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## **THE STRUCTURE OF MIGRATION FLOWS FROM ROMANIA TO ITALY (2008-2016)**

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**Abstract:** In this article, based on data from Eurostat databases, we have tried, by applying mathematical methods of quantification of the migratory femomen to understand structurally this phenomenon. During the study, the resulting data revealed several statistically interesting situations. However, for an overall understanding of the migratory phenomenon in Romania, we intend in the near future to further elaborate such studies and for other destinations of the Romanian migrant population, such as: Spain, Hungary, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland or the Netherlands, for which Eurostat databases are quite generous.

**Key words:** emigrant, emigrant by sex, emigrant by age, permanent emigration, temporary emigration, annual averages

\* \* \* \* \*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Birth and death, marriage, and divorce are demographic events. With a classic term, they fall into the general notion of natural movement of the population. The closed-end population, as defined in his time, is a community that is always renewed, under the effect of births and deaths, and these processes find their full expression in the stable population model (Caselli et al, 2005).

The population is also an open system. Thus, its number and structure, on a national scale or on a territorial-administrative unit, may be influenced by external and internal migration. This part of the general movement of a population is *the migratory movement of the population* (Pécoud et al, 2007). Thus, the general

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movement of the population, her dynamics, consists of two movements, natural and migratory, whose equation of balance results as a sum of the initial population, *the natural balance* (difference between the number of live-births the number of deaths) and *the migratory balance* (the difference between the number of immigrants and the number of emigrants) (OECD, 2007).

Migration, as an event involving the change of a person's status, is no longer dual, biological-social, that they had birth and death. It is entirely a social event. This means that migration has a social conditioning, in the broadest sense of the word, and generates social consequences, among which, of course, and demographic consequences. That is why the study of migration is interdisciplinary excellence. Thus, sociology, geography, political economy are among the most interested sciences of knowledge of migration (Ritzer, 2015).

Demographics are interested in this event, primarily as a factor of the general movement of the population, as the population flow that changes the number and structure of the population in the locality of origin and in the locality of destination, but also by the demographic characteristics of the two populations. At the same time, demography also studies demographic phenomena such as the birth rate, mortality, marriage, or divorce of the migrated population, the change in reproductive behavior, etc. (Ford, De Jong, 1970).

Migration is then studied as a factor of redistribution of population in the territory, as a factor of urban growth, and last but not least, of social homogenization (Nel at all, 2016). The process is particularly wide and with implications at all levels.

In this article we will be limiting to consider migration as a factor of the general movement of the population. For this purpose, will be presented the main notions, indices, methods of description and analysis of migration.

### **METHODOLOGY AND TERMINOLOGY**

Population mobility is the process by which people change their residential, professional or social status by moving to another status. Accordingly, schematically can be distinguished: *space mobility*, *professional mobility* and *social mobility* (Canzler, 2016). By extension, can also be applied to the change of matrimonial status (by switching from one civil status to another), change of educational status, etc.

Modern studies used, in describing and analyzing mobility, regardless of its character, longitudinal method (on cohorts) and matrix representation, with the help of the probability matrix from one status to another, from one state to the next, precisely because mobility is a lot of passages. This explains the recent trend of use of Markov's theories (Aigner, 2013).

*Spatial mobility* of the population is the process that includes the sum of population displacements in space, caused by various causes, on larger or smaller distances, accompanied or not of permanent (permanent) change of the legal domicile or usual residence. In this notion are quantified travel of tourists, of seasonal workers, the commuters, of people from one locality to another, including those accompanied by permanent change of residence (Aybek et al, 2014).

*Population migration* is a form of population's geographical mobility, accompanied by a change of usual residence, between two clearly defined administrative-territorial units. It is also called residential migration, because the person involved in such a movement changes his residential status (Gould, Findlay, 1994). Thus, in the notion of population migration or residential

migration are not quantified nomadism, trips, tourist activities or seasonal movements (seasonal migration), different forms of commuting or pendulum migration.

Therefore, it is important to define geographic units correctly or territorial-administrative between which they occur residential changes. For Romania, these units are those defined by the administrative division of the territory in 1968: the commune (including the suburban commune), the city (including the municipality), the county and the country. These changes are pursued through official information systems. Changes of domicile within the same city or city (municipality) do not fall within the notion of migration, although they may have a large scale or can generate certain economic consequences.

In relation to the official borders of a country, migration can be:

- *internal migration* represent all movements, which generates definitive (permanent) change of usual residence within a country, between the territorial-administrative units;
- *international migration (external migration)* represent all movements which generates definitive (permanent) change of usual residence between two countries.

Period (the length of migration) is that period of migration, determined at the time of registration and which may be (Kilkey, Palenga-Möllenbeck, 2016):

- *fixed period or interval*, defined from the beginning of the period or through the length of the period;
- *migration in the course of life* defined as recorded migration, usually, in censuses, representing the interval between the date of birth (in the place of origin) and the date of registration (in the destination city), making an abstraction by the number of journeys.

For a correct description and statistical analysis follow separately:

- *migration* or *movement* from one place to another, this being the demographic "event" by analogy with the birth and death event;
- *migrant* is the person who has committed one or more migrations.

For probabilistic interpretation and the compilation of probabilistic migration tables, it is important to make a distinction between people who have made one or more migrations, migrant people and the population exposed to "migration risk" (Williams, Baláz, 2014).

In relation to participation in migration, each person has a certain situation.

*Migration status* or *mobility* is defined based on the population census data classification, in the following categories (Parsons, Smeeding, 2006):

- non-immigrant population;
- immigrant population within the country;
- immigrant population outside the country (through external immigration).

This classification has an analogy with classification by professional status (by socio-professional categories) and by social status (by social category).

*Place of origin* (departure) represents the locality from which the migrant goes, so from which the movement begins (usually marked with index i).

*Place of destination* (arrival) is the place where the migrant person moves (note with index j).

Taking into account the two fundamental types of migration, it is advisable to use the following expressions (Kucera et al, 2012):

- *departures and arrivals*, as events within internal migration as they appear in the databases of the National Institute of Statistics in Romania and

Eurostat; accordingly, those people have leaving their home town and arrived in the destination town;

- *immigration and emigration*, as events in international migration; accordingly, those persons are emigrated from one country and immigrated to another country.

*Gross migration* represent the sum of the arrived (immigrants) and the displaced persons (emigrants). This indicator is to know the magnitude or intensity of the displacements between town  $i$  (town/place of departure) and  $j$  (town/place of arrival) and also, for calculating the gross redistribution rate of the population in the territory (Kucera et al, 2012).

A special form of migration is *the return migration* that represents migrant people who, after a period of residence in the destination city, return to the place of origin (Nadler et al, 2016; Conway, 2016).

Migration flows include a group of migrants which have the same place of origin (departure) and same place of destination (arrival), in a given time period.

Migration description and analysis depend on sources of information on migrants, the volume of recorded features and of course and the quality of those data.

In Romania, migration data sources are generally:

- censuses of the population;
- household surveys;
- permanent population registers;
- other sources.

Under the current conditions in Romania the sources of migration are censuses of the population the current migration statistics and statistical surveys. Current statistics of migration are based on statistical data in the databases of the National Institute of Statistics (<http://statistici.insse.ro/shop/>) or in the Demographic Yearbook of Romania published by the same institution. In its current form, the Tempo Online database (updated and managed by the National Institute of Statistics in Romania) contains a large number of characteristics for migrant home change: gender, age, residence, etc. However, statistics for the study of migratory flows from Romania are provided by Eurostat, through its databases (<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>).


## **THE STRUCTURE OF MIGRATION FLOWS**

### **Total number of emigrants**

In the period 2008-2016, according to the survey conducted by Eurostat, emigrated from Romania to Italy, permanent or temporary, a total of 84,336 people, representing only 13.4% of the total number of people who left Romania permanently or temporarily. We say "only" because, for example, emigrated from Romania to Spain, permanent or temporary, a total of 436,188 people, representing 69.3% of the total number of people who left Romania permanently or temporarily. According to these data, the main destination with regard to the choice of emigrants followed by Italy, Hungary (4.3%), Austria (3.3%), Belgium (2.8%), Denmark (1.7%), Ireland (1.6%), Netherlands (1.2%), etc.

From the above data resulting in an annual average of 9,371 emigrants (with values that varied from year to year from 6,945 emigrants to 12,071 emigrants), respectively gross annual growth of 408 emigrants and an average annual increase of 5.7% (with percentages that varied from year to year from -25.6% to 20.3% and gross values from -2,392 to 2,033) (Figure 1).






**Figure 1.** Total number of emigrants (2008-2016)

(Data source: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>)

### Emigrants by sex


Of the total 84,336 people who emigrated definitively or temporarily to Italy, men represent 43.7%, respectively 36,882 emigrants. From the above data resulting in an annual average of 4,098 emigrants (with values that varied from year to year from 3,108 emigrants to 5,107 emigrants), respectively gross annual growth of 23 emigrants and an average annual increase of 2.4% (with percentages that varied from year to year from -35.1% to 22.1% and gross values from -1,713 to 926). At the same time, of the total 84,336 people who emigrated definitively or temporarily to Italy, men represent 56.3%, respectively 47,454 emigrants. From the above data resulting in an annual average of 5,237 emigrants (with values that varied from year to year from 3,771 emigrants to 6,964 emigrants), respectively gross annual growth of 385 emigrants and an average annual increase of 8.5% (with percentages that varied from year to year from -15.2% to 24.4% and gross values from -679 to 1,107) (Figure 2).



**Figure 2.** Emigrants by sex (2008-2016)




(Data source: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>)

Of the total nine years covered by this study (2008-2016), in only two of them, the emigrant masculine population was numeric superior of the feminine emigrant population, respectively in the first period covered by this study (2008-2009). Over the next seven years covered by this study, the female emigrant population was superior of the male emigrant population. In fact, share of female emigrant population increases throughout the period covered by this study; if at the beginning of the study period, the female emigrant population was less by about five percentage points than the male emigrant population, at the end of the study period, the feminine emigrant population was more than 20 percentage points than the male emigrant population. On average, over the whole period covered by this study, the share of female emigrant population was higher than that of the male emigrant population by 11.7 percentage points. (Figure 3).



**Figure 3.** Emigrants by year and sex (2008-2016)

(Data source: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>)

**Figure 4.** Emigrants of less than 15 years (2008-2016)(Data source: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>)**Figure 5.** Emigrants from 15 to 64 years (2008-2016)(Data source: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>)**Figure 6.** Emigrants of 65 years or over (2008-2016)(Data source: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>)

### **Emigrants by age**

Of the total number of 84,336 permanent or temporary emigrants from Romania to Italy during 2008-2016, 5,381 emigrants, representing 6.4% of the total number of emigrants from Romania to Italy, are under 15 years of age, 76,894 emigrants, representing 91.2% of the total number of emigrants from Romania to Italy, are from 15 to 64 years, and 2,061 emigrants, representing 2.4% of the total number of emigrants from Romania to Italy, are 65 years or over. Of the total number of 36,882 permanent or temporary male emigrants from Romania to Italy during 2008-2016, 2,784 male emigrants, representing 7.5% of the total number of male emigrants from Romania to Italy, are under 15 years of age, 33,512 male emigrants, representing 90.9% of the total number of male emigrants from Romania to Italy, are from 15 to 64 years, and 586 male emigrants, representing 1.6% of the total number of male emigrants from Romania to Italy, are 65 years or over. Of the total number of 47,454 permanent or temporary female emigrants from Romania to Italy during 2008-2016, 2,597 female emigrants, representing 5.5% of the total number of female emigrants from Romania to Italy, are under 15 years of age, 43,382 female emigrants, representing 91.4% of the total number of female emigrants from Romania to Italy, are from 15 to 64 years, and 1,475 female emigrants, representing 3.1% of the total number of female emigrants from Romania to Italy, are 65 years or over (Figure 4, 5, 6).

During the survey period (2008-2016), the total emigrant population less than 15 years, decreased on average from year to year by 9 people (with a minimum of -277 emigrants less than 15 years and a maximum of 186 emigrants less than 15 years). Ponderal, however, for the entire period covered by this study (2008-2016) there was an increase of 0.4% for emigrants less than 15 years (with a minimum of -30.9% for emigrants less than 15 years and a maximum of 32.5% for emigrants less than 15 years). During the survey period (2008-2016), the total emigrant population from 15 to 64 years, has increased on average from year to year by 363 people (with a minimum of -2,187 emigrants from 15 to 64 years and a maximum of 1,850 emigrants from 15 to 64 years). Ponderal, for the entire period covered by this study (2008-2016) there was an increase of 5.6% for emigrants from 15 to 64 years (with a minimum of -25.6% for emigrants from 15 to 64 years and a maximum of 20.8% for emigrants from 15 to 64 years). During the survey period (2008-2016), the total emigrant population of 65 years or over, has increased on average from year to year by 54 people (with a minimum of -3 emigrants of 65 years or over and a maximum of 155 emigrants of 65 years or over). Ponderal, for the entire period covered by this study (2008-2016) there was an increase of 33.1% for emigrants of 65 years or over (with a minimum of -0.9% for emigrants of 65 years or over and a maximum of 92.8% for emigrants of 65 years or over) (Figure 4, 5, 6).

During the survey period (2008-2016), the male emigrant population less than 15 years, decreased on average from year to year by 4 male people (with a minimum of -177 male emigrants less than 15 years and a maximum of 82 male emigrants less than 15 years). Ponderal, however, for the entire period covered by this study (2008-2016) there was an increase of 0.4% for the male emigrants less than 15 years (with a minimum of -31.1% for the male emigrants less than 15 years and a maximum of 27.3% for the male emigrants less than 15 years). During the survey period (2008-2016), the male emigrant population from 15 to 64 years, has increased on average from year to year by 14 male people (with a minimum of -1,600 male emigrants from 15 to 64 years and a maximum of 851 male emigrants


from 15 to 64 years). Ponderal, for the entire period covered by this study (2008-2016) there was an increase of 2.3% for male emigrants from 15 to 64 years (with a minimum of -25.7% for the male emigrants from 15 to 64 years and a maximum of 22.5% for the male emigrants from 15 to 64 years). During the survey period (2008-2016), the male emigrant population of 65 years or over, has increased on average from year to year by 13 male people (with a minimum of -7 male emigrants of 65 years or over and a maximum of 49 male emigrants of 65 years or over). Ponderal, for the entire period covered by this study (2008-2016) there was an increase of 28.9% for male emigrants of 65 years or over (with a minimum of -7.4% for the male emigrants of 65 years or over and a maximum of 106.5% for the male emigrants of 65 years or over) (Figure 4, 5, 6).

During the survey period (2008-2016), the female emigrant population less than 15 years, decreased on average from year to year by 5 female people (with a minimum of -110 female emigrants less than 15 years and a maximum of 106 female emigrants less than 15 years). Ponderal, however, for the entire period covered by this study (2008-2016) there was an increase of 0.5% for the female emigrants less than 15 years (with a minimum of -30.6% for the female emigrants less than 15 years and a maximum of 38.2% for the female emigrants less than 15 years). During the survey period (2008-2016), the female emigrant population from 15 to 64 years, has increased on average from year to year by 350 female people (with a minimum of -587 female emigrants from 15 to 64 years and a maximum of 999 female emigrants from 15 to 64 years). Ponderal, for the entire period covered by this study (2008-2016) there was an increase of 8.5% for female emigrants from 15 to 64 years (with a minimum of -14.5% for the female emigrants from 15 to 64 years and a maximum of 26.6% for the female emigrants from 15 to 64 years). During the survey period (2008-2016), the female emigrant population of 65 years or over, has increased on average from year to year by 41 female people (with a minimum of 4 female emigrants of 65 years or over and a maximum of 106 female emigrants of 65 years or over). Ponderal, for the entire period covered by this study (2008-2016) there was an increase of 35.3% for female emigrants of 65 years or over (with a minimum of 1.8% for the female emigrants of 65 years or over and a maximum of 87.6% for the female emigrants of 65 years or over) (Figure 4, 5, 6).

### **Emigrants by age group and sex**

One of the suggestive graphical representations for the study of the population is the chart of population by age group and sex. According to the representations generated by data obtained from Eurostat, for all the years covered by this study (2008-2016), stands out the majority share of the majority of the adult population (from 15 to 64 years), both for the male emigrant population and for the female emigrant population. even in the adult population (from 15 to 64 years), are highlighted by a majority share age groups from 20 to 24 years, from 25 to 29 years, from 30 to 34 years, and from 35 to 39 years, which represents 52.0% of the total emigrant population and 57.0% of the total total emigrant population from 15 to 64 years. Also from the graphical representations of the population by age and gender the femonens observed in the study of the emigrant population by sex, respectively a smaller initial share of the female emigrant population. Starting with 2011 can be seen an increase in the proportion of the female emigrant population from 40 to 59 years, and then starting with 2014 can be seen an increase in the proportion of the female

emigrant population from 40 to 65 years, fact that imbalances roughly equal situations observed both within the young population (less than 15 years), and the aging population (65 years or over) (Figure 7).



**Figure 7.** Emigrants by year and sex (2008-2016)

(Data source: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>)

## CONCLUSIONS

Italy is one of the favorite destinations of emigrants from Romania. The causes are multiple, but the most relevant are the small distances between the place of departure and the place of arrival of the emigrants (compared with Spain or the UK, two other favorite destinations of Romanian emigrants), the easy availability of transport and, last but not least, the linguistic compatibility (Romanian language and Italian language have about 30% of the same lexicon). This study has highlighted, among others, the following:

- in migratory flows the female population is the majority;
- the trends of numerical evolution of emigrants are more obvious for the feminine population;
- the share of young migrant population (less than 15 years) is declining;
- the ratio of the young population (less than 15 years) and adult population (from 15 to 64 years) decreased from 1:12 to 1:18 (total emigrant population), from 1:12 to 1:13 (total male emigrant population) and from 1:11 to 1:24 (total female emigrant population); this indicates either the fact that the emigrant population of major age (from 19 to 64 years) chose not to make children, focusing their interest in work, or children were left in Romania in the care of other family members (grandparents, brothers or sisters, cousins, etc.) or in the care of other people, situations that generate, sooner or later, complications of a social nature;
- the ratio of the adult population (from 15 to 64 years) and the aging population (65 years or over) increased from 1:126 to 1:21 (total emigrant population), from 1:179 to 1:31 (total male emigrant population) and from 1:95 to 1:17 (total female emigrant population); this indicates either the fact that the third-age migrant population increased in number and share in the period covered by this study (2008-2016);
- 68.5% of the female emigrant population from Romania in Italy, respectively 32,511 women, are of childbearing age (from 15 to 49 years), which is causing demographic problems in Romania;

As we have already mentioned, we intend, in the near future, to further elaborate such studies and for other destinations of the Romanian migrant population, such as: Spain, Hungary, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland or the Netherlands, for which Eurostat databases are quite generous. Thus, by analyzing the structure of the migration phenomenon, we will be given a complex understanding of the migration phenomenon from Romania.

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## **THREATS IN THE SECURITY POLICY OF THE USA**

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**Abstract:** Using meta-analysis as methodological instrument, we are trying to shape the possible trajectories of US geopolitical games in early 21<sup>st</sup> century. According to some considerations, nowadays the US are going through a relative decline process, especially due to the fast economic growth of his principal rival, China. The study is presenting the main threats that can arise in the US international relations, especially those ones which are related to Islamic, Chinese and Russian challenge. We conclude that from these possible challenges the Islamic one can be the most dangerous, because of its unpredictability and because it can encompass some unconventional, non-state types of threats, such as terrorism. At the end of the study is presented three different attitudes towards the US geopolitical role – the neo-conservative interpretation of Huntington, the eco-socialist discourse of Wallerstein and the liberal-criticism of Revel.

**Key words:** security, relative decline, conflict, terrorism

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### **INTRODUCTION**

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the USA remains the first economic and military power of the world, unequivocally dominating international relations on a global level. However, its power is gradually decreasing, slowly but progressively, foreshadowing a future when the USA will lose its hegemony, a status that characterized the USA at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. The rise of the USA on a global level began in 1870 when following the Civil War the country was unified again and consolidated in a strengthened inner cohesion which facilitated the explosive economic expansion unprecedented in history. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century until the beginning of WWI the USA considered with contempt the European politics based on the realistic principle of balance of power, founded by the Holy Alliance. In the same time, in alliance with Latin

America the USA managed to keep the European colonizers away from the American continent during the 19<sup>th</sup> century according to the Monroe doctrine (Lakatos, Kerekes, 2010, p.2). This phenomenon of isolationism was interrupted for a short amount of time during WWI when the American intervention was motivated by Germany's aggressive attitude in the submarine war and by the idealist principle of self-identification of the nations launched by president Wilson. Instead of negotiating a peace of the *status quo*, the USA decided to intervene unilaterally on the side of the Allies, thus obtaining the total victory of one of the belligerent parties (Kazin, 2017, p.46). In reality through this direct intervention on the side of the Allies the USA wanted to make sure that the immense amount of war credit given to the Allies in the first three years of war would be redeemed; this credit would certainly have been lost had the Central Powers been victorious. Disillusioned by the peace treaty of Versailles, considered rapacious by the USA (in the end the USA did not sign the peace treaty of Versailles), the Americans will again distance themselves from the Europeans, leaving the continent in a political vacuum where in a short amount of time Fascism, Nazism and Communism will thrive.

The isolationism of the USA will only be interrupted following the Japanese attack in 1942 and after winning WWII along with the Allies the American war industry will grow so big that it will not be possible to 'de-structure' it. The weight and the 'inertia' of movement of this military apparatus will always need to be put to use during the Cold War to restrict and discourage the Sovietic mammoth, or through direct deployment of forces (Korea, Vietnam, Grenada) or through proxy wars (Afghanistan).

After winning the Cold War, Fukuyama's prediction about the end of history did not come true (Fukuyama, 1992), we are witnessing the reorganization of the global order which generates multiple threats for the USA and for the world in general. Through this modest paper we would like to list these threats, analyzing their possible exogenous as well as endogenous sources.

### **CHALLENGE NUMBER ONE – THE INSTABILITY OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC AND ITS GLOBAL REPERCUSSIONS**

Losing ground on the economic and military level the USA tries to redefine the specific standards and variables of their status as global superpower shifting the emphasis on the qualitative type of elements to the disadvantage of the quantitative ones that are specific for the rise and the growth of China in general. The USA and the world – especially the western part of it – could reach the same dangerous situation prior to WWI when the main actors of global politics could not find appropriate and balancing answers to the fast rise of Germany under Wilhelm's rule. This lack of any reaction or the lack of resilient adaptability led to the outbreak of a global conflict in 1914. Last, but not least, China has the responsibility to manage its own growth between reasonable terms, a growth that produces unbalances, including the dispute concerning the islands of Paracell and Spratly (Emmers, 2010).

In this context of the hegemony of the USA the main challenge is the rise of China, which as far as GDP is concerned in 2017 produces half of the GDP of the USA, but in the next 20 years will outpace the American economy and the economic interdependence of the two – labelled Chimerica in the specialized literature (Ferguson, 2010) will represent the most important relation in the global

system of international relations (Beeson, Lee, 2015, p. 93-95), in some cases characterized by cooperation, in other ones by competition – a classical example of this being their mutual interests, but, in the same time, their competition in the case of the investments in Africa (Thrall, 2015, p.76). This competition and economic growth will make it possible for China to increase its military expenditure, a fact that will establish China's future geostrategic weight. China already has the largest military force in the world as far as the number of combatants is concerned, but this force is predominantly land force with a significantly reduced destructive power than that of the US army as well as a more reduced capacity of "power projection" as compared to the US army. The growing economic capacity of China will also ensure the funds to cover the military expenses in order to change the global hegemony; at present the Chinese army benefits from the second most generous financing in the world (approximately 120 billion dollars a year) as compared to the financing of the American army that represents an overwhelming ration (40%) of the global military finances – approximately 600 billion dollars a year (Probáld, 2004, p. 25). It was not a coincidence that the Obama administration turned its attention mostly towards the Pacific area, thus Europe became sidelined in 2009, at least until the breakout of the crisis in the Ukraine in 2014. This area of the Pacific became increasingly important for the US due to its rivalry with China – predicted by certain analysts as early as the beginning of the 1990s (Bernstein, Munro, 1998) – as well as the military risks arising from the situation around the Korean peninsula and the South China Sea. There is a dispute between China and its maritime neighbours as far as the ownership of certain territories is concerned; these territories are located in the continental shelf of the East and South China Sea and contain important reserves of hydrocarbon. The animosity with Japan, South Korea Vietnam and the Philippines has grown recently; these countries on their turn have also armed themselves and they are the US' most reliable allies in its territorial containment policy towards China (Auslin, 2017, p. 21). China is building artificial islands in the South China Sea around the Paracell and Spratly islands in order to develop its military base and to strengthen its claims over the hydrocarbon reserves and also planning to restrict free sailing in certain areas. American warships have intentionally entered these restricted areas in 2016 thus expressing the fact that the US refuses to recognize the arbitrary limitations on free sailing imposed by the Chinese, thus creating an extremely tense situation from the military point of view. China, on its own turn, does not recognize abusively and unilaterally the ruling of the International Court of Justice of Hague concerning the right to access the hydrocarbon reserves of Vietnam and of the Philippines in the South China Sea area. These disagreements on the level of international relations might determine the smaller countries of the region – Vietnam, the Philippines, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and even Indonesia – to seek shelter at the US. A future Russian – American alliance is possible in the context of China's territorial claims over Siberia or in the context of China's increasing influence on the former central Asian republics at Russia's disadvantage, or, simply because of the unbearable pressure of a future superpower, such as China, on the power balance (Lakatos, Kerekes, 2010, p. 7). According to this reasoning the USA tried to limit China economically in order to slow its rate of growth, relying on an economic partnership of the Pacific between the states of Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, and the American states lining the Pacific coast. The Transpacific Partnership was signed in 2015 during Obama's

presidency, with an obvious intention to exclude China from this free trade cooperation, whose nucleus was represented by the ASEAN states. In January 2017, the Trump administration terminated the USA's participation in this partnership, considering that it created a disadvantage for the American producers in comparison with a cheaper import of their competitors. Thus, paradoxically, the USA offered China to take the initiative to create such an economic background which could turn against the USA limiting the American's free movement in the macro-region of the Pacific.

China's sensitive point in the competition with the USA is its insufficient nuclear force, China being the fourth nuclear power of the world, following Russia, the USA and France (it possesses somewhat more than 200 nuclear warheads as compared to the 6,000 – 7,000 that Russia and the USA possess). Although China has the triad of the launching capacity (land, maritime and aerial), it has to invest massively in its nuclear arsenal in order to equal the Russians or the Americans.

In this context we have to mention the nuclear crisis around North Korea, a neo – stalinist regime which benefits from China and Russia's silent approval to distract the USA's attention from other possible conflicts.

The first crisis related to North – Korea's nuclear endowment broke out in 1994 when the neo-communist dictatorial regime prohibited the UN's inspectors to visit its nuclear facilities. At that time a diplomatic agreement was reached which was later disrespected by the Pyongyang regime and thus in 2006 North Korea launched its first nuclear test. In parallel it also developed its transportation capacity of the nuclear warheads by launching the programme of medium and long range ballistic rockets. Some American secret services do not exclude the possibility that North – Koreans will hit continental America with rockets, even in Chicago in the central area of the Great Lakes. The crisis deepened in an unseen manner in the summer of 2017, when the sanctions against North Korea for executing a nuclear test became more severe, the country threatened the USA and its allies with a preventive nuclear attack, launched especially against the islands of Guam and Hawaii. Although it is not a fact practically proven, American experts do not exclude the possibility that North Korea has the capacity for a real nuclear attack against the USA. North Korea represents a substantial threat to the USA as it is the most dangerous among the criminal states (rogue states) and it can contribute via smuggling to the proliferation of mass destructive weapons, offering ammunition even to Muslim fundamentalists. This threat strengthens the alliance between South Korea, Japan and the USA; although the two Asian countries fear an American attack against North Korea as only the USA has the capacity to protect itself, South Korea and Japan are very much exposed to a military retaliation of the North Koreans, due to their geographical closeness. In fact, the strategy of the US serves the deepening of the collaboration with South Korea, especially on an economic level, through which these countries attempt a moderate counter-balancing of the Chinese economic influence, and on a smaller scale, that of Japan, but also serving America's economic interests in the region. For example, with the latest free trade negotiations the USA got some more favourable terms from Seoul as did the European Union (Brands, Feaver, 2017, p.29), a fact that the EU tries to counterbalance by negotiating with Japan. Nobody is interested to cause a destructive conflict which would mean the end of the regime in Pyongyang, but the North Koreans consider that they need the nuclear weapon in order to avoid the fate of the dictatorial regimes of Lybia and Irak. However, the USA was quick to reassure them that it did not want to abolish

the criminal regime of Pyongyang and it did not force the unification of North and South Korea. On the other hand, neither China, nor Russia is interested in installing a probably pro-American regime in case the peninsula would be united. In consequence North Korea is an irrational and unpredictable enemy as compared to a possible Russian-Chinese threat which would be “rational” and incomparably more predictable.

In the same context we could also refer to the initiative of certain Republican congressmen who proposed the selling of weaponry to Taiwan in order to help it resist the threat of a Chinese invasion (nationalinterest.org). The idea is totally out of place and it could result in the aggravation of the conflict with continental China and it would represent an unacceptable precedence in which the USA would contribute in the nuclear proliferation. Quite probably the desire to counterbalance the North – Korean threat with a corresponding threat of a third party against China, seen as the passive patron of North – Korea, was behind the curtains of this American plan. The USA’s military presence (in Japan, Guam and the Philippines) has been a factor to convince China not to force the issue of Taiwan, but quite obviously the USA will be less and less able and willing to protect Taiwan. But until then, this threat could also be used to obtain a substantial advantage, the Trump administration is going to sell Taiwan conventional weaponry for a worth of \$1.4 billion. The possibility that in the future Taiwan will wish to be unified with continental China and will not refuse the idea cannot be excluded either: but until then the USA have the moral obligation to protect Taiwan from a possible invasion coming from the continental giant (Peng, 2009, p. 109).

It is common knowledge that tensions in inter-state relations, that present the chance to escalate into military conflict, offer a good opportunity for the business of weaponry sales. In the case of the North-Korean crisis there is an increased chance for the American weapon industry to cash large amounts of money from the export of the ultra-sophisticated THAAD anti-missile system, or any other type of weapons, to South – Korea and Japan, thus increasing their ability to protect themselves.

It is interesting to consider the attitude of the American public opinion, which started to be radicalized following the exchange of spiteful declarations between the American and the North – Korean leaders during the crisis in the summer of 2017 and there is a slight increase of the number of people who would support a preventive and destructive war against North – Korea. This is all the more surprising if we take into consideration the fact that the American public opinion is already disgusted with the USA’s military activity in the Middle East (vox.com).

### **THE ISLAMIST CHALLENGE**

The conflict between the Islam and the West and between the Islam and the USA, respectively, has its roots in the cultural differences as well as in the divergent economic interests which are escalating instead of decreasing. The demographic pressure on the part of the Islam has diminished significantly in the past 30 years, which means that the *total fertility rate* in the Muslim countries of the Middles East and Northern Africa decreased on average from 5-6 to 3newborns per fertile woman (except for Afghanistan where the TFR is still around 6). This means that the pressure of the migration towards Europe and other Muslim states will decrease in the short run. The Islam – according to Huntington – despite

feeling frustrated because of the West and especially because of the USA due to its considerable economical and technological backwardness has gained significant self – confidence and certain superiority towards the West in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, fuelled by the fast-paced demographic growth and the discovery of the hydrocarbon reserves. The slowing of the demographic growth and the discovery of new alternative sources of hydrocarbon even in the USA will leave room gradually only to the frustration, losing its ammunition that could have provided it with a narcissistic satisfaction. These factors were complemented by the Islamic Revolution many times developed on the grounds of identity, nationalist or indigenous issues. This movement was amplified especially with the appearance of the ayatollahs and with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and since then has been the main fuelling source of the fundamentalist Islamic terrorism. This religious revolution is anti-democratic, anti-modernist, it also seeks to introduce the traditional *sharia* law thus introducing fanaticism and brutality in a society which has not been touched by the Enlightenment and in the same time it is very popular among young people who have an anti-system attitude. This background has significant effects on the shift of the combat methods which will be led by a blind indoctrination, by a fanatic hatred where the majority of the combatants will not be fearful of self-destruction as they have been told in the mosques that they would go directly to heaven if they sacrifice themselves. In other words, the West and the USA will not face a calculable threat anymore as it happened during the Cold War with the communist regimes – aggressive but perfectly rational. How could the doctrine of limiting/enclosing or that of discouraging work with an enemy that will not hesitate to use weapons of mass destruction of any kind, on a state level and on a non-state level, as terrorist threats? It is no wonder that the majority of the criminal states have been the Muslim states: Libya, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan (in the meantime Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Libya have been removed from the black list). The effect of this unpredictability in the confrontation with the Islam will be a huge pressure. The American interventions caused Pakistani researchers to identify three types of government in the Middle East: secular Arabic dictatorial regime, authoritarian government or American invasion and the imposing of forces close to the USA (Mirza, Abid, Qaisrani, 2017, p. 58).

American – Islam relations have not always been determined by cultural differences. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Mujahedeen were seriously supported financially and militarily by presidents Carter and Reagan. During the Iraq – Iran war, Iraq was sponsored by the USA. In this case, against what is expected, the former beneficiaries of the American aid turned into its most fierce enemies, thus the so-called ‘blowback’ effect was produced, a term used in the CIA slang, developed later by Chalmers Johnson (Johnson, 2000, apud Lakatos, Kerekes, 2010, p. 9).

Even Saudi – Arabia fit into the pattern of a pragmatic partner of the USA, what is more, on paper it is one of the USA’s most reliable allies. The ambiguity of the problem is easy to understand, though, if we analyse the religious fanaticism of the Wahhabites which can at any time turn against the USA. At the beginning of Trump’s presidency they developed a strategy which aims to separate the fanatical Islamism from the large masses of the Muslim world and combating it through force and propaganda; one of the proponents of this strategy is Sebastian Gorka, former counsellor of the president (Gorka, 2016). Only the future will tell us how viable this strategy is.

Pakistan has also managed to become a rational and cooperative partner of the USA during the military operations in Afghanistan, thus it was removed from the list of criminal states. However, Pakistan is playing a double game; it is rather a close ally of China due to the numerous hostilities with India. Besides, this regional rivalry of India with China and Pakistan could lead India to seek refuge in the arms of the USA, a vocal supporter of this idea the American analyst of Indian background, Fareed Zakaria (Zakaria, 2008).

### **POSSIBLE CONFLICTS IN THE RELATIONS WITH OTHER REGIONS**

As a consequence of the Russian invasion of Crimea, Europe has once again become the territory of geopolitical uncertainty with a frozen armed conflict between Russia and the Ukraine. As opposed to the situation in the former Yugoslavia in this conflict neither NATO nor the USA can intervene unilaterally due to the fact that Russia is involved in the conflict and its response could have unimaginable dimensions. Russia is attempting to de-stabilize NATO and the USA through a hybrid war of information and manipulation, through cybernetic diversions. Europe is less and less to be vulnerable to blackmailing by the Russian energy issue due to the revolution in the exploitation of shale gas and to the spreading on a large scale of the renewable sources of energy. These tendencies have generated an explosion of the offer and they significantly reduced the price of the fossil energy resources on the global market, thus decreasing dramatically the income of the Russian economy gained from oil and gas exports. This fact added to the western economic sanctions caused the Russian economy important contractions as of 2014 and it only recovered starting with 2017. Its economic capacities being affected, Russia cannot continue to finance neither its war with the Ukraine nor its military endowment at the same pace as before 2014. However, the presence of the Americans and NATO's vigilance are justified by the fact that they enforce the defence capacity of the NATO member countries geographically close to Russia (Poland, the Baltic states, Romania) because the geopolitical interests of the USA and those of Russia are diametrically opposed. If from the point of view of real politics Russia's interest to increase its influence continuously to obtain the status of great power can be justified, the interest of the USA is to prevent the ascension of a hegemonic power in Europe, Russia being the main candidate for this position due to its richness in hydrocarbon reserves as well as to its military arsenal. The ascension of Russia to the status of a hegemonic or quasi-hegemonic power in Europe would lead to the de facto elimination of the American influence on the continent and through this a serious failure for the USA's politics (Güner, Koc, 2017). The Ukrainian crisis seems to have triggered a major breach between the EU and the Russian Federation which has not been desired by either of the parties involved (Larrabee, Wilson, Gordon, 2015, p. 24) and which offers the possibility for some American interests to be imposed in the region, although it is uncertain until when.

At the beginning of his presidency, Barack Obama showed a gesture of reconciliation towards Russia suspending the implementation of the anti-missile shield in Eastern Europe (Poland and The Czech Republic) started by president Bush who claimed that it is supposed to protect Europe from an Iranian attack and it is harmless for Russia. However, the Russian invasion in Crimea determined the USA to continue its display of defensive forces with a new impulse, this time in Romania, in Devesel (Lakatos, Kerekes, 2010, p.10). This fact produces profound mistrust between the two superpowers, both perceiving the

situation as a possible threat which could trigger a new era of arms race especially through the fact that the limiting of nuclear arsenal has been given up. The fact that Donald Trump won the elections and moved into the White House did not bring the results the Russians expected, that is the abandonment of NATO by the USA or the removal of the anti-Russian sanctions. Trump has already hit Assad's Syria (a traditional ally of Russia), declared that Russia has to leave Crimea and significantly strengthened the economic sanctions against Russia (justified, paradoxically, by Trump's wish to punish Russia for its involvement in the American presidential campaign on Trump's side).

In Latin America there is no state that would threaten the security of the USA, even if the import of certain phenomena – criminal gangs culture, drugs – seriously affects the American society.

At the moment Venezuela is the most unfriendly state towards the USA but it is not a real threat as it gradually enters social convulsion. In South America Brazil and Argentina could be the next countries that own nuclear weapons, but they are arming themselves against each other. Mexico, with the entire dispute concerning commercial exchange and illegal migration, does not represent a real threat for the USA. Anyway, these countries are incomparably more predictable and reliable negotiation partners in comparison with the countries of the Middle East.

### **THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN POWER REFLECTED BY CERTAIN THINKERS OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, SHAPERS OF OPINIONS**

Samuel Huntington in his chef-d'oeuvre study *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* discusses, among other things, the issue of the erosion of the American power. In Iulia Motoc's opinion the realistic interpretations concentrated exclusively on the role of the state are criticized by Huntington and the state is replaced by culture (Motoc, 2002, p.21). We would add that in many cases the cultural – religious factors appear as absolute and sometimes fatalistic in the context of global security thus offering the possibility of a simplistic interpretation. There is no doubt that cultural similarities have a key role in the process of choosing one's allies and enemies on a global level, but there are many cases when interests superior to those ethnic, cultural and religious ones appear and the enemies have the same ethnic and linguistic origins or the same religious background.

We are obliged to start from the premise that Huntington developed this idea of the clash of the civilizations as a reply to Fukuyama's naive and idealistic vision that in the euphoria of the victory over totalitarian regimes following the Cold War predicted the gradual triumph and generalization of the western-type liberal democracies.

At this point we would like to highlight two aspects: the American – Muslim conflicts and the Chinese – American divergences which, according to Huntington, may be combined into a global conflict.

The American – Muslim conflicts of recent years are fueled by the insurmountable cultural gap between the two entities, the West and the Islam – Huntington points out. This fact was proved to be true beyond any shadow of doubt for the first time by the first Iraqi war in 1991. Iraq invaded Kuwait in the summer of 1990 annexing it as a new province to its territory, a province that was conquered by force. It was an obvious case of aggression against a sovereign state with a clear motivation to conquer, an act condemned by the majority of the



international community (the western world, that is, in Huntington's interpretation), but also by the majority of the Muslim states. However, when the time came to free Kuwait with the help of an international military coalition led by the USA where the great majority of the armed forces was also supplied by the Americans, the Muslim world, especially the Arabic countries condemned the American 'aggression' against Iraq. Saddam Hussein, previously considered a criminal, suddenly became a hero of the Muslim world (although he had been posing as a charismatic but lay leader). The American invasion also prompted an unexpected reconciliation of Iraq with its arch enemy, Iran. In other words, in this case the spiritual relations as well as 'kinship' were more important counterbalancing the pragmatic aspects related to respecting of the international law.

Another aspect developed in Huntington's work is the scenario of an imaginary global conflict initially caused by the USA and China in the first decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. According to the conflict's plan the USA would have interfered in the South China Sea in a military conflict that appeared between China and another state, offering military help to the smaller country. The conflict spread quickly, China provoking considerable losses to the American Navy in the Pacific, thus shortening the time until nuclear weapons – first tactical ones, later strategic ones – are introduced into the conflict. Gradually, as the conflict escalates to a global level, fueled by regional divergences other parties join in the war. The Arabic countries attack the American forces in the Middle East, Israel and Europe respectively. As the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was a total disaster the Muslim states already possess atomic bombs which they are going to use in the first phase of the conflict against the Europeans (Marseilles and its surroundings are going to be hit by an atomic attack). As a response North Africa and the Middle East will be heavily bombed by NATO. Russia, animated by the Muslim threat and fearing China's territorial claims, becomes the ally of the West, due to its Christian origins as well, although Huntington sets Russia apart, as a different civilization, dissociated from the West. Surprisingly (it is very unlikely in our opinion) Japan will be attracted by China, taking part in the war against the Americans and the Russians, as a result of the increase in China's prestige in Eastern Asia, due to China's ascension to the status of attractive superpower. This will happen in spite of the fact that Japan is a different cultural entity from the Taoist China and the relations between the two countries are poisoned by the memory of the atrocities committed by the Japanese during WWII. India will obviously side with the American – Russian – European coalition and will face heavy battles with China and Pakistan. Huntington also identifies an internal risk for the USA, namely due to the cultural breach the Hispanic population of the USA will trigger ample and destabilizing internal movements arguing that they do not wish to take part in a 'gringo' war.

Eventually the civilization will collapse with every belligerent party suffering considerable and irrecoverable losses. The regions less affected of Latin America and Africa will contribute to the stripping of North America and Europe, that is, what is left of them. This somber scenario clearly sketches the possible threats for the USA but it also contains a clear warning as well, that the USA should not take risks and should not enter conflicts where it does not have direct interests. The chain of conflicts started in the South China Sea (Huntington intuitively placed the conflict area there two decades ago), but the same formula is applicable to the

conflict between continental China and Taiwan and the Korean peninsula. In consequence the American interference in these conflicts should be avoided.

Immanuel Wallerstein wrote a book about the decline of the American power inspired by the events of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001 and by the possible shift in the global order following these events. Wallerstein accepts the idea of a slow, but steady decline of the American almightiness on a global level, as we got used to it at the turn of the century. In the author's opinion the 9/11 attacks, but mostly America's disproportionate response by starting the war against terrorism accelerated considerably this decline. In the meantime we could add that the financial crisis of 2008 (subprime mortgage crisis) only added fuel to the fire as it sped up the American regression. Wallerstein postulates that capitalism is suffering from an incurable disease and as a consequence we will witness the changing of the social organization system on a global level; that is the decline of the capitalist order established 250 years ago. This does not mean the decline of the West in Spengler's terms because we are talking about a systemic crisis of global capitalism on the whole, applicable to non-western countries as well, but the American society keeps the finger on the trigger. The increase of insecurity, the shorter time in which economic crises appear, the chaos of the political exchequer due to the almost complete disappearance of the former 'mainstream' left, the threat of the environmental and climate disaster – all these are part of the symptoms of this crisis. The author does not explicitly state what will follow after this system or at least what that system will be called, but he makes it clear that it will be centralized, corporatist, authoritarian system, with a brutalized society where the rights and liberties of the individual will be limited, where the more powerful will dominate over the weaker ones and social polarization could reach paroxysm. He recommends a revitalization of the left along the traditional values of the left, eco-socialist ones, through the promotion of the leveling of societal inequalities. He proposes a domination of the ecologist spirit, a 'Porto Alegre'- type, of sustainability, as opposed to the global monetary spirit, the 'Davos'- type. He criticizes Huntington (although never explicitly names him) as Wallerstein does not agree with the idea that the global crisis has its focal point in cultural and religious differences. In the same time he also criticizes Fukuyama for not promoting the eternal glory of liberal capitalism, on the contrary, he predicts its self-deletion. He rejects the third way of Giddens put into political practice by Tony Blair and somewhat by Clinton through which western left was compromised by being inoculated with neo-liberalism. This neo-liberalism is responsible for the increase of inequalities and for the disorders that triggered perpetual crises of the financial markets. Neo – liberalism, which is the third way of the left was an erroneous response to the challenges of accelerated globalization starting with the '70s. As a result of these tendencies the left abandoned the old middle-class, especially in its lower layers, affected by the reduction of their income due to outsourcing, by the relocation of workplaces in the classical industry to the peripheral areas of the global economy, by the increased use of robots, by the need to be competitive through life-long learning and the need to be adaptable to the knowledge that sells on the workforce market. The left has forsaken the old blue – collars, which is nowadays more of a 'pink-collar', new postmodern proletarians of the offices. Instead of the de-classed of America and Western – Europe the new left promoted, in an ultra-liberalist vision, different minority groups, such as the LGBTQ group, multiculturalism, feminism, disabled people, Afro-American people, refugees, the paupers of the Third World, who, no doubt, are a lot less

fortunate than the chronically out-of-work Westerners. As they felt completely betrayed by the old socialists, these frustrated and furious groups marched directly into the arms of the alt-right protagonists, or those of the populists or even neo-fascists. On the other hand, the radicalization of certain leftist movements represents as well an extreme which leads to the loss of internal cohesion and solidarity, being an endogenous factor of de-stabilization of the American society. What happened in Western Europe in 2016 with the ascension of the right, or the presidential elections in the USA with Donald Trump being the winner is symptomatic for the process of internal de-stabilization, which is a clear internal threat for the capitalist system in perfect concordance with Wallerstein's diagnosis, related to the anti-system movements. This internal scourge was added to by the Russian interference through the manipulation of the elections, the spreading of fake news, significantly increasing the social chaos via cybernetic diversion. Wallerstein, as a reforming eco-socialist, wields an internal criticism of the left with an anti-racist vision, attempting to avoid a fatal social upheaval that could happen due to a disastrous bifurcation following the crisis of the system and whose consequence would be the complete fall of the USA on the basis of contradictory movements and endogenous dysfunctions.

Jean François Revel's book *Anti – Americanism* discusses a phenomenon very dangerous for the USA, namely, the lack of a positive image, which produces aversion, enmity and hatred in large circles towards the foreign affairs of the USA and against the USA on the whole.

Revel condones rather easily Wallerstein and Chomsky's well-grounded criticism related to the double standards that the USA applies so clearly in many cases of its international relations. Revel represents the classical liberalism as compared to Huntington's neo-conservative attitude or Wallerstein's eco-socialism. Based on this ideology, in his book, the values of the state of the rule of law, of the individual rights and the free economy (value-systems representative of the USA) are worshipped and the attack against capitalism, liberalism and against globalization are reduced to simple anti-Americanisms in a slightly Manicheist way. The anti-globalist movements of Porto Alegre and Seattle, considered a positive initiative by Wallerstein are denigrated by Revel as simple destructive and unconscious acts of vandalism of some modern anarchists and Marxists.

Revel considers that America has frequently been viewed simultaneously with envy and despise because of its capacity to adapt, its enormous innovative abilities through which it has always managed to be number one, especially in areas where the qualitative contribution and added value count far more than the purely quantitative efficiency. The role of the 'Planet's gendarme', 'unique superpower', unilateralism, America's messianic mission, provoke irritation and are considered narcissistic whims by America's critics.

The solidity of the foundation of the American democracy, eulogized with absolute superlatives by Revel, has managed so far, in the author's opinion, to save America from dangerous derails of the societal evolution which could have led to the malignant proliferation of political extremes. This commendable immunity is shown in sharp contrast with the European continent's susceptibility to fall in the trap of totalitarian regimes or in that of fratricide conflicts that devastated Europe twice during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The American balance could be maintained by the cleverly named and apparently contradictory combination of political idealism and rationality.

Revel points out, that especially the Muslim world, but also the French – who are the European champions of anti-Americanism – suppress their own frustrations, shortcomings and societal failures via their anti-American manifestations. Thus, the USA is used rather as a subterfuge for the camouflaging of their own inertia and inabilities.

The author underlines the fact that the American unilateralism is the product of the European impotence (and not only European) to maintain the order and security of foreign affairs. In fact, Europe's post-war and post-colonial decline in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century determined the USA to play this role of the balancer. The last European war, for instance, the one in the former Yugoslavia, could not have been solved without the intervention of the USA. Paradoxically, the USA is criticized in both extreme cases – if it remains passive, it is blamed as being isolationist and for its lack of responsibility; when it actively interferes, alone or in a coalition, it is rebuffed for interfering in a state's internal affairs or in those of a group of states, it is accused of unilateralism.

### CONCLUSIONS

The USA's security is inseparable of that of the Western world. In the post Cold – War era we are faced with new, unconventional, non-state types of threats, such as terrorism. Due to the efficiency of the anti – terrorism measures taken after the events of 9/11 at the moment the USA is less exposed to fundamentalist Islamist terrorism than Europe. Anyway, the presence of the two oceans does not provide the USA with the protection that it once did. A small and very poor country, situated at a considerable distance, as North Korea, is capable to threaten the USA with nuclear weapons – this means that the threat has reached a superior level. Finally, the nature of the enemies has fundamentally changed that is, as compared to the Cold War, at present the USA has to face – especially in the case of fundamentalist jihadists – some irrational, unpredictable and ruthless enemies, with whom negotiation is practically impossible. Even if the American influence is in decline, the USA will continue to play on the most important position in the game of international relations, even though the hegemony of the '90s will be lost.

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## **THE DEVELOPMENT CENTERS AND THE PROGRESS OF THE WORLD HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVES**

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**Abstract:** Civilization has always been the center of the progressive world, where the tendencies of the moment develop and where the great men, the rulers and the ingenious ones have been able to implement the ideas and ambitions that give birth to the creative class. Civilization has always sought the most propitious lands in which it has been unbounded, moving according to the requirements of the times, through: Africa, Asia, Europe, North America and Asia again, to include in the future: Southeast Asia And South, Africa, Latin America and Europe again.

**Key words:** world centers, evolution, civilization, creative class, technology, advance economic

\* \* \* \* \*

### **INTRODUCTION**

Africa is the cradle of mankind, where the first methods of improving life have developed and has emerged as the first creative class. The Great African Rift, with its savannas and lakes, propitious for hunting and fishing, was the first center of humanity. From here, the man continued his journey, creating new and new centers of civilization, according to the requirements of the time, creating new tendencies. With the population multiplying, people settled in creating the villages and the ancestors, and at the same time the planting and animal husbandry took place, so the new centers located on fertile and warm valleys such as the Nile Valley, the Mesopotamian Valley and the Indul Valley. The use of fire led the centers of civilization further north, creating the beginning of temperate temperament, such as the Yellow River Valley. Increasing the importance of trade in the establishment of world centers, maritime powers such as the Greeks and the Romans have become advantageous. The development of weapons has supplanted the power of maritime states, defending the empires of Western Europe such as Portugal, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Germany and England.

Technology overcame domination based on colonialism, so Europe taught North America, the northeastern seaside becoming the new center of the world. Further advances in technology have become the first priority of humanity over war weapons. At the same time, the North Pacific has advanced North America commercially, so the US has moved its priority area from west to California, and California has become the new heart of the world. At the same time, the Pacific coast of Asia has developed its own center in Japan which, together with the State of California, represents the main area of decision making, technology advancement and robotics worldwide, becoming the magnet of the creative class. Similar to the other centers of the world, and California will decline over time, yielding East Asia and thereafter to Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe.

### **THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CREATIVE CLASS - THE FIRST CENTERS**

In the past, the foundations of civilization were put into Central Africa, roughly in the 200,000 BC. Along the Nile Valley, Mesopotamia, the Valley of the Indus River, and the Yellow River Valley, with their fertile lands that provided abundant food (Brown, 2009, p.53-111). With the development of trade between East Asia and South-West Asia as well as Europe, the Silk Road has evolved, returning the center of the world to the Middle East and South Europe. Maritime trade has secured the pre-eminence of the older continent for more than 2,000 years, passing through the Mediterranean Sea (Greece, Rome, Genova and Venice) and continuing to the Atlantic Ocean. Spain and Portugal have become the new centers of the world, their empires stretching across the Earth. They followed the states of North-West Europe and then England that built the greatest empire of all time (Grimal, 2003). They have facilitated the emergence of the industry and have revolutionized the financial industry. Meanwhile, the wars in Europe have made it hard for further progress, which has taken North America and thus the North Atlantic has become the world's main trade route, and the northeast coast, the center of the world. Europe is weakening economically, leading to the loss of colonies (Haack, Lehmann, 1960). The growing trade between the North American coast of the Pacific Ocean and East Asia has made profound changes in North America and the new concentration of the world's leading industry and attraction has become California and its neighboring areas considered the heart and home of the present creative class (Attili, 2016, p. 97).

### **THE CENTERS OF THE SAY WORLD**


After 1980, California surrendered part of the industry that was absorbed by Japan, and North Pacific became the world's main maritime route (Diercke Weltatlas, 2000, p.231-233). Currently, there are two world centers, both located on the Pacific Ocean shore, which have created the attractiveness of high technology. The need for more and more finished products has begun to focus on quantity rather than on quality, with priority being given to cheap, young and vast workforce areas. At the same time, globalization and the liberalization of borders, as well as the ability of companies to produce a lot, are looking for new and expanding markets. North America has a small population of less than 500 million inhabitants and Europe 700 million inhabitants, investors are increasingly attracted to East Asia. The current trend is that after 2030, China, South Korea and Japan, with over 1,550 million inhabitants, will become the new center of the

world where new global trends will be created, creating the new creative class (Vlad, Josan, Vlăsceanu, 2010).

## THE FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE WORLD CENTERS

### Southeast Asia or the World Hotel

East Asia will lose its attractiveness, and Japan will lose between 10 and 20 million people by 2050, and China will experience stagnation or a decline in population (Friedman, 2009, p.83-93). Overcrowding, excessive urbanism, pollution, and perhaps authoritarian regimes, will be other elements that will encourage the region's elite as well as external investors to escape to more welcoming areas. Such a center is Southeast Asia. With over 4,000 islands, an exotic land that still occupies the main maritime route, and neighboring the world's most populated areas, the Indian Ocean Pacific states will be the world's main attraction pole until 2060 (GeoCenter International, 2008, p.86-87, 120-131). With An expanding population of 600 million people, both Islamic and Catholic, Protestant, Hindus or Buddhist, mega-cities, and at the same time extended beaches and spaces not affected by civilization, Southeast Asia, Might want the rich and the geniuses of the Earth. But the combination of holiday, research and business in the same area, cities with tens of millions of inhabitants and jungles on the same islands will not last forever in the Paradise of Asia. What will be considered as the World Hotel, Southeast Asia after dominating global tourism in the 21st century, will soon become an uncertain area, the place of rebellion between the separatists and the inter-state wars, backed by the main powers that will sharpen the struggle for the domination of this region.



**Figure 1.** Migration Map of the World Economic Centers, over the course of history to date and the planned travel path for the future

### South Asia or the World of the World

The next center of the world will be in an area of Hearland that binds East and Southeast Asia to the Middle East, Europe, Africa and Rimland. South Asia, has about 1.7 billion inhabitants today and will exceed 2.2 billion inhabitants by



2050 and perhaps over 2.4 billion by 2100, meaning three times the population of Europe on an area of only half, what makes it look like a huge city (Bertelsmann Lexikon Institut, 2007, p.185). Battered by the Indian Ocean's warm waters, the Indian sub-continent located between the Himalayan Mountains and the ocean, composed of 7 states of which Hindu India is dominant and Pakistan and Bangladesh representing Islamic India, Nepal being Buddhist India and Sri Lanka, South Asia will be the new pole of attraction of the world. With a density of nearly 400 places/km<sup>2</sup> and over 500 inhabitants by 2050, South Asia will become a conglomerate of megalopolis, of which Indus-Gange-Brahmaputra will exceed a billion people. In addition to the advantages of a large, easy-to-buy market on a small area and three rivers that allow ships to enter the continent, South Asia also has many problems that will make it economically unstable and thus drive away the world's elites. The lack of water in the western half as well as the pollution from the East, the continual war between East and West Islamists and Hindu Indians in the center, the Dravidian population of the South with priority access to development and an Indo-European population in the northern half, poorer and more religiously divided, As well as overcrowding, will force the ceding of global primacy that will move to Africa, the continent expanding at that time.

**Table 1.** Evolution of the African continent population, compared to the population of Europe and the World, between 1500 and 2100 (millions)

Source: Worldometers ([www.worldometers.info](http://www.worldometers.info)); Radu., 2009, 162-167;

Haack, 1989, p.10, 180-181.

Year	World	Africa	Europe
1500	450	85	170
1600	500	115	170
1700	610	110	180
1800	980	110	200
1900	1600	130	410
1950	2,500	230	550
2000	6,140	810	720
2017	7,500	1,260	740
2050	9,770	2,520	715
2100	11,180	4,400	640

### **Africa or the New Demographic Asia**

Africa, a continent of poverty, colonialism and divisions, subjected to European atrocities, will become, by the year 2208, the great hope of the world, which will attract the creative class, becoming the new workshop of the world. In order to understand the negative evolution that decimated Africa from 1500 to the present, as well as the change taking place until the year 2100, it is enough to look at the evolution of the continent's population and its comparison with the total population of the world, And of Europe. Between 1500 and 1800, the population of Africa was generally slightly more than half of Europe's population. In 1900, the situation was even more dramatic, with a ratio of 4 to 1 (Negut, 2011, p.298). In 1950, Africa recovered, accounting for half the population of Europe, taking advantage of the wars that took place on the Old Continent that eventually triggered the decolonization process. At the beginning of the millennium, Africa succeeds for the first time in reaching and surpassing the population of Europe, and in 2017 it will register almost doubled. Until 2050, if Europe's population stagnates, Africa will be the second largest continent in the world, after Asia, with

2.5 billion inhabitants. If the population of Europe was four times as large as the population of Africa at the level of 1900 when the colonization was on the rise, by 2050, the Africans would be more than three times as numerous as the Europeans, and by the year 2100 it would be Seven times more.

### **Latin America or the Garden of the World**

Africa, with problems similar to South Asia and East Asia, will fall aside the place of the Green Continent. The emergence of high technology and robotics in industry and services will make the world economy no longer dependent on the large workforce, and the overpopulated areas will lose ground in the less inhabited and less anthropogenic regions. This is how a new era begins, where elites, investors and high technology will move to green, unpolluted and low-population settlements. With abundance of resources and infernal forests, South and Central America will be the neutral ground that will delight the entire planet (Aschenberner, Hornung, 2009, p.193, 199, 222). These will represent the Green Continent, being rediscovered after 2150 as the only oasis of tranquility still unpolluted by the human race, becoming the new magnet for the creative class.

### **Europe or the World Museum**

With a gentle climate with a low population and long peace, Europe will return, be green and green, being the first experiment of its kind, implemented on an entire continent. Without fossil-fueled power plants, only with electric cars and historic buildings rehabilitated, Europe will be completely rebuilt, becoming a colossal open-air museum and a green continent, becoming the world's most attractive attraction until 2200. This trend is visible today, developing smart cities across in the European Union (Ferrara, 2016).

### **CONCLUSIONS**

The first hunters and gatherers were concentrated in savannah areas, rich in herbivore animals, fruits and lakes with potential for fish. With the development of agriculture, priority was given to the fertile valleys of the great rivers where the first great civilizations were established: the Valley of the Nile, the Tiger-Euphrates Valley, the Indus Valley and the Yellow River Valley. Animal husbandry has facilitated the development of settlements on higher areas, reaching areas such as Manchuria, South China Plateau, Dekkan Plateau, Anatolia Plateau, Central Asia as well as the Balkans. By defending and developing writing, paper, compass, map as well as domestication of horses or camels that facilitated displacements on large surfaces, the Arab, Persian, and Mongol empires emerged until then in territories considered marginal. With the development of ships, developed countries from the East Asian, Mediterranean or Caribbean Sea. Over time, faster and cheaper shipments have taken trade and new maritime powers have outpaced continental ones (Venice, Genoa, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, England). The Industrial Revolution has brought about the replacement of the old criteria for calculating the power of a state, so countries such as England, with only 130,000 km<sup>2</sup>, dominate 20% (33,000,000 km<sup>2</sup>) of the Earth's surface and 450 million people, and the Portuguese Empire of 100,000 km<sup>2</sup>, dominates an area of the whole of Europe (10,400,000 km<sup>2</sup> in 1815). Meanwhile, the place of the Western European states was taken by the US, the double oceanic empire (Atlantic Ocean and Pacific Ocean), which emphasized the development of the industry. With the economic advance, the world has also experienced a military revolution that has

led to world powers like Germany and Japan. This economic and military development has caused a crisis of raw materials (the "Oil Crisis" in 1973), and thus states situated on the outskirts of the developed and sparsely populated world, have become major exporters and, at the same time, the new world power centers, Such as Canada, Australia, the USSR, South Africa, Argentina and Brazil, or the Arab states. Now, with the population decline in Central and Eastern Europe, an aging population aging in Western Europe and Japan, and a decline in population dynamics in other developed countries such as the US, Canada and Australia, countries with Young population, labor force and expanding market. As a result, technology tends to slip into the old outbreaks of civilization, well-populated, and naturally high, thus closing two millennia of continuous civilization movements. After 2010, the old developed countries face more and more problems in stopping de-occidentalization. Instead, the populated countries of East and Southeast Asia as well as those in South Asia and Africa know a continuous momentum that tends to lead to a redistribution of global power that will bring centers of influence to the world in areas with an equatorial climate.

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## **URBAN REGENERATION THROUGH CULTURE**

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**Abstract:** Cultural urban regeneration, is it myth or reality? The information below, aims to analyze the trend of urban regeneration through culture and if it can be used in the case of cities in Romania. First, the theoretical aspects with regard to urban regeneration through culture are presented in order to develop a broader vision upon the topic. Second, a case study of the Muzeul Țării Crișului building, in Oradea is considered in relation to urban regeneration and culture. Cultural urban regeneration became an important aspect through-out the years to be considered in the decision-making process as it influences the quality of life of the citizens.

**Key words:** culture, urban conservation, industrial, cultural heritage, museum

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### **INTRODUCTION**

The Industrial Patrimony Charter (2003) elaborated by The International Committee for the Conservation of Industrial Heritage (TICCIH) and the International Council for Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), defines the industrial heritage as "industrial culture testimonies that have historical, technological, social, architectural and scientific significance. These testimonies may include buildings, machinery and installations, laboratories, mills and factories, mines and sites for processing and refining, warehouses, places where energy is generated, transmitted and used, transport structures and infrastructure, and places used for social activities related to industry such as housing, places of worship, education buildings, etc". (The Industrial Patrimony Charter-International Congress of TICCIH Moscow, 2003)

Old industrial sites should not be demolished or abandoned, but should rather be inventoried, remodeled or gentrified and reused as interesting, attractive, functional spaces whether we are referring to purely economic uses or the cultural option - museums, exhibition halls, theater or locations for other cultural events.

**THE ROLE OF IDENTITY IN THE REGENERATION STRATEGIES** The concept of "cultural heritage" has undergone changes over time and essentially refers to the selection of past elements to become sources of the present, in other words, what is understood by the heritage is closely related to what it considers to be worth, those elements that have a meaning for them, will be preserved and modeled by contemporary concerns (Sutherland, 2002).

Conservation of industrial heritage results, as well, from the need to preserve the identity of places and the memory of the work edifices. This also implies the structural and typological analysis defining the architectural criteria and solutions.

Despite the economic role often attributed to identity, the analysis of successful urban regeneration cases is not only associated with economic outcomes but also with the level of engagement with local identity in terms of socio-cultural benefits to the community (Bailey, 2007). Identity must therefore be seen not only as an economic factor, but as a "source of local pride that generates a local identity source as much as the local economy" (Bailey, 2007, pg 61), which refers to a balance between intrinsic nature and instrumental heritage values. From a different perspective, Colombo (2011) says that in order to achieve local socio-cultural benefits, it is necessary to rely on a strong political will by state and local authorities, which should commit themselves to benefiting and more extensive for the existing population. However, the determination of local authorities in Valparaiso's case study to generate benefits for the community is limited by the institutional framework in which regeneration takes place, which can not represent a correct image of local perspectives.

In the spirit of urban regeneration, a topical concept oriented towards identifying and preserving community values, the conversion of buildings involves a complex approach to projects, with intelligent interventions on the existing built environment, as a premise of urban perennial and identity.

Conversion assures the fulfillment of both economic, social and cultural factors and policies, depending on the available resources and the risks associated with the development as well as the relation with the local tradition, the dynamics of the human settlements and the urban form. The conversion appears as an approach to integration into the social and cultural circuit, with the aim of regaining and re-using the spaces that have been abandoned and which have the potential to be transformed into centers of interest.

Conversion can work on two levels:

- Modernization of an existing, old or new structure;
- Functional conversion of buildings, by redividing the interior space and remodeling the outer space.

Architectural, urban and spatial planning operations in the process of reintegration into the modern urban fabric of urban waste spaces can be important factors contributing to the regeneration of the city and the enrichment of cultural trails, and resemble the creation of open-air museums, which are open to public access, thus becoming genuine public spaces for art exposure. (URBAN REGENERATION STUDY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL AND ROAD IMPACT ON RECONVERSION IN ROMANIA - An Exploratory Research Program | UAUM / CCPEC Partnership financed by CNCISIS)

Urban regeneration emphasizes the cultural dimension of cities, as one of the major political objectives focused on increasing the attractiveness of the territories. The cultural dimension of cities is considered by the Culture

Commission Working Paper (CEC, 2004), together with accessibility, mobility, availability of services and optimal environmental conditions as part of the competitiveness of cities by creating special urban spaces for cultural and entertainment resources, including large streams of tourists or residents. (Nae, 2015)

Culture is considered to be a tool for territorial development, as such, culture-centered, culture-led regeneration policies have become implicit means and components in the development of territories. Finding the right balance between social, economic and cultural areas is the main challenge for cities that use cultural events to use urban regeneration.

The industrial heritage is being redeemed in many of the regeneration projects, which have as their object the setting up of museums, generally by the conversion of abandoned buildings. (Nae, 2015) Museums have become tools of cultural regeneration, whether they have national or local importance. As relevant examples, we note:

- The Guggenheim-Bilbao Museum is now a model of urban regeneration through culture, an investment that has increased the attractiveness of the city, the number of tourists growing eight times;
- The North Imperial War Museum was set up on the former area of Salford Keys, in the suburbs of what once was the largest textile center in Western Europe, Manchester, as an annex to the famous London art and history museum of the Imperial Wars (Nae, 2015);
- Schindler's factory in Krakow - a reminder of the period when the city was under Nazi occupation, the former factory becoming an integrated part of the City History Museum of Krakow. This tells the story of the city's inhabitants, both from the point of view of the Polish and the Jewish ones, subjected to a regime of terror and extermination.

### **STUDY CASE-CRIS COUNTRYMUSEUM ORADEA**

Oradea, 2017, the new headquarters of the Cris County Museum, is put into use in the building of the former Garrison of the city, which was built in 1896.

Despite the fact that in 1857 Emperor Franz Jozef cancels the military character of the fortress, Oradea is included in the military centers due to the large number of barracks.

The Ministry of Defense decided in June 1897 to build a cadet school on a 22-acre plot of land between the Rulikowski Cemetery, the Rhedey Garden and the Peta Canal. (Pașca, 2015)

Work on the new construction began in 1897, until October 1898. The complex consisted of the main building with 3 floors and an overhead floor and eight adjoining buildings, at the time being the tallest construction in the city.

The building still implies the idea of force, order, stability and prestige. Its volumetric composition evokes the typology of the imperial palace at Schönbrunn. With its military style, the center is a reminiscence of the Greek temples of the archaic period, but it is also decorated with ornaments inspired by the Roman imperial style. It is also possible to observe elements belonging, to the late Baroque style, for example stucco stitches arched in simplified volumes.

The military style can also be seen at the main entrance portal, preceded by two trophies, and on the the façade there can observed four other military trophies, based on Roman triumphal monuments. The photos attest to the beauty

of the interwar period park, which expresses the idea of order, harmony and discipline.

In October 1944, with the liberation of the city, on the main façade there could be observed testimonies of the Soviet marks, with military slogans in Russian, drawn on the walls. After the Romanian army took over the building, these slogans were covered. Between 1948 and 1989, during the communist regime, the building became the headquarters of UM 01326 and the garrison of Oradea.

With integration into N.A.T.O. there is a relocation of the military units to the east, as many properties are abandoned. In 2005, the Bihor County Council decided to move the main buildings into free use of the Museum, thus respecting the decision of the Government of Romania, that the edifice should have only the quality of the Museum.

In May 20-22, 2006, a unique museum experiment was carried out in the garrison park: the galvanized sheet fence that surrounded the militarized area was partially removed by students from the Faculty of Art in Oradea, Cluj and Timisoara, who out of these sheets have shaped sculptural ensembles in contemporary space visions. This was the first step, which led to the transformation into a contemporary museum of the headquarters of a former barracks, a building of special architectural value, included on the list of historical monuments.

Decision No. 276/2016 approved the submission of the project and funds for a new headquarters for the Cris Country Museum. The landscaping and museum remodelling cost over € 24 million. The large volume and advanced degradation, improper at that time for the museum function, stopped the work of regenerating the buildings.

The museum will be the largest and most modern museum in Romania, a cultural landmark for this area of Europe, and will host permanent exhibitions of other European regions that will host Romanian heritage.

## CONCLUSIONS

Cultural policies have become implicit means and components in the development of territories, the cultural element being the main support. These are the types of culture-based policies that lead to the regeneration process applied to European cities, when emphasizing the cultural dimension of cities and increasing urban attractiveness, numerous urban regeneration projects based on cultural policies as a strategic image for European cities (Bilbao, Sheffield).

The main challenge for cities using cultural events to use the regeneration process is to find the right balance between social, economic and cultural areas. Culture is considered to be an instrument of territorial development.

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