26, 2008	India	Mumbai	173	327
October 25, 2009	Iraq	Bagdad	155	520
March 20, 2010	Russia	Moscow	43	100
March 28, 2011	Yemen	Ja'ar	150	45
January 20, 2012	Nigeria	Kano	185	unknown
January 10, 2013	Pakistan	Quetta	126	270
December 16, 2014	Pakistan	Peshawar	145	114
April 1, 2015	Kenya	Garissa	148	79

The most significant terrorist attacks in the 2001-2015 period, have received increased attention from the media, especially TV stations. If attacks or incidents are dramatic enough, as were those of 11 September on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, viewers from around the world will learn about them in a very short period of time (Ross, 2006).

Figure 1. International terrorism 1968-2000
(Data source: Sandler & Enders, 2004; Frey et.al., 2006, http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/)

TERRORISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY

The American Civil Code defines terrorism as "*premeditated violence, politically motivated against civilians, committed by local groups or clandestine agents, in order to influence a target audience*" (American Civil Code, quoted by Weinberg, L., Eubank, 2006).

The Romanian language explanatory dictionary defines terrorism as "*all deliberate acts of violence committed by a group or organization to provoke a generalized fear to achieve political goals*" (http://dexonline.ro/definitie/terorism)

Other authors define terrorism as a form of political violence, used mainly when one of the opposed factions has not the strength and numbers to overcome their enemy militarily. The final goal may be to force the other side to concede by inflicting more casualties and damage than they can bear. "*If the opponent is a government, the object may also be to turn their own citizens against them, by constantly reminding them that their government cannot protect them.*" (Korstanje, 2012, 8)

In fact, terrorism is a form of politically motivated violence, for which the advertising - the message - plays a crucial role. Kropotkin considers terrorism as "*propaganda by action*" (Weinberg, Eubank, 2006, 17), one way through which a relatively small number of people can draw attention to a social or political cause.

We can deduce that terrorism is a tactic, a very violent form of political communication, which depends heavily on modern means of communication such as television and the Internet to transmit a message to the audience. Terrorists hope that they will influence their emotions or behavior (Weinberg, Eubank, 2006).

It is difficult to say, if lately terrorism itself grew, or just our awareness and concern about it. But in a society obsessed with mass-media, ample coverage of this type of events, gives terrorist organization the illusion of power and efficiency. In no other period of history, a relatively small number of people managed to create this much chaos so quickly and efficiently. The attacks against the United States on September 11th 2001 and the subsequent terrorist attacks (Bali, Madrid, London) testify to this assertion (Weinberg, Eubank, 2006; Henderson, 2007).

THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON THE TOURISM INDUSTRY

One of the victims of terrorism is tourism, especially operators acting in its surrounding areas (Baker, Coulter, 2007; Min, 2008). Glaesser (2006) believes that there is a significant difference, especially for the tourism industry, between natural and anthropogenic disasters. As a rule, negative events caused by people have a longer effect causing a lack of confidence in the safety of potential tourists in the region or city where the events took place.

Goeldner and Ritchie (2009) identified four reasons why terrorists choose to attack tourist centers: 1. an attack on a tourist center is a shock to the entire economy - which highlights even more the importance of the tourism sector for national economies; 2. tourism is at the center of media attention - terrorists seek publicity and media representatives are already on site in the event of major tourist attractions or events, such as sporting events or festivals; 3. attractions, such as museums, historical sites and landscapes represent the spirit and essence of a nation; 4. places frequented by tourists provide

anonymity to the terrorists. Police and security forces do not know the identity or motivation of those who visit sites or festivals.

To determine the exact impact that terrorism has on tourism numerous studies were conducted: Holden (1987), Enders & Sandler (1991), Enders, Sandler and Parise (1992), Drakos & Kutan (2003) etc. Their conclusions are vague in general, because there are several categories of incidents and terrorist organizations, and significant differences from region to region (ETA in Spain, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Al Qaeda in the Middle East, Chechen separatists in Russia etc.). Instead, Drakos and Kutan (2003) concluded that "*the intensity of violence, casualties and location of the incident have significant effects on the host country and in neighboring countries.*" Therefore, the authors emphasize the importance of regional security by creating multinational organizations that receive funds from all the involved states to combat terrorism. In addition, joint operations of the army and police forces of these states can contribute to more efficient security forces. All this can improve economic and political relations between states, which is an important opportunity for peace in the region. Research conducted by Drakos and Kutan (2003) is focused on studying the effects of terrorism at a regional level, the selected countries were: Greece, Turkey and Israel. The authors consider regional cooperation in the fight against terrorism an important cornerstone in the external relations between states.

In addition to improving security systems, the tourism industry will have to implement a crisis management system that can handle a wide range of disasters.

September 11, 2001 was a key moment in human history, but in terms of tourism impact was considered minor by officials at the UNWTO (Bonham et. al., 2006100). The number of international arrivals decreased with less than 1%. Instead, the American tourist market fully felt the shock, the number of American and international tourists dropped from 128.2 million in 2000 to 122,200,000 in 2001 and 116,100,000 in 2002 (Henderson, 2007, 67). The hardest hit sector was air transport, airlines lost about $ 2 billion in 2001 and in the following years important airlines filed for bankruptcy: United Airlines, Air Canada and Delta Airlines (Beirman, 2003, 53).

Regarding the Bali attacks, its consequences were felt immediately at local and national level, registering an exodus of foreign tourists and an avalanche of cancellations of reservations by tourists who wanted to come to Indonesia. Travel agents and tour operators from several countries blocked the sale of packages to Bali, and simultaneously sought solutions to repatriate the customers who had already reached the island (Henderson, 2007). All sectors of the tourism industry were affected, including the national air transport company, which had to reduce the number of flights because of the lack of demand. The occupancy rate of the hotel decreased from about 75% to less than 10% (Baker, Coulter, 2007). All other businesses (catering, tourist attractions and trade), which depended on tourism, suffered losses. Amateur tour guides, salespeople, souvenir producers and sellers, which formed a substantial underground economy, were in the same dire situation (Henderson, 2007).

CONCLUSIONS

In general, despite worldwide efforts to reduce the activity of terrorist groups, the frequency of terrorist acts will be higher than before, at least duet o these three important reasons (Ross, 2006): citizens will feel powerless in the

face of injustices, created by political leaders and national governments or some other countries, and they will begin using terrorism as a form of protest; governments will want to avoid armed conflicts and thus will sponsor and support terrorist groups; weapons and communication technologies will be more accessible to terrorists.

As a consequence, increase security (both by police number and using cutting-edge equipment) will become a necessity for air carriers, hotels, restaurants and other service providers. In addition, experts in the field of security will have to be prepared for the entry or the presence of people carrying bacteria or viruses that may infect the entire population of a city.

We can conclude that the tourism industry of any country or region can be profoundly affected by a terrorist attack. For this reason the recovery is extremely important, and the involvement of all stakeholders (national, regional and local governments, business, academia and civil society) is essential.

Figure 2. The impact of a shock on the incoming tourists
(Source: Bonham et. al., 2006, 101)

With regard to the recovery following a disaster, there are two different opinions on this concept. In the case of the disaster of September 11th 2001, for example, tourism officials take as a reference the year 2000, and consider a full recovery when international visitor arrivals and / or receipts will exceed the ones recorded pre-shock (Figure 2). On the other hand, economists see things differently. For full recovery to take place, it is necessary to reach a level that would be reached if the shock had not occurred.

If we will focus on the second opinion, we can deduce that in the post-impact period, tourism will have to register a growth rate much higher to recover in a very short time the losses duet o a shock. Evidence suggests that while terrorism can cause damage to the tourism industry in the long term tourists will not avoid visiting these destinations. "*Many locations (Northern Ireland, Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Turkey, etc.) that have seen significant decreases in the*

number of tourists duet o terrorist attacks, recorded a growing number of visitors when the hostilities stopped" (Baker, Coulter, 2007, 264).

From this point of view, both the United States and Indonesia have recovered and recorded impressive growth rates of about 4% and 9% per year (UNWTO, 2011). If we analyze Figure 3 we can see that in the United States, in 2006 the number of international tourists reached the level recorded in the year 2000 (50.9 million), but so far failed to achieve the (virtual) level it could have reached without the September 11 attacks, even if the historical trend we took into account was an average increase of only 3% (in 1998 and 1999, growth rates were 4.5% and 4.9%) (OTTI, 2014).

Figure 3. The impact the September 11 attacks on incoming tourists
in the United States (millions of visitors)
(Source: OTTI, 2014)

Practice shows us that, through proper crisis management, any destination can overcome any kind of shock, whether it is a natural disasters or a terrorist attacks. But we must also recognize that terrorism remains one of the most important challenges of the global tourism industry.

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SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION
AND SPATIAL PLANNING - THE CASE OF POLAND

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Abstract: Socio-demographic changes exert significant influence on space management. Knowledge on demographic processes and trends may help to create efficient social and spatial policies in a particular region. It may also help to prevent some negative effects of demographic changes as well as it may improve quality of life. The analysis conducted by the author has proven the necessity of taking up actions aimed at improving demographic condition of regions through proper space shaping and altering the space of cities and villages so it corresponds to their current and future demographic structures.

Key words: Poland, population, demography, space management, social infrastructure

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INTRODUCTION

One of the most important development factors of a particular region is its population and changes it undergoes. This concerns economic, social, cultural or physical space as well as natural conditions. Space management, urban planning and all similar actions shall be taken having citizens in mind. In order to do so, it is necessary to be aware of all demographic tendencies and population forecasts. It leads to better quality of live and prevents negative processes taking place in some spaces.

DEMOGRAHIC PAST AND THE PROCESS OF SPATIAL PLANNING

In Poland as well as in whole Central and Eastern Europe some historical events had a significant meaning in the process of demographic profiles shaping and they can also be considered contributing factors in space management. The case of the eastern part of Poland can be an illustrative example as this region lost a significant portion of its population after the Second World War. As a result of this the dynamics of building up the housing stock there was low and it was intensified much later by the help of some industrial investments (Rodzoś, J., Wesołowska, M., 2012), which have influenced the space of the whole region. Pomerania is another example where a large population of immigrants, mostly repatriates from Eastern Europe, has significantly changed both the sacred and

social spaces (Przybylska, 2014). What is interesting, we can still observe different social and demographic patterns there.

It is also worth mentioning that the complicated past and the experience of communism were contributing factors to social changes. During the period of transformation interpersonal relations, including neighbourly ones, were changing constantly. They were triggered by, among others, wealth inequalities, loss of confidence and, as a result, by a decrease in durability of relationships (Giordano, Kostova, 2002). On the one hand, it resulted from a severe deterioration in financial situation of a large part of population, on the other, it is related to the new European hierarchy of priorities. The process of urban space shaping was influenced by the economic problems which started in 1990's (Andrusz, Harloe, Szelenyi, 2011). The influx of people to the large urbanized centres was decreased as less people from the rural areas and small towns were migrating at that time. Stanilov, K. (2010 a) claims that until 1995 all capital cities of the region, except Warsaw, had been depopulating, however, in 2005 the situation became stable.

All these intense changes which took place in Poland triggered the process of social groups polarization. Warsaw is a good example as some kind of segregation was observed there before the transformation and after the fall of communism it was even more visible (Śleszyński, 2004). These disproportions started to play a special role in the initial phase of the transformation period, when financial problems became the main problem of a great percentage of Poles. What is more, the process of urban space heterogenisation in the aspect of a social status is observed in the whole country, however, it is more visible in the largest cities. Social and spatial polarization is progressing dynamically (Węcławowicz, 2003). As a result of demographic processes differentiation in a given region, migrations especially, the space of some administrative units may be changed. Areas perceived synonyms of poverty shall also be mentioned as they are created as a result of socio-spatial changes, too. They are often considered temporary or permanent places of residence for many people what makes the social segregation of a given area even more visible.

The period of inhabiting a given area as well as the year in which a given district was created shape some distinctive areas where people concentrate accordingly to the demographic features, i.e. city centers become areas where the process of population ageing is visible while the population of suburbs is much younger. We should also take into account that although city centres are usually prestigious places, they are not free from pathological phenomena (Zborowski, Dej, 2009). It is also proven by the fact that when planning revitalization processes for particular administrative units, the planners shall be aware of the socio-demographic situation in a given unit as it often defines its popularity, property prices and the demands its citizens have concerning the aesthetics of urban spaces.

SOCIAL STATUS AND SPATIAL PLANNING

Social status of citizens fosters creation of units dominated by people with high material status. Nowadays the employed or the elderly can also create poverty areas. That is why it is advisable to benefit from the experience gathered by the western metropolises, which try to increase their own demographic potential through revitalization as it is also a way of reconstructing social space of cities (Haase, Biedrzyński, Grabkowska, and others, 2011).

Additionally, when the well-educated and the wealthy dominate in a particular area, they exercise influence over space management processes. In Polish cities we can observe the process of ghettoization, which is popular among the wealthiest citizens. As a result, a kind of microspace emerges which is occupied by the group of people of similar social, demographic and cultural features. The most important determinant of these changes is popularization of the gated communities which has its roots in the need of having a save, aesthetic and prestigious place of residence. However, it deteriorates the quality of interpersonal relations which, in fact, are already a serious problem of modern metropolises (Polanska, 2010).

Therefore, it can be stated that the issue of housing occurred to be a major problem in the post-communist countries (Stanilov, 2010b). Not only the issues connected with aesthetics of space and social segregation, but also the legal aspects of purchasing properties have become significant problems for a large group of people since 1990 when our society started to impoverish.

Nowadays, besides the socio-demographic features of a particular area which directly shape the demand for housing, a general economic condition of the country, housing policies and mortgage loan availability are of essential meaning. The trends observed, which are extensively dependent on the demographic situation, influence the quality of life of young Poles. Thus, in the last few years the largest number of real estate purchase-sale transactions were concluded in the northern and western parts of Poland. It is worth mentioning that the above-mentioned regions are characterized by relatively high birth and marriage rates.

URBANIZATION AND SPATIAL CHANGES

A key role in the process of urban and rural space transformation played the process of urbanization which had been triggered by accelerated migrations. During the last two decades the suburbanization processes were visible. As a consequence of this process both peripheral districts of cities and neighbouring villages undergone a transformation. It does not only concerns expanding housing estates, trade and services developments or modernization of transport infrastructure, but also a substantial change in social space – what is even more important as the suburban areas are usually demographically young.

Although a slight decrease in the population inflow to cities has been observed since the 1980's, the process of suburbanization has become particularly relevant since 1990 (Kupiszewski, Durham, Rees, 1998). It was the year when an increased influx of population from urban to rural areas was observed for the first time. From this time on, demographic profiles of regions were mainly influenced by migration, not by vital statistics. Thus, it can be stated that the trend, which had been forced earlier, changed its direction and after the Second World War development of suburbs was significantly limited.

Therefore, rural areas surrounding the largest Polish cities are facing population growth at the moment (Szymańska, Biegańska, 2011). It is a visible trend mainly in Warsaw, Poznan, Tricity, Szczecin, Wroclaw, Bydgoszcz and Torun (Figure 1). There are also considerable fluctuations in the population growth in towns and villages neighbouring Cracow. Such a situation leads to intense changes in rural spaces concerning architecture, functions and socio-demographic issues (Wójcik, 2012). In contrast, we can observe a completely

different situation in the central Poland and its south-west borderlands. A decline in population of the eastern part of the country is related to some disadvantageous structural and spatial features (Szul, 2006) which are closely linked to the fact that farming is a very important component of the GDP structure and that the branch structure is not diverse enough. Such a situation only exacerbates the problems of local labour markets as well as social-demographic ones and degradation of space.

Figure 1. Dynamics of population in Polish counties
in the period of 1996-2012 (1996=100.0%)
(Source: own work on the basis of the data derived from Local Data Bank,
Central Statistical Office of Poland)

The aforementioned process of city centres depopulation is an interesting example of changes taking place in cities and their space. They are expressed by the ongoing qualitative process which is mainly visible by reorganizing interiors of buildings. It is a wide-spread practice that flats are converted into retail and service facilities. However, Warsaw is a thought-provoking case where two contrary processes are going on at the same time: many people are outflowing to the suburbs while a group of the wealthy are inflowing or returning to Downtown. In this case these inner-city migrations shall be considered a symptom of gentrification taking place in the city centre and a manifestation of deepening social inequalities in capital city.

POPULATION STRUCTURE AND SPATIAL PLANNING

When analyzing the changes in the age structure of population, it is clearly visible that the number of minors has decreased significantly. The percentage of people of the pre-working age is characterized by evident negative dynamics. It is a result of an increased percentage of people of the working and post-working ages. As far as the implications of demographic trends are concerned, the age structure of population shall not be overlooked, especially the process of ageing, which is affected by the second demographic transition. The age and gender structure determines the demand for certain services. It concerns the issue of education, health care and leisure which generates the need to properly organize public spaces.

As it was mentioned before, particular parts of the administrative units usually have very diverse structures of residents. Areas located further away from city centres are usually demographically younger. Mainly because the properties located there are cheaper, and that is why people between the ages of 20-40 can afford them. It is a vital issue regarding the revitalization process. However, we should bear in mind the fact that in the nearest decade large housing estates inhabited in the period of 1970-1990 will also start ageing.

When analyzing the changes in the age structure of Poles, it is clearly visible that the number of under-18s has decreased significantly (by 10.0% during the last 30 years). It is a result of an increased percentage of people of the working and post-working ages – they constitute 17.0% of Polish society nowadays. When planning any actions connected with space management it is necessary to bear in mind that the highest increase in the number of people of retirement age will have taken place until 2020. Thus, Polish local authorities shall prepare themselves to this upcoming situation as the population structure is shifting towards regression. What is more, our young society has changed its reproductive behavior. However, this obviously disadvantageous direction of change could be hampered by encouraging young foreigners to settle down in Poland.

Knowledge in the scope of the population structure is also helpful when considering the education system of country. A significant decrease in the number of pupils which will take place in the nearest future will also have its implications for shaping and managing the space of Poland. It will not probably be a noteworthy organizational problem in large cities, but in smaller towns and villages where the authorities will be forced to close some educational establishments it may have some negative consequences as these facilities will have to be used in other ways (Jelonek, 2008). Regions having relatively limited educational offers shall be monitored.

The demographic decline affecting the university-age young will also affect higher education institutions which will have to face some serious problems. Despite the trend to continue education after graduating from secondary school is popular, if not even common these days, the present demographic situation of the above-mentioned age group makes it impossible for all universities and other higher education institutions to continue as before (Jelonek, 2008). This is mainly a problem of private schools which will soon start to disappear from the space of Polish cities. This is also further amplified by migration tendencies among the young who decide to leave the country and begin a new life in the countries of the old continent. In light of these tendencies, the demographic profile of Poland changed significantly after its accession to the European Union. On the other hand, it is worth mentioning that in the cities where state schools

are located, especially universities and technical universities, the pace of population ageing shall not be as fast as in the cities with smaller education offers thanks to constant inflow of young people. Therefore, the space of these cities will have a slightly different nature and they will probably change more dynamically. However, accordingly to the most pessimistic forecasts until 2020 the number of students in Poland will have drastically fallen – by over 30.0%.

Although Central Europe has a relatively high demographic potential when compared to the western countries, the above-mentioned process of ageing is more and more visible also in the analysed region (Długosz, Kurek, 2006). Population ageing is global and continuous process (Gjonça, Gjonça, 2011). This process will affect mainly Poland, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Hungary during the next few years (Długosz, 2007). Despite numerous socio-economic issues, including problems with the labour market, this unavoidable population ageing process requires development of pro-social activities. When considering this process in the context of space management there are several issues that should be taken under consideration, i.e. accessibility of leisure areas, deleting architectural barriers or health care.

It is estimated that until 2020 the age median of our country will have exceeded 40 years. However, it should be mentioned that the population of Lodzkie Voivodship already exceeded this age in 2011. Slaskie Voivodship also stands out among the demographically oldest regions. The economic condition of these two is negatively affected by their demographic profiles and will have to face some further social changes. The values similar to these achieved for the whole country were reported in the eastern and western voivodships. More favourable situation is in the voivodships of the northwest parts of the country which are Warminsko-mazurskie, Pomorskie and Wielkopolskie as well as in Malopolskie and Podkarpackie voivodships. Population of these regions is ageing relatively slow, so it is possible to forecast some changes which will take place in the future, concerning vital statistics, especially birth and death rates. What distinguishes demographic profiles of the largest Polish cities such as Lodz, Warsaw, Wroclaw or Tricity is the fact that there is a relatively large group of post-working age people living there (Figure 2).

Matrimonial decisions and procreation strategies of Polish population are highly correlated with the demand for immovable properties. However, it is not one and only factor influencing broadly-understood spaces, but it involves the necessity of implementing proper tools in order to manage the space in a rational and pro-social manner. A live birth rate may be a good example, which indicates that the highest fertility - exceeding 13% - is in the sub-region of Gdansk. High live birth rates have also been observed in the following sub-regions: poznanski, nowosadecki, warszawski wschodni and leszczynski. It means that by 2016 in the above-mentioned sub-regions the issues of kindergartens and primary schools will have become the most important. In many cases, especially in demographically young suburbs, it will be necessary to rearrange the space and provide a proper environment for the youngest.

It is impossible to rationally plan development of social infrastructure not having the knowledge of a population's health situation. Such knowledge lets the authorities manage all health care institutions and implement programs preventing the most dominating problems (Michalski, 2009). What is more, just like in the case of high percentage of people of post-working age, it is of crucial meaning when adapting space for the disabled. There are some necessary

improvements connected with the free movement in their place of residence which shall be introduced in cities in order to prevent social exclusion of these people. This concerns in particular means of urban transport and accessibility of public spaces and other facilities in their place of residence. These issues shall enjoy special priority in Kujawsko-pomorskie, Lubelskie and Lubuskie voivodships as these are regions where the highest percentage of the disabled has been registered.

Figure 2. People of post-working age in sub-regions of Poland in 2012 (in %)
(Source: Own work on the basis of the data derived from Local Data Bank,
Central Statistical Office of Poland)

Nationality structure of society is also a contributing factor when concerning space management. As people of the same nationality have the tendency to concentrate in particular locations, several enclaves emerge which change the space character in a natural manner. We can observe it in districts where people from the People's Republic of China or from the Middle East live. However, in Poland this issue is not so meaningful nowadays and it is not possible to assess to what extend the foreigners may change its space. Most probably this situation will change in the next few decades what might lead to creation of nationality ghettos and increase in spatial segregation of people. Nevertheless, it will depend on age, education and occupational structure of the future immigrants as well as on their wealth (Warych-Juras, Gałka, 2009). Their country of origin and cultural background will be of fundamental importance as these two factors decide

whether immigrants will assimilate into Polish culture and values or not – what we actually can observe in Scandinavia and in Western Europe.

Occupational structure of population living in a particular area is also of significant meaning, especially the unemployment rate. Not only it affects the crime rate and the level of space degradation, but it also has an impact on fertility, marriages and migrations – it changes, often permanently, the space of administrative units (Smits, Mulder, Hooimeijer, 2004). The above-mentioned crime rate can be minimised by proper organization and development of public spaces. Involving citizens in monitoring the most dangerous places will also contribute to tightening social ties between them (Mordwa, 2009). Unemployment is a major problem of the north-east Poland and in some counties of the western part of country (Figure 3). That is why, these areas shall be given special protection.

Figure 3. Unemployment rate by counties in Poland in 2012 (in %)
(Source: Own work on the basis of the data derived from Local Data Bank,
Central Statistical Office of Poland)

SUMMARY

In Western Europe demographic problem, in the context of spatial planning also, has been considered a significant field of study for many years. In Poland, this issue was a bit underestimated in the past, mainly because the process of social modernization began much later, as it had been slowed down by the political transformation. Space management and all activities connected

to it depend primarily on demographic condition of a particular area. However, cultural, economic and political background shall also be taken under consideration. Education plays an important role as well because it shapes a proper attitude to space management and protection what results in creation of a citizens-friendly zone. Social infrastructure reflecting demographic condition of a particular area has a different meaning as well as activities taken up by local authorities and stakeholders aimed at increasing its demographic potential. That is why, we should remember that on the one hand, demography exercises influence over the space, but on the other the way of managing it can have a positive or negative impact on demographic situation.

Thus, it is worth taking actions aimed at improving demographic condition of a particular region through proper space management which can boost its vital statistics. Qualitative development of cities and rural areas may prevent depopulation and other negative demographic changes. Another factor is proper management of public spaces and their pro-social designing – it regards mainly places intended for social and cultural interactions. Aesthetics of housing estates and green zones is an important issue as well and these aspects shall also be taken under consideration by both authorities and citizens. Finally, in order to meet the needs and requirements of a population inhabiting a given area, local authorities and decision makers shall do their best to include its residents in the process of spatial planning (Kopeć, A., 2009). This is a key issue in terms of creating a friendly and proper environment for a community inhabiting a particular area.

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ROMANIA. WHAT A COUNTRY, WHAT A DESTINY…

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Abstract: In a country with remarkable resources taking account of its surface, population, and climatic conditions, contradictions shock any observer. Romania has all necessary conditions – even seashore and a long natural frontier marked by Danube rover – to be an economic power horse. In this context, I take a look to Switzerland, country with 7 months of winter per year and a harsh mountain landscape, but with a unique economic position in the world. But Romania's potential is only that, nothing more. Reality makes it only a pipedream. First part of the paper gravitates around Romania's economic and social situation after 1990. There is shortly presented the situation peculiar to Romanian economy prior to 1989, December. Renowned schools, engineers, activities and an industrial and energetic base were to be met in Romania; while with the "wind of change" which blow communist regimes from European continent, there came a quite strange situation in this country. Romania's education and research systems have been steady eroded, seeming that actions taken in these fields were aimed only at this base's destruction. Industry faced a dramatic downturn (over 75% of prior to 1990 industry had been practically wiped out from the Romania's industrial and economic map). Markets which had been gained through sustained work and efforts during over three decades were abandoned for nothing, while the greatest part of ex-employees in Romanian industry headed to countryside – or worse – chose the emigration path. Romanian researches and education bases almost disappeared, with the incoming inevitable negative consequences: Romania's turn to archaic values and a society characterized by living in myths and prejudices. But this pessimistic tone is changed in second part of the paper. South Korea is mentioned as a successful example which could inspire Romania, while there are brought two examples which Romanian's ancestors passed through, bringing optimism for this country's foggy short-past and precarious present. Solutions aiming at measures to be taken in agriculture, forest, industry, touristic areas are shortly presented. While the last paragraph focuses upon the role of education in changing mentality, in order to improve Romania's geopolitical position on the regional and world stage.

Key words: agriculture, education, forests, industry, tourism

*   *   *   *   *   *

For an uninformed society such a Romanian one during communism, the events which took place in December 1989 came as a shock. Even if few years before, in the middle of the 9-th decade of the last century Moscow and Washington started to work together for a calm downturn for one of them (ex-USSR), and the year 1989 was characterized by sudden changes in ex communist European countries, events in December 1989 came as a thunder over Romanian society; even for the regime's leader it was the same. And he found death that month...

Unbelievable was then for great part of Romanians what happened. Euphoria came with that event. And hope came, too. It was like a siege around a fortress for a long period, and conquering it brought overreacting, and irrational behaviour. As Romanian character is characterized by enthusiasm facing waited events, but it is possibly to be followed by sudden abandon, those events came to look like a misleading *shadow*, as time has passed.

In 1989 Romania didn't have external debts at the end of 1989, having a unique position among countries with similar level of development from this point of view, while other countries were indebted to Romania (ex-USSR, Iraq, Libya, which together had to pay over USD 3 billion) and had a quite diverse industrial sector, producing from airplanes to ship-tankers of 150000 tonnes, and agricultural tools and machines, locomotives and house equipment, and turbines for hydroelectric power plants. Furthermore, it had good and renowned refineries and a developed steel and aluminium industry.

It can be mentioned that in Oradea (a town in the North-Western part of the country) there was produced tabular aluminium, a key-element used in aerospace industry; in Tirgoviste (close to Bucharest) there was an installation unique in the world: it could produce very different pipes from very different material composition with the highest frequency (used in oil, gas, and military industry). Cimpia Turzii industrial complex (in Transylvania) produced materials using iron and steel. Guban factory (in Timisoara, located in the Western part of the country), when exporting en-gross Milanese shoes distributors, they put "Made in Italy" on them. It was built and finished Danube-Black Sea Canal. Romania had a developed tourist sector, exploiting for the good of the country, the natural potential, and there existed an infrastructure which put Romania on European and Middle Eastern countries touristic map. People from Germany and Israel came regularly in Baile Felix (close to Oradea) and Borsec (in Eastern Carpathian Mountains) for medical care and treatment. As a matter of fact, Borsec mineral water gained twice Gold Medal at international competition: Wien in 1873 and Paris in 1878).

There were present developed oil and mining industries, which, had they been modernized they would have covered the necessary for a modern Romanian economy, export-oriented especially to third world countries; a market gained during three decades of sacrifice.

And – what I consider the most important thing – there had existed institutes, laboratories, and a research base, and universities with a high professional human base.

This is a synthetic framework of what Romania had had.

And after euphoria and optimism, came the strong hand of reality, shocking Romanian society in a manner giving way not only to disoriented people, but pushing them to collective depression, Romanian morale being steady low; words such as we cannot do it, we cannot work in an organized

manner, are common in post 1989 Romanian vocabulary. In the moment of Romania's accession to the European Union, it had an external debt of USD 30 billion! Over three quarters of its 1989 industrial capacity was completely destroyed, being whipped out from the map. In this point can be brought to reader's attention the fact that steel and aluminium industry were the main focus of foreign investment and privatisation. *Russian* interests manifested strongly in these areas: Tirgoviste, Cimpia Turzii and Oradea became "familiar" with these investors: they bought and after that closed them, curtailing a strong competitor for Russian similar industries. It was a hardly identifiable trait, and while Romanian society was oriented only to West, it forgot its Eastern interests and competition – looking through these lenses, after 1989 Russian influence in Romania was far greater than before! Furthermore, all plans aiming at energy's sector development, in order to curtail dependence on more and more expensive imports hit a very strong *opposition*, both internal and *external* (Malita and Georgescu, 2010: 190), the expansion of Cernavoda Nuclear power plant and the hydropower plants' modernization were postponed with negative consequences. Parts of Romanian extractive oil and gas industry were privatized in an opaque and dubiously manner, bringing Romania in a position of *total dependence on external decision elements*, which is for the first time in its entire modern history! As a consequence of chaos specific to post-1989 year education has paid, too; quality of education is lower than 45 years before, while technical and scientific research has been almost abandoned.

The Romanian economy's destruction, social chaos, cultural stagnation, downturn in education system, losing national wealth are direct consequences of Romanian society's misses, together with a paralyzed attitude from the part of political leadership.

First part of the post-communist period was witness to a more or less planed chaos, and because of it, *a part of ex-communist apparatchiks* metamorphosed in the new Romanian big and medium bourgeoisie (Malita and Georgescu, 2010: 191). During this time, Romanian industry started to enter a steady downturn trend, while unemployment affected in 1993 over one 1 million employees, and the Romanian GDP reduced with 36%. *Agriculture* was directly hit by a "sector" reform, absorbing some 40% Romanian active population. And migration from towns towards villages became a sustained peculiarity of '90s, a unique situation in Europe since the year 1800. Informal economy became part of Romanian normal life.

The worst (and synthetic) result of this situation was and still is the massive emigration of Romanian professionals.

In 1990 only, left the country (with no intention to return) over 96000 persons; if we add to this definitive migration the "temporary" emigration, which transformed in a definitive one, there results over 3 million people for the period 1990-2005. After 2007 another great part of Romanian fled to the West, Italy and Spain becoming the biggest absorbing countries. In Italy Romanians are the biggest foreign community, and it would be not a surprise at all if one walks on Italian streets and hear people speaking Romanian language. No one of the ex-communist countries faced such a dramatic shift of population! And the best professionals educated in the period 1960-1980, when graduates from Romanian schools were internationally recognized, preferred to emigrate, a mass social phenomena. Human degradation is the direct result of these combined factors, archaic spirit gaining an upper hand upon a possible solution aiming at

Romanian society's modernization; the period is characterized by the lowest cohesion degree in its entire modern history.

External factors came to push Romanian society in this desperate position, too. In 1980 neoliberal thinkers started to promote a smaller role for the state, preaching the great benefits of free market, while starting with 1990 Romanian thinkers fully embraced the idea of unhindered market activities. It is a fraudulent doctrine (Malita, 2012; 128), resulting in a prone crisis system. Philosophical trend of this neoliberal inspiration came together with its administrative arms: International Monetary Fund and World Bank pressed in an aggressive manner for the privatisation of Romanian big state enterprises, with disastrous consequences on long term. For example, one of the biggest industrial enterprises from Romania, located in its capital city, was sold for USD 500 thousands. Short time after that, the new owners (Kverner from Norway), would close the enterprise, selling it for, piece by piece for an enormously profit. Only one building belonging to the ex-IMGB built in the '80s was sold for USD 2.5 million (Malita and Georgescu, 2010: 196). Romanian National Bank reserves have risen because Romanian national wealth was sold at the lowest imaginable prices (both because of incompetence, incoherence and foreign influences). When nothing was left to be sold by Romania, other ex-communist countries – which didn't obey to foreign consultancy and influence – gained from selling their national wealth, a value close to the real one.

Furthermore, Romanian education system – which produced geniuses such as Haret (his education system is implemented in Japan!) or Oberth (which invented the rocket, which was perfected by his fellow von Braun, helping USA in conquering the space) – has steady lost its capacity. In 1997 there were initiated two new directions, foreign to Romanian soul: niche specialization, and informative learning. The result is already fully felt all over Romanian society: *lower quality of teachers, pupils and students*.

Scholar abandon in first 8 years of study doubled between 1996 and 2006, and for the twelve years of study it is 24%. The percentage of Romanian pupils with lowest standards is 41%. Researches institutes were closed and their assets were sold for almost nothing.

All these are direct effects of post-communist reforms, which constantly eroded Romanian society, due to a trend aimed at industry's *destruction*, instead of its *modernization*. Instead of economic recovery programs, the Romanian political leadership agenda between 1990 and 2006 missed any coherent plan for a national industrial plan.

Thin and short views of party's interests or group interests, coupled with political leadership which was looking only for votes in electoral years, overlapping elite's muteness, and mass-media exclusive interests for rating and sensational news, made Romanian national interests in the best case only a pipedream. Important problems for national interests were replaced by action aimed only at a very short term effects, all "tailors" being experts in cutting national interest's clothes.

Here we can note a comparison between South Correa and Romania. In the 60s South Correa Gross Domestic Product was 10 smaller than Romanian one. In 1972 the ratio it jumped from 1:10 to 1:6; in 1972 it was 1:2. In 1981 South Correa for the first time outmatched Romania. In 1989 the ratio become 4:1, while in 90s it was more than 10 times bigger than the Romanian one. In 2007 the Asiatic state left the developing countries ranks, entering the developed

countries branches. It is the 11-th economy of the world, but has the 4-th place in the area of patents and inventions (after Japan, USA, and China). What a proof of good and healthy policies; a country which experienced wars and occupations, bounced from underdevelopment to the table of world economic leadership.

For a country which has been striving for over a millennium to leave the stage of subsistence agriculture and archaic mentality, there is only one sustainable solution centered upon Romanians mentality's changing.

It could seem strange, but it is a country which can overcome encumbrances in short notice time. It happened two times in its history, and both times it come as a surprise for neighbors and not only for them. During ancient times, a folk from Dacian plains characterized by lecherousness and dwindling was metamorphosed through the new gospel of moderation and fortitude. *In a matter of only few years* king Burebista established a *strong state* on both sides of Danube (Mommsen, 1988: 164). In the short time of Cuza's leadership (1859-1866) there were established all main directions for Romania's future. Entire framework of reforms aiming at taking out Romania from the Middle Ages into modernity were taken in those 7 years of Cuza governance; while Hohenzollern dynasty only put them into details and followed them with sagacity.

Sustainable solutions could be found even Romanian seems to be a country purposely kept in underdeveloped position precisely in order to be exploited.

Moral renaissance should be the key-point around all should details concentrate. Self-confidence in their destiny is not only a fiction but a potential which could be exploited in the real world, with benefits. *Education* is vital subject to consider. As Haret and Mehedinti in the past developed the concept of labor's school and discipline, with remarkable effects, this could be again a viable solution for Romania's modernization, both social and economic. Industry and discipline are the two inseparable parts of the development's coin. And with discipline, comes other type of organization, where time becomes a very valuable resource. If in the traditional society – in Romanian society is the same – time is an unlimited resource, with industry, comes organization, the *watch*, time becoming important and limited resource.

Over time, the education should overlap Romanian culture and traditions. And as Romanians belong both to East and West, in the same time, having Orthodox and Eastern peculiarities, while French Revolution connecting them to Western values, they share both worlds' peculiarities. From this point of they have a quite unique situation in Europe, which they could exploit – should they be conscious of it – for their advantage, and Europe's, at large.

Around two other fields should Romania's interests gravitate: forests and land (agricultural land).

In context of climate changes and rising world population's, soil and forests would provide strength for Romania national security. Romania's agricultural potential puts it on the 7-th place at European level. Romania has almost 9.5 million hectares of arable land, while land used for hay cultivation and domestic animals "industry" is about 4,8 million hectares. Furthermore, 27% of Romanian soil is fertile or highly fertile (world average is only 11%), and 21% have a medium fertility. Romanian territory is covered by forests and associated vegetation in a proportion of 27% (Hera in Mali\ua and Georgescu,

2010: 85) while optimal surface should be around 45% (Giurgiu in Malița and Georgescu, 2010: 93); if we speak only about functional ecological forests, Romania's territory is covered only in proportion of 22% (Giurgiu in Malița and Georgescu, 2010: 93).

As a consequence, in order to create the preconditions for Romania's sustainable development, there should be urgently taken measures regarding soils protection and forestation from place to place in agricultural areas. This measures aimed at forestation are vitally necessary for a superior use of agriculture soils, for CO2 emissions sequestration, and for rising soils' fertility. Due to social and technological factors, Romania is a net importing country in food industry. In order to change this past situation for the better, there should be taken measures aimed at agriculture's revitalization: funding for research in biotechnological field should be one direction. During the last 26 years Romanian research in agricultural area has registered a de-capitalization process, while the quality and number of researchers constantly reduced. *Rebirth of Romanian agricultural researches* is a sensitive point on national security agenda, being extremely vulnerable in face of external influences and manipulations. And bio-food is a long term solution not only for Romania's economy, but for its social system, too: good and organic food reduces diseases impact, cutting medical spending and rising life standard and expectancy.

In the field of forests, we should regard South Korea's path: from a country without almost any forests, in a matter of decades, it succeeded in covering 65% of its territory with forests. Some parts of Romanian territory (especially in Southern and Eastern parts) are prone to droughts due to climate changes, forestation being a key-action for sustainable development; forests will have an eco-protective function, providing shield for water, soils, climate and ecological equilibrium, biodiversity, and landscape. Only in that moment Romanian forests will speak for and about Romanian society's moral and material credibility.

But these major points which are provided by Romania's peculiar potential should overlap with Romania's industrial rebuilding, but with environmental protection as a cornerstone; rural areas' development using rising agricultural production, rebirth of national skills and abilities; bigger founding for research and development activities in a knowledge-based society; education system's modernization in order to prepare Romanian society for the 3-rd millennium requirements; rebuilding/modernization Romania's national infrastructure (both energetic and for transportation); tourism development; environmental protection; medical care and social protection systems' revitalization.

But each this potential element can become reality only if they are preceded by a *"reform" in mentality* and in this point one can easy observe the importance and role of a fitted *education* system. Third millennium asks for a different education system where man will switch during his active life several times from learning to work and back. Uneducated population is a heavy burden on the state, while an educated population is a geopolitical vector which could push forward Romania's favorable geographical position to an important geopolitical position, it deserves. A mentality open to this necessity becomes a key to survival and development in global society.

IN CONCLUSION

In order to better act in future it is important to know and understand present and past. Guiding the future implicates knowing the past; it is a

prerequisite to avoid future failures. Romanians' soul has passed through hardship and a fire during the last quarter of the century… Economic chaos and social dissolution are main traits of Romania's this period. Even paper starts with missing and failures peculiar to this period, some examples are brought to the reader's attention, in order to bring an optimistic attitude. In context of climate changes, Romania could successfully play its strong points: tourism, agriculture, water. *But* there is strongly needed a "revolution" in mentality, which could be brought by a well directed educational reform. A reform which should take place discretely, but in a sustained manner, in order to prepare peoples to cope with global changes and trends, and to prepare Romanian society for future challenges, is a cornerstone. Only in this way the Romania's great potential will be transformed in geopolitical reality.

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SYRIA, AN AGONIZING COUNTRY.
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL
AND ENVIRNOMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONFLICT

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Abstract: The Syrian conflict that broke out in March 2011 seems to not end anytime soon. For various reasons, the efforts of the international community to stop the civil war have not been successful. The Assad regime, still supported by Russia and Iran, even if has lost more and more ground against opposition forces, including the access to oil resources, is not willing to cede power. The state of insecurity and dissatisfaction in the region has increased the influence of radical Islamic groups, such as the Islamic State. In all this time, the socio-economic situation and the environment have deteriorated continously. Nearly half of the population is displaced within or outside the country, living in poverty, many settlements are in ruins, and public services are not functional.

Key words: Syria, civil war, conflict's effects

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INTRODUCTION

Syria is confronted with a civil war that has resulted in more than 200,000 victims, over 3.7 million refugees, significant property damage and cities lying in ruin. The negative impact of the civil war was felt in all spheres of political and socio-economic life, as well as in the environmental quality. Despite all the events that have occurred, this conflict, which broke out in 2011 as a result of popular discontent against the Assad regime, has not been solved even after four years since it began. The failure in conflict management, for which are responsible all stakeholders, including the international community, has made violence, war crimes and the abuses against fundamental human rights be common features of these years. The political and economic situation, as well as the quality of life in general, has deteriorated from year to year, although they were not very high even before the war. Towards the end of 2014, about 10.8 million Syrians needed humanitarian assistance (BBC News 8.12.2014).

According to Amnesty International, Syria has been crossing a major crisis from the points of view of human rights and humanitarian situation. Both governmental forces and the other parties involved in the conflict, especially the Islamic State, have seriously violated the human rights; many cases of arbitrary detention, torture, abductions, disappearances or extrajudicial executions have been reported all these years.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this study is to analyze the socio-economic, political and environmental effects of the long-term conflict in Syria. The investigation relies on the analysis and interpretation of the data coming from various sources: Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Syrian Centre for Policy Research, US Energy Information Administration (EIA), Food and Agriculture Organization, etc.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The socio-demographic impact. At the beginning of 2011, Syria had a population of about 22 million inhabitants, the children and the young people under 25 accounting for 56% (DESA, 2014). According to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, more than 200,000 people lost their lives since the beginning of the conflict. Only in 2014, 76,000 people were killed, of which 17,790 civilians and 3,500 children. Similar values have been presented by other sources as well, among which the United Nations. Many other people were injured or mutilated. Besides, 2014 was the year when most people were killed, if one compares the situation with the previous years, as follows: 73,447 in 2013, 49,294 in 2012 and 7,841 in 2011 (NYT, 1.01.2015). In addition, nearly half of the population was forced to abandon their houses, their jobs and their way of living, in order to find safer places and escape violence. Therefore, 6.5 million people moved to other areas within the country, while 3.7 million fled across the borders (figure 1). In January 2015, of those who left the country, 1.5 million took refuge in Turkey, 1.1 million in Lebanon, 621,000 in Jordan, 235,000 in Irak and 136,000 in Egypt (UNHCR, 2015).

Figure 1. The evolution of the number of Syrian refugees recorded outside the country borders in the period December 2011 – January 2015
(Source: UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency, 2015)

Besides the officially recorded refugees, living in camps, other hundred thousand Syrians sought shelter in the cities and villages of the neighboring countries, according to the estimates of the governments of these states, especially Turkey and Jordan.

The conflict had traumatic effects on many Syrians, because some of their family members were killed, injured or disappeared, the houses were destroyed or damaged, jobs were insecure, and the prices for basic services (food, electric power, fuel, medication, etc.) were high. In comparison with the regions administered by the government, which benefit of many public services, in the territories controlled by the rebels (30%-40% of the country) the situation is serious: economic activities are almost completely absent, public services (education, health, power supply) are not operational, commodities are lacking, while poverty and famine are widespread (Yazigi, 2014). But problems also occur in the regions controlled by the Assad regime. During the Latakia governorate, the war led to considerable demographic changes because many people came there from elsewhere seeking refuge from ongoing military conflict. Before the war, the port of Latakia was known as the unofficial capital of the Syrian Alawites, as they accounted for 70% of the city's population. Since the beginning of the conflict, about one million Syrians, mostly Sunnis, settled there, generating fear and discontent.

The Syrians who left the country are not better off. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other organizations and humanitarian groups, together with the authorities of the states bordering Syria, cooperate in order to provide people in need with the basic products: tents, matresses, food, water, health care. In the refugee camps like Zaatari in Jordan, the living conditions are poor (Kawakibi, 2013). Here, the most affected are the children, many coming from broken families, who apart from food, water, shelter or hygiene also have special medical needs, including psychological, as well as education needs (in the refugee camps teachers are few in number, although schools have been established).

The Syrians who have settled outside the refugee camps, have stirred up strong frustration among the local communities, because of the pressures exerted on economy, infrastructure, resources and public services, which have resulted in higer prices for food, fuels, electrical power or rents, as well as in a tough competition for jobs. According to the analysis undertaken by MercyCorp in October 2012, such a situation occurred in the city of Mafraq in North Jordan. The survey conducted on this occasion revealed that 80% of the residents of Mafraq thought that Syrians should be hosted in refugee camps, separated by the communities. A more serious situation, which led to violence, occurred in Ganziatep City lying in the southeast of Turkey, where the Syrian refugees have come to account for 10% of the population. Likewise, according to BBC News (25.08.2014), hundreds of people clashed with the Turkish police during a protest against the growing number of Syrian refugees.

The impact on the economy. Before the conflict broke out, Syria's economy, although not very developed, was diversified and dominated by services and industry, oil sector and tourism having the most significant shares. The average economic growth rate in the period 2000-2010 was 5%. Apart from hydrocarbons, which ensured the largest part of the country's incomes, Syria also relied on its significant resources of phosphates, chromium, iron ores,

manganese, gypsum, marble and other construction rocks. The long duration of the conflict has led to the collapse of the Syrian economy, especially after the European Union and the United States imposed sanctions against oil export in the fall of 2011. Another important reason was the extension of the conflict to Damascus and Aleppo in the summer of 2012. These two cities were the largest economic centers of the country, holding together more than 50% of the manufacturing sector of Syria (Yazigi, 2014). The conflict affected all economic sectors and was responsible for the deterioration or destruction of important parts of industrial, commercial, tourist and transportation infrastructures. The trade was strongly disrupted, the national currency depreciated, public debt incresed (because of the imports of oil and capital goods), while purchasing power dropped. In November 2013, the prices of cereals and other food products increased by 100%, in comparison with the previous year (FAO, 2014).

Figure 2. Syria. General map

At the end of 2013, unemployment exceeded 54%, while 75% of the population was living in poverty, of which 54% in extreme poverty (World Bank, 2014). According to the Syrian Centre for Policy Research, at the end of 2013 the total economic loss considered since the beginning of the conflict was estimated at 143.8 billion dollars, i.e. 276% of the GDP of 2010. If the civil war would end soon, it is estimated that, at an economic growth of 5% per year, three decades would be necessary for the GDP to reach the level of 2010 (Yazigi, 2014).

In 2010, the oil sector, which relied on confirmed reserves of 2.5 billion barrels and a production of 386,000 barrels per day, was extremely important for Syria, as it ensured about a quarter of the governmental incomes. More than 90% of the crude oil exports, i.e. around 150,000 barrels per day, went to the Europeam Union. According to the Energy Information Administration, because of the civil war and international sanctions, Syria's oil production dropped dramatically, recording in 2014 only 25,000 barrels per day. The government's incomes dropped accordingly. Besides the destruction of oil infrastructure and the international sanctions, at the end of 2013 the Assad regime lost control of the northeastern part of the country, where the main hydrocarbon resources lie (figure 2). In addition, this region is crossed by the Euphrates, which ensures the greatest amount of water for the country, especially for the irrigation of agricultural lands.

Although the oil products are vital to the war machine, because of the nearby clashes and the difficulties in supply the Homs refinery operated only for a short period of time. On the other hand, the Baniyas refinery, located in the area controlled by the authorities, has suffered less and its production has taken advantage of the oil imported with Iranian help (Reuters, 19.09.2014). The gas production, although important for electric power generation, also dropped by about 30% in comparison with the pre-war period. At the same time, the infrastructure for power generation, including the electric power stations and the power transmission lines, have been the target of sabotage actions.

Despite the facts that large areas of the country are arid or semi-arid, that water resources are low and droughts are frequent, agriculture managed to provide part of the necessary food for the population and even to export some products like cotton, vegetables, fruits, sheep and cattle. Before the conflict, agriculture played an important part in the Syrian economy, having contribution levels of 18% to the GDP and 17% to the labor force. About 10 million Syrians, representing 46% of the population, were living then in the countryside and 80% of them were dependent on agriculture (FAO, 2013). The war had a devastating impact on agriculture; it hindered the supply with seeds, fertilizers, veterinary drugs, and fuel, which explained the high prices of these products, the deterioration of irrigation canals and agricultural machinery, the decay of storage facilities, as well as the people behavior, who left the farms because of the violence. According to FAO, the wheat production of 2013, as well as the one estimated for 2014, was less than two million tons, i.e. less than half in comparison with the normal years prior to the crisis.

Before the conflict, Syria was an appreciated tourist destination and the number of tourists was on the increase. In 2010, the country was visited by 8.5 million tourists, meaning 40% more tourists in comparison with 2009, which generated incomes of 8.3 billion dollars (Bloomberg, 3.01.2011). This economic sector had a significant contribution to the GDP (12%) and provided for 11% of the jobs (Al Arabiya News, 29.08.2012). As soon as the conflict broke out, Syria became a dangerous country for tourists. Most of the states that supplied the tourists banned travel to Syria, many hotels were shut down or suffered serious damage, especially in Aleppo, while tourist companies, like Wild Frontiers Tour Operator, left the country (Telegraph Travel, 19.03.2014).

The major tourist sites, which were also the main attractions, were deteriorated by bombing and robberies. In June 2013, UNESCO included six Syrian sites on the List of World Heritage in Danger: the cities of Damascus and

Aleppo, the ruins of Bosra (the ancient capital of the Roman province Arabia, lying 40 km southeast of Deraa) and Palmyra, the Cracs de Chevalier Castle, and the Saladin's Fortress/ Qal'al Salah el-Din (30 km east of Latakia). In Aleppo, the minaret of 1099 of the Umayyad Mosque, one of the oldest and the most important in the country, dating from 715, was destroyed. Significant damage also suffered the Crac des Chevalier Castle (1142-1271), located 60 km west of Homs, and the ruins of Palmyra, 215 km northeast of Damascus, an important city of antiquity.

All international airlines suspended their flights to and from Syria after the violence broke out, while the national company SyrianAir has been banned from all European Union airports since October 2012.

Division of political power. Territorially speaking, Syria is controlled by numerous political and military entities, the boundaries between these parties varying considerably since the beginning of the conflict. The Assad regime, still strongly supported by Russia, Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah, still retained controll of some western territories at the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2015 (figure 3).

Figure 3. Syria. Dynamics of political and territorial control
(Source: Processing after Coalition for a Democratic Syria, 2015)

The forces opposing the Assad regime are split into about 1,000 groups with 100,000 fighters (BBC News 8.12.2014), with large differences of identity and ideology, including jihadist groups like the Islamic State (IS), the former Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Al-Nusra Front. The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, an alliance of moderate opposition composed of four political blocks (Democratic Party of the Arab Socialist Union, National Democratic Block, National Alliance, and Movement for a Free and Democratic Syria), supported by the Free Syrian Army, is considered the only legitimate representative of the Syrian people by many states like the USA, France, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.

The Islamic Front, created in November 2013 through the merger of seven important islamic groups (Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa al-Tawhid, Suqour al-Sham, Al-Haqq Brigades, Ansar al-Sham, Army of Islam și Kurdish Islamic Front), is an

alternative to the Syrian National Coalition, which is committed to build an Islamic state based on Sharia. In the second half of 2014, the Islamic State extremist group was very active and gained more ground. This radical Islamic group, which intends to create a Caliphate in the region, governed according to the Islamic law (Sharia), by its brutal actions, including killings and abductions, sparkled worldwide concern, which justified the air strikes launched by the United States (September 2014).

According to ACAPS, the Islamic State utterly controls the Raqqa governorate and significant parts of the governorates of Aleppo, in the north, and Al-Hasakah and Deir ez-Zor, in the east (figure 3). The various armed groups of the Syrian opposition control territories in Idlib and Hama, in the north, and, to a lesser extent, in Deraa and Quneitra, in the south.

Environmental degradation. Although an accurate assessment is difficult, because the conflict is underway, the observers believe that the impact of the civil war on environment and people's health is significant. The negative effects on the environment are especially due to the military activities. The large amounts of weapons and ammunition used by the combatants, including the air raids of the United States and their allies, have released toxic substances, for instance heavy metals. Some explosives like TNT and RDX are potentially carcinogen and toxic for living organisms. These substances, together with the smoke and oil leakings in the extraction and processing areas controlled by the rebels, the dust from collapsed buildings (which may contain asbestos and other poisonous substances), the destruction of industrial areas, and the robbery of chemical plants, have polluted air, water (including groundwater) and soils. Where the impact on soil cover is serious, because of explosions and chemical contaminations, the fertily is reduced or lost for good, and conseqently lands become barren.

According to PAX, a non-governmental organization cited by the United Civilians (23.09.2014), if the war would end now, nature would need 25 years to recover. Until then, water and soil will be already contaminated and the accumulated toxic substances will significantly affect human health, including that of the future generations (increased number of children born with handicaps or suffering from cancer). According to the data provided by PAX, about 40% of the bombs fallen in Syria din not explode on impact.

There are also indirect effects of the conflict, which are associated with population movement and the suspension or the limitation of the activity of environmental institutions or of the national plans aiming to control desertification, biological diversification and climatic changes. But the implementation of such plans is all the more urgent as Syria is a country extremely vulnerable to climate changes, and especially to desertification, having large arid and semi-arid areas and limited amounts of water, and being exposed to severe climatic fluctuations. Likewise, the large number of people who fled war zones in search for a safer life strongly impacts the environment in the regions where they settled down.

CONCLUSIONS

Syria is an example of the failure of national and international policies. On a national scale, the dissatisfaction that led to civil war was generated by the fact that the Assad regime failed to manage efficiently the political, socio-

economic and environmental problems of the country, and was reluctant to promote reforms for the advent of democracy and the enthronement of human rights. Syria's present situation, characterized by a serious humanitarian crisis, a collapsed economy, destroyed settlements and degraded environment, stands for the political failure of the international community, which was not able to identify solutions or concrete measures for ending the conflict. This particular case, which is neither the first nor the only one, should give much food for thought to the authorities and to the national and international political institutions. Al these are called upon to identify the policies, programs and proper strategies capable to foster the establishment of democracy, the protection of fundamental human rights, the sustainable development of economy, and the preservation of environment.

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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC SECURITY: POSITION OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY IN THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL COMMITTEES OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS OF HUNGARY

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Abstract: Today, the public safety plays an increasingly important role in people's live and improving it more and more task falls to local governments. In the light of the above, the present paper examining the Hungarian situation tries to answer the following questions:
- to what extent is public safety present in the committee structures of the municipal councils in case of the local governments examined and how its situation changed after the 2014 municipal election?
- which factors influence the presence of public safety in the committee structure of municipal councils?.

Key words: public security, local governments, municipal council committee, Hungary

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INTRODUCTION

Nowadays, good public security is listed among the fundamental rights, thus it is entitled for everybody who is the citizen of a democratic state. Consequently, from the point of view of most societies it is a question of fate how the public security situation develops especially in the light of the social and economic changes and processes taking place in the world during the past almost two decades which made the issue of public security to become even more determining (Sallai & Ritecz, 1996).

Achieving public security meeting the needs of the citizens is based on three pillars: state, local government and local population. The objectives to be obtained by the State (police) can become part of the local social policy only with the active involvement of the local governments and population (Tóth, 2007; Mátyás, 2011; Velez & Lyons, 2014). Many surveys found that the local population associates public security with the public security situation of their own habitats, and considers the public security and criminal situation of their wider environment, and even their country, on the basis of that (Salgó, 1995). It is essential, therefore, to improve the public security situation on the local level, and to increase the subjective sense of security of the population (Jármy, 2003). However, first of all that approach should be changed (both on the population and local government level) which claims that the maintenance and improvement of public security on the settlements lie solely with the police. The unfavourable criminal processes during the past few decades also confirmed it for certain that the criminal statistics could be improved only on those settlements where the local governments themselves took an active part in crime prevention. It is essential, therefore, that the local governments should provide both material and moral support (e.g. installation and operation of surveillance camera systems, supplement payment for the public order workers, provision of tied accommodation, infrastructural developments /cars, computers, renovation of buildings/ etc.) for the police. The local governments should also regard it as their duty to pay an important role in the maintenance and improvement of public security on the local level.

In Hungary the importance of the correlation between the local level of public security and the local governments is also shown by the fact that the related legislations deal with the topic on both sides. On the one hand, Act XXXIV of 1994 on the Police provides, inter alia, that for the establishment and elimination of police headquarters, border branches and other local police authorities and prior to the appointment of the head of police headquarters and other local police authorities, the Police should request the opinion of the municipal council of the local governments operated in the jurisdiction concerned (Árva et al., 2014).

On the other hand, the latest legislation concerning the local governments (Act CLXXXIX of 2011 on Local Governments in Hungary) states that participation in ensuring the public security of the settlements is the task of the local governments, and (which did not exist in the previous legislation /Act LXV of 1990 on Local Governments/) discusses the public security related tasks of the local governments in a separate section.

Within the local governments, the primary entitled body of the surveillance of public security – similarly to the other fields – is the municipal council which however may transmit some of its scope of duties and competencies to the committees established by it (Belányi et al., 2010). The scope of tasks and competencies is in most cases wider than their names might indicate nevertheless, we think that, to some extent, the name chosen reflects the system of preferences of the local government. In the majority of the cases, the municipal council created after the local elections considers new aspects (e.g. the system of preferences of the Government, the future situation of the budget) also in addition to the consideration of the earlier traditions when setting up the committees, and this fact – taking into account the local elections of Hungary in 2014 – also justifies the actuality of the survey.

In the spirit of the above, the analysis seeks answers to the following questions:

- how the presence of public security changed in the municipal council committees of the local governments after the local elections in 2014;
- what the most important characteristics of the appearance of public security in the committee structure are;
- which factors determine the presence of public security in the committee structure.

DATABASE AND METHODS APPLIED

The settlements with more than 5 000 inhabitants in Hungary constituted the target group of the research (meaning 273 local governments in total). The necessary data were ensured by the Organisational and Operational Rules of the municipal council, in the absence of these the websites of the settlements and the records of the body of representatives were consulted. During the research four categories were set up on the basis of the size of the settlements chiefly due to the fact that the number of the members of the bodies of representatives differ according to the size of the settlements (Table 1). The expression "public security", however, may be regarded only as a generic term since the names of the committees dealing with the topic vary greatly (e.g. public safety, police, crime prevention, public order, public order protection), and these are included in the survey. The collected data were organised in an Excel file and were analysed using the SPSS software.

Table 1. The number of elected representatives on the settlements with different sizes
(Data source: Act L of 2010 on the Election of Local Municipality Representatives and Mayors)

Number of inhabitants	Number of elected representatives
5,001 – 10,000	8
10,001 – 25,000	11
25,001 – 50,000	14
over 50,001	minimum 17

PUBLIC SECURITY AND THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL COMMITTEES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Analysing the data reveals (Table 2) that nowadays the municipal councils regard it important to include the expression "public security" in the names of the committees only to a limited extent: only less than 20% of the local governments participating in the survey had a committee with "public security" included in their names which means the 14th place in the ranking by sectors. The intensifying role of public security, however, is correctly reflected by the increasing proportions at the elections following the local elections in 2014 which could be detected in the case of only a limited number of sectors (Table 2 showing six).

The importance of the sectors is marked to a certain degree by the fact that a given area is dealt with a committee whose scope of tasks and competences consists of only that one sector, or the committee must deal with other areas as well. Looking at the consolidated data (Table 3), from among the three options analysed an approximately equal ratio can be found, and this situation has not changed significantly after the local elections in 2014 either. Analysing the position of public security, the picture is not too positive (Table 4): the sector belongs to the scope of tasks and competences of such committees which deal with at least two more areas.

Table 2. The representation of the sectors in the municipal council committee structure before and after the local elections in 2014 (the table contains only those sectors which were mentioned by at least 5% of the committees at the two given times, %)
(Data source: Organisational and Operational Rules of the local governments of the settlements concerned, records of the municipal councils and the websites of the settlements)

	before the local elections	after the local elections
finance	100.0	100,0
urban development	69.6	71.1
social	71.4	68.9
procedures	70.3	67.0
culture	64.5	60.8
sport	52.7	50.5
education	60.4	49.8
healthcare	52.0	46.2
economy	35.2	32.2
law	35.9	31.9
human	24.5	31.9
environmental protection	28.6	28.6
youth	25.6	24.9
public security	17.2	19.4
urban management	14.3	14.3
tourism	10.3	13.9
public procurement	10.6	9.5
proprietorship	9.2	8.8
agriculture	8.4	8.8
declaration of assets	7.0	7.3

Table 3. The most important elements of the municipal council committee structure on the studied settlements
(Data source: Organisational and Operational Rules of the local governments of the settlements concerned, records of the municipal councils and the websites of the settlements)

	A	B
proportion of committees dealing with only one sector/area	30.2	30.5
proportion of committees dealing with two sectors/areas	37.1	37.3
proportion of committees dealing with three or more sectors/areas	32.7	32.2

Note: A – period prior to the municipal elections in 2014, B – period following the municipal elections in 2014

Table 4. The presence of public security in the municipal council committee structure on the studied settlements
(Data source: Organisational and Operational Rules of the local governments of the settlements concerned, records of the municipal councils and the websites of the settlements)

	A	B
number and ratio of committees dealing only with public security	2 (4.3%)	2 (3.8%)
number and ratio of committees dealing with one more sector/area in addition to public security	13 (27.6%)	15 (28.3%)
number and ration of committees dealing with two or more sectors/areas in addition to public security	32 (68.1%)	36 (67.9%)

Note: A – period prior to the municipal elections in 2014, B – period following the municipal elections in 2014

In the spirit of the above, it is very interesting to look at the sectors with which the municipal council committees deal with in addition to public security (table 5). Looking at the complete committee structure, the first three places are occupied by procedures, law and environmental protection, besides them the topics of sport and urban development should be also highlighted. In the case of the committees dealing with only two topics, the predominance of procedures is clear, while in the case of those committees which deal with at least three sectors law also gets an important role. The outstanding significance of these two areas

can be mainly explained by the fact that people most often link the issue of public security/public order with law (legislation), and it is reflected in the correlation of the thematic areas (able 2 shows the highlighted role of procedures as opposed to law, and it is also reflected in their correlation with public security).

Table 5. Distribution of the thematic areas linked to public security
on the studied settlements after the local elections in 2014 (%)
(Data source: own data collection relying on the websites of the local governments concerned)

	A	B	C
procedures	47.1	53.3	44.4
law	33.3	13.3	41.7
environmental protection	15.7	20.0	13.9
sport	13.7	0.0	19.4
urban development	11.8	0.0	16.7
youth	9.8	0.0	13.9
culture	9.8	0.0	13.9
education	7.8	0.0	11.1
finance	5.9	0.0	8.3
equal opportunities	3.9	0.0	5.6
external relations	3.9	0.0	5.6
agriculture	3.9	0.0	5.6
social	3.9	0.0	5.6
civil	2.0	6.7	0.0
ethics	2.0	0.0	2.8
human	2.0	0.0	2.8
minority	2.0	0.0	2.8
tourism	0.0	6.7	0.0
urban management	2.0	0.0	2.8

Note: A – total number of settlements, B – local governments with committee structure dealing with public security together with an other sector, C – local governments with committee structure dealing with public security together with two or more other sectors

Table 6. Composition of the municipal council committees during the period after the local elections in 2014 (ratios of the internal and external members; the Table includes those sectors where there are at least 15 committees)
(Data source: Organisational and Operational Rules of the local governments of the settlements concerned, records of the municipal councils and the websites of the settlements)

agriculture	1.47
environmental protection	1.50
tourism	1.50
civil	1.51
youth	1.51
public security	1.52
education	1.53
urban management	1.53
human	1.54
economics	1.55
culture	1.55
sport	1.55
health	1.57
social	1.57
urban development	1.57
finance	1.60
law	1.62
proprietorship	1.69
procedures	1.81
public procurement	1.85
declaration of assets	2.59
conflict of interests	2.63

One of the most important principles of public administration is democracy, one of its forms of appearance being the democracy of participation. In the case of the local governments it is manifested, inter alia, in the participation of the representatives of the population (or at least the experts of a given rea) as external members in addition to the members of the municipal councils in the work of the committees. The issue is not regulated by legal acts, thus the municipal council is absolutely free to decide about the personal composition of the committees. Analysing the data (Table 6), the important role of professionalism can be observed: public security can be listed among those sectors where the involvement of external members is substantial.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PRESENCE OF PUBLIC SECURITY

In respect of the factors influencing the presence of public security, the impacts of three elements were analysed:
- size of the settlement;
- number of crimes committed on the settlement;
- number of criminals linked to the settlement by place of residence.

Looking at the impact of the size of the settlements (Table 7) an absolutely obvious relationship may be observed: with the increase in the size of the settlements the ratio of those local governments gradually increases whose municipal council found it important to create a committee whose name contains "public security". It can be mainly explained by the fact that in the case of the bigger settlements the municipal councils have more members (Table 1) which consequently have the opportunity to cover more sectors.

Table 7. Presence of public security in the committee structures
after the municipal elections in 2014 on the different settlement sizes (%)
(Data source: Organisational and Operational Rules of the local governments of the settlements concerned, records of the municipal councils and the websites of the settlements)

Settlement categories	A	B
5 001 – 10 000 inhabitants	10.6	12.1
10 001 – 25 000 inhabitants	23.2	22.1
25 001 – 50 000 inhabitants	21.4	32.1
over 50 001 inhabitants	27.8	38.9

Note: A – period prior to the municipal elections in 2014, B – period following the municipal elections in 2014

Table 8. Presence of public security in the committee structure
on the areas variously infected from the aspect of criminal offences
(number of crimes per one thousand inhabitants in 2013)
(Data source: Organisational and Operational Rules of the local governments of the settlements concerned, records of the municipal councils and the websites of the settlements)

	A	B	C
significantly infected (the value considerably exceeds the national average)	38.5	40.0	60.0
strongly infected (the value exceeds the national average)	27.0	40.0	60.0
moderately infected (the value is lower than the national average)	21.8	35.3	64.7
hardly infected (the value is significantly lower than the national average)	12.1	18.8	81.2

Note: A – the ratio of local governments indicating the label "public security" in the committee structure within the settlement category (%), B – the ratio of local governments with independent public security committee and the local governments handling public security with another sector within the category of local governments presenting the name public security in the committee structure (%), C – the ratio of local governments handling public security with two or more sectors within the category of local governments presenting the name public security in the committee structure (%)

Looking at the relative (per 1,000 inhabitants) number of crimes committed on the settlement, there is also an obvious relationship (table 8): on the settlements highly infected by crimes the appearance of public security is much more pronounced in the municipal council committee structure than on the less infected settlements. The closeness of the relationship is shown by the fact that while in the former category public security appears over the average in those committees which deal with only one other sector beside public security, while on the latter settlements those committees dominate whose scopes of tasks and competences include at least two other sectors.

No such close relationship can be detected from the aspect of the third test factor, the residence of the criminals (Table 9): the ratio of settlements having a committee dealing with public security (as well) is the highest in the case of the settlements with moderate criminal emitting settlements, and the ratio decreases into both directions.

Table 9. Relationship between the presence of public security in the committee structure and the residence of the criminals (number of criminals per one thousand inhabitants) (Data source: Organisational and Operational Rules of the local governments of the settlements concerned, records of the municipal councils and the websites of the settlements)

	A	B	C
significant emitter (the value considerably exceeds the national average)	16.9	30.0	70.0
strong emitter (the value exceeds the national average)	19.7	38.5	61.5
moderate emitter (the value is lower than the national average)	25.3	32.0	68.0
poor emitter (the value is significantly lower than the national average)	10.2	20.0	80.0

Note: A – the ratio of local governments indicating the label "public security" in the committee structure within the settlement category (%), B – the ratio of local governments with independent public security committee and the local governments handling public security with another sector within the category of local governments presenting the name public security in the committee structure (%), C – the ratio of local governments handling public security with two or more sectors within the category of local governments presenting the name public security in the committee structure (%)

CONCLUSIONS

The most important conclusions of the study can be summarised as it follows:
- When creating committees, the municipal councils of the local governments do not consider public security as a particularly important area; nevertheless, the significance of this sector increased after the municipal elections in 2014.
- As far as the committee structure is concerned, "public security" in most cases forms a joint committee with the areas of "procedures" and "law".
- Due to the special subject, the ratio of external experts is very high in the committees.
- The appearance of public security in the municipal committee structure is mainly influenced by the size and criminal infectedness of the settlements.

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