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C O N T E N T S

THE ABOLITION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC PROBLEM IN THE LAST FIVE DECADES
Remus PRĂVĂLIE
(Art#1421**01**-247) 143

DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND OIL REVENUES INTO THE ARABIC SPACE – GEOGRAPHY OF MANDATORY CORRELATIONS
Cezar TECLEAN
(Art#1421**02**-246) 155

THE MILITARY ROLE OF SOMEŞ GATE
Ioan D. ŢARCĂ
(Art#1421**03**-249) 164

CORRIDORS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE HUNGARIAN EXIT TO THE SEA
Norbert PAP, Péter REMÉNYI, Andor VÉGH
(Art#1421**04**-254) 176

THE GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION OF PLAIN BIRDA-MORAVIŢA AS REFLECTED ON THE MAPS FROM THE HABSBURG AND CONTEMPORARY PERIOD
Raluca COVACI
(Art#1421**05**-250) 189

URBAN REGENERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CURRENT URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN ROMANIA. CASE STUDY: ŞTEI CITY (BIHOR COUNTY, ROMANIA)
Luminiţa FILIMON, Valentin NEMEŞ, Paul OLĂU
(Art#1421**06**-252) 200

THE LOBBY ACTIVITY OF LARGE CORPORATIONS
Gheorghe HURDUZEU, Liviu Bogdan VLAD, Raluca HURDUZEU, Gheorghe VLĂSCEANU
(Art#1421**07**-251) 211

THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF TRANSCARPATHIA AND ITS COMPARISON WITH THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAIN REGION OF HUNGARY
Gyula FODOR, István D. MOLNÁR, Lajos KURUCZ
(Art#1421**08**-253) 219

THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS SLOVENE MINORITIES: RE-INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN BORDER REGIONS
Matjaž KLEMENČIČ
(Art#1421**09**-255) 232

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Revista Română de Geografie Politică Year **XIV**, no. **2**, **November 2012**, pp. **143-249**
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THE ABOLITION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC PROBLEM IN THE LAST FIVE DECADES

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Abstract: The appearance of the nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War, as well as their development in an extremely high number (of the order of tens of thousands) by the great powers, especially during the Cold War, represented first of all a real problem of security for the humanity. The present paper aims to evaluate both aspects regarding the alarming nuclear race, especially after the '50s, but mainly the way in which it has been attempted over the last decades to stop/diminish the development of the nuclear arsenal at a global level with extremely high direct/potential destructive effects for human and the environment. Although in the last 5 decades there have been numerous strategies of abolition/non-proliferation of the nuclear arsenal, part of these being briefly presented in this paper, the real decrease of the nuclear weapons strength has proved to be extremely difficult, especially in the context in which their existence has represented until now one of the most important guarantees for the preservation of the geopolitical and geostrategic supremacy of the great powers.

Key-words: nuclear arsenal, abolition, geopolitics, geostrategy, non-proliferations, treaties.

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INTRODUCTION

The abolition of the nuclear weapons represents an actual preoccupation of the global community, especially in the context in which their existence represents nowadays one of the greatest uncertainties for the nations' security. The beginning of the nuclear era started at the same time with the experimentation of the first nuclear bomb on 16 of July 1945 near Alamogordo locality in the south of New Mexico state, within the so-called Trinity test (Schenck & Youmans, 2012) has represented the start of the nuclear race at a global level, first in the U.S.A, and then in Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China, etc.

At the same time, the debut of the nuclear era determined international crucial moments in the following decades, creating the premises of some real nuclear political crisis between states. One of the worst effects is represented by the nuclear attack of the U.S.A against Japan, at the end of the Second World

War, the effects being devastating both for the Japanese state on the whole, and especially for the population (Malloy, 2012).

Another example, though of an extremely high potential-conflictual nature, is represented by the nuclear missile crisis in Cuba from 1962, year in which it is observed one of the greatest geopolitical-military (nuclear) crises from the second half of the XXth century. Although it is one of the most tense bilateral moments between the U.S.A and Soviet Union during the Cold War, this event creates the initial premises of the nonproliferation action at a global level, at the same time with the understanding by the governments of the potential devastating effects on the humanity, in the case of a nuclear war (Van der Meer, 2011).

Although initially the perspectives of extension of the number of nuclear states were quite alarming, the signing and confirmation of Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from 1968, both by the already existent nuclear powers (the U.S.A., Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China), and also by the majority of the world's states, represented one of the most important opportunities of abolition of the nuclear arsenal from the second half of the XXth century until now (Weitz, 2011).

The signing and the confirmation of other important nuclear treaties after 1970 has represented important evolutions in the international politics of abolition of the nuclear weapons (Schenck & Youmans, 2012). Although in the last four decades it is observed a relative decrease of the nuclear arsenal due to the abolition politics, nowadays there is still a number of approximate 25 000 nuclear warheads at the level of the five *official* great nuclear powers, these being owned in the ratio of approximate 95 % by the U.S.A. and Russia (Van der Meer, 2011).

The maintenance of the nuclear weapons in the military arsenal of the five states mentioned in the context of the exception stipulations of the treaty, as well as the non confirmation of this until now by three nuclear existing powers, namely Israel, India and Pakistan (Weitz, 2011), represent the main lacks of the nonproliferation treaty from 1968. Also, the contemporary possession of the nuclear weapons by North Korea (Revere, 2010), the only state which owns nuclear weapons (with the exception of the five great powers) from the 198 states which confirmed the treaty of nonproliferation (Magnarella, 2008), represents another obstacle of the global nonproliferation. In the context of the actual geopolitical isolation, the situation of North Korea is at the same time one of the most important contemporary unsolved problems, this fact taking shape on the background of the critical military geopolitical conflicts with the U.S.A. after the second half of the XXth (Carter, 2010).

At the same time, the actual geopolitical conflicts between the states which own nuclear arsenal represent one of the most critical issues regarding the nuclear abolition, but especially in the preservation of an optimal strategic safety at a global and regional level. In this context, there can be observed two contemporary conflictual situations, one being represented by India-Pakistan military geopolitical conflict (Stransky, 2011) on the background of the mutual claim of some territories situated at the frontier, whereas the second situation brings to the foreground the geopolitical conflict and the potential military one between Israel and Iran (Lindsay & Takeyh, 2010). Actually, the efforts of the nuclear arming of Iran, as well as the military geopolitical threats to Israel, the nuclear armed country (Dayyeh, 2010), also represents a real difficulty in the preservation of the geopolitical stability in the Asian region, therefore creating nowadays the premises of some major obstacles in the international nonproliferation politics.

METHODOLOGY

For the elaboration of the present article there have been utilised data both from the specialised literature and from the data base atomcarchive.com. Therefore, the analysis of the information within the data base mentioned above it has been realised both from the spatial and from the temporal point of view, hence trying a complex approach of the analysed theme. In this way the spatial representation (the mapping) of the different information regarding the subject of the nuclear geopolitics it was possible with the help GIS softs, while the temporal analysis has been realised with the help of the tabular calculation.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL AND THE NUCLEAR EXPERIMENTS

The beginning of the Cold War after 1945 started the alarming nuclear race, especially between the two great global actors, the U.S.A. and Soviet Union, thus creating the premises of the foundation of a bipolar nuclear world created of two main poles, namely the capitalist and the communist. Therefore, in the period of the Cold War (1947-1991) there is observed a powerful proliferation of the nuclear arsenal both in the capitalist states (the U.S.A., Great Britain, France, India, Israel), and in the communist states (Soviet Union, China), the main actors owners of the nuclear arsenal at the global level being the United States and Soviet Union. The period after the Cold War marks the appearance of another two nuclear powers, namely Pakistan (1998) and North Korea (2006), this fact being possible on the background of the non-confirmation, respectively the non-compliance with the provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty from 1968 (Van der Meer, 2011).

Therefore, the number of the nuclear states has increased from five in 1968 (the U.S.A., Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China) to nine in 2006, in this period, states such as India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea became nuclear powers (Sauer, 2006). However, there are numerous doubts regarding the status of nuclear power of North Korea (Van der Meer, 2011), thus being likely that nowadays are only eight nuclear powers.

Along the decades, the nuclear race at the level of the five great nuclear powers gained apocalyptic dimensions, currently the two main protagonists being the United States and Soviet Union, followed by Great Britain, France and China, from the point of view of the nuclear weapons stocks owned (table 1, figure 1).

Table 1. The development and proliferation of the nuclear weapons (1945-2000) (data processing from atomicarchive.com)

States	1945	1955	1965	1975	1985	1995	2000
U.S.A.	2	2.280	32.400	28.100	23.500	14.000	10.500
Soviet Union/Russia	0	200	6.300	23.500	44.000	28.000	20.000
U.K.	0	10	310	350	300	300	185
France	0	0	32	188	359	500	450
China	0	0	5	185	426	400	450
Total nuclear weapons	2	2.490	39.047	52.323	68.585	43.200	31.535

The main aim of these huge stocks with extremely high financial implications over the decades hasn't been a strictly military one, but a geopolitical strategic one. Thus, any state with the status of nuclear power benefits of a certain prestige at an international level, of a geostrategic consolidation at a regional level, as well as the status of regional/global power (Van der Meer, 2011). The mentioned premises for the starting of the

development of the military nuclear programs determine real current problems in the nuclear abolition.




Figure 1. The current spatialization at a global level of the main nuclear (military) facilities (data processing from atomicarchive.com)

Although these mass destruction weapons have never been utilized, with the exception of the second World War, however, during the Cold War there have been at least ten moments of maximum tension between the two power centers (the United States and Soviet Union) which have brought to the foreground the idea of using them in a nuclear war: six times during the Dwight Eisenhower presidential administration, twice during the John F. Kennedy administration, once in the case of Lyndon Johnson administration and at least once during the administration of the soviet prime-minister Leonid Brezhnev (Magnarella, 2008).

It is very important to signal the fact that the devastating effects of these mass destruction weapons haven't been felt directly in a military conflict, excepting the United States attacks from 6 and 9 August, but indirectly by the numerous nuclear experiments (figure 2) generally during the Cold War period, experiments which have had negative repercussions both over human health and over the environment. The major region in which the most nuclear tests (approximately 900) have been effectuated is the Nevada desert, here the U.S.A. effectuating the majority of the nuclear experiments (Lay, 2007). The second major site is represented by the ex-soviet region Semipalatinsk from the east of Kazakhstan, the second region in the world from the point of view of the number of nuclear experiments (almost 500) (Yamamoto *et al.,* 2010).

Another relevant example is South Pacific, region in which numerous nuclear experiments have been effectuated by the U.S.A., Great Britain and France. Thus, in the region of the Christmas Islands, the U.S.A. made approximately 106 nuclear tests only before 1963, while Great Britain effectuated over twenty nuclear tests in the period between 1952 and 1957 in the areas of Maraligna, Emu Field, Monte Bello, as well as in the area of the Christmas and Malden islands (Magnarella, 2008). Unfortunately, there are more alarming situations, France being an example in this way, with a number

of 193 nuclear tests in the 1966-1996 period, in the region of French Polinesia, in the proximity of Moruroa atoll (Magnarella, 2008).




Figure 2. The number of nuclear tests at the level of the five nuclear powers (data processing from atomicarchive.com)

The great number of nuclear experiments of France in the South-East Pacific until 1996 is due to the non-confirmation of Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) from 1963 by this (Schenck & Youmans, 2012). The treaty prohibited the testing of the nuclear explosive in the atmosphere, the cosmic space as well as underwater (excepting the underground), its effects being felt directly by the severe restriction of the number of nuclear experiments after 1963 (figure 2). Thus, from 1945 until the present there have been over 2000 nuclear tests at a global level, the majority being made by the U.S. (50 %) and Russia (37 %) (table 2). The situation becomes more alarming because a great part of these have been made in the terrestrial atmosphere and underwater (25 %), environments with the greatest vulnerability and fragility of the ecosystems.

Table 2. The number of nuclear tests on types of environment (1945-1998) (data processing from atomicarchive.com)

Nuclear states	Period of nuclear tests	Underground tests	Atmhosferic and underwater tests	Total nuclear tests
U.S.A.	1945-1992	815	215	1030
Soviet Union	1949-1990	496	219	715
U.K.	1952-1991	24	21	45
France	1960-1996	160	50	210
China	1964-1996	22	21	43
India	1974-1998	7	-	7
Pakistan	1998	6	-	6

THE STRATEGIES OF ABOLITION OF THE NUCLEAR ARSENAL AND THE GEOPOLITICAL-STRATEGIC PROBLEMS INVOLVED

Although the most important abolition actions have begun after the 1960s, it must be reminded the fact that one of the first initiatives of nuclear non-proliferation has been unwound as far back as 1946, along with the proposal of *Baruch Plan* during Truman administration (Schenck & Youmans, 2012).

The plan stipulated for the founding of a supreme authority in the supervision and control of the nuclear weapons, named the International Atomic Development Authority. Among the most important provisions on which the

authority was due to function was the abandon of the nuclear weapons by the United States (the only nuclear power which existed at that time) with the condition that all states with potential of developing a nuclear program accept the recognition and the control of the authority. Even though the plan did not function because of the denial of Russia to join in, this remains one of the key-moments from the beginning of the atomic era which could have changed radically the course of the geopolitical-nuclear events from the second half of the XXth century.

It follows a period of over a decade of international decisional void in the control and restraint of the nuclear arsenal, for as after 1959, are taken the first measures regarding the testing of the nuclear weapons. Therefore, the first international treaty which regarded the control of the nuclear weapons is the *Antarctic Treaty* open for signing in 1959 and entered into force in 1961 (Gottemoller & Arnaudo, 2008). The treaty prohibited the experimentation of the nuclear weapons in the region of Antarctic, therefore saving the Southern continent with the huge potential of nuclear tests due to the isolation from the rest of the continents, lack of inhabitants and of the vast surface.

Other treaties which regarded the prohibition of the nuclear experiments in the uninhabited areas are *The Outer Space Treaty* (Lall, 1996) open for signing and entered into force in 1967 (followed by *Moon Agreement* open for signing in 1979 and entered into force in 1984) and *The Seabed Treaty* open for signing in 1971 and entered into force in 1972 (Schenck & Youmans, 2012).

Although the Outer Space Treaty (treaty which aimed at the prohibition of the nuclear tests in the outer space) represented a success by the great number of signatory states, The Moon Agreement (a continuation of the previous treaty which prohibited the military activities on the moon, including the nuclear ones) represented a failure because of the non-signing and non-confirmation by neither of the cosmic powers, except India and France (signatory, but which not confirmed) (unoosa.org).

The Seabed Treaty also presents a special importance because, at the same time with the becoming operative of Limited Test Ban Treaty which permitted the testing of the nuclear weapons exclusively in the underground, without a clear delimitation of this environment, the possibility of the effectuation of the nuclear experiments on the ocean floor it would have been real. Therefore, the concern regarding the utilization of this new environment for the effectuation of the nuclear tests, as well as the interests of the states on this environment seen as a resource, led to the opening for signing of the Seabed Treaty in 1971 (Schenck & Youmans, 2012).

The real starting point in stopping the nuclear tests and therefore in the abolition of the nuclear weapons consisted the *Limited Test Ban Treaty* (LTBT) open for signing in 1963 and entered into force in the same year. This prohibited the nuclear tests in the atmosphere, the outer space and under water, excepting the underground environment. The treaty arises in the context of the imminent dangers observed after 1950 for the humanity and the environment at the same time with the advancement of the most powerful nuclear experiments ever winded by the U.S. and Soviet Union (Goodby, 2005). The testing of the first bombs with hydrogen by the U.S. in 1954 (Castle Bravo experiment from Bikini atoll, Marshall Islands) and Russia in 1961 (the Tsar experiment from Novaia Zemila archipelago, north from Ural Mountains), creates the premises of the first important international collaboration regarding the restraint of the nuclear tests. Therefore, the treaty arises in 1963, currently being 116 signatory states.

The main lack of LTBT was its non-signing by France and China (Mastny, 2008), states which were at that time in full ascension in the development of their own nuclear programs. The geopolitical strategic causes of the non-signing and non-confirmation of the treaty in the case of France consisted in the fact that the testing of France's nuclear capabilities, without restrictions, became a priority in France's geostrategic consolidation as a nuclear power after the '60s, especially in the context of some military conflicts with the former colonies, but especially on the background of some geopolitical tensions with the U.S., the reason for which France draws back from NATO in 1966 during Charles de Gaulle presidential administration (Ghez & Larrabee, 2009).

The situation of China was even more difficult, because joining LTBT would have meant a limitation of the nuclear capabilities, especially in the conditions in which the testing of the first nuclear bomb takes place in 1964, at just a year after the opening of LTBT. Thus, in full research and ascension in the development of the nuclear program, China refuses to sign and to confirm the treaty. Also, other important considerations are connected to China's geostrategic consolidation in this period, the development of the nuclear program as well as its confirmation via the nuclear test, representing a real opportunity of independence and geopolitical-strategic consolidation towards Soviet Union and the United States at that time (Mastny, 2008).

Eventually, the treaty is continued by *Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty*, open for signing in 1996, an international treaty of wide scope which prohibits any kind of nuclear experiments in any kind of environment on Earth. Although the treaty disposes of a very modern and complex system of supervision regarding the detection of the signals of the possible nuclear explosions, the main currently issue of the treaty is the non-confirmation by the key nuclear powers such as the U.S., China, India and Pakistan (Larsen *et al*, 2011).

To be mentioned the fact that, likewise LTBT, another strategy of reducing nuclear danger, it is represented by the creation of a connection line in 1963 between the two superpowers (the U.S.A. and Soviet Union), regarding the avoidance of some potential nuclear disasters caused by possible accidents, misunderstandings, or deliberate nuclear attacks. Thus, the communication agreement between the two states was named *Hot Line Agreement*, this representing a major consequence of the missile crisis of Cuba (Schenck & Youmans, 2012).

The first international treaty with a major impact on the abolition of the nuclear weapons consisted of the *Non Proliferation Treaty* from 1968. The treaty stipulated the prohibition of the expansion of the nuclear programs at a global level, with the exception of the U.S.A., Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China, nuclear powers which already existed until 1968 (Weitz, 2011). In the case of these states it hasn't been imposed a total nuclear disarmament, but only a recommendation of stopping/restriction of the military nuclear programs, this fact remaining to be decided by each state.

The application of the stipulations of the restraint and control treaty at the level of each signatory state has been possible via International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an authority responsible until present for the identification of the nuclear programs with military purposes in different states. However, according to the stipulations, the treaty permitted the signatory states to utilize the atomic energy in a civil (economic) purpose, this fact being possible after the checking and approval by the IAEA inspectors.

The experience of the geopolitical situations in the last two decades in the case of some states such as North Korea, Iran and even Siria, shows that the efficiency of the treaty, via the main instrument, IAEA, has been a relative one (Weitz, 2011). One of the most relevant examples is Iran, situation in which IAEA has not been capable in the last two decades to present concrete proof regarding the development of its nuclear program, so that the Security Council of United Nations to take real measures of abolition (Shen, 2006).

As a consequence, the nuclear ambitions of Iran materialized by an advanced current stage of development of its own nuclear program could lead to a series of repercussions among which the most important is the destabilization of the Middle Orient by starting a potential nuclear war with Israel (Lindsay & Takeyh, 2010).

Another major deficiency of the treaty is represented by its own basic principles by which the treaty arose. Therefore, the exceptional stipulations regarding the abolition of the nuclear armament in the case of the five main nuclear powers, stipulations which permitted the owning of the nuclear weapons by these (the U.S.A, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China), have represented a real discrimination for the other signatory states, thus generating a strong lack of confidence regarding the moral eligibility of the treaty.

However, having 189 signatory states and via some severe measure of checking the nuclear programs, in the majority of the situations, the treaty remains until now one of the most important initiative of nonproliferation of the nuclear weapons.

Another international very efficient form of nuclear abolition stands out towards the end of the '60s at the same time with the creation of the NWFZ (*Nuclear Weapons Free Zones*). These zones represent state regions on the globe, whose states, via some multilateral treaties have agreed to prohibit the acquisition, the stocking, the development or the testing of nuclear weapons in the terrestrial, atmospheric or aquatic area of the respective region (Magnarella, 2008). The main causes of the foundation of these NWFZ are related to the consolidation and increase of the security of the signatory states from the respective space by the prohibition of any nuclear activities, excepting those which have a civil purpose (the obtaining of energy). In this direction, the security of the respective space was going to be realized both by the supervising activities of IAEA inspectors, and by their own inspectors named within NWFZ treaties.

Therefore, until now, there have been fixed five NWFZ areas at a global level (figure 3), namely South-America and the NWFZ Caribbean area, the NWFZ South Pacific, the NWFZ south-eastern Asia, NWFZ Africa and NWFZ Central Asia (Magnarella, 2008).

South-America and NWFZ Caribbean is the first region of prohibition of the nuclear activities for a military purpose, this being formed after an open multilateral agreement for signing in 1967 at Tlatelolco (the area within Mexico City capital) and which entered into force in 1969. The main cause of the first form of nuclear abolition of this type in this area it is related to the nuclear missile crisis in Cuba, the intense geopolitical crisis between the two superpowers (the U.S.A. and Soviet Union) which highlighted how vulnerable it is the international community in front of a nuclear war.

Though initially there have been issues regarding the integrity of the treaty because of some geopolitical tensions from the region (the communist régime in Cuba, the military governments from Brazil and Argentina), into 2002, at the same

time with Cuba's acceding, the treaty covered the entire area of Latin America and the Caribbean, including Mexico from North America (33 states) (Tabassi, 2009).

NNWFZ South Pacific is the second treaty open for signing in 1985 at Rarotonga, Cook Islands, which entered into force in 1986. The creating a new NWFZ in the South Pacific was absolutely necessary, especially in the context of the numerous nuclear experiments developed in this region by the U.S.A., Great Britain and France. Having a number of 13 signatory states, the majority of the small states (island states) from South Pacific, but among which also Australia and New Zeeland, the treaty assures the nuclear security both for the state communities, and for the numerous fragile aquatic ecosystem from South Pacific.




Figure 3. The globally spatial representation
of the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone areas (NWFZ)

NWFZ in south-eastern Asia is another important region of prohibiting the military nuclear activities, the treaty being open for signing in 1995 and entered into force in 1997 (Magnarella, 2008). Although the idea of constituting a new free area was older with two decades, the treaty became realistic at the same time with the removing of the nuclear weapons by the U.S.A. from the Philippines. Currently, the treaty covers the entire area of the states included in the economic structure ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), area which overlaps in the greatest part the peninsula Indochina.

In the case of Africa, its designation as NWFZ became of a vital importance at the same time with the progress of the French nuclear experiments in West Sahara in 1991. Also, the development of the nuclear program of South Africa during the apartheid represented another necessity of creating a new NWFZ on the African continent.

The creation of Africa NWFZ became possible at the same with the collapse of the apartheid in South Africa after 1990, the only country on the African continent who owns nuclear weapons due to the nuclear program developed in the period of apartheid. Thus, in the context of the political changes from South Africa and its adherence to the NPT after the complete destruction of their own nuclear weapons, the Africa NWFZ treaty was opened for signing in 1996 and entered into force in 2009 (Tabassi, 2009).

Although it was named the Pelindaba treaty in the memory of the destruction of the nuclear installations from the nuclear center with the same name, situated in the proximity of the capital Pretoria, the treaty was open for signing in the city Cairo, currently being signed by approximately half of the number of African states.

The last region designated as NWFZ is the region of Central Asia, constituted by the former soviet states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Open for signing in 2006 at Semipalatinsk, the eastern region of Kazakhstan, the treaty represented a real necessity for Central Asia, especially in the context in which these constituted the main region of testing the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union.

Very important to mention is also the situation of Mongolia, which declared in 1992 its own NWFZ (Tabassi, 2009), its unique situation being currently a role model for all the world's states.

Therefore, the covering of a large surface from the southern hemisphere in the last four decades by the NWFZ treaties led to the premises of the idea of creating a new NWFZ for the entire southern hemisphere. Currently, this fact is very difficult because it would presuppose the violation of the Law of the Sea Convention, convention which allows inclusively the transport of the nuclear weapons (Magnarella, 2008).

Another major issue of the efficiency of NWFZ treaties is that their areas of covering include neither of the current nuclear powers. Thus, with the exception of Central and Southeastern Asia, the greatest part of the northern hemisphere is discovered (lack of NWFZ treaties), this needing mostly the creation of some NWFZ due to the situation of all the nuclear powers at northern latitudes. However, the real possibility of creating some new NWFZ treaties in the near future, which cover the territories of the nuclear states, is a small one, this fact being due to the very complex geopolitical interests of the great powers.

At the same time, it is very important to mention the fact that after the '70s, it is observed a series of abolition bilateral treaties which were concentrated especially on the confinement politics of the nuclear arsenal between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union. Thus, among the most important bilateral treaties there can be observed Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I and II (START I, II) and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START).

Although *Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty* entered into force in 1972 (Schenck & Youmans, 2012), hasn't represented a major success in the confinement of the nuclear stockpiles between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union, this has played an essential role in the politics of the nuclear abolition during the Cold War, representing the key moment for the triggering of the negotiations between the two superpowers regarding the confinement of the offensive nuclear weapons.

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, open for signing in 1987 and entered into force in 1988 during Ronald Reagan's presidential administration (the U.S.A.) and Mihail Gorbaciov's (Soviet Union), it is of a special strategic importance because via this an entire series of nuclear weapons is being removed, namely those with intermediate-range (Cimbala, 2009).

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) and *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II),* are two treaties signed in 1991, respectively 1993 which aimed the removal of an important number of nuclear warheads with long-range. Thus, START II treaty imposed the confinement of the nuclear warheads at

approximately 3,500 both for the U.S.A. and for Russia (Schenck & Youmans, 2012), the most aimed categories of the nuclear weapons being the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM). The treaty represented a failure because of the Russia's abandon as an immediate reaction of the U.S.A.'s retreat from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) is the most current treaty of nuclear abolition, signed in 2010 and entered into force in 2011 after the confirmation from the two states. The main objective consists in the reducing of the nuclear warheads for both parts at approximately 1,500 (Futter, 2011), the most aimed being ICBM and SLBM (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile) rocket missiles. Although the reducing objectives seem to be quite daring, in reality, the difference between the two states and the other nuclear powers is quite big (France – 300 nuclear warheads, China – 240, UK - 220, India/Pakistan/Israel 70–90) (Futter, 2011).

Likewise, unfortunately, these bilateral treaties between the U.S.A. and Soviet Union/Russia regarding the nuclear abolition haven't been very efficient because the maximum limits imposed by these regarding the owning of warheads, didn't include all the categories of nuclear weapons, but only a part of them. The situation is similar also in the case of the multilateral treaties, hence, after five decades of important negotiations between the nuclear powers, currently still exists, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, a total number of over 20,000 nuclear weapons at a global level (Futter, 2011).

CONCLUSIONS

Even if in the last five decades have existed numerous abolition treaties at a global level, their efficiency was a relative one, because of the difficulties between the nations to reach a favorable agreement.

The diverse strategies of nuclear abolition of the global political community have played in the last five decades an essential role in the reducing of the nuclear arsenal, therefore decreasing considerably the risk of some nuclear conflicts between the nations. However, in the majority of the abolition efforts there can be observed a real lack of participation and collaboration from some key states such as Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea. The situation becomes more complicated in the context in which these states are involved, not only in the geopolitical conflicts, but also military ones, therefore increasing the risk of a potential nuclear conflict at a regional scale or even at a global one. It is the situation of India and Pakistan, and more clearly, the situation Israel-Iran, conflictual axis with enormous potential of destabilization of the Middle Orient.

Thus, among the most important solutions of diminishing the conflicts is cooperation and joining these states to the nonproliferation politics. In this way, one of the most real strategies is the creation of a new NWFZ in the Middle Orient, strategy which implies huge efforts, both from the part of the international community, but especially from the part of the implied states.

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DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND OIL REVENUES INTO THE ARABIC SPACE – GEOGRAPHY OF MANDATORY CORRELATIONS

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Abstract: The support of military component into the Arabic countries required, into the post-war period, the consumption of considerable financial energy, which led to the formation of very generous military budgets into the Arabic world, with a high percentage into the general economy of public expenditures and gross domestic product of each State. Both the size of budgets allotted to defense, as well as their dynamics within the last five – six decades render the image of a drawn geopolitical space, in which the dimensions of military expenditures evolved in a convergent manner with the entropy of critical stressed intra-regional relations. The uneven space distribution of power into the Arabic territory actually reflects the uneven distribution of energetic resources. Thus, for the Arabic States rich in hydrocarbon reserves, the volume of military expenditures evolved after the second world war, directly proportional to the volume of oil revenues, some of them (Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) being registered with the highest international percentage on military expenditures from the gross domestic product. Based upon these oil revenues, certain Arabic States (Iraq, Saudi Arabia) equipped their territory by important critical airport infrastructures, which increased their stake of territorial potential and which transformed them into interesting territories for the main international power actors.

Key words: Arabic States, oil revenues, military budgets, power, critical infrastructures

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SPACE DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND OIL REVENUES – STRATEGIC CORRELATIONS

The expenditures for defense on the entire Arabic speaking countries mounted in 2009 to 122.578 billion USD, which represents 4.8 % of the total G.D.P. of the area and 8.3 % of the total of military expenditures worldwide. These figures individualize the Arabic territory as of one the international areas much more extra-dimensioned in terms of military budgets, in comparison with the worldwide average of military expenditures – 2.3 % of the worldwide gross domestic product.

The allotment for funds needed into the armed forces is still very different into the area. The over-budget feature is visible especially into the Arabic-Asian area, where the invoice of military budgets mounts to 7.5 % of G.D.P. and 6.7 % of the international military expenditures, unlike Arabic speaking countries in Africa, which records values of 2 % and 1.6 % (Table 1).

Table 1. Military expenditures and oil revenues into the Arabic speaking countries (2009)
(Data source*:* SIPRI Military Expenditure Database; CIA World Factbook)

States	Volume of military expenditures			Volume of oil revenues			Regression residue (ε)
	Billion $	% from GDP	$/capita	Billion $	% from GDP	$/capita	
Algeria	5.65	3.3	162	72.8	42.5	2,086.0	-0.4
Saudi Arabia	31.05	10.1	1,818	280.0	59.9	10,886.0	0.5
Bahrain	1.02	5.2	1,290	17.5	88.9	2,212.0	-0.8
Chad	0.38	4.2	34	4.3	47.2	384.0	-1.2
Comoros	0.015	2.8	22	–	–	–	–
Djibouti	0.037	3.8	42	–	–	–	–
Egypt	5.54	3.5	72	23.4	14.8	305.0	0.5
U.A.E.	8.64	3.2	1,878	120.5	44.6	26,201.0	-2.2
Eritrea	0.093	6.3	18	–	–	–	–
Jordan	1.64	8.6	260	–	–	–	–
Iraq	8.06	8.6	262	56.2	59.9	1,500.0	0.5
Kuwait	8.46	5.3	2,834	85.9	53.7	28,777.0	-0.8
Libanon	0.92	3.3	218	–	–	–	–
Libya	4.45	4.1	693	60.8	56.0	9,470.0	-0.6
Malta	0.06	0.7	145	–	–	–	–
Morocco	4.97	5.5	160	0.6	0.7	19.1	2.8
Mauritania	0.2	5.5	60	0.02	0.5	6.0	1.8
Oman	6.48	11.5	2,277	20.3	36.0	7,135.0	2.3
Westbank & Gaza	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Qatar	12.15	10.4	8,623	56.2	48.1	39,886.0	3.6
Western Sahara	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Syria	2.71	6.1	125	1.9	4.3	86.7	1.2
Somalia	0.023	0.9	2	–	–	–	–
Sudan	1.92	3.1	45	5.4	8.7	127.7	0.2
Tunisia	0.58	1.4	56	0.9	2.1	87.1	-0.7
Yemen	1.81	6.6	76	3.2	11.6	135.7	0.1
Israel	13.77	7.3	1,860	–	–	–	–
Arabic Asia*	98.66	7.5	814	641.7	49.0	5,292.0	–
Arabic Speaking Africa	23.918	2.0	106	107.4	8.9	476.5	–
Arabic Speaking Space*	122.578	4.8	346	749.1	29.6	2,115.5	–
World	1,470.0	2.3	217	1,320	2.1	194.7	–

* – the values not include Israel

Defense related budgets of 20 States have percentages of G.D.P. that exceed the worldwide average, and in 3 States they have the greatest percentages in the world: Oman (11.5 % of G.D.P.), Qatar (10.4 %), Saudi Arabia (10.1 %). As a matter of fact, according to the weigh criteria of military expenditures from G.D.P., the first 5 positions into the worldwide hierarchy are held by the Arabic States, and on the sixth place is Israel among the first 10 countries worldwide, 7 are Arabic countries Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Eritrea), and among the first 20 States of the world, 11 States pertain to the Arabic countries. This reality demonstrates the *overstressing of fund priorities into the military field into the area between the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.*

Within a larger spatial frame, the following are observed: the area of Arabic peninsula, Levant and Suez, which includes a number of 6 States with annual military expenditures of over 8 billion USD and on percentages that exceed 0.5 % of worldwide military expenditures – Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iraq, and Israel. Practically, it is a bridge-areal, which connects the two continents, and which is situated between two territorial components of the Arabic world, overlapped to a certain extent on the antiquity's Fertile Half Moon – the primordial space of human kind, which, according to the high level of army funding, is also nowadays the host of strategic human conflicts of interest. Egypt is surprisingly in a more modest position, with a financing of only 5.54 billion USD (0.37 % of worldwide military expenditures), and thus it does not reach its regional ambitions and nor the level of other hereinabove mentioned States with generously financed armies.

A second area of well budgeted armed bodies is Maghreb, where the rivals for the regional supremacy – Algeria and Morocco – allot higher military stipends (5.65 billion USD, respectively 4.97 billion USD), as well as Libya (4.45 billion USD), which transforms the Maghrebian area into a well financed "oasis" from military point of view, into the African "desert" of chronic sub-financing of the armed forces.

The military expenses per capita emphasizes an average value (346 USD/inhabitant) slightly above the international average (217 USD/inhabitant), case which is more emphasized into the South – West Asia. Actually, there are only seven States that record values/ inhabitant above the average of the Arabic world (Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Libya), of which Qatar (8,623 USD/inhabitant), Kuwait (2,834 USD/inhabitant) and Oman (2,277 USD/ inhabitant) are among the States with the highest military stipends per capita in the world, *emphasizing the attribute of Persian Gulf area from the well armed area, which is financially subsidized.*

The ratios between the military expenditures and oil revenues are well illustrated by the correlation between their sizes/inhabitant, especially for the States that are situated into the Arabic peninsula, where the States' classification (rank) resembles for both of the variables: Qatar (with the maximum values into the Arabic space – 8,623 USD/inhabitant, respectively 39,886 USD/inhabitant), Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain.

Given this context, it is obvious that a series of States with military-human manpower and impressive technical-military facilities, hardly benefit from an appropriate financial support of their defense bodies, neither at the level of their budgets nor in terms of military expenditures per capita. Thus, States as Syria, Eritrea, Sudan, which hold a huge military-human resource and a technical-military arsenal much more over-dimensioned in relation to their potential and vocation into the area, cannot afford the appropriate budgeting of the related structures, phenomenon which is expressed by a low percentage of their military expenditures worldwide (under 0.2 % of worldwide expenditures) and by minimal expenditures per capita: Syria-125 USD/inhabitant, Eritrea-18 USD/inhabitant, Sudan-45 USD/inhabitant. A series of other States are charged by a chronic sub-financing of defense system and also they are not fitted with significant technical-military facilities from qualitative or quantitative point of view: Somalia (military expenditures of only 2 USD/inhabitant!), Chad, Mauritania, Comoros, Djibouti, Malta.

Drawing a parallel between the quantum of military expenditures incurred by the Arabic States and the volume of their oil incomes, we shall identify the existence of a powerful positive correlation between the two sizes, expressed by

the value of 0.936 regarding Bravais-Pierson coefficient (r) and by **the value of 0.876 regarding determination coefficient (r^2),** which means that in terms of percentages, for the entire Arabic space, 87.6 % of military budgets are supplied by hydrocarbon related revenues and it is just a percentage of 12.4 % of defense related expenditures that comes from other sources of revenues resulted from other economic activities.

The equation of regression line that defines the functional correlation between the two variables is the following: **$y = 0.14 \cdot x - 3.6 + \varepsilon$** (Figure 1), where x – oil revenues, y – military expenditures; a=0.14 and b=-3.6 – regression related coefficients; ε – regression residue.




Figure 1. The Correlation between the military expeditures and oil revenues and space distriction of regression related real dues – ε (2009)

Testing the regression model *with the help of "F" test for the variation assessment of the two sizes used (Fisher-Snedecor test) reveals the normality of relations between the assessed explained variance and the assessed residual variance, according to the following formula:*

F(x, y) – distribution of the ratio between the assessed explained variance and the assessed residual variance;

$F(x, y) = (r^2 \cdot (N - 2))/(1 - r^2)$

where: r^2 *– determination coefficient (square of Bravais-Pearson coefficient);*

N – number of terms of data row used.

The existence condition of a significant correlation between the two variables is that $F(x,y) \geq F(a)$*, where F(a) represents the corresponding size of F(x,y), for the significance levels of the test defined by the following values a=0.05 and (1÷15) degrees of freedom (g.l.), respectively a=0.01 and (1÷15) g.l.*

The calculated values are the following: F(x,y)=105.96; F(a)=4.54 for a=0.05 and (1÷15) g.l.; F(a)=8.68 for a=0.01 and (1÷15) g.l., which ***confirms the trust granted to regression's assessed parameters.***

Space distribution of residual values (ε) related to regression illustrates the quantitative differences, per each State, into the contribution of oil dividends to the formation of military budgets. The residues that are largely distanced from the general tendency described by the regression line are the most relevant since their mapping allows us to seize the space structures with certain peculiarities of the interrelation between oil revenues and military expenditures as well as the identification of territorial disparities from this point of view.

Thus, that States that record the highest residual values (both positive and negative) are both the oil supply States with great hydrocarbon dividends, which substantially contribute to creation of military budgets, as well as those States in which the percentage of oil revenues is not that significant and in which the defense related budget is greatly formed of other non-oil sources. In some of these States, the registry of expenditures used for the armed forces is over-dimensioned and mainly ensured from the oil annuity, which is emphasized by the residue's great and positive values, which classify the related countries way above the regression line: Qatar (ε=3.6), Oman (ε=2.3). The following is identified: certain States with more modest oil revenues, such as Morocco (ε=2.8), Mauritania (ε=2.8), fall under this category, as the regression model shows that their oil revenues do not cover the value of defense related expenditures, for the insurance of which other fund sources are necessary.

The States that record great but negative values of the residue are also States with great oil revenues, but unlike those hereinabove mentioned, they are wider in terms of sources from which they form their military budgets, as the direct oil annuity is less into the structure of defense related expenditures. This is a case particular to United Arab Emirates Federation (ε=-2.2), in which the dividends obtained from reinvestment of oil funds formed into the last two decades the grounds of national revenues and over-classified the net percentage of oil funds. This type of revenues has priority in building the military budget, casting a shadow over the contribution of direct oil revenues and positioning the federation under the line defined into the regression equation.

The States with residual values of regression which are situated close to the null value (between -1 – 1), are those States that form the rule of normality into the Arabic space (10 States), where military stipends that these States afford are proportionally based upon the recorded oil revenues.

Extremely relevant for the appreciation of dependency level between the volume of military expenditures and oil revenues is the dynamics of values pertaining to the Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficient (r) and of determination coefficient (r^2), calculated for the entire Arabic area at different points in time during the post – war period (1950, 1970, 1990, 2009) (Table 2.)

Table 2. Dynamics of values pertaining to correlation coefficients and determination coefficients between the volume of military expenditures and oil revenues (1950-2009)

Parameters for determination of correlation's intensity	1950	1970	1990	2009
Bravais-Pearson correlation coefficient (r)	0.952	0.968	0.945	0.936
Determination coefficient (r^2)	0.906	0.937	0.893	0.876

The analysis of values pertaining to the hereinabove mentioned coefficients emphasizes the fact that within the last six decades, the volume of defense related expenditures into the Arabic world had been tightly connected to recorded oil revenues and the powerful intensity of the correlation between the two variables is expressed by values that exceed 0.900 of the correlation coefficient (r) and over 0.870 of determination coefficient, which are registered for the entire post-war period. At the level of the entire Arabic space, the intensity of the correlation had been much "diluted" due to the existence of States without oil production, registering an overall decreasing dynamics, given the context of diversification of Arabic economies proven into the last four decades.

In 1950, the percentage of oil related revenues in configuring the military budgets was already of 90.6 % at the level of the entire Arabic field, percentage mainly due, at that particular date, to oil related revenues of Saudi Arabia and to reduced military budgets of the other few independent Arabic States into the era.

At the beginning of the seventies, the economic boom of oil into the young States of Persian Gulf and North of Africa determined the increase of their military ambitions and thus a greater and greater supply of the invoice related to military expenditures based upon the estimates obtained from the hydrocarbon exports. This phenomenon is well emphasized by the increased level of the correlation between the two sizes (r=0.968) and by the percentage of 93.7 % of the oil related annuity into the structure of defense related expenditures. The difference of 6.3 % was mainly represented by the low military budgets of the few non-oil poor States which appeared on the political map into the seventh decade of the last century.

During the seventies and eighties, there had been immense financial accumulations following the trade of hydrocarbons in a very poisonous period for the great Arab producers after the crises of 1973 and 1981-1982, fact, which triggered the initiation into the diversification and development of national economy. Given this context, the possibilities (sources) to supply the military budgets, especially in non-oil States, resulting in a slight reduction into dependency of petrodollar into the military expenditures. The phenomenon was materialized by reducing the value of correlation coefficient to 0.945 and by decreasing the percentage of oil revenues when forming the military budgets to 89.3 % in 1990. The decrease could have been even more accentuated, but it was attenuated due to the extension of oil production into the new States (Oman, Yemen, Sudan, Chad), which, into the well-known tradition of the Arabic world, as soon as they entered into possession of the first oil funds they got orientated towards the equipment of their armed forces: Oman and Yemen during the nineties until 2000, and then Chad after 2003 (the year when oil exploitations started in Doba Basin).

The tendency was maintained on the same coordinates in 2000 as well, when, due to the same arguments, the percentage of hydrocarbon dividends into the invoice of military expenditures decreased by 87.6 %.

As the Arabic economies diversified during the globalization process, as dividends issued from reinvestment of oil funds increased and as the usage of new alternative energetic sources increased worldwide, for the following decades

we may assess the maintenance of current tendency in decreasing the contribution of direct oil revenues upon the insurance of military expenditures.

DYNAMICS OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND THEIR PERCENTAGE FROM GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT

The almost permanent inter-Arabic and Arabic-Israeli conflict related relations, the mark of international tensions over the East-West competition during the post-war II period, as well as the privileged financial possibilities of some of the Arabic oil States have led to the building of well equipped armed forces and in consequence, to a continuous increase of the volume pertaining to military expenditures (Table 3).

Although not all Arabic States benefited from the hereinabove mentioned financial privileges, the dividends of those blessed with the gift of black gold have continuously raised the level of their military expenditures into the Arabic world from 2 billion USD in 1950 to over 122 billion USD in 2009. In exchange, we must observe that the percentage of such expenditures from Gross Domestic Product, for all Arabic countries as well as for most of the States, recorded a much more attenuated dynamics than the dynamics in absolute figures, due to the armed options set as a strategic priority by big and small, rich or poor States, within the context of a general level of conflict into the post-war Arabic space. Thus, the percentage of the armed expenditures from the total Gross Domestic Product recorded by the Arabic world had a relatively constant evolution, which is from 4.2 % in 1950 to 4.8 % in 2009, and into the Arabic-Asian space, it evolved almost constantly around the value of 7.5 %. Into the Arabic Africa, where most of the States gained their independence later on and thus, they entered into the worldwide circuit of values later on, the dynamics of military expenditures within the G.D.P. was more visible, evolving from 1.1 % in 1950 to 2 % in 2009.

At the State level, a powerfully increasing dynamics was recorded into the volume of amounts allotted to defense for the entire post-war period, except for Iraq and Somalia, where, due to the internal political context, the invoice of military expenditures evolved according to a crescent initial curve, following which they met a “crash” in values, at the same time with the fall of totalitarian regimes of those States.

In Iraq, the leading of Baath Party during the governance of Saddam Hussein built a main objective from the militarization of the country and from the maintenance of aggressive relations towards most of the neighbors, context in which the volume of military expenditures, supported by the oil annuity, reached in 1990 to more than 20 billion USD each year. Practically, a great part of the oil related revenues had been used by the former regime from Baghdad for the maintenance and equipment of an army excessively over-dimensioned, to the detriment of socio-economic projects and public utilities. Nevertheless, there has been a development into those segments of critical infrastructures of both civil and military use, as the case of Iraq over-dimensioned airport infrastructure developed, opposite to the natural objective needs of the country: a network made of 76 modern aerodromes (of a total of 110), that is the same number of aerodromes as those into its developed neighbor – The Saudi Kingdom. This aspect, in such a sensitive area as the one of Middle East, had weighed and it still weighs heavily into the pragmatic calculations of those powers (U.S.A., Great Britain) that are military and economically involved in Iraq, transforming Iraq in a space of high stakes, not only from economic (energetic) point of view,

but also under the aspect of its territory fitting with a strategic air infrastructure.

Tabel 3. Compared dynamics of military expenditures and oil revenues (1950-2009)
(M – volume of military expenditures – billion $; P – Oil related revenues – billion $)
(Data source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database; CIA World Factbook)

States	1950		1970		1990		2009	
	M	P	M	P	M	P	M	P
Algeria	–	–	0.9	16.4	3.8	53.2	5.7	72.8
Saudi Arabia	0.4	9.6	4.2	58.5	25.3	245	31.05	280
Bahrain	–	–	–	–	0.7	12.4	1.02	17.5
Chad	–	–	0.01	–	0.08	–	0.4	4.3
Comoros	–	–	–	–	0.01	–	0.015	–
Djibouti	–	–	–	–	0.02	–	0.037	–
Egypt	0.7	2.6	2.7	10.2	4.6	20.5	5.54	23.4
U.A.E.	–	–	–	–	7.6	105.4	8.64	120.5
Eritrea	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.093	–
Jordan	0.08	–	0.7	–	1.2	–	1.64	–
Iraq	0.5	3.3	3.2	26.5	21.5	52.2	8.06	56.2
Kuwait	–	–	0.5	32.2	4.3	78.4	8.46	85.9
Libanon	0.05	–	0.5	–	0.75	–	0.92	–
Libya	–	–	0.6	18.4	3.6	49.2	4.45	60.8
Malta	–	–	0.02	–	0.04	–	0.06	–
Morocco	–	–	0.65	0.05	3.4	0.3	4.97	0.6
Mauritania	–	–	0.07	–	0.15	–	0.2	0.02
Oman	–	–	0.6	2.8	4.8	12.5	6.48	20.3
Westbank & Gaza	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Qatar	–	–	–	–	7.8	45.3	12.15	56.2
Western Sahara	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Syria	0.2	–	1.3	–	2.4	0.8	2.71	1.9
Somalia	–	–	0.08	–	0.22	–	0.023	–
Sudan	–	–	0.2	0.8	1.1	3.3	1.92	5.4
Tunisia	–	–	0.2	0.1	0.45	0.4	0.58	0.9
Yemen	0.08	–	0.5	–	1.4	–	1.81	3.2
Israel	2.7	–	8.4	–	12.8	–	13.77	–
Arabic Asia*	1.31	12.9	11.5	120.0	82.8	552.0	98.66	641.7
Arabic Speaking Africa	0.7	2.6	5.4	45.9	17.43	126.9	23.918	107.4
Arabic Speaking Space*	2.01	15.5	16.9	165.9	100.2	678.9	122.58	749.1
World	76	35	565	322	1,230	1,080	1,470	1,320

* – the vallues not include Israel

In Somalia, the maximum level of defense related stipendiums was recorded at the end of the eighties and after 1991, the country fell in a total chaos, which ended even in destroying regular armed forces.

For those States directly involved into the Arabic-Israeli conflicts, the dynamics of financial-military efforts had known the fastest growth in the 6th, 7th and 8th decades of the last century, that is during the wars with Israel, and following that there was a maintenance of the increase of defense related expenditures, but to a more moderate level, which is a typical case for States such as Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, States that during the fifties, sixties and seventies even exceeded the double of amounts used for defense. A similar case was recorded for the states involved in inter-Arabic regional conflicts or rivalries, some of them even tripled the amount of their military expenditures into the hereinabove mentioned decades: Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan, and Yemen.

The oil-monarchies into the Arabic peninsula perceived the spectrum of a potential Iraqi threat both before and especially after the invasion of Kuwait in

1990, reason for which later on they increased their military expenditures in a significant manner, obviously based upon the oil revenues, reaching during the last two decades record levels: Saudi Arabia – the Arabic State with the highest military expenditures, increased their financial funds from 30.3 billion USD in 1990 to 46.77 billion USD in 2009; Qatar increased its military stipendiums from 7.8 billion USD in 1990 to 12.15 billion USD in 2009; The United Arab Emirates increased their military budget from 7.6 billion USD in 1990 to 8.64 billion USD in 2009; Kuwait, directly affected by Iraqi aggression, doubled its volume of military expenditures from 4.3 billion USD in 1990 to 8.46 billion USD in 2009, and Oman increased the military financial effort from 4.8 billion USD in 1990 to 6.48 billion USD at present.

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THE MILITARY ROLE OF SOMEŞ GATE

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Absract: In this article I try to present a different side of geography, the military geography. Military geography role is to study the characteristics of land in military terms and relief the importance of knowledge elements in organizing the fight. Knowledge of the field strengths can make the difference between victory and defeat, and applying appropriate tactics can change the tide of battle.

Key words: patriotic war, defence war

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INTRODUCTION

The notion of gate[1] is defined in dictionaries as:

– a loop in a wall, fence which allows the entrance from the inside to the outside an vice versa;

– the access point in a fortress, city, which together with the mobile panels and other accessories form an ensemble.

Geographically, the notion of "*gate*"[2] designates an alley between two rows of mountains.

From a geographic and military point of view, the gate can be defined as an ensemble of geographic and planimetry details, crossed by a relative long valley which forms an opening towards the inside of the territory, situated especially on an (strategic, operational) entry path which from a military perspective is an strategy of non-entry/attack which enables the action of military force and means.

Bearing in mind the statement made by a great politician and military man who said that "no war can be carried outside the means of communication", the military practice focuses on the battle in the mountains and in this setting the battle for passes is of utmost importance. For always the action carried in the mountains had in view the battle around passes, the battle for their opening or defense being the major purpose, the essence itself of the military confrontations in the mountain areas.

[1] *Dictionary of Comtemporary Romanian Language*, The Scientific and Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, page 618

[2] *Dictionar of Comtemporary Romanian Language*, The Scientific and Enciclopedic Publishing House, Bucharest, 2000, page 618

THE HISTORY OF THE SUBJECT IN FOCUS

The military phenomenon in the study area started with the first human settlements which evolved with the modification of climate, socio-economic, sometimes political factors, but always favoured by the proper conditions that the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic space offered and will always do.

In Antiquity, the system of fortifications was spread across all the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic space, highly present in the study area. Almost all the settlements in this area were fortified with defensive ditches and large ramparts. As for example the ones in Andrid, Carei, Pir (Satu Mare county), Girişu de Criş, Otomani, Văşad (Bihor county), Gilău (Cluj county) and so on.

During the reign of Burebista, in Dacia spread the phenomenon of building mud and especially stone fortifications whose clear purpose was to protect its own population from the invasions of the enemies.




Figure 1. Map with a system of towers in the area of Meseş Mountains, drawn by I. Ferenczi (According to N. Gudea, *The limes on the Meseş Mountains*, page 101)

Such fortifications were regularly set on the peaks of some dominant heights, being usually defended from three sides by steep slopes, hard if not impossible to be climbed. The only access section, binding the settlement with the neighboring plane or heights, was barred by a rampart of mud or crushed stone upon which it was usually raised a wood panel. Often the rampart was preceded by a defensive ditch without water, an illustrative example in favour of this argument being *Marca* (Sălaj county) on the "Fortress" height.

The fortified settlements formed a component of the defensive military system of the Getae-Dacian territories representing the local defensive effort highly organized for that time, being considered the military strengths of this state.

After the Roman conquest of Dacia, these established the Northern boundary of the Empire on the East Side of the study area, emphasizing the boundaries fortification. Thus, appeared a significant fortification system in the Western part of the study area, extended towards South-West, on the West side of the Apuseni Mountains, in the Crişuri Hallow.

The setting of the fortifications (according to castes and to themselves)

The fortifications are generally set in the highest places, especially on the entire Meseş peak being considered as a long, natural barrier.

The fortifications system was organized as a network in order to be observe and control all the movements inside the territory in front of the boundary, all the access possibilities and to quickly set in motion the entire defensive system, including the castes behind it. The display of the towers on the field assured a visual connection between them and the other elements, on one side, and between the entire observation system and castes, on the other hand.

The stone towers are divided into two groups: with quadrilateral plan (usually square) and with circular plan. The sizes are different in the case of both groups: small square towers (3-5 m), medium (5-7 m) and big (7-10 m); small circular towers (4-5 m), medium (5-7 m) or big (7-11 m).

During the period after the withdrawal of the Roman army and administration, the remaining population was forced to defend its existence and liberty, to develop its own civilization and its own method of social, political and military organization.

In the VIII-XIII centuries, the population had to face the invasion attempts of the Hungarians, Pechenegs, Uzis and Cumans.

The major battle that the historical sources mention was that of defending the voivodeship of Glad, Gelu and Menumorut against the Hungarian tribes who wished to consolidate their expansion towards East. Thus, under the rule of Tuhutum, the Hungarian army tried to invade the Transylvanian Hallow. Informed about the danger at the boundaries, Voivode Gelu gathered his army and quickly departed towards Meseş Gate, with the purpose to withstand the invaders in that place. The Hungarian troops, consisting in horsemen, rapidly crossed the mountains, thus, the two armies faced each other on the Almaş river. It was a dramatic encounter during which Voivode Gelu was outnumbered and then bravely fell in battle while trying to take cover in his fortress near Someş, to continue the defensive from there.

Another important event that took place in the study area was the Peasant Riot at Bobâălna, between 1437-1438. It was the first main riot of the peasants, both in Romania and in the Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, against social and national oppression, practically showing the stage of feudal reports and but also the tension between the oppressed and the oppressors, and the will of the peasantry to stop the aggravation of the material and social condition.

The riot bursted in the spring of 1437, the major cause being the abusive measures of the Catholic Bishop of Alba-Iulia, but also those of the Roman-Catholic Church. One of the reasons are the collection the parish quitrent for the

last three years in new coin, "heavier", in a single installment, the increase in the number of working days of the peasants for the oppressing nobility, the ban of free relocation and also the parish sanctions pronounced against those that would or could not pay their rents, abuses which could no longer be endured.

The riot started in the North of Transylvania but soon spread towards *Sătmar* and *Szabolcs* regions, the representatives of the Transylvanian peasantry calling them to arms by indicating as gathering place Bobâlna.

The rebelled peasants headed towards Bobâlna hill (10 km north-west of Dej) which was referred to by the locals as Babdiu (693 m high). The place was well chosen because it represents the highest point in the Someşan Plateau, situated West of Someşul Mic, between Cluj and Dej, dominating all the other heights in the Someşan Plateau and offered the possibility to observe up to long distances (could be seen- in good weather conditions- Lapuş, Ţibleş and even Rodnei Mountains, towards the Eastern Carpathians, and towards South-East the peaks of the Apuseni Mountains). On the tops of the chain of hills, around Bobâlna, it could be easily traced the approach of any enemy to the area where the rebelled forces gathered. This plateau presents itself as a natural fortress, hardly accessible from its three sides (as the fortified settlements from the Roman period) and which a brief defensive arrangement could stand for a true obstacle in case of a possible attack.

In the first part of the year 1437, the major strategies of the masses of peasants were the attacks by surprise of the castles and the punishment of their noblemen. As result of these striking attacks and the conditions of seeing their lands not worked, the noblemen built their own camp to press back. They chose as gathering place Căpîlna, situated approximately at 15 km North-West of Dej. Here, on a plateau on the right shore of Someş, referred to even today as Podul Curţii, could be found a strong noble court around which the bands of noblemen from the Transylvanian counties gathered, as well as the army of Szekely leaders. At the end of June 1437, the noble army headed towards Bobâlna hill where the rebelled peasants were ready to fight. The armament of the noblemen was far more superior than that of the peasantry which also denotes optimism and faith in a quick victory.

The approach of the noble troops to the gathering place of the peasantry was made through the less steep part of Bobâlna height, from North-East. The peasant troops with a scarce armanent but lighter unleashed themselves upon the noblemen from the flanks of the march apparatus, like in a horseshoe, gradually tighting it between the Bobâlna and Peştera Valley, where was practically circled. The heavy noble army could not move at ease and could not attack with its full force in those tight and narrow places, while the light peasant troop gave striking blows. The noblemen faced the fact of being attacked both from front and flanks.

Defeated, the nobility had no choice but to bargain; in the end, they settled to an "agreement" sealed at Bobâlna and corroborated by the Cluj-Mănăştur Convent, in July 6th, 1437, mentioning to abolish the "unbearable difficulties and burdens".

Fervent actions took place on both sides after this agreement. On one hand, the nobility reorganizes the forces and attracts at their side other classes financially superior (the upper clergy, the leaders of the Szekely and Transylvanian Saxons and the gentry), on the other hand the peasantry carries out activities of completing their numbers and ensuring the necessary food,

extending the area of riot towards West to Meseş Mountains and towards South to Aiud Fortress.

As a result of the above mentioned treaty, the noblemen, reorganized and strengthened with new forces, marched again against the rioters. The new confrontation between the two parties took place at Apatiu, towards Bistrița, near the monastery of this village, on a plateau under the vineyard, being as bloody as the one under Bobâlna hill. The noble army did not succeed to ensure the victory again and in consequence a new agreement was reached between the two parties at Apatiu and corroborated again at Cluj-Mănăştur, but this time the text of the agreement was more moderate than at the first agreement at Bobâlna.

At the end of 1437 the peasant riot entered a new phase. Maintaining the camp on Bobâlna hill was no longer possible because winter was approaching, the nurture was even more difficult to obtain as well as the acquisition of new people. The solution was to find shelter in a city fortified by walls, where the chances of resisting the enemy were bigger, Cluj giving the fighters the most advantages. Supported by the poorer classes from Cluj, the rioters entered in the fortress and united with the local groups of peasantry helped organizing the walls defensive. For three months Cluj was in the hands of the rioters. The troops of noblemen decided to siege the locality. In spite the brave resistance organized by the peasants and citizens, the noble forces managed to take one of the city's outskirts, at the end of the first decade of January 1438. An assault upon the fortress was rejected by the rioters. But receiving new back ups, especially from the Transylvanian Saxon Seats, the leaders of the aristocracy organized new attacks and towards the end of the month managed to take over the city and thus end this riot. The leaders of the peasant were judged at Turda and sentenced to death.

The battle at Guruslău (August 3rd, 1601) is among the most glorious heroic deeds in the area in focus.

The Romanian Ruler focused his army at Oradea, counting on approximately 10,000 soldiers and waiting further back up on behalf of General Basta. Mihai set his army in motion in the Oradea-Carei direction uniting in July, 9th, 1601, at Moftin (8 km East of Carei), with the army of Basta. Here also arrived the troops which the Emperial Commander was waiting for, namely 2,000 Silesian armoured horsemen.

In his turn, Sigismund Bathory started to gather his forces at Gherla having in mind the occupation of a central position from where he could quickly intercept the allied forces on whatever directions they might have engaged. Simultaneously, he requested military aid from the Gate, from Poland and Ieremia Movilă. Informed about the advancements of the troops of Mihai and Basta, Sigismund Bathory moves his troops from Gherla to Şimleu where came in his assistance a group of 12,000 Ottomans and Tatars sent by the Sultan, his soldiers exceeding 40,000 men, among which 18,000 horsemen. For artilery, Bathory had in possesion 45 cannons, big and small. All this time, through advanced detachments, Mihai the Brave engaged into searching the area where the allied troops rested, seeking to obtain information and even engaged in some harassment conflicts with the safety subunits sent outside the camp by Mihai and Basta. Bearing in mind the fact that their enemy is relatively close and not to allow him to make the first strategic step, the two commanders decided to set their troops to march towards Şimleul Silvaniei and to attack at the right time the army of Bathory. But he discovered their intentions and advanced himself as

well, taking the lead in area of Guruslău village, where he occupied a dominant position on the South-Eastern shore of the stream with the same name. Adopting a battle strategy with most of the infantry units at the right side, the majority of the cavalry at the left flank and setting the artillery on the peak of a dominant hill on the right flank had in mind to seize the intention of Sigismund Bathory of resisting with the centre and right and engaging the mobile cavalry troops in maneuver actions against the flank of the enemy hoping in an easy victory.

The troops of Mihai the Brave and George Basta in the direction Moftin — Şimleul Silvaniei, faced the enemy in the afternoon of August 2nd, 1601. After analyzing the situation they decided to set their troops in two lines on the South-Eastern slopes of the height of 269 m. Not far from the Guruslău streambed, on an advanced position, were set some subunits of pedestrians, framed by horsemen to cover their flanks. In the second line, set to such a distance not to be touched by the artillery of the enemy, occupied battle positions the gross of pedestrian and horsemen forces. At the center were the arquebusiers and the armoured cavalry, important crushing force, at the right Mihai the Brave and the mobile troops and at the left Basta with his own. The cannons of the army were placed partly in the front of the first line and the rest, most of them, in front of the main defensive line. Thus, resulted a genious apparatus, well set, able to assure a strong defense against the attacks of the enemy troops and to allow at the same slight force regroupings in order to charge back decisively.

The battle at Guruslău took place on the 3rd August 1601, around 9 am, through an exchange of artillery fires. The use of Bathory's cannons had little effect due to lack of precision. On the opposite, the artillery of Mihai the Brave and Basta, which was better arranged on the field and guided skillfully, struck with full force causing the enemy significant losses.

Sigismund Bathory ordered the first attack. The troops from the right side of his apparatus received the mission to cross the Guruslău stream and engage the left flank of the enemy. Under the presure of a highly numbered enemy, the first line, slightly scarce, of Basta was forced to give in, reorganizing in order under the coverage of the fire of their own artillery, towards the gross of forces.

At the same time, the cavalry from the right flank of Sigismund Bathory's army received order to execute a maneuver of surprise on the opposite apparatus. Mihai the Brave thwarted the intent of the enemy engaging in this direction infantry and cavalry units which after bloody struggles succeeded in stopping his action. By 5 pm, the troops of Prince Bathory were stopped on the entire battlefield; their attack was crushed while a great deal of Mihai the Brave and Basta's troops were not yet engaged in battle. Thus were created proper conditions for them to be able to attack. In the decisive phase of the battle, the hard shielded cavalry from the troops of Basta executed a strong counter attack whose result was the penetration under the form of feather in the enemy apparatus and dividing the forces from its center. Another attack was made upon the troops on the right flank, taking them by surprise from East. However, the result of the battle was determined by the action conceived and carried out personally by Mihai the Brave. While the infantry from his troops caused losses to the opposite maneuver group, Mihai the Brave leading the cavalry executed a large maneuver through the meadow of Zalău valley, turning and dissembling the entire apparatus of Sigismund Bathory's army. The effect of such a coordinated action was decisive. Circling a significant part of the enemy forces, the constant attack of Mihai and Basta's pedestrians, horsemen and cannoneers

determined the victorious end of the Guruslău battle. Sigismund Bathory saved himself by running away while the rest of his army was destroyed through isolated battles which continued during the night. As a result of the victory at Guruslău, Mihai the brave had reasons to view his future with optimism. Defeating the army of Sigismund Bathory brought him the reign of Transylvania. He received news from Muntenia that the whole country rebelled and that Simion Movilă, although helped by the Polish and the Tatars, was driven away. A delegation of noblemen from Muntenia was already waiting at Cluj for the ruler.

Between 1600-1900 in the region of Someş Gate did not occur any other spectacular events to present further introspection.

During the First World War staff officers established an action hypothesis. The "Z" hypothesis had in view a bold conception about the preparation and execution of the strategic, operational-strategic and operational military actions. The superior Romanian Command had in focus strength and speed actions as in the war of movement. At the same time, they also had in mind to gain and harness the advantages of the conquered land.

A decisive blow was to be executed at the Someş Gate, at almost a month after declaring the mobilization, with the clear purpose of annihilating the most dangerous enemy forces; another decisive blow was to be taken in the direction Oradea, Debreţen in order to liberate the Romanian historical territories, West of Apuseni and to stop any enemy attempt to regain control over the Transylvanian redoubt.

Unfortunately, underestimating the possibility of the Central Powers to bring on short notice various troops on the Eastern front, they made such action hypotheses to remain at the state of merely goals. The Romanian army lost the element of surprise, receiving a pretty harsh reply, being practically forced to retreat to different intermediary lines, failing to face the enemy. Moreover, due to the fact that the Russian Empire left the war zone determined by the Red Revolution in October 1917, Romania was left without the promised support. Starting with 1919, the Romanian army switched to disband reservists and adopted the regular procedures of recruitment of the young in the army. This situation did not last for long as in 1933 dark times were in store for Europe with Adolf Hitler's leadership of Germany and Romania entering The Second World War.

After the victory over Hitler's army between the 23rd-31st August 1944, the Romanian army heroically managed to liberate the North-Western part of the country taken by Horthyst Hungary through the Vienna Dictate on the 30th August 1940. The 1st and 4th troops succeeded their operational maneuvers North of Middle Carpathians and West of the Occidentals.

The Supreme Soviet Command ordered its armies to cross the passes of the Middle Carpathians into the Transylvanian Plateau. On their way to the new battle line the Soviet divisions passed through the Carpathian cities and passes without being needed to fight hard as did the bigger units which tried to cross the Oriental Carpathians from East to West.

The decision of the political and military U.R.S.S. leadership to subordinate the Romanian army starting with the night of September 6th/7th, 1944 also meant significant changes in the strategic plan of the national military command regarding the liberation of the North-Western part of the country, this being practically excluded from any military operations. Imbedded in the Ukrainian Front 2 apparatus, the 1st and 4th Romanian armies created together with a similar and bigger Soviet unity, a group of armies leaded by the commander of the bigger Soviet Unity.




Figure 2. The offensive attack of the Romanian 4th Army
in the North-Western part of Transylvania
(between the 9th-25th October 1944 – according to The Romanian Army during Hitler's war,
Military Publishing House, 1980, pages 86 to 87)

On the 9th October, the 4th Romanian Army aided by the Soviet forces attacked in the direction of Luduş, East of Cluj, obliging Hitler's army to move from defense to gradual withdrawal of the forces through "Someş Gate".

The military actions of the Romanian armies in the final stage of the battles on the national territory, at Cluj, Carei, Satu Mare, Oradea and in other places had important consequences for the general unfolding of the military actions, the enemy being pushed in a short while almost 200 km towards West. Due to the heroic effort of the Romanian army in annihilating the enemy apparatus in the North-Western Romania, the Eastern front practically gained an almost linear disposing between the Baltic Sea, the Danube Valley and the Adriatic Sea. The liberation of the North-Western part of the country, completed on the 25th October 1944, has been achieved by the sacrifice of 58,330 soldiers, killed, injured or taken prisoners. The losses caused to the enemy consisted of 82,934 among which 76,275 prisoners.

As it can be noticed even from Antiquity, the principle of ensuring the advantages of the territory has developed in order to protect the population and their own troops against an even more numerous and skilled in battle oppressor. Some ancient elements of military strategy are still used today, some of them being changed and renewed, thus the location and role of the passes in the

system of the military actions carried out in the mountains prove them to be one of the core elements of the geographic-military and tactical-operational analysis undertaken by the military commands both in time of peace and war. Knowing in detail their characteristics, realistically portraying their consequences and implications in the preparation and execution in the mountains allow the commanders to take the most clear decisions and to establish the necessary measures to carry them out.

THE AREA OF STUDY

Couloir on the Somes Valley can be traced in Sălaj county, starting at Căpîlna and ending at Mirşid (near Zalau), having a length of 80 km. It comes along the valley of the Someş river up to Jibou, then on the valley of the Apa Sărată stream up to South of Firminiş, separating Ciceu Hills (in depth Brezei Peak), Boiului Plateau (in depth Prîsnel Peak) and Silvaniei Hills (on the Northern part of the pass) of the Someşan Plateau and Meses Mountains on the Southern side, after which continues for 3 more km towards West and ends at Mirşid.




Figure 3. Someş Gate

The main defensive direction is Satu Mare – Dej which later evolved in Cluj Napoca – Tîrgu Mureş – Braşov (thus the main important cities in Transylvania) or Bistrița Năsăud, to joint further with the passes in the Oriental Carpathians.

The pass is crossed by the national road 1 C, from Căpîlna up to 2 km West to Perii Vadului locality, then from here to Mirşid on the national road 1 H which mainly follows the course of the Someş river on its right shore, between Căpîlna and Ciocmani and from here on the left shore of the river up to Jibou, from where it continues up to Mirşid following a part of the trail along the Apa Sărată stream.

The road is in construction almost on its entire length.

When finished, the connection would allow the passing of all types of military convoy with an average speed of 30 km/hour, on both directions simultaneously, ensuring a traffic capacity of 250 vehicles per hour.

The area surrounding this pass is covered with dense woods which allow the soldiers and the battle equipment to be hidden, using both the personal material and the ones in the area. However, a good shelter can be also obtained by making use of the mines galleries at Surduc and Babeni.

Putting in use the maneuver over the Someş river, using both of the connections situated either to the North or South of the pass, is possible by crossing the Someş on the bridges at Rus, Ileanda, Letea - Lozna, Ciocmani.

In case the pass is closed (blocked) it can be proceed as follows:

Through the Northern part of the pass, a detour can be made on the direction Tîrgu Lăpuş, Şomcuța Mare, Ulmeni, Benesat, Cehu-Silvaniei, Crişeni on a distanceof 135 km. The route presents no difficulties regarding the relocation of the unities and bigger tactical unities equipment, the average speed being of 20 km/hour, with a traffic capacity of 198 vehicles per hour (4,752 vehicles in 24 hours).

Through the Northern part of the pass, a detour can be made on the direction Dej, Bobîlna, Panticeu, Sărata, Voivodeni, Hida, Românaşi, Zalău 2 km West of Crişeni, on a distance of almost 110 km.

The route allows the circulation in both directions of any type of technical convoys, with an average speed also of 20 km/hour, with a capacity almost equal as in the previous situation.

In case some sections of the pass are blocked, the routes remain mainly the same, with small changes and junctions between certain communal or county roads, but which decrease the traffic speed and the capacity.

The transport by train can be made on the 400 main railway, Dej – Jibou direction with 412 railway branch Zalău – Satu Mare. It is a simple railway, with normal gauge, unelectrified, having a length of 71 km. The loading/unloading possibilities on/from the railway can be made in the 10 stations (trading halts) where exist loading/unloading ramps, with lengths between 10 and 225 m, all lateral ramps except the one in Gîlgău which is in an advanced state of deterioration (approximately 75 %). The maximum traffic capacity on this main railway is of 7, 2 tones per meter or 20 tones per axle. The consolidation works carried out in this section allow oversized transports with maximal weights of 20, 5 tones/axle.

Along the pass, the railway crosses but once the Someş river on the railway bridge at Ciocmani, with a length of 160, 60 m, width of 5, 64 m, made of concrete and metal, 8 m above the Someş river.

CONCLUSION

The pass crosses over a wide area of hills and plateaux with relatively small altitudes (the axis of the pass marking the Northern limit of the Occidental Carpathians), being a favourable route to carry out battle actions, making possible the use of all types of weapons both from the Transylvanian Plateau towards Tisa Plain and vice versa.

The actions that a possible enemy could take from West would probably focus on the conquest, in the first instance, of some objectives such as the passes and the mandatory passing points (on communications, communications nodes and orographic), the main economic objectives (hydro dams and their installations, tourism and recreation bases, mining and forestry exploitations, and so on), control points and broadcasting centers.

In the case of the pass on the Someş Valley, a successful attack of the enemy may give him the possibility to reach the Transylvanian Plateau where he can unleash his forces and means and carry out successfully the actions on the important directions (previously mentioned) ending with the conquest of the main cities in Transylvania and the resources laying here.

The importance of the pass on the Someş Valley resides in the fact that along it, can act forces up to two big tactical unities, with the possibility to force themselves upon the river North of Jibou and then to give the main blow towards Dej.

In case the enemy decides to act in such a manner, the river Someş, in the section South and North-West to Dej, can enable the alignment of a large unit whose conquest may open new directions leading towards the main political and economic centers in Transylvania but also to the execution of a good maneuver in the flank and behind the entire defensive apparatus in the Apuseni Mountains. In order to strengthen the attack, the enemy can use tactical air landing at the entrance in the pass (Jibou) or at the its exit in order to block the defensive armies towards the front.

The defense of the pass can be organized first of all even at the entrance on a strong operational line which crosses Baia Mare, Jibou, Zalău, Ciucea. Another defensive line, of same importance, can be organized at the exit of the pass, on the Eastern shore of the Someş river, crossing Năsăud, Beclean, Dej, Bonțida, Apahida. The enemy which tries to enter the pass can be crushed by executing counter attacks with reserve soldiers between Jibou and Zalău and in case the pass is conquered by reserves set East of Someş in the direction of Dej, Zalău or Cluj, Jibou, in order for the defense to be reorganized with a line at the entrance in the pass.

Occupying and taking hold of this can lead, with the shift of power on the local level, to its transformation into a strong starting base to the offensive towards West in order to liberate the territory occupied by the enemy in this part of the country.

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CORRIDORS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE HUNGARIAN EXIT TO THE SEA

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Absract: The study considers the question of sea outlets from a continental, Central European (Hungarian) point of view. It gives a historical overview about the position and politics of the states in the area which are either land-locked or have limited outlets. The paper takes the corridors into account relying upon these findings. The study discusses the Hungarian geographical and political situation in details. Since the nearest sea is the Adriatic, the issues of the Western Balkan corridor will be discussed in more detail. Today the question of marine transport in Europe affects primarily the connection with Far-Eastern/Chinese areas; therefore, we interpreted the possibility of a partly unnecessary sea-lane induced by the Eurasian railway transportation.

Key words: corridor, Hungary, Adriatic, geopolitics, international relations, transport, Western Balkans

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After the collapse of the Soviet Empire the number of landlocked states increased. In the Eighties just Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were without sea exit in the region. In the Nineties Slovakia separated from the Czech Republic, FYROM Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia and former soviet republics of Belarus and Moldova also joined this group. Serbia in 2006, after the independence referendum of Montenegro, and Kosovo in 2008, as a landlocked country, became an independent state. Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Slovenia gained their independence only with a narrow coastline.

According to today's professional opinion private seaside and the lack of territorial ports do not represent special political disadvantage. Owing to the

flexibility of traffic systems and logistics “national” ports do not represent real benefits in transport competition. The European Union can assure free sea-lane access to anyone by means of the four “freedoms”. If this would be the case then writing this study would be unneeded.

However, the actual worldwide recession inclines us to re-think the situation from many aspects. The future of the European Union and mainly the impact of sovereignty debates have become questionable. The first gaps have exactly appeared in the Balkan area and in its proximity. Greece has sunk into economic and political crisis while the economic problems of Italy impend over the entire Union. Turkey has made an alteration in its foreign policy. It is dominantly Hungary that receives uncountable judgments on its economic and political issues, but Bulgaria and Romania also share this status. The Kosovo conflict has not been solved and Bosnia-Herzegovina has not become more stable. The European perspective of the Western Balkan states has become questionable. We may reckon upon that national view points, the question of sovereignty and territorial debates within that will become lively in that area. Global economic rearrangement will also have significant impact on transportation, although it is not clear what kind of effect it will be, at least for the time being. States are trying to get benefits by competing with each other for creating relations with those ambitious BRIC countries that have been not or merely affected by the recession. Territorial advantages are marked up, historical reflexes become critical and this is the reason why we regard considering the pre-integration corridor-issue reasonable.

Some of the new countries of Central Europe and the Western Balkans have smaller or bigger problems with their shape or territorial extension regarding the sea exit. Not a precise term, but the journalistic “corridor” indicates these land bridges, which are in the focus of our study.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ABOUT THE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHICAL QUESTIONS OF THE DISTANCE FROM THE SEA SHORES

One of the major factors of classical geopolitics is the evaluation of marine or inland nature of the regions. It is a particularly sensitive issue from a Hungarian or Central European point of view, which we also need to focus on in our study.

The fact that Southern Europe is strongly determined by the sea is immediately conspicuous for a superficial bystander. It does not require a detailed proof. However, the question arises: what role does the sea or the access to the sea play in the In-between European region including Hungary? Traditionally the most prominent of the geographical factors is when we would like to evaluate the kind of the area. The closest coast to “landlocked” Hungary is lying in the direction of the Southern European region along one of the marginal seas of the Mediterranean Sea. The following analysis studies whether the accessibility to the seas have appeared/appears as an aspect in the foreign political efforts of the South-Central European states involving Hungary.

Owing to Europe’s peninsular nature, the distance of Eurasia’s inland territories from the seas, especially from the so-called warm seas, grows from the west towards the east. Accordingly, a "maritime" and a "continental" Europe may be differentiated. Moreover, certain thinkers claiming that Europe is primarily maritime, draw its border along the line connecting the Finnish Gulf and the Azov Sea.

Several facts convincingly prove the maritime determination of Europe's major part, if not all of it. Such are special climatic features in the formation of which the ocean, the seas play a fundamental role, or the high value of coast length per 1000 km^2 (*4 km/1000 km^2, as opposed to the Asian value of 1.7 km/1000 km^2*), or the fact that the world was "discovered" and colonised by European seafaring nations.

However, 45 states in the world or 15 in Europe do not have coasts, for them, reaching the open sea is only possible through the territory of another state (or other states).

Table 1. Some basic data of the European landlocked states 2009
(Ed.: Pap, N. Source: CIA World Factbook)

Country	**Area** (km^2)	**Population** (thousand persons)	**GDP per capita** (USD)
Andorra	468	84.825	46,700
Austria	83,870	8,217	40,400
Belarus	207,600	9,577	13,600
Czech Republic	78,866	10,190	25,600
FYROM Macedonia	25,333	2,077	9,700
Hungary	93,030	9,976	18,800
Liechtenstein	160	35.236	141,100
Luxembourg	2,586	503	82,600
1244-Kosovo	10,887	1,825	6,600
Moldova	33,843	4,314	2,500
San Marino	61	31.817	36,200
Serbia	77,747	7,310	10,900
Slovakia	48,845	5,477	22,000
Switzerland	41,290	7,639	42,600
Holy See (Vatican City)	0.4	0.832	no data

The distribution of states isolated from the sea, the so-called landlocked states follows a growing tendency from the west towards the east in Europe. Their territorial distribution regarding their distances from various seas reflects a characteristic picture. Out of the 15 states 12 (Andorra, San Marino, the Vatican, Switzerland, Austria, Liechtenstein, Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo) are situated closest to the Mediterranean region, 1 (Luxembourg) to the Atlantic Ocean, while 2 (Belarus and the Czech Republic) to the Baltic Sea, Moldova to the Black Sea. The previously mentioned group of states without coasts share very few common features. It must be noted, however, that these states are relatively small ones with small population size. Even together they constitute a minute proportion of Europe. Their overall population is 9 % of Europe's, while their total territory is 6 %. They include extremely wealthy (Switzerland) as well as very poor (Kosovo) countries.

During the course of history, various ways of reaching the sea have evolved. In the Middle Ages the use of sailable rivers leading to the sea was regarded as something secured by a natural right. (*Duties and taxes were collected there, thus the maintenance of waterways was also considered as a responsibility of the state.*) In actual fact this possibility was very limited. In the Modern Ages the accessibility of sea for different states was regulated by contracts.

Europe's inland waterway system is primarily determined by two rivers: the Rhine and the Danube. The Rhine Navigation Central Committee, one of the oldest European multilateral organisations, was founded in the closing

agreement of the 1815 Vienna Congress. Its duty was to solve problems related with securing free shipping. Originally its members were certain coastal states, with Belgium and the United Kingdom joining in (as winners) after the World War I. Initially, shipping was not free at all, and it could only be secured through multiple stages, by various contracts. Such were, for example, the Mainz Act of 1831 which ensured free shipping for states along the river, or the Mannheim Convention of 1868 declaring that ships of states both along and away from the river Rhine could freely use it. Certain privileges, however, have not been made general ever since then (e.g. cabotage).

The case with free shipping on the Danube was similar. Austria and Russia made an agreement about the freedom of shipping in 1840, in the Danube Shipping Agreement. The same were the contents of the British-French and the Austrian-Turkish contracts in 1854. Then in 1856 the great powers negotiating in Paris declared the Danube as an international river. A variety of organisations were established. Transportation on the Danube, irrespective of the principles of free shipping, always proceeded depending on the power relations of the great powers. Losers of the wars were normally excluded from committees dealing with the river, or directions were made on their expenses.

States for which sea transportation occurred as a problem thought that the best solution was to occupy coastal territories together with opening a corridor (inland exit route). The greatest of such attempts in history was that of the Russians who aimed at providing themselves with a free exit to a warm sea. The Russian state used to be functionally *landlocked* until the 18th century. It was Peter the Great with whom the attempt to establish Russian ports on the coasts of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea started, but for them the result seemed not entirely satisfactory.

States other than Russia are also found in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, the sea exits of which open on a closed, controllable and controlled sea. In view of historic experiences, their possibilities to access the World Ocean must be considered limited. These states include for example Bulgaria and Finland too, the efforts of which to improve their situation can be best seen if their histories are analysed.

Debates and aspirations regarding corridors were most abundant in the first half of the 20th century. At that time, states of Europe which was, from many aspects, totally disintegrated, were characterised with hardly penetrable borders, high customs barriers, and aspirations for autarchy. Nations regarded each other suspiciously. Resentments from the recent past (wars) were still too lively.

The first wars of the new century in Europe were fought in the Balkans. During these wars, Bulgaria opened up an exit to the Aegean Sea (1913), but was able to possess it only until 1919 when it went to Greece. This area, namely Western Thrace, which had only a small number of Bulgarian inhabitants, was populated almost entirely by Turks, Pomaks and Greeks. It was chiefly motivated by opening an exit to the Aegean Sea and not by the ethnic issue. Typically of Bulgaria, during the World War II, in 1940 it conquered the territory again and kept it until the end of the war (Pándi, 1997).

The situation with the Finnish state was similar to the Bulgarian. When the independent Finnish state was established, it possessed a long Baltic coast and a very narrow exit (corridor) leading to the Barents Sea. The latter was the surroundings of the port city Petsamo (today: Pechenga), the so-called Petsamo-territory. It was not some sort of ethnic feature that secured its importance in

the sparsely populated north, but the fact that it faced a sea that was navigable throughout the year. As it can be observed even today, the North Atlantic stream keeps this coast segment ice-free all year round, as opposed to most Finnish coasts in the Baltic. The possession of such an "open-sea" port was favourable from the point of view of security politics too, since the Baltic Sea is "hermetically" sealable. Its practical significance was probably quite low, it wasn't very economically important for its background area. It rather had a potential for significance. The territory securing the exit was kept even during the Finnish-Russian "winter war", and it was only in the 1947 Paris Treaty marking the end of the World War II that Finland had to give it up for the benefit of Soviet Union (Pándi, 1997).

The World War I, the first great "resource (?) war" in history was lost by the central powers locked away from seas, and through that, from supplies. The determining role of the United States in winning the war was unquestionable. The victorious Americans pronounced their concepts about how to close down the war and set the situation straight. These ideas were reflected in President Woodrow Wilson's 14 points. Out of these points the 13th dealt with the issue of establishing a new Polish state. In order to ensure the viability of the new state, he proposed the creation of a corridor which was the so-called "Danzig corridor". According to the words of French marshal Ferdinand Foch, the commander-in-chief of the winning Entente military forces, the seeds of a next war had been sown by the establishment of the corridor, and indeed, this was the point where the World War II started.

Czechoslovakia, another country that was created by the peace treaty, also pronounced its claim for sea exit (Gulyás, 2008). The route would have followed a course towards the south-west, through the western areas of what are today Hungary and Burgenland (Eastern-Austria), way down to the SCS Kingdom. (Gulyás, 2005). Peculiarly enough, it was not planned to lead directly to the sea, instead it would have ensured railway connection with ports in the Adriatic, and would have completed the ring of the Little Entente around Hungary. The peace conference in March 1919 rejected the proposal, because the corridor would have meant Austria's complete isolation, and would have forced the country into a union with Germany, which was just what the Entente powers wanted to avoid (Romsics, 1992).

At the end of the 19th century Mahan wrote that great power existence was unimaginable without appearing on seas and without the possession of an effective trading and naval fleet (Mahan, 1890). The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was a great power until the end of the World War I when it fell and broke into pieces. Its successor states, Austria and Hungary, by the discontinuation of great power existence, lost their sea exits too, which went to the winner Entente powers.

The basis of the present status quo got created by the disintegration of multi-national empires after World War I. The settling of the situation following the World War II. basically preserved the former structure. The trend of "new state establishment" after 1989 has increased the number of states that need to perceive sea access as a problem. The sea accessibility problem of the landlocked states belonging to In-between Europe demanded a solution as early as after the World War I, so that it would be possible to moderate the disadvantages of these countries and decrease tensions probably occurring later.

In 1921 in Barcelona, a conference with 32 participant countries was held, and a convention about the freedom of transit traffic was signed. The issue of

free access to seas was settled in 1958 in the framework of the UN. The situation of the newly formed African states without coasts was set straight in an international agreement in 1964. The integration process starting to develop in Western Europe ensured for its members that this problem would not appear in a form of interstate conflict.




Figure 1: Landlocked states and corridor problems in Europe
(Ed.: Pap, N., 2009, updated by Pap, N., 1999: Korridorok Köztes-Európában (Corridors in In-between Europe). in Földrajzi Közlemények (Geographical Review) pp. 180-190)

As a wave of new state establishment came in the 1990s, securing corridors leading to the sea became important again in the regions of In-between Europe, especially of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Moldova, one of the new Eastern European states, is in a specific situation. Although the country is very near to the sea it can only get at an exit to the sea by the Danube (Giurgiuleşti Port). In the Balkans, where new states were formed by means of violent events of wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, the landlocked status was involved in the syllabus of interstate relations. The Greek blockade on Macedonia showed how great advantages a home exit to the sea could bring to a country.

The issue of connection to the sea seems to appear in various forms on the political agenda of the new states.

The term "corridor" usually refers to the possibility of moving along between two points. The realization of communication in broad sense has technical and international legal frameworks and limitations. In the areas under the sovereignty of *one* state these frameworks and limitations are not so strong. There are wider possibilities of development, simpler rules, smaller dependence on international relations and financial difficulties are easier to overcome. Thus we must make a difference between complex transportation corridors running through the area of two or more countries and those connecting a state with international waterways.

Corridors can be defined as means of reaching world seas and international inland waterways and as geographic phenomena enlarging state scope for action restricted by international relations. In the background of their creation generally stands the intention to make the state's geographical framework optimal. Usually, corridors are not long-lasting elements of the political geographic system, although aspirations for their establishment can be quite permanent. The dispute about sea exits of In-between Europe in the south and towards the Mediterranean Sea is formed as a need. Most conspicuously these needs and problems increase on the eastern coasts of the Adriatic closest to Hungary. Historically Hungary also used to possess a sea exit for a longer time in the region.

CORRIDORS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

In the region of the Adriatic there are several states that are connected with their inner territories to the sea through a short coast section and a land bridge. The following main corridors were present on the northern and eastern coasts of the sea during the past hundred years:

- The Austrian corridor which ran out to the Trieste region until 1918 (Habsburg rulers opened a narrow exit to the sea for Austria in 1366, and in the 19th century they built railway lines leading here, in competition with the Hungarian Fiume Railways; Austrian Southern Railway). Today, the Austrian sea outlet means the Danube that has busy water traffic either towards the North Sea through the Rhine or southward to the Black Sea. Beyond that trading takes place through numerous European seaports only because of economic and logistic aspects.
- The Slovenian corridor which includes the port of Koper and a coastline less than 50 (47 km) kilometres long. In the past few years debates over the usage of the Croatian Gulf of Piran, and over the designation of Croatian-Slovene boundaries show the sensitivity of new states about the

issue of sovereignty, frustrations and lack of common seaside-management cogitation. The issue also became an obstacle to Croatia in the EU integration process. The decision will be made by the International Court of Justice.

- The Bosnian exit: the surroundings of the port town Neum, and the geopolitical issue of Croatia regarding the planned Pelješac bridge... The story of Bosnian sea outlet dates back to 1699. This is the year when the Republic of Ragusa gave the territory to the Ottomans in order to gain defense from the Venetians. Anyway, the inner Bosnian area obtained a legitimate sea outlet that was also maintained after the country had gained independence. However, the Bosnian exit to the sea is practically attained through the port of Ploče, which is Croatian territory. Nevertheless, in the sense of constitutional law, Neum divided the Croatian sovereignty into two parts so as a way of elimination Croatia decided to build the Pelješac bridge. This small town shows the picture of a typical Adriatic seaside resort but ambitious plans appeared about developing it into a significant port. However, the reality of these plans is uncertain.

The development of the port of Ploče has already begun during the first Yugoslavia but because of World War II its traffic enhancement was postponed until Tito's regime. Improving the port was always in connection with the demands and possibilities (Bosnian export-import) of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the one-time Dinaric core of Yugoslavia), namely, it was Split and later Rijeka and Zadar that represented primary ports for Croatia but Serbia and its territories had the possibility of the Thessaloniki outlet besides the remaining Croatian ports as well. In spite of Croatian and Bosnian authors highlight the importance/possibility of its Central European relations the Ploče outlet had never served as a port for these areas and it is also questionable whether the final port of the still unstable Bosnia-Herzegovina's transport line, which strikes along the country, can compete with the ports of Trieste, Koper and Rijeka which started developing earlier and thereby have significant advantages. It is visible that the significance of the port of Ploče is primarily a traffic corridor issue for Bosnia and for the Bosnian-Croatian relations. The most suitable sea outlet for Bosnia-Herzegovina's industrial demands for raw materials and for products conveyed by water is Ploče. Since the development under the 1960s was a result of a joint Bosnian-Croatian project Bosnia-Herzegovina demanded to obtain automatic ownership in the Port Corporation of Ploče which was established by the Croatian Privatization Fund that has majority ownership in it. Currently the port is mostly maintained by Dalmacijacement and besides that the raw material supply and shipment of Bosnia-Herzegovina's industry (aluminum industry in Mostar, Arcelor Mittal Ironworks in Zenica, GIKIL Lukavac, etc.).

The complicated question of the Serbian sea exit:

The problems of a Serbian outlet to the sea became key question for the newly shaping Serbia and Serbian geopolitics in the 19th century. Serbian politics partly reinforced this by ethnic and geopolitical reasons. The only sea exit on ethnic territory was realized in Dalmatia; which, according to the shaping Serbian political elite, was considered to be one of the future Serbian provinces just like Bosnia and Herzegovina so territorial continuity between Serbian core land and sea was guaranteed. The junction of the Adriatic Sea exit (mainly because of cultural and symbolic reasons) was Dubrovnik, though for example

under the dominance of V. S. Karadžić, Serbian territories led to Trieste (including Zara, Fiume and Trieste as major ports).

After the Balkan Wars and World War I, the Serbs aimed the Shkodra area sea exit in the first place. In October 1918 Serbian troops marched in, but mainly due to Italian military forces they shortly marched out of the city. After World War I and even in the summer of 1920, there were significant movements of Serbian troops and military actions in North-East Albania but this attempt also ended in failure. As an outlet to the sea, Montenegro is evident from an ethnic-national point of view but disadvantageous from a traffic-geographical one. Building the Belgrade-Bar railway also required huge sacrifices and it was implemented rather late. Although Montenegro, and its port in Bar, is already going on its own way for Serbia it is still one of the marine gates to be potentially developed.

The other Serbian marine communicational relation is currently realized through Croatia, though this route is longer than the above mentioned Montenegro route but it is more built up and more favourable from a traffic-geographical aspect. The Romanian Constanta is similarly longer, but despite of this it is one of the most utilized Serbian sea outlet. Presumably, every sea outlet that so far has been fallen into the background just because of ideological reasons can be revalued by the consolidation of the one-time Yugoslav territories and by a unified EU direction. This is shown by the circa 2-years-old Serbian-Croatian-Slovene railway agreements and other Serbian developments in the past year (Sremska Mitrovica-Rijeka coordinated port developments, two-sided coordination of Belgrade-Bar highway and railway developments).

Kosovo is the latest mini state that has been established in the Balkans. It has a traditional kind of economic relation system which rests upon a North-South direction. However, this land-locked state has a sensitive relationship with its northern and southern neighbours but Serbia refuses to recognise that. The majority of Macedonians in Macedonia reckon Kosovo as the hinterland of local Albanian separatist ambitions and Albanian armed troops. Since the economic prospects in Kosovo relate to the exploitation of its mineral resources the state has a share in organizing the opportunity of mass transportation. Thessaloniki is the traditional sea outlet across Macedonia. Kosovo's transport relation with Albania is handled on the Durrës-Kukës-Prizren-Priština route that has huge strategic importance but its permeability is little for the time being. Theoretically, an alternative outlet could be offered by Montenegro but the conditions of transportation are significantly worse there.

The Hungarian Kingdom for centuries had a sea exit to the Adriatic. Details of it can be read hereafter.

CHANGING POSITION OF HUNGARY: THE QUESTION OF THE SEA EXIT – A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Hungary's relationship with the sea is one of the very nearly unexplored fields in the country's political geographical way of thinking. At the end of the 19th century and in the first two decades of the 20th century numerous documents were written within the scope of Fiume and the Hungarian coastline, and the public was also interested in Hungarian marine politics. The most important documents are related to Rezső Havass (Havass, 1911) and Gyula Prinz (Prinz, 1905). Thereafter, the political geography was concerned with discussing the Trianon-issue, the possible solutions for Hungary and the theme

of bipolar world order. It had not become a relevant part of neither the revisionist policy between the two World Wars, nor the concerns of Hungarians beyond the frontier and the agenda of loose foreign relations. Hungarian-Yugoslav relations did not shape up as it was planned so the question could not emerge. The process of Euro-Atlantic integration, the role of Hungary in the Western Balkans, the needs of Hungary in transportation under the process of modernization, the increasing Hungarian presence in Yugoslav succession states, and the previously exceptional interest in Croatian coastline all contributed to have conversations about the issue as an agenda.

From among the three possible seas (Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Adriatic Sea) the major part of the historic Hungary laid closest to the Adriatic. This sea offered more considerable advantages for becoming interconnected into the world market, than did the Black Sea.

When the concept of capitalist market economy spread generally in the 19th century, the Hungarian state made serious efforts to connect the Hungarian coastline with the inner basin regions with modern means of communication. This is how railway lines leading through the Karsts were constructed, through which products of Hungarian agriculture (mainly grains) were forwarded to the ports, primarily to Fiume, than by means of inexpensive sea transportation, to the world market.

The Hungarian Crown had a 190 km long Adriatic coastline, and even this short coastal segment could be accessed through an inland stripe inside the state's body, being 48 km wide at its narrowest point. This area was one of the first territories (then being part of the Croatian Monarchy) to be annexed to the Hungarian Crown, and it was possessed permanently until 1918. The most important town of the Hungarian coast was Fiume, the Croatian name of which (Riekae) was given in the 13th century.

Habsburg rulers wanted to improve the Empire's trade by, among other means, developing seaports. Charles III reinforced the autonomy of Trieste and Fiume (1723), then built the first road through the Karsts, the Charles Route. Maria Theresa continued her father's policy. She organized the coastal territories into a separate province (Littorale Austriacum) in order to optimize the state's economic policy in the region. However, on the whole, she showed preference for Trieste in her foreign policy. As suggested by her son Joseph, she annexed Fiume to Hungary, and placed it under the Hungarian Governor's administration in the form of a *corpus separatum*[1] (1776). The aim was to open up channels for the transfer of Hungarian products, to provide market for them, and, through these, economically improve this region.

The interest of the Hungarian public in seacoasts livened up during the mid 19th century “reform period”. It was believed that one key to economic and industrial development was the improvement of sea transportation and the strengthening of Fiume as an export port. Plans were made for the construction of railways leading to Fiume[2]. The actual work could not proceed because of the War of Independence and the absolutism which then followed. After several years of wrangling, the legal situation of the town was finally settled in 1881, following the Conciliation in 1867.

[1] A separate corpus belonging to the Hungarian Crown.

[2] István Széchenyi appeared to be extremely influential (cf. the slogan "Out to sea, Hungarians!")

The construction of the railway lines belonged to the political debate of the "Fiume or Constanța" dilemma. The route following which Hungarian grains should be transported to its markets in Italy and Western Europe was debated. In fear of competition with the Austrian line leading to Trieste, Hungarian economic politicians proposed that the railway should be directed to the port of the Romanian Constanța. On the contrary, estate owners from the Great Plains, after considering the conditions of transportation (*longer and more expensive shipment on rail, much longer shipment on sea, the competition with Russian and Romanian grains*) voted for the Fiume port. The final section of the railway connecting Budapest and Fiume was completed in 1882, the Oradea-Fiume section in 1909. In the 1910s plans were made for the development of the port and the improvement of the railway line. The geographic and legal basis for establishing improvable *Hungarian* seaports in Dalmatia did exist, but the basic requirement for such development would have been, here, too, the construction of an appropriate railway line. The World War breaking out soon prevented the realization of these plans, and the peace treaties made the loss of coastal territories definitive. Hungary became *a landlocked* state, inside the ring of the hostile states of the so called "little entente". The state looked for a sea exit with new geographic and geopolitical context in the 20th century.

What about the modern times, the 20th and 21th centuries?

As the scientific-technological revolution commenced, and the characteristics of external economic relations went through transformation, the importance and the main features of sea shipping also became different. The circle of goods-, persons- and information carriers broadened, their inner hierarchy changed significantly. Power lines of the core vs. periphery relation also became re-arranged. All these lead to certain directions of communication to become devaluated while the value of others grew. The nature and importance of communication axes became changed.

What about present day Hungary?

There are seven communication axes or channels of present time Hungary, distinguished in the literature. These are as follows (Erdősi, 1996):

a) western (Budapest-Vienna),
b) south-western "Adriatic" corridor,
c) north-eastern "Borsod-Galitian",
d) northern "Tatra-Kraków",
e) eastern "Subcarpathian-Podolian",
f) south-eastern "Pontus-Levante",
g) southern "Suez".

Today, Hungary's foreign trade is done primarily with member states of the European Union, and, to a lesser extent, with neighboring countries. The network of necessary railway, road, inland water and pipeline connections are available. The goods originated from overseas countries (mainly from the Far East) arrive across the ports of Rotterdam, Hamburg and Bremen (altogether 65 %), because the relatively low costs, good logistic services and significant transport capacity. The role of the ports of the Adriatic, Koper and Rijeka are less important despite the geographic proximity. The role of the "Adriatic" corridor itself, in accordance with one of its former functions, is basically the maintenance of communication with the highly developed northern-Italian regions.

In the communication development concept of Hungary the country's specific national interests are being harmonised with Pan-European plans. Elements of the Trans-European Network that cross our country have special

importance. The intention to develop the so-called No. 5 complex communication corridor, the most important element of which is the Trieste-Ljubljana-Budapest-(Bratislava branching)-Uzhgorod-Lvov-Kiev road and railway corridor, is included in the infrastructural system of the European Union. In its function and capacities, though, it is identical with the old route: provides Hungary with a south-west connection with the *West* and the *World Market.*

QUESTION MARKS OF THE NEW "SILK ROAD"

A new concept and opportunity is the "Chinese-Hungarian" railway project. Recent world financial crisis has been re-arranging the spatial order of world economy, which may result in a more powerful and economically stronger China. Now the Chinese goods (or any others from the Far East) are delivered to Europe through the huge ports in Western Europe (Rotterdam, Hamburg etc.). The marine routes circumventing Eurasia and Africa are long, crowded and expensive. Piracy threatens the cargo ships in the Southeast-Asian archipelago and around the Horn of Africa. Shipping distance between Hong Kong and Rotterdam 20,600 km, which takes 46-48 days with a speed of 10 knots.

The direct transport connection between Shanghai and Budapest takes 11.000 km. The railway connection between China and Hungary exists (via Ukraine, Russia and/or Kazakhstan), but there are lots of question marks. Security threats, legal background, transport capacity, different gauges, the overall stability of the region, development issues are the major problems. As with the German-Chinese railway project profitability and demand are the major hindering forces of the operation of such a land corridor. However the potential of this eastern direction is undeniable, it is also present in the Hungarian development strategies it can be an alternative only in the long run.

In the 21st century the question of the Hungarian exit to the sea is still an open issue. The northwestern direction dominates the overseas trade but the southwestern corridor is gaining importance. The investments of the port of Koper, the stabilized situation of Croatia (the lack of which caused the drop of the shipments towards Rijeka), and significant infrastructural investments linking these ports to Hungary (railway links, highway and pipeline connections) are the major elements. The eastern corridor, while being a real alternative, needs significant efforts and a suitable economic environment to be elaborated.

CONCLUZION

The marine vs. continental dichotomy has been the base of political geography for a long time. Major part of the world's countries have no coastlines, they are so called landlocked states. Majority of such areas is concentrated in Europe but besides that there are numerous other states in Central and Southeast Europe that have sea outlets oppressed by difficulties and conflicts. The geographical location of European landlocked states and corridors trace out a temporary zone between maritime and continental Europe which coincide with the In-between European (Zwischen Europa) territorial category.

It seemed for a long time that the process of European integration may terminate the problem of corridors and landlocked states in Europe (so-called four freedoms). Today's crisis in global economy, the most severe political crisis in integration association, and the subsistent multiplicity of international territorial conflicts jointly contribute to revising the question of national sovereignty and within that the marine and political importance of sea outlets.

The policy of sea outlets among the Western Balkan states is still very vivid nowadays. Events of near past, conflicts of present day still make the situation difficult. The European perspective gave and still offers a kind of solution to problems but the question is whether the present acute crisis, that turned severe exactly in the Balkan (Greece), leads to the loss of European perspective. In this case we may count on severe conflicts, territorial debates, individual solutions, and the revival of historical offences.

Hungary is affected in this issue on many layers. The country is motivated to handle the problem because of its historic heritage, present economic interests, and security demands. Currently, from the aspect of transport, the Adriatic Sea plays a second-rate role but touristically and politically it has a more important role.

Transport and delivery relations with China bear high significance for the whole of Europe. In most of the cases shipments arrive by sea mainly to Western European ports. The question of whether this remains the same or whether Hungary may function as a turntable in a future Eurasian land bridge is not subsidiary for Hungary.

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THE GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION OF PLAIN BIRDA-MORAVIŢA AS REFLECTED ON THE MAPS FROM THE HABSBURG AND CONTEMPORARY PERIOD

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Abstract: The article entitled – The Organizing geographic area during Habsburg rule and the contemporary period in Plain-Moravia-Bird – plans to conduct an analysis both of the spatial organization of settlements in the Plain Birda-Moravita during the Habsburg rule . In preparing the present article, there were used several methods of which there could be mentioned the followings: the method of analysis, the historical method, the synthesis method, the comparison method and the mapping method.

Key words: villages, the period of count Mercy, old district of Ciacova, countries, regions, socio-economic developement

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THE HABSBURG RULE

The removal of medieval structures from the areas inhabited by Romanians (from the mid eighteenth century) and important economic and social changes had two major consequences, namely the birth of new social relations and the development of national consciousness, which was an important step towards building the Romanian nation.

In 1716, the whole region of Banat came under Habsburg rule. After the Treaty of Passarotwitz (Pazarovac) from 1718, the entire Banat and other territories previously under Turkish domination became Austro-Hungarian provinces. After the conquest, Banat became the personal property of the emperor from Vienna that administers the province economically. In order to evaluate the possible tax exploitation of the province, the military administration carried out a census in the entire Banat in 1717, the census being completed by the development of detailed maps for the whole of Banat region, showing both the inhabited and abandoned settlements from Banat (Bercea, 2008, 37).

Between 1716-1751 Banat, under Habsburg domination, goes through the military administration period, during which the region was divided into 11 districts for a more effective control.

The reforms that took place during the Austrian Empire period had a major role in the economic and social development and exploitation of the natural resources of Banat.

One of the objectives of the Habsburg domination was the development of economy in Banat, development embodied in: the existence of fertile land, the possibility to increase the agricultural land through drainage and embankments. The development of the province was necessary so that it could to supply and support the troops from the garrisons established in Banat, Banat being an important region for the Habsburg military system. (Bercea, ibid).

The period of Count Mercy, or rather the new Habsburg administration after 1718, is characterized by a cultural, social and economic development, the building of churches for Catholic and Orthodox churchgoers, schools for children, the regulation of river flows and the reclamation of wetlands and ponds, the introduction of advanced agricultural crops, urban expansion and consolidation of cities, improvement of roads and development of markets, building factories and public monuments.

With all the drawbacks caused by the casual hostile attitude of the Hapsburg authorities, their presence here had a beneficial role for the development of the entire region. The orientation towards modernization is evident. However, it should be mantioned that these measures taken by the Habsburg rule had some consequences from a geographical point of view, massive deforestation and draining of marshes destroyed the local climate characteristics, generating climate changes (climate became drier and drier and the temperature rose).




Figure 1. The period of Habsburgh mastery-direct influences an indirect ones on the geographical space in the Birda-Moravița Field

After conquering Banat, the Habsburgs started a long process of colonization, using mainly German Catholics fromWurtenberg, Schwaben, Nassau etc. Therefore, for a time, the population growth was ensured only by the immigration process. As a result, the share of German Catholics reached a point of 50 % of the population. This still represent an exception, since the rest of the region, despite

colonization, was populated mostly by Romanians. As skillful craftsmen, the Germans contributed to the development of industry and trade. Due to the need to ensure better living conditions for the colonizing population, the Austro-Hungarian authorities began a reorganization of all the villages from Banat, while building new ones. As a result, the region became an organized network, and an ordered and compact structure. Relations between the different consequences on the geographical organization of settlements caused by the Habsburg rule in the Plain Birda-Moravita and the entire region of Banat, are shown in Figure 1.

Cartographic sources

Period of old maps

At a first analysis of several maps belonging to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries we could consider the major differences between the old and the contemporary periods.

If we were to look at the map from 1723 (Figure 2) we can easily confirm the presence of these differences.




Figure 2. Ciacova district during count Mercy's times, 1723-1725
(Source: after Arhivele Naționale/Archives of the State – maps and plans collection nr. 33)

Firstly, this period was characterized by instability, the entire region of Banat being ravaged by the Ottoman domination that lasted for 164 years and which has brought great pain and loss of life.

Thus, up to the Treaty of Passarowitz, the entire region was covered with water, the figure below showing a land occupied by marshes and swamps.

In what the settlements from Plain Birda-Moravita are concerned, it should be noted that the current territory of Plain Birda could be identified with the old district of Ciacova (District Csakovaer), the settlements being almost the same for both territories, except certain that are found in the district of Vărset.

However, there were differences in the names of the settlements. Thus, the village of Jebel bore the name Schebel under Count Mercy, Ciacova bore the name Csakova, Petroman bore the same name as it currently hes, Cebza bore the name Csepsa, Obad bore the name Obadic. The parish of Giera bore the name Gyr, and Ciavos bore the name Csavosch. Regarding the village Toager which currently belongs to the parish Giera, does not appear on the map of Mercy because it is attested much later. At that time, the parish Voiteg bore the name Woiteg, and the village Folea (which belongsto Voiteg parish today) bore the name Follia. The village of Cerna, which currently belongs to the parish of Liebling, bore the name Cserna in 1723.

The village Ghilad bore the name Gillad and Gad bore the same name. The settlements situated in the south also had differences in names. Thus, the today parish of Banloc bore the name Banlok, the village Dolat bore the name Dollaz, Ofsenita was recorded under the toponym Offseniza, and Soca bore the mname Soka.

The current city Deta bore the name Detta in 1723 and the village belonging to it, Opatita, bore the name Oppatiza.

The settlements from the south-east of the current Plain Birda also show differences in names. However, Birda kept the same name during the period 1723-1725. The villages that belong to this village today had different names under Count Mercy. Thus, the today village of Sfantu Gheorghe bore the name St.Gorg, and Berecuta bore the name Berekuza, but it should be mentioned that at that time Berecuta was part of Vârset District.




Figure 3. Vârşeţ district during count Mercy's times, 1723-1725
(Source: after Arhivele Naţionale/Archives of the State – maps and plans collection nr. 33)

Denta is another village from Plain Birda which had the same name on the map in 1723, but the village Rovina which now belongs to the parish of Denta, bore wore the name Omor under Count Mercy.

Regarding the settlements from Plain Moravița (Clopodia, Ferendia, Jamu Mare, Gherman si Dejan), it should be noted that on the map from 1723-1725, they were part of the district Vârset (Figure 3).

Thus, as it can be seen on the map, the parish of Jamu Mare bore the name Scham and the villages that currently belong to it, Feredia and Clopodia, were found on the map bearing the name Firendia and Klopodie.

Gaiu Mic, village belonging to the parish of Moravia, bore the name Mal Gay. Another village that belongs to Moravita today, Dejan, in 1723 it bore the name Radovanz.

Stamora Germana is not recorded on the map of Mercy, being certificated later.

The official map of 1761 (Figure 4) does not bring significant changes because it fits in the context of the Habsburg administration.




Figure 4. Ciacova district map during count Mercy's times, 1761
(Source: after Arhivele Naționale/Archives of the State – maps and plans collection nr. 27)

Most of the settlements bore the same names as in 1723-1725, but there must be mentioned some differences in the position of the houses. Thus, the today parish of Livezile appears on the map of 1761 as Dolvadia, and it was placed in the north of the parish of Banloc in 1761, unlike the current period when it is in the western part of the same parish. The toponym Birda becomes Pirda. Also Jamu Mare appears under the name Scham, Ferendia was known under the name Ferentia, and Clopodia bore the name Klogodia. The present parish of Moravita is found on the map as Moraviza, this being found in Vârset district (Figure 5).

Griselini's map (1776) (Figure 6) and Ciacova district map from 1789 (Figure 7) and Vârset map from the same year bring no significant changes in the toponymic elements or in the location of the settlements.




Figure 5. Vârşeţ district map during count Mercy's times, 1761
(Source: after Arhivele Naţionale/Archives of the State – maps and plans collection nr. 27)




Figure 6. The map of Timişan Banat the Birda-Moravița Field, 1776
(Source: after Arhivele Naţionale/Archives of the State – maps and plans collection nr. 32)




Figure 7. Ciacova district map, 1789
(Source: after Arhivele Naționale/Archives of the State – maps and plans collection nr. 58)

However, there are some differences in name on Griselini's map that should be highlighted. Thus, Jamu Mare appears on the map as Gros Scham, the today parish of Voiteg, which was known as Voiteg on the previous maps, is recorded as Neu Voitek, and the village Lătunas that currently belongs to the parish of Jamu Mare, is recorded under the toponym Zatonasch.

The year 1789, does not bring any major changes, compared to 1723 and 1761, on the location of the settlements, however there are some toponymic changes recorded. The today settlements of Plain Moravița are also to be found in Vârset district (Figure 8).




Figure 8. Vârşeț district map, 1761
(Source: after Arhivele Naționale/Archives of the State – maps and plans collection nr. 58)

We must, however, mention the presence of the trade routes that crossed the region at that time and the presence of wetlands and ponds and large afforested areas, areas which are found around Deta, Denta, Toager, Giera, Granicieri Gad, Tolavadia, Liebling, as shown by the geographical organization of the area of these settlements in 1777, respectively 1818 (Liebling).

Period of contemporary maps

After the Great Union of 1918, the entire Banat is characterized by significant changes not only in social, economic or demographic terms, but also in terms of territorial administration, the settlements from the current Plain Birda-Moravita felt those radical changes. Thus, by the Royal Decree of June 13, 1925 nr. 1972, the country was divided into 71 counties which included nets and parishes. The Timis-Torantal county comprised 12 nets and 237 parishes and in 1926 it was established the 13th net. The village Fodorhaz (Fodorhaza), which belonged to Gad parish, was not part of the rural villages and it was disbanded in 1939 (Figure 9).




Figure 9. Localities from Birda-Moravița Field in the period between the wars
(Source: after Arhivele Naționale/Archives of the State – maps and plans collection nr. 20)

In 1942, following the Decree Law 288 of January 23, five parishes are disbanded in Timis-Torontal county, including the parish Omoru Mic. In 1945

the county's administrative organization was represented by two cities (Timisoara and Lipova), 234 parishes and 13 nets, including Ciacova and Deta (Figure 10).




Figure 10. The localities Birda-Moravița Field – administrative organization the racks (Source: after Lotreanu, 1935)

After the World War II, Romania's entrance in the Soviet sphere of influence had consequences on the territorial and administrative organization. On September 6, 1950, by Law No. 5, the 58 counties and 424 nets were disbanded, and in their place, there were created 28 regions with 177 districts, 148 cities and 4052 parishes. The territorial administrative unit was the district, which was directly subordinated to the region. The parishes were subordinated to the district. The two districts were Deta and Ciacova and they were in charge of other parishes from the present territory of Plain Birda-Moravita.

In 1921, Liebling was part of Timis- Torontal County, Ciacova net, being also a parish (Drinovan, 1973, p.203). In 1956 Liebling was part of the Timisoara region, district Ciacova and the village Josif belonged to it (Drinovan, ibid). Since 1972, it is part of Timis county, it is a parish, with the villages Josif and Cerna

belonging to it (Drinovan, ibid). However, in 2002 the parish of Liebling (including the two villages: Cerna and Josif) consisted of 3,680 people with over 80 % Romanians.

Opatita also witnessed an economic boom in 1921, and the settlement belonged to Deta net it was also a parish. In 1956 Opatita was part of the district Ciacova, the village belonging to the parish of Deta. Since 1972, it is part of Timis county belonging to the town Deta.

After the establishment of communism in 1947, the parish of Manastire would also include the villages Berecuta and Sângeorge. But this parish will not last long, being included in the parish of Birda and later in that of Gataia.

The year 1956 is characterized by an administrative reform: Ciacova becomes the residence of Ciacova district.

Between the years 1950-1966 Tolvadia was part of the Banat region, belonging consecutively to Ciacova then Deta districts, and at the same time, it was a parish.

In 1966 Jebel was part of the Banat region, being included in the Deta district and it was a parish (Drinovan, 1973, 202).

In 1950 Folea was part of the Banat region, Deta district (Drinovan, 1973, 253).

In 1968, the village Pădureni becomes attached to the Jebel parish, situated at a distance of 6 km. In 2004, following the law 84/ 2004 on setting up new parishes, Pădureni is restored to its previous status of parish.

According to some studies carried out in 1966 and 1967, The Grand National Assembly from 1968 adopted the Law no. 2 by which it was decided the administrative territorial organization of the country in counties, cities and parishes. Following the disbandment of regions and districts, 49 settlements were declared cities (including Deta- on 27 May, 1967 is disbanded as district, and it declared town, for the third, in 1968). Ciacova became a town in 2004, the year when it was re-established the parishes of Birda, Ghilad and Parta.

According to the new administrative-territorial division, Tolvădia changed its name to Livezile, and since 1972 it belonged to the parish of Banloc, just as the village Dolaț.

Livezile was redeclared parish under law 461/ 2006, by being detached from the parish Banloc (General Urban Plan, 2010, pg 7).

Between 1972-2006 Dolaț belonged to the parish of Banloc. However, following the decree 461/2006, it became part of the parish of Livezile.

From an administrative point of view, after 1952, the village Sângeorge was included in the Deta district, and between 1956-1967, it was part of the Gataia district. But after the administrative reform of 1967, the village will belong to Birda parish until 2004, except for a short period (1988-1990) when it belonged to the parish of Voiteg.

Following the Law 84/2004 Birda became a parish, and the villages Berecuta, Mânăstire and Sângeorge belonged to it. To date the four villages that belonged to the village by the decree becomes Gătaia city.

CONCLUSIONS

The two distinct periods in the history of the settlements from Plain Birda-Moravita present major differences in the geographical organization: the Habsburg rule represents the period when the geographic area of Banat was capitalized at a higher level than in the Middle Ages. Equally, the modern period

stands for a new administrative division that will generate the socio-economic development of the settlements.

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URBAN REGENERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CURRENT URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN ROMANIA. CASE STUDY: ŞTEI CITY (BIHOR COUNTY, ROMANIA)

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Abstract: The centralized planning of the economic development transposed in the territory through forced industrialization and urbanization policies was one of the most powerful transformative processes of the communist Romania space, triggering sudden changes in the traditional lifestyle of the inhabitants and causing territorial disturbances with long term effects. These policies have profiled a specific urban typology, represented by collective buildings with small surfaces, neighborhoods with high urban density, built in the close vicinity of the industrial centers. In most cases, the decision of selecting the rural settlements seen as "having high possibilities of development" to gain the urban status through forced industrialization, was conditioned by the presence of resources (especially the subsoil resources). The fall of the communist regime and the transition to market economy have initiated a metamorphosis of the Romanian urban spaces. Thus, with the disappearance of some industrial branches, imbalances shaped up at urban scale between the working-class neighborhoods lacking investments and the rest of the urban tissue. In the southern part of Bihor County the presence of mineral resources, especially uranium, subsequently represented both the chance of explosive development on the one hand, and the decline and total collapse of these communities, on the other hand. The changes brought by the uranium exploitation (the largest uranium deposit on the surface in the world) in the region were multiple and fast. The most important ones were related to the intake of manpower for whose accommodation there had been built new towns, like Dr. Petru Groza (currently Stei, built from scratch and attached to the namesake village) and Nucet (dormitory town for miners, also built from scratch). This study proposes to analyze the urban regeneration of Stei (named Dr. Petru Groza during the communist era after one of the most important Romanian communist leaders) in the context of current policies of urban development

in Romania. The aim is to emphasize the need for urban regeneration measures in the industrial towns built during the communist regime, which are in a demographic, economic, social and derelict urban structures from the communist period, with outdated infrastructure, degraded built environment and an overall poor quality of the urban life.

Key words: urban regeneration, Ştei city, urban policies, transition

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INTRODUCTION

Within operational planning field, urban regeneration represents a form of the evolution of the city which designates the action of rebuilding the city on itself and recycling built resources. That aims specifically to treat a variety of problems such as social, economic, urban, architectural of certain old neighborhoods degraded and encourage new developments including economic development (Roberts and Sykes, 2000), and to develop solidarity across the community. In the last decades, both scholars and practitioners developed a series of guidelines to optimize urban regeneration (Roberts, 2000) taking into account the existing situation and the global context. Therefore, after the two world wars was set up an urban regeneration based on reconstruction and extension of older areas of cities, often based on a master plan and suburban growth. The key actors and stakeholders in this process were national and local authorities with less involvement of the private sector. In terms of spatial action the emphasis is on local and site levels. Investments were made by the public sector and were oriented towards improvement of housing and living standards (Edgar and Taylor, 2000). Besides implants and replacement of inner areas (Jeffrey and Pounder, 2000) early peripheral development appears. In the 60s, the first signs of the need for an urban regeneration policy based on revitalisation show up. During this period were continued the suburban and peripheral growth, being realized early rehabilitation actions (Jeffrey and Pounder, 2000). Is the period when was encouraged the private sector involvement in urban regeneration. Spatial level of activity was expanded to the regional context. Concerning the economical part of the urban regeneration were continued the public investment with growing influence of private investment. Urban regeneration is oriented towards social and welfare improvement in this way increase the rehabilitation works of existing areas. The evolutions of the urban spaces in the 1970s have determined a reorientation of urban regeneration towards new policies, especially urban renewal. Urban regeneration was focused on in-situ renewal and neighborhood schemes, but at the same time the development at the fringe went on. Spatial level of activity is related to the regional and local levels initially, later with more local emphasis (Lichfield, 2000). Social content of the urban regeneration is oriented towards community-based action and a greater empowerment of local stakeholders.

Redevelopment type policy of urban regeneration started in the 1980s with an emphasis on private sector and special agencies strengthening the growth of partnerships (Carter, 2000).

In the early years the focus is on site regeneration, following then to emphasize on local level through the dominance of the private sector with selective public funds (Noon et al., 2000). In the 80's, urban regeneration starts

to focus on the social issues involving the community in this process but still at an incipient stage. During this period major works are accomplished represented by replacement and new development, often flagship schemes.

Next years have determined the rethinking of urban regeneration towards a more comprehensive form of policy and practice, placing more emphasize on integrated approaches. Partnership is the predominant approach with a greater balance between public, private and voluntary funding (Carter, 2000; Noon et al., 2000). These are the first years that outline the principles of sustainability and the responsibility being assumed partially by the community. Heritage buildings are the most covered by urban regeneration actions. Urban regeneration should start from a strong knowledge of territory by using attribute data arising from economic, social and environment analysis. To these are added various inputs by one hand, internal and external factors of change and the individuality of implementation of necessary measures according to the characteristics of urban space by the other hand.

All these measures generate some outputs that have a noticeable effect on the socio-economic and environmental development. Some outputs have long-lasting effects, as in the case of successful local initiatives which are then transposed into national or European policies. Effects of urban regeneration measures are found obviously in physical improvements and also in the community behavior educated and trained for this purpose (figure 1).




Figure 1. The urban regeneration process
(Source: Roberts, 2000)

URBAN REGENERATION PROCESS IN ROMANIA

In Romania urban regeneration has been understood mostly as a building practice carried out outside housing policies applied to the city as a whole, intended to recover traditional housing to make it available as an exclusive, rehabilitation of heritage buildings in central urban areas. Urban regeneration has acquired a less elitist character and has focused on deprived, underprivileged and vulnerable urban neighborhoods and areas, etc.(Integrated Urban Regeneration in the European Union[1] , 2010). Romanian national urban policy in its current stage of development and implementation is an ongoing process which addresses a series of priorities in a comprehensive and integrated way. Therefore, the emphasis is on the efficient use of urban territory and the limitation of urban sprawl, improving housing conditions and ensuring responsible management of resources, importance of fulfilling the conditions for sustainable, competitive and cohesive cities and the limitation of the exposure of the population to natural and technological risks (EUKN[2] , 2010).

Romania had to tackle and overcome disparities of all sorts left as a legacy by the communist on the one hand and post-socialist urban evolution on the other hand. A short retrospective analysis shows the evolution of the urban population in Romania, deducting the metamorphosis of Romanian urban space in order to meet the housing needs of residents and their related elements such as economic zones, services, public spaces, etc. In the last century the percentage of the urban population from the total population increased steadily (Benedek, 2006) from 20% in the interwar period to over 55% nowadays(table 1).

Table 1. Evolution of the urban population in Romania
(Data source: Romanian Population Census, 1930-2010)

year	1930	1960	1970	1990	2010 (-EU integration)
urban population	20 %	33 %	38 %	53 %	55 %

-forced industrialisation
-emergence of new towns
-collective dwellings

The evolution and the trends of urban development in Romania indicate an increase in population's interest for dwellings in the urban environment, especially in peripheral areas that could take advantage of the availability of certain urban infrastructure items or from the outlooks of their development (Luca, 2009). Romanian post socialist cities are forced to confront with essential dysfunctions referring to financial resources, migration of work labor, gentrification process etc., all related to the urban regeneration process which belongs to the external factors and the limitation of the urban design in order to reduce the urban sprawl and the decline of the cities. Romanian cities are characterized by the dual appearance that displays, on the one hand by the communist legacy and by urban

[1] Toledo Informal Ministerial Meeting on Urban Development June, 2010 Questionnaire on integrated urban regeneration policies

[2] European Urban Knowledge Network, Development and Urban Policy in Romania

drift of the transition period after the end of communist regime and post-integration into the European Union period, on the other hand.

Centralized planning of the communist period highlights some features visible in most cities whether it is about cities with a natural organic growth or cities resulted from the policy of forced industrialization and urbanization. This may outline a specific typology of cities represented by collective housing with small surfaces, neighborhoods with high urban density, built in the close vicinity of the industrial centers. The post communist period captures the transformation of the Romanian urban space (IanoŞ and Tălângă, 1994), when cities dependent by the declined local industry has drawn the entrance of localities in crisis, unable to return to a positive evolutionary course. These cities are characterized by working-class neighborhoods with poor living conditions and socio-economic dysfunctions. Other cities have managed to revitalize their workers' neighborhoods although socialist mark remains visible. Accession of Romania to European Community space is reflected in urban physiognomy by a chaotic development especially at the periphery of city's causing uncontrolled urban sprawl.

The main goals of the current urban regeneration policies as described in a informative guide concerning the urban regeneration published by the Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing are: the rehabilitation of the historical centers; modernization of public space; modernization of the urban infrastructure and improving living conditions in residential neighborhoods(MDLPL[3], 2007).

URBAN DEVELOPMENT AND URBAN REGENERATION IN ŞTEI

Stei city is located in the South-East part of the Bihor County, surrounded by Bihorului, Pădurea Craiului and Codru Moma mountains, at the confluence of the rivers CriŞul Negru, CriŞul Băița and Sighistel. The city is crossed by national road DN 76 Oradea-Deva and Oradea-VaŞcău railway (Filimon, 2007). The distance from Ştei to the main city of the county - Oradea is 80 km. In the immediate vicinity of Stei are three cities BeiuŞ, VaŞcău and Nucet (figure 2).




Figure 2. Localization of Ştei city

[3] Ministry of Development, Public Works and Housing

First mentioned around 1580, Stei was initially a village untills 1986. Urban evolution of Stei city is closely related to nearby existing subsoil resources and the industry developed on this basis. The growth rate of 2190%, from just 377 inhabitants in 1880 to 8637 inhabitants in 2002 (maximum demographic population was 10,415 in 1992) shows to what extent the old village was changing. It should be noted that, although the overall level of Beius Land was facing a downward trend in population since 1966, widespread after 1977, the population growth rate between 1966 and 1977 was over 35% in Stei, and between 1977 and 1992 over 33%. Obviously, the situation is due to the role of "demographic aspirator" imposed by forced industrialization (Filimon, 2007). Only after 1992, together with the economic downturn was installed demographic decline, growth rate became negative (-17%). The negative trend of evolution rate continued for the period 2002-2010 at a rate of - 29% (figure 3).




Figure 3. Evolution of number of inhabitants
(Source: Romanian Population Census, 1930-2010)

After the Second World War, the village had a characteristic mountain village physiognomy, extended along the river with wooden houses (GF, GF +1[4]). The discovery of uranium, caused profound changes in Stei village, the future new town was designed in Moscow by a Russian architect. At first they built numerous barracks of boards, grouped by neighborhoods. In the eastern part of the village was a town of barracks, arranged for the soviet army, brought especially in the village. For soviet specialists were built solid two floors blocks (Lenin Street-nowadays Unirii Street), prohibited to the circulation of vehicles (figure 4).



Figure 4. Two floors block built for the soviet elites (Lenin Street–nowadays Unirii Street)

[4] Ground floor and ground floor plus 1 level

There followed a sports and exclusive stores, which had access only Russian citizens. Common people were living in KD (with wall panels) type blocks and BW type houses (green boxes German inspiration), these were dwelling with a floor or two, buildings for 4 families and houses for 2 families (figure 5).



Figure 5. BW type family house

During 1952 and 1956, the masses were accommodated within old buildings (with two floors) in Petrileni neighborhood.

On 10 January 1956, together with Nucet and VaŞcău, Ştei is declared city by the means of a Council of Ministers Decree. In 1958 the town changed its name to Dr. Petru Groza, and in 1996 regained its former name Ştei.

The town's residential area is compact and has three distinct housing subareas. The first one is the old village, developed on the current Miron Pompiliu Street, extended along the river, near Minerul Ştei stadium with dwelling GF, GF+1 and GF+2.


In the western part of city on the 1945-1955 plotting was developed a primarily residential area with individual and collective apartments with small and medium height GF, GF+2, GF+4.

Local architecture is specific to a Transylvanian mining settlement (eg. Jiu Valley developed in the same period), - wooden dwelling for GF and brick buildings in a classic-style for GF+1 and GF+2.

Housing has mushroomed since 1960, with concrete blocks and brick with high regime, GF+4 and GF + 9; these are similar in architecture with the collective dwellings built around that time across the country.

Most of these buildings were located in the central area along thoroughfares having commercial spaces at the ground floor. The residential areas expanded with new buildings (ANL[5]) nearby railway station and old blocks (ANL) near the intersection between Miron Popmpiliu Street and Lucian Blaga Street. Thus, 72 apartments (ANL) were completed and 36 are ongoing tender for construction (figure 6).

[5] Agenția Națională de Locuințe/ National Housing Agency



LEGEND

1 - collective houses GF + 1, GF + 2
2 - existing collective housing in blocks, GF +1, GF +2, GF+ 2, GF + 4 with commercial and service at the ground floor
3 - existing individual houses and collective houses in blocks GF, GF+1, GF+2, GF+3
4 - existing individual houses and collective houses in blocks GF, GF+1, GF+2, GF+4 with commercial and service at the ground floor and collective housing in high blocks with GF+ 5 and GF+ 9
5 - proposed individual houses with GF, GF +2
6 - services, industry
7 - existing individual houses and collective housing in blocks with GF +2, GF +4; proposed individual houses with GF, GF +2
8 - proposed individual houses with GF, GF +2
9 - existing individual houses; proposed individual houses with GF, GF +2
10 - leisure, sports, tourism areas
11, 12 - public institutions and services

Figure 6. Functional zones of Ștei city
(data source: Ștei Land Use Plan, Ștei Local Planning Register)

Urban regeneration in the city of Stei is a long process, and since this is a small town resources are limited and largely dependent on national policies and European funding opportunities (Filimon et al., 2011). The inclusion of city in the nationally created disadvantaged areas, specifically by declaring disadvantaged mining area Stei - Nucet (founded by GD[6] 194/1999) conferred it some opportunities. These areas have been created for a period of 10 years (01.04.1999 - 01.04.2009) by the decision no. 194 of 25 March 1999, published in Monitorul Oficial al României[7] no. 134/01.04.1999. Thus, investors were installed in Ştei who developed an industrial platform one of the largest in the country. Important in this case is that these investors have contributed to the rehabilitation of heritage buildings. On the basis of the "Casa Verde" program launched by the Ministry of Environment, individuals had the opportunity to access grants to carry out works to improve their individual houses in order to achieve better energy efficiency. This program continues to be accessible to individuals. ANL had a major role in the last years urban development as can be seen by the number of apartments built in the city, over 72 apartments was built and other 36 are in progress.

The municipality is involved in projects aimed at indirectly urban regeneration, the investments targeting priority works of rehabilitation of water and sewerage networks in the city, or the creation of an integrated rehabilitation system of the water supply systems, of sewage systems, of water treatment plants and of waste water treatment. By the Environmental Fund Agency with the Local Public Found co-financing was realized the project targeting "the green rebuilding of the Stei city" focusing on the modernization and the expansion of public lighting in Stei.



Figure 7. House of Culture Miron Pompiliu (rehabilitated)

Furthermore, there are two projects in the cultural field such as "the project for cultural cohesion between Stei and Hajdudorog" which was funded by the Programme for the Romanian-Hungarian Cross-Border Cooperation 2007-2013 and the project “the rehabilitation and the equipping of the House of

[6] Romanian Government Decree

[7] Monitorul Oficial al României is the official gazette of Romania, in which all the promulgated bills, presidential decrees, governmental ordinances and other major legal acts are published

Culture Miron Pompiliu" financed by the Ministry of Culture[8] (figure 7). During this period there were also individual initiatives to rehabilitate individual houses with their own funds (figure 8).



Figure 8. Old soviet BW types houses rehabilitated

CONCLUSION

In Romania urban regeneration is focused more on the rehabilitation of collective dwellings, modernization of the urban infrastructure, improving living standards in residential neighborhoods and rehabilitation of the historical centers. Many of the major actions in recent years have been based on European structural funds available for these types of works. Adaptation of the urban regeneration concept in Romania is based on the fact that there are similarities in its application and it represents one of the program tools with high potential of revitalizing the residential areas in city centers. Romania has an obsolete housing stock that awaits rehabilitation; the programs developed are suffering from a low participation of all major actors and stakeholders. The small cities in Romania have even greater problems, their resources being limited and largely dependent on national policies and European funding opportunities.

The former mining town has been exposed to many external interventions, causing an artificial growth during the communist regime. Through forced urbanization and industrialization policies, the city has reached the peak of built area. After 1989, the city continued to grow due to its ability to attract labor force from adjacent rural areas. The city of Ştei, with an obsolete housing stock is facing a lack of financial resources to initiate urban regeneration programs. The absence of urban regeneration strategies and the lack of specialists condemn Stei city to an opportunistic urban regeneration depending on external factors.

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[8] Datas was extracted from the list of investment projects of administrative-territorial unit Ştei;

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THE LOBBY ACTIVITY OF LARGE CORPORATIONS

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Abstract: This paper analyzes the corporate actions towards the management of the political environment, the methods to influence it and the ethic framework of corporate political actions. In this respect it is important firstly to understand the role of corporations in the current geopolitical circumstances, and secondly, the systematic understanding of how corporations seek to influence the governmental actors as critical element of corporate strategy or as an adjunct in the process of implementing the strategy. In the purpose of this work, we should note first that the companies are reluctant to discuss their relationship with the government and in particular their involvement in lobbying. This occurs at least partly because of the concern of corporations that such information is commercially sensitive, and also, because of the competitive value. Secondly, the difficulty in discussing the concept of lobby changes due to the continuous (re) definition and semantics of the term. There is no single definition regarding the term "lobby", thus, undermining the attempts to quantify its importance to the efficient functioning of corporations, and the attempts to dispel the assumption that any form of corporate-government relations is essentially corupted and antisocial as well. Finally, we aim to answer the question: Is the lobby a way to make the economic policies more eficient?

Keywords: corporate, policy, strategies, geopolitics, lobby

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THE CORPORATIONS AND THEIR ROLE IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY

The last three decades have testified a lively debate regarding the role of corporations in society. These entities play an active role and have become more and more important.

The corporation is the most original social invention of the democratic capitalism[1], created for economic purposes. The motivation for this invention was also social: to increase the welfare of the nation, to generate (for the first time in history) sustained economic growth, this effect has been obtained. However, the corporation – as type of voluntary association - is not only an economic institution, but it is also a moral and political institution. It generates different values, but it also depends on different moral-cultural values and new forms of political governance. In two centuries, the existence of corporations has produced a huge social revolution, moving the focus from the agricultural and industrial activities on business[2].

The economic and geopolitical role that corporations have come to play in society over 150 years is an important role, not being a 'social threat', but the product of human ingenuity, as they built a complex network of contractual relationships that serve the objectives of the parties within the law. The corporation is not a creation of the state having none of the privileges enjoyed by the state actors, on the contrary the corporation has survived despite the sometimes unfavorable treatment applied by the state (taxes, legal restrictions etc.).

The corporation is not an individual, it does not feel, does not choose, do not benefit from specific taxes or subsidies, however, all these actions can be to the benefit or disadvantage of the individuals who have relationships with corporations (stakeholders: investors, employees, customers).

Today's corporations have become very powerful social and economic agents. The arbitration of the various national structures involuntarily forces a process of convergence and a tendency of opening. The corporate empires stretch across the globe, in some cases their income may exceed the GDP of the country of implantation[3] (for example: Unilever - Best had sales exceeding the GDP of countries like Ecuador, Kuveit, Kenya and others), such a country is clearly dependent on the implanted company.

We must take into consideration the role that corporations play in the international arena of peace and war (geopolitical role). The corporate governance involves not only the economic but also the obligations and ethical and legal constraints (compliance with social problems and maximizing of the economic value). Understanding the interconnections between the modern war and the corporations shows that the social and corporate goals have not yet reached the end of history. The corporations and the competition in an organized market can contribute to long-term social solution. On one hand it can provide modern means to war (it can profit from war, this statement raises the following problem actually quite difficult: the political isolation of business interests related to industrial military enterprises). On the other hand the existant competition on the market can provide what William James called "the moral equivalent of war" the institutions necessary for peace[4].

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[1] Bainbridge, S.M. (2003), *Catholic Social Thought and the Corporation*, University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law October 22.

[2] Idem.

[3] Branson, D.M. (2006), *The social responsability of large multinationals corporations,* http://thinkexist.com

[4] James, W. (1983), *The Principes of Psychology,* Harvard Business Press.

In 2007, Stephen Barley examined the growth of the influence of corporations in the political process, pointing out their tendency to undermine democracy[5] and concluded that students should reserve most of their time to understanding and studying the influence of the powerfull corporations "leviathan"[6] on the democratic system.[7] The author also noted that by lobbying, political contributions and sophisticated public relations campaigns, the corporations and their leaders have turned the political system and a large part of public opinion against the rules. Thus, the ability of law to protect the people and environment from corporate damage suffered. As such, we are currently witnessing a greater involvement of corporations in the political process.

At the same time corporation was and is both a social and productive invention.[8]

The network of the multinational corporations and their subsidiaries, located around the world is materialized in the form of an integrated system, with economic value, social and ethical policy, which occupies an increasingly privileged position in shaping the evolution of the global economy as a whole and each country, as self-standing entity, also influencing the social and political behaviors capable to sustain the transformations necessary to support the development and the economic growth worldwide.

THE CORPORATE LOBBY ACTIVITY

We mentioned that there is no single definition regarding the term "lobby"[9].

From a historic point of view, the term "lobbying" comes from the tradition that the representatives of the groups of interest used to expect the U.S. president in the lobby of a hotel. Thus, the term of lobbyist refers to those who "are kept on hold" on those who try to influence the actions of powerfull people to achieve specific goals[10]. There are two trends in the world in terms of understanding the concept of the lobby. In the continental Europe, the lobbying organizations are seen as representing an attempt to make particular interests prevail to the detriment of general interest and are thus a deviation from the principles of democracy and having more to do with the traffic of influence. In general, Europe-wide the citizens' participation in the exercise of political power is seen as possible only by vote or by referendum, excluding the intermediary role of the lobbying organizations.[11] A different perception on how to reach the policies that serve the public interest exists in the Anglo-Saxon democracy, especially in the U.S. In this case it is considered that the general interest is a result of many private interests and, consequently, the lobbying organizations are designed to mediate the relationship between individuals and state.

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[5] Barley, S.R. (2007), *Corporations, Democraty and The Public Good*, Journal of Managerial Inquiry, 16 (3): 201-15.

[6] Chandler, A.D.; Mazlish, B. (2005), *Leviathans multinational Corporations and The New Global History*, Cambridge University Press.

[7] Palazzo, G.; Scher, A:G. (2008), *Corporate social responsability, democracy, and the politicization of the corporations,* http://www.chinadaily.com.cn

[6] Jensen, M.C.; Meckling, W.H. (1983), *Reflections on the corporation as a social invent*, Midland Corporate Finance Journal, vol. 1, nr. 3.

[9] Taminiau, Y.; Wilts, A. (2006), *Corporate lobbying in Europe, managing knowledge and information strategies*, Journal of Public Affairs 6: 122–130.

[10] Idem.

[11] Academia de Advocacy, *Cercetare privind Reglementarea Activitatilor de Lobby*, http://www.academia-de-advocacy.org, 2003

One of the main differences that need to be made is between the concept of lobbying and the traffic of influence. Therefore, lobbying can be seen as a transparent way of influencing legislative and executive decisions through any type of actions that are aimed to support rights and legitimate interests in promoting, the adoption, amendment or repeal of laws or administrative legislation, by the public authorities. The traffic of influence, on the other hand, is defined in the Romanian law as receiving or demanding money or other benefits or accepting promises, gifts, directly or indirectly, for himself or for another, committed by a person who has influence or let them believe that has influence on a lead officer to do or not do an act that comes into his duties.

The lobby is part of the methods by which groups of interest (namely corporations) – defined as a group of individuals organized to defend and promote the common interests try to influence decision-making, respectively the formulation of the public policy[12] – pursue their objectives. According to the same definition, lobbying is the method through which ah group of interest tries to determine an official to take a position or to make a decision to serve the interests of that group.

The objectives of any lobbying activity can be classified into two broad categories[13]: (i) the adoption or rejection of a proposal in the legislative component, and (ii) the issue or refraining from issuing an administrative act, in the executive component.

The analysis of the lobby activities revealed both the existence of positive and negative aspects of them as well. The critics of lobby illustrate the situations in which this activity has degenerated into corruption or the lobbyists' power of persuation determined the adoption of measures conflicting to the opinions and interests of the majority. The control over the negative impact of lobbying can be obtained by legal regulations. Among the positive effects of lobbying are, certainly, the adjustments of the legislative or the executive actions to meet the needs of a group when that group does not have enough force to sustain the cause through the electoral process.

Since the 1940s Fainsod [14] said that an industry can achieve a favorable regulatory by mobilizing three types of resources: financial (public campaign financing), human (lawyers and lobbyists) and political (political coalition).

Some authors [15] use the term political market strategy as most corporations engage themselves in lobbying also because the consequences are often felt industry-wide. The financial resources and time consumed on "lobbying" by large corporations, although often difficult to determine, certainly imply that, in practice, lobbying will have beneficial effects. Indeed, many large corporations are engaged in such strategies; however, the caractheristics of these activities vary in scope and intensity.

In the literature, we may find a variety of terms used to describe this process of interaction between corporations and the governmental actor but if we were to adopt a broader definition, the term lobby describes an attempt to influence government decisions.

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[12] Gorcea A., *Rolul Grupurilor de Interese in Elaborarea Politicilor Publice in Romania*, Europolis, Universitatea Babes-Bolyai, http://www.polito.ubbcluj.ro/europolis/articol%20Gorcea.htm

[13] Academia de Advocacy, *Op. Cit.*

[14] Dahan, N. (2005), *A contribution to the conceptualization of political resources utilized in corporate political action*, Journal of Public Affairs 5: 43-54.

[15] Baines, P.; Viney, H. (2010), *The unloved relationship? Dynamic capabilities and politicalmarket strategy: a research agenda*, Journal of Public Affairs, vol. 10, Issue 4: 258-264.

We consider justified the opinion of the authors who argue that the need to build strong links between corporations and government is a direct consequence of the degree to which the government regulates an industry environment. For example, industries such as defense (involving high government spending), pharmaceuticals, food production or the utility (with strong regulatory activities) would be expected to develop and maintain a high efficiency of the political strategies market, rather than in the sectors where government intervention is limited and relatively passive, as if they were not doing so they might actually reduce the size of some competitive companies on the market.

It is obvious that all corporations want the govermental actors to develop legislation or to regulate it and the result to be beneficial to their objectives. For some this process is critical and justifies the additional investment required.

In this respect, there are corporations whose contact with those who take political decisions is so powerful that they are actually involved in co-creating the laws. [16] This is the highest level of polical market strategy, and certainly suggests activities that go beyond the scope of the term "lobby" because lobbying involves only active attempts to persuade.

Then, there are corporations that try to change the law in their favor as it is developed. They cannot create the law, but will try to influence it in detail before it is adopted. Thus, the corporations can exercise their influence either through contributions to the legislative process during the advisory periods, or by denying and interpretation of the new legislation or regulatory actions as they are introduced, if there is no opportunity to influence it.

Finally, there are corporations that need to respond to legislative or regulatory measures because of lack of influence in the legislative or regulatory bodies. The focus of their strategy will be largely placed on managing the potential impact of regulatory or legislative activity scanning through the political environment[17].

Taminiau i Wilts[18] believe that, for example, the effectiveness of corporate lobbying in Europe depends on the quality of knowledge and the information strategies of corporations. All these authors believe that the financial incentive strategies are not applicable in the EU context, the direct interaction with committees and decision-making bodies of the European Union and providing reliable information for public officials remains the most important way to influence the political environment and the new regulations.

For the politically active corporations this means that, to be able to provide information both for stakeholders and other EU institutions is of strategic importance and the efficiency of lobbying can be achieved by monitoring and processing of the information of all corporations. Thus, the effectiveness of lobbyinf increasingly depends on the ability of corporations to manage the flow of information and share knowledge internally and externally within the corporation with other stakeholders. Therefore, in Europe, the corporate lobby depends heavily on the knowledge and information management capacity of corporations.

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[16] Dahan, N. (2005), *A contribution to the conceptualization of political resources utilized in corporate political action*, Journal of Public Affairs 5, Issue 1: 43-54.

[17] Baines, P.; Viney, H. – *Op cit.*

[18] Taminiau Y.; Wilts, A. (2006), *Corporate lobbying in Europe, managing knowledge and information strategies*, Journal of Public Affairs, vol. 6, Issue 2: 122–130.

In this context, we consider that it is important for corporations to know how to manage the knowledge and the strategies in their attempts to influence the government decisions. Along with knowledge and expertise, therefore, the ability to understand the political dynamics and the appropriate time to start lobbying is important for corporate lobby in Europe.

Moving to another register, despite the popularity of corporate involvement in politics there is, yet, little discussion of corporate political action in business ethics. Few studies on the ethics of corporate policy actions focus primarily on one or two things in judging ethics, such as purpose, means and consequences, but very few are systematically made to analyze and articulate ethical standards for these corporations and the industries actors seeking to influence the government.

Gao Yongqiang[19] is trying to do so in An ethical judgment framework for corporate political actions. Thus, by applying three basic ethical principles, including the utilitarian theory (Bentham, Ricardo, Smith), the theory of rights (Kant, Locke) and the theory of justice (Aristotle, Rawls), Gao proposed an ethical framework for analyzing the corporate political action. This ethical framework focuses on four aspects of annaction, including objesctives / purpose, the means used to achieve the objectives, the results and consequences of the process itself. The means and the consequences are considered basic criteria but the objectives and the process contribute to the ethical analysis of corporate lobbying.

The policy actions of the large corporations have been suspected almost since their emergence.

It was argued that these corporations which provide lobbying are harmful to the society, arguing that they corrupted the political system. It is true that most corporate committees that provide for some business lobbyists are perceived to be greedy and self-interested in their attempt to expand their influence towards the boardrooms in government policy making. As a result, the government now responds more often to limited power-interests groups, mainly economic organizations, the wealthy and elite groups of influential people about their wishes instead to the will of the people. It is true that the businesses financed by lobby have captured the political process and prevented other legitimate voices to be heard in the debates on public issues. In this context is the practice appropriate or inappropriate when the corporations try to influence the public policy? While in the past much attention has been placed on the ethic principles and practices for the standards in the government service, very little was done in a systematic way to analyze and articulate ethical standards for those corporations and industries that actively seek to influence governmental actors. In Gao's study, the corporate political actions are ethical if they follow appropriate objectives through appropriate means, with appropriate processes and outcomes and appropriate consequences. However, an ethical corporate political action does not necessarily meet all four criteria. A corporate political action is ethical if it meets all criteria: appropriate means and appropriate consequences. However, when the means and consequences are difficult to measure, and the goals and process are easily identified, when appropriate targets and appropriate process helps in terms of corporate ethical policy actions.

In this context, today's businesses are often challenged by the public for bad or unethical acts performed in the political arena. Some corporations have even suffered the loss of legitimacy and public image after unethical acts were implemented.

[19] Gao, Y. (2008), *An ethical judgment framework for corporate political actions*, Journal of Public Affairs, vol 8, Issue 3: 153–163.

AS CONCLUSIONS – IS THE CORPORATE LOBBY A WAY TO MAKE THE ECONOMIC POLICIES MORE EFFICIENT?

In the economic sphere, the corporate power is exercised through a process of negotiation between corporations and the state agencies, between the corporations and within the latter, between managers and unions. In the sphere of politics, the power manifests themselve in the process of negotiation between the political parties, interest groups and the state. The negotiation process is not equivalent to that of free competition. If the latter is of impersonal nature, the negotiation involves special mechanisms where specific elements which are present in political and administrative processes: hierarchy, domination, influence. The negotiation relationship assumes a balance of power between all partners.[20] The opinion of the quoted author is that the use of negotiation can avoid some conflicts of interest that may cause loss but that in order to take advantage of this process a balance of power between the parties involved in negotiation must exist.

The research of prestigious authors draw attention on the negative effects exerted on the economic systems of some actions of the interest groups (in our case corporations), lobbying entering within the scope of their activity. The conclusions of the research conducted by Mancur Olson[21] are summarized by Iancu[22]:

(i) In an economic and social system in which the most powerful interest groups have the sole purpose of distribution, that system cannot reach the optimal state (efficiency).

(ii) The corporations, collective action aimed, proliferate and strengthen especially in those societies and economies that have a higher degree of stability.

(iii) By their nature, the corporations representing the interest groups for collective action, follow closely the interests of their members and have no incentive to make significant sacrifices in the interest of society. The groups will choose their most favorable actions, even if the social costs of change will exceed many times the amount distributed.

(iv) The expansion organizations for collective action and especially the formation of coalitions for the distribution severely undermine the competitiveness and the growth.

(v) To achieve the goals, the distribution coalitions use both the influence actions on government policy, and the actions to influence the markets. Such actions have resulted in not only the expected effects but also in a series of side effects underlined in the following two points:

(v_1) The distribution coalitions which take actions to influence the government policies contribute to the proliferation of regulations and the increase of bureaucracy.

(v_2) The agreements between the allied corporations to influence the market relations mean increasing negotiation and organization, which complicates the decision-making mechanisms and increases the transaction costs.

It should be mentioned that the above effects produced by some collective action focused on the distribution of social gains. In principle, in the case of the social benefits of a certain level, their distribution is limited to the members of society at that level. Their division is achieved through a negotiation process that

[20]Iancu, A., (1998), *Bazele Teoriei Politicii Economice*, Ed. All Beck, Bucuresti, p. 38.

[21] Mancur, O., (1965), *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

[22] Iancu, A., *Op. cit.*, p. 621 - 624

relies on a simple principle: a party wins are losses to the other side or even absence of earnings.

One of the problems that can occur because of the lobbying activities in an environment of corruption is that is possible to create a privileged class of lobbyists agreed to certain institutions and/or persons or dignitary, contrary to the principle of free access to public authorities.[23]

On the other hand, however, through lobby we can promot some niche interests in order to pursue and achieve a maximization of general welfare.

In conclusion, we can say that lobbying can lead to effective public policies but can also have an adverse effect in an unstable institutional environment, poorly regulated or where regulations are not respected.

We would like to conclude by saying that although the public corporations are urged to have an ethical behavior, ethical behavior setting is a challenge. We believe that an ethical behavior does not preclude pursuing their own interests, but should take place in an appropriate manner and with appropriate consequences.

In other words, a corporate ethics policy action should be legal, not violate the fundamental human rights, should not deliberately harm, or if it harms the others then to provide appropriate compensation arrangements. Also, a corporate ethics policy action should have a positive net effect on society, should not make any undue harm to others and should not oppose others involved in lobbying.

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[23] Academia de Advocacy, *Op. cit.*

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THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF TRANSCARPATHIA AND ITS COMPARISON WITH THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAIN REGION OF HUNGARY

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Abstract: Transcarpathia is one of the 25 administrative units of the Ukraine. Till the recent times it has remained a peripheral region of the country, as being situated very far from the economic centres of Central and Eastern Ukraine. But nowadays, in the changing and transforming Europe it has some remarkable advantages as to the possibilities of economic development. Firstly, Transcarpathia borders on four different foreign countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Poland) which are now all members of the European Union. This fact is very promising from the point of view of the present and future cross-border cooperations between Transcarpathia and the borderside regions of these states, especially the Northern Great Plain region of Hungary. Secondly, the region is getting an increasing share of foreign investments arriving in the Ukraine, the main target of which is the developing industrial sector of Transcarpathia. That's why it deserves a further and more thorough examination.

Key words: raw materials, heavy industry, light industry, branches of production, industrial export

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INTRODUCTION

Despite its potentially favourable economic conditions, the Transcarpathian region now plays only a minor role in the social and economic life of the Ukraine. Being the second smallest region of the country, Transcarpathia occupies one of the bottom positions on grounds of population number, the value production of the service and agricultural sector or the

amount of industrial output. On the other hand it takes up a "distinguished" place in the unemployment ranking list[1]. Some optimism can only be caused by the fact, that a constantly increasing proportion of the foreign investments in the Ukraine arrives in Transcarpathia, mainly in the industrial sector of the region. Mostly due to this in 2010 Transcarpathia occupied the first position according to the growth of the industrial production in the country (*Table I.*).

Table I. The place of Transcarpathia among the regions of the Ukraine
(Source: Transcarpathian Regional Statistical Yearbooks, 2003-2011)

Index	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
	position								
Area	24.	24.	24.	24.	24.	24.	24.	24.	24.
Number of the present population	18.	17.	17.	17.	17.	17.	17.	17.	17
Unemployment rate	9.	11.	11.	12.	11.	11.	9.	11.	10
Average monthly earnings	17.	16.	16.	15.	17.	17.	17.	17.	22.
Volume of the industrial production	24.	nd.	nd.	nd.	nd.	nd.	23.	24.	24.
Growth of the industrial production compared to the previous year	1.	3.	16.	2.	4.	10.	27	1.	21.
Production of consumer goods	22.	nd.	nd.	nd.	nd.	nd.	nd.	nd.	nd.
Gross agricultural product	24.	24.	25.	24.	23.	19.	24.	24.	25.
Direct foreign investments during the year	6.	6.	8.	10.	13.	11.	14.	13.	15.
Services	25.	18.	20.	21.	21.	20.	21.	21.	21.
Human development index	3.	4.	6.	7.	8.	9.	12.	8.	nd.

Industry plays an important role in the economic structure of Transcarpathia, though the region has a share of only less than 1 per cent of the industrial production of the Ukraine. (24th position among the 25 major administrative units of the country). The factories of Transcarpathia produce more than half of the region's GDP, while they give work only to 12,7 per cent of all the employees. In the middle and in the end of the 1990's the general economic crisis deepened and there was a decrease in industrial production, but in the last 10-15 years the industry of Transcarpathia is showing an increasing tendency again. (Figure 1).




Figure 1. The role of Transcarpathia in the economy of the Ukraine (1990-2011)
(own editing, based on the data of the Transcarpathian Regional Statistical Yearbooks, 2000-2011)

[1] *Transcarpathian Regional Statistical Yearbook 2011*, Transcarpathian Regional Bureau of Statistics, Ungvár, 2012, 30

LATEST GEOGRAPHICAL CHANGES IN THE INDUSTRY OF TRANSCARPATHIA

As for the development of the industrial sector in general Transcarpathia has favourable conditions, because the amounts of the industrial labour force, the agricultural and silvicultural raw materials and non-metallic mineral resources are sufficient. On the other hand numerous kinds of fuel and basic industrial raw materials are missing in the region. Due to this Transcarpathia is dominated by the labour-intensive branches of industry which don't require too much raw materials. The changing of the sectoral structure of the industry is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. The division of the industrial sector of Transcarpathia by branches (Source: Transcarpathian Regional Statistical Yearbooks, 2000-2011)

Industrial branch	Share from the industrial production of the region, per cent					
	2000	2003	2006	2009	2010	2011
Mining industry	3.7	1.7	1.3	1.0	1.3	1.1
Food industry and processing of the agricultural products	22.6	20.8	14.9	15.1	13.8	12.1
Light industry	9.5	7.9	5.4	5.6	4.7	4.1
Forest and wood-working industry	19.0	13.8	5.2	4.6	3.8	5.0
Chemical industry and oil refining	2.5	5.5	2.8	7.2	7.4	7.1
Engineering industry	6.0	25.6	48.0	38.5	43.9	46.3
Power generation	15.2	9.4	12.0	18.0	16.7	16.8
Other	21.5	15.3	10.4	10.0	8.4	7.5
Industry in total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

As it is seen from the table, since the turn of the millennium the proportion of most industrial branches in Transcarpathia is stagnating or decreasing. The only exception is the engineering industry, which shows a spectacular production increasing in this period. This is the branch, towards which remarkable foreign capital investments are directed. For example, the Ungvár electric motor and cable factory produces different cable bundles by a German investment for such important multinacional companies as the Bosch or the Opel. All the more, in the village of Tiszasalamon, located in the very west of Transcarpathia, the Škoda company has opened up a car assembly plant. All this, of course, has seriously revived the attention of the home investors too[2].

Thus, the most important industrial branch of Transcarpathia is the engineering industry, which has a fairly complicated structure. Its plants are producing mainly electric motors, metal- and wood-working equipment, TV sets, machinery for distribution of natural gas, gas meters and, of course, cars. (Table 3). The largest factories of the branch are the Ungvár Electric Motor Works, the Munkács and Beregszász Precision Instrument Factory, the Kölcsény Machine-Tool Factory, the Ilosva Factory of Electromechanics, the Munkács, Nagyszőlős, Szolyva, Ökörmező and Volóc affiliated companies of the Lemberg "Elektron" concern[3].

Till the year 2001 the main importance in the engineering industry belonged to the electronics and electric engineering branch (72,5 per cent in the total value production in 2001), but in the last six years the leadership has been

[2] Fodor, *Kárpátalja iparföldrajzának változásai az ezredforduló óta eltelt időszakban.* In: „Regionális átalakulás a Kárpát-medencében" Pécs, 2006, 111

[3] O. V. Zastavetska – B. I. Zastavetskiy – I. L. Ditchuk – D. V. Tkach, *Heohrafiya Zakarpatskoyi oblast'i*, Ternopil, 1996, 66

taken over by the car-manufacturing, which had a share of 71 per cent in the total value production in. This happened unanimously due to appearance of the Škoda company in Transcarpathia, which, as we mentioned above, has opened up a large car assembly plant near Tiszasalamon, not far from the town of Csap[4].

Table 3. The most important products of the Transcarpathian engineering industry (Source: Transcarpathian Regional Statistical Yearbooks, 2000-2010)

Product denomination	2000	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Electric motors (1000 pieces)	103,4	109,5	88,8	110,0	92,2	82,7	55,8	55.6	46,1
Gas meters (pieces)	4688	4729	2667	2545	1489	1348	791	1106	nd.
Radiators, convectors (1000 pieces)	nd.	25,5	52,6	103,6	93,7	97,3	131,5	92,3	95,5

The forest and wood-working industry was created on the basis of formerly rich forest reserves of Transcarpathia. The most important lumbering centres are now located in the eastern part of the region, while the wood-working plants are found all over it. The production scale of the branch is headed by the sawn timber, plywood, different kinds of parquet and furniture, but the formation of output indices of the separate product groups was quite dissimilar in the last few years. For example, a clear increase is seen in the production of sawdust plates (*Table IV.*). A remarkable production fluctuation is noticeable in case of many wood-working products, what is primarily due to the unstability of the local market and the changeability of the demands[5].

Table 4. The main products of the forest and wood-working industry in Transcarpathia (Source: Transcarpathian Regional Statistical Yearbooks, 2000-2010)

Product denomination	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Sawn timber (1000 m^3)	207,8	236,1	234,4	256,9	378,7	326,2	256,7	251,4	213,1	168,7
Sticked plywood (1000 m^3)	9,7	8,8	9,3	7,4	7,3	6,8	7,0	1,7	0,7	0,5
Compressed sawdust plates (1000 m^3)	0,4	-	-	4,0	-	33,5	-	15,9	64,2	24,4
Parquet (1000 m^2)	36,1	30,6	80,7	61,0	78,7	48,6	54,2	16,6	37,9	12,5

The share of the most important branches from the total value production of forest and wood-working industry shows serious changes in the post-millennium period. The most remarkable shift in the balance has been in favour of sawing industry, which now gives more than 4/5th of the total value production. Meanwhile the proportion of all the other branches is stagnating or decreasing[6].

The biggest forestry companies are found in Rahó, Huszt, Szolyva, Királymező (Uszty-Csorna), Kőrösmező and Perecseny (*see Figure 2.*) Many of their plants and factories are scattered about in the settlements of the foothills

[4] *Transcarpathian Regional Statistical Yearbook, 2003*, Transcarpathian Regional Bureau of Statistics, Ungvár, 2004, 141

[5] Fodor, *Ipar*. In: Kárpátalja. Régiómonográfia, Pécs-Budapest, 2009, 309

[6] Fodor, *Ipar*. In: Kárpátalja. Régiómonográfia, Pécs-Budapest, 2009, 309

or mountain regions. The largest wood-working plants are located in Taracköz and Tiszaújlak, while the most important furniture factories are settled in Munkács and Técső[7]. In addition to these, a big plywood and furniture factory is found in Ungvár, whereas the important in all-Ukraine relation wood-chemical plants are in Nagybocskó, Perecseny and Szolyva. The latter ones process the secondary products of the wood-working industry thus producing methanol, charcoal, synthetic resin, acetic acid, different solvents, camphor etc. The most unique in the whole Ukraine is the Munkács Ski Factory, which, among others, supplies the Ukrainian national skiing and biathlon team with world-famous skis[8].




Figure 2. The main centres of the engineering and forest industry in Transcarpathia (own editing, based on O. V. Zastavetska et al., 1996.)

The light industry of Transcarpathia develops predominantly on the basis of the local raw materials (animal skins and fur, wool) and imported textile bases. Its most important branch is the garment trade with the biggest centres in Munkács, Nagyszőlős, Perecseny and Beregszász[9]. The last town's traditional garment trade has been reorganized in the last 15 years involving Italian capital

[7] O. V. Zastavetska – B. I. Zastavetskiy – I. L. Ditchuk – D. V. Tkach, op. cit., 66
[8] Fodor, *Kárpátalja iparföldrajzának változásai az ezredforduló óta eltelt időszakban.* In: „Regionális átalakulás a Kárpát-medencében" Pécs, 2006, 116
[9] Fodor, *Ipar.* In: Kárpátalja. Régiómonográfia, Pécs-Budapest, 2009, 313

(for instance, that of the Benetton company). The plants of the boot and shoe industry are also located in the western part of Transcarpathia, the most important ones are in Ungvár, Nagyszőlős and Tiszaújlak. Among the other units of light industry the Ungvár and Szerednye textile factory or the Kőrösmező artificial fur factory are worth mentioning. Formerly, internationally famous products were manufactured in the Huszt Hat Factory, though the production is now paused from financial reasons[10].

It is important to note, that in Transcarpathia such traditional branches of the light industry are found, as making of different kinds of homespuns (Nagybereg, Beregszász, Rahó, Kőrösmező), or manufacturing of wooden souvenirs (Nagybocskó, Huszt, Técső etc.)

The most remarkable change within the light industry is, that in the last few years the joint share of garment trade and fur industry has increased by nearly 10 per cent, while the proportion of skin and shoe industry has doubled. At the same time the contribution of textile industry has diminished by almost 15 per cent.

The food trade is also a crucial branch of Transcarpathia's industry. It predominantly manufactures local raw materials. The most important sub-branches of it are the production of wine, the bottling of mineral water and soft drinks, the industry of tinned vegetables and fruits, the dairy, meat and milling industry.

The Transcarpathian region gives nearly the half of the Ukraine's wine production, noting that a significant part of it goes for export. The biggest wine factories are in Ungvár, Beregszász, Szerednye and Ilosva (*see Figure 3.*) Nowadays the processing of spirits and soft drinks plus the bottling of mineral water compose together more than 50 per cent of the value production of Transcarpathia's food industry.

The industry of tinned vegetables and fruits is also of all-Ukrainian importance. Its main centres are in Ungvár, Beregszász and Szerednye too, but also in Munkács, Técső, Visk, Nagybocskó, Nagyberezna, Tiszapéterfalva and Tiszakeresztúr[11]. The share of this sub-branch from the total value production has doubled since the millennium, what is mainly due to the increased Ukrainian demand.

During the last few years the vegetable oil and fat production has diminished to its fractions. Its main plant is the Ungvár Margarine Factory. The producing units of the dairy and meat trade can be found in almost every district centre, though the proportion of these two sub-branches has equally lessened since the millennium[12].

The milling industry is now really capable of development, as both the inner and the foreign demand for its production are on the increase. At the moment it gives more than 10 per cent of the total value production of the food industry. On the whole, its plants are divided evenly in the region.

Among the other sub-branches of the food industry we must mention the Beregszász Tobacco Fermenting Factory, the Munkács Sweets Factory and, of course, the mineral water bottling plants that are of all-Ukrainian importance (Szolyva, Polena, Saján, Nagymuzsaly).

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[10] Fodor, *Kárpátalja iparföldrajzának változásai az ezredforduló óta eltelt időszakban.* In: „Regionális átalakulás a Kárpát-medencében" Pécs, 2006, 116

[11] O. V. Zastavetska – B. I. Zastavetskiy – I. L. Ditchuk – D. V. Tkach, op. cit., 67

[12] Fodor, *Kárpátalja iparföldrajzának változásai az ezredforduló óta eltelt időszakban.* In: „Regionális átalakulás a Kárpát-medencében" Pécs, 2006, 118




Figure 3. The most important centres of the light and food industry in Transcarpathia (own editing, based on O. V. Zastavetska et al., 1996)

Transcarpathia's industry of building materials is mainly based on the local non-metallic mineral resources. One circle of activity of the branch is the mining of different building materials (marble, dolomite, andesite, limestone, sand) and the other is to produce various walling and roofing materials, structures of reinforced concrete etc. The main settling factor for this branch is the closeness of the consumers, thus its biggest plants are the Ungvár, Munkács and Nagyszőlős factories of reinforced concrete structures and also the Munkács and Tiszaújlak asphalt factories.

The chemical industry is represented mainly by the companies of houshold chemistry, which, among others, are found in Ungvár and Ilosva[13]. Besides these, we must mention the Ungvár Pharmaceutical Factory and the plants producing plastic products in Nagyszőlős and Majdánka (*see Figure 4.*)

For a long time the fuel industry in Transcarpathia was only represented by the petty brown coal mining not far from the village of Ilonca. By now the exploitation of the local mines has actually been ceased as the high cost-price and the out-of-date mining technology made it unprofitable. At the same time, promising natural gas fields are opened up in several different parts of the region, which can play a remarkable part in satisfying Transcarpathia's fuel needs in the future. The biggest deposits are believed to be at the fields near Aknaszlatina and Oroszkomoróc.

[13] O. V. Zastavetska – B. I. Zastavetskiy – I. L. Ditchuk – D. V. Tkach, op. cit., 68

The development of the power-generating industry so far is not satisfactory, only a few little hydroelectric power stations have been built in the region. The biggest of them is the Talabor-Nagyág power station, that has been built on the left bank of the river Nagyág, but for driving its turbines the water of the close Talabor river is also used. The major part of Transcarpathia's power needs is covered by the high-tension lines starting out from the Burstin and Dobrotvir thermal power stations in Western Ukraine. The region is also crossed by a transit power line which connects the Ukrainian Vinnyica and the Hungarian Albertirsa[14].

As a conclusion we can say, that the settling of the industry in Transcarpathia takes place according to several spatial characteristics. Many multi-branchal industrial centres are formed in the region, such as Ungvár, Munkács, Nagyszőlős, Beregszász, Ilosva, Szolyva, Huszt, where the engineering, forest and wood-working, light and food industries are equally well-developed. Besides them also there are many specialized industrial centres, which are characterised only by one or two branches of industry (for instance, the salt-mining in Aknaszlatina, the wood-chemical and light industry in Nagybocskó or the wood-working in Taracköz).




Figure 4. The main centres of the chemical trade, the industry of building materials and the power generation in Transcarpathia
(own editing, based on O. V. Zastavetska et al., 1996)

[14] Fodor, *Ipar*. In: Kárpátalja. Régiómonográfia, Pécs-Budapest, 2009, 312

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES IN TRANSCARPATHIA

In the last two decades the number of companies (also) leading industrial activities has remarkably increased[15]. This became possible first of all thanks to the privatization, which has started right after the change of regime, but a certain role in it was played by the growing unemployment too. That is, a significant part of the long-lastingly unemployed population started an own business under duress, but many of them (lacking the capital and the business experience) have given it up in a short time. Though they are permanently replaced by new and new persons, thus the total number of the companies doesn't decrease. The most private enterprises are registered in the light and food industry, while in the engineering and chemical industries plus in the industry of building materials the state-owned companies are still prevailing.

PRODUCTIVITY OF THE INDUSTRY IN TRANSCARPATHIA

Similarly to the other sectors of economy the efficiency and productivity of the industry in the region is low. This is mainly due to the out-of-date production technologies, the lack of capital and the underqualification of the labour force. But it is also an important factor, that the new company-leaders (especially in case of small firms) are lacking the basic leadership experience, thus simply are not able to organize the work of their employees well. As a result, in factories of this kind there are too many "neutral gears", they usually employ more workers than it is needed for the fulfilment of a particular work.

Modern methods of organizing work and the newest technology are only characteristic for one or two prospering companies, that are intensively involving foreign capital. In their branch they have already become market-leaders in the region (for example, the Ungvár Electric Motor Works in manufacturing cables for different transport devices).

THE INDUSTRIAL EXPORT IN TRANSCARPATHIA

A remarkable amount of Transcarpathia's industrial production is realized outside the region's borders. Thus, the county maintains intensive economic connections not only with other regions of the Ukraine, but also with several foreign countries.

In 2002 the industrial export of Transcarpathia ran to 1,397,589,000 USD[16]. This meant an increse by roughly 241 million dollars comparing to the previous year. In the structure of the export the leading branches are the light and engineering industry, the metal manufacturing and the forest and wood-working trade (Table 5).

The most important export articles of Transcarpathia's industry are the different kinds of knitwear, clothing and shoes, the furniture, parquet, sawn timber, metal-cutting equipment, electric motors, batteries and accumulators, the mineral water, wine, margarine, salt, tinned vegetables and fruits etc.

In the last ten years Transcarpathia has foreign trade connections with roughly 90 countries of the world. As for the most important trade partners of the region, the first three positions in the field of export are occupied by Hungary, Austria and Germany, and in the field of import – by Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary.

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[15] *Transcarpathian Regional Statistical Yearbook, 2003*, Transcarpathian Regional Bureau of Statistics, Ungvár, 2004, 134

[16] *Transcarpathian Regional Statistical Yearbook, 2011*, Transcarpathian Regional Bureau of Statistics, Ungvár, 2012, 295

Table 5. The division of Transcarpathia's industrial export by branches (2000-2011)
(Source: Transcarpathian Regional Statistical Yearbooks, 2000-2011)

Branch of industry	**Sum of the export** (1000 USD)					
	2000	**2002**	**2005**	**2007**	**2010**	**2011**
Light industry	62,829	90,342	154,489	182,211	156,543	183,051
Engineering and metalworks	49,806	59,276	206,930	668,921	751,774	906,225
Forest and wood-working industry	45,011	55,909	95,813	47,974	26,296	40,390
Food industry	5,732	8,016	17,970	31,866	19,556	23,308
Chemical industry	1,637	4,488	15,945	27,698	44,458	46,352
Industry of building materials	849	1,189	1,724	2,858	150	596

Similarities and differences between the Northern Great Plain region of Hungary and Transcarpathia, including the industrial sector

As it was mentioned earlier, Transcarpathia has a unique geographical position as it borders on four different European countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Poland), and, of course, on even more areas and regions of theirs. Among those some are very important from the point of view of the economical co-operations in general and co-operations in the fields of industry in particular (e. g. those belonging to the Carpathian Euroregion), while some are potentially very promising in this respect. The Northern Great Plain region of Hungary actually belongs to both classes, as there are several types of co-operations already running in some fields of economy and there are many possible ways of collaboration in many others. That's why this region deserves a more thorough examination from the viewpoint of economic co-operations and industrial export-import opportunities of Transcarpathia.

The region is situated in the northeastern part of Hungary and borders on the Ukraine, Slovakia and Romania. Its area (17729 square kilometres) is almost one and a half times bigger than that of Transcarpathia (12800 square kilometres) and it plays a more remarkable role for Hungary in nearly every respect than does Transcarpathia for the Ukraine. For example, the Northern Great Plain region makes up 19.1 per cent of the area of Hungary[17], while Transcarpathia owns only 2.1 per cent of the landmass of the Ukraine. The population of the Northern Great Plain region (1.55 million) is also slightly bigger than the population of Transcarpathia (1.25 million), though it is important to note that the former is made up of three different counties (Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Hajdú-Bihar and Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok) while Transcarpathia is one county and a region of the Ukraine on its own (Figure 5)

The registered unemployment rate is, surprisingly, higher in the Northern Great Plain region (7,8 per cent) as in Transcarpathia (1,6 per cent), but it is to note that for the latter the high indices of the hidden unemployment are much characteristic. As for the Northern Great Plain region it can be stated, that the dicreasing of places of work due to transformations and structural changes in the economy afflicts more the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and Hajdú-Bihar counties and less the Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county of the region[18].

Unlike Transcarpathia, the Northern Great Plain region is characterized by a great number of towns and cities. While in the former there are only 10 urban settlements, in the latter there 64 ones, which is the most among all the regions of Hungary[19].

[17] Baranyi, *Az Észak-Alföldi régió bemutatása.* In: Mag kutatás, fejlesztés és környezet, Budapest, 2008/3, 2
[18] Molnár, Pénzes, *Kis- és középvárosi foglalkoztatási centrumok az Észak-alföldi Régióban.* In: Kisközségtől az Eurorégióig, Debrecen, 2005, 246
[19] Molnár, Pénzes, *Az észak-alföldi városok fejlettségi viszonyai az ezredfordulón.* In: Nagyközségek és kisvárosok a érben, Szombathely, 2008




Figure 5. The position of the Northern Great Plain region within Eastern Hungary (Stiefel, 2007)

The most important natural resources of the Northern Great Plain region are the carbon dioxide, the clay and the thermal water, whereas in Transcarpathia these are the rock salt, the brown coal, the building materials and some ores (aluminium, mercury, lead, zinc, copper, gold etc.) The only similarity is, that both regions are rich in natural gas, though in Transcarpathia their exploitation is only about to begin.

As for the industry of the Northern Great Plain region, there are remarkable differences among its three counties by the importance of processing industry and its branches. The most important role in this respect belongs to the Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county, where (also due to the inheritance of the Socialist period) the whole processing industry is overrepresented. The main industrial branches here are the textile, the clothing and leather industry, the production of building materials, the metallurgy, metalwork and engineering industry. The Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county is famous for its food, drink and tobacco industry, the Hajdú-Bihar county – for its wood, paper and printing industry, while the chemical production is equally characteristic for both counties. Some of these industrial branches, as it was mentioned above, are also quite characteristic for Transcarpathia (e. g. engineering, wood and textile industry, production of building materials), while others (such as metallurgy and metalwork, printing industry) are rather unfamiliar here.

An important difference between the industry of the Northern Great Plain region and Transcarpathia is the presence of so called industrial parks in the former. By the end of 2006 there functioned 179 industrial parks in Hungary, out of which 14,5 per cent were allocated in the Northern Great Plain region[20].

[20] Molnár, *Megújulás vagy csendes vegetálás? Az észak-alföldi kisvárosok feldolgozóipara az ezredfordulón (doktori értekezés)*, Debrecen, 2007, 43

Though this share itself is remarkable (4th place among the regions of Hungary), it is to note, that their economic output is generally modest. This is also true in case of the number of enterprises and employees functioning and working within those industrial parks.

In the Northern Great Plain region there are 22 settlements that have at least one industrial park. As for the number of enterprises within the park(s) the most important is Debrecen, by the number of employees working in the park(s) the most significant is Nyíregyháza, while by the volume of income created within the park(s) the leading settlements in the region are Jászfényszaru, Debrecen and Nyíregyháza. In 2006 in the industrial parks of the Northern Great Plain region there functioned 320 enterprises altogether, the most being in Debrecen, Szolnok, Berettyóújfalu, Mátészalka and Nyírbátor. The total number of their employees has reached more than 19000.

The most workers were employed by the industrial parks of Debrecenben, Nyíregyháza, Jászárokszállás, Jászfényszaru and Mátészalka, while the yearly net income of all the parks in the region has equalled to 786 billion forints. The biggest yearly income was registered in Jászfényszaru, Nyíregyháza, Debrecen and Jászárokszállás. In Jászfényszaru the most important is the Samsung enterprise (producing TV sets and monitors), in Nyíregyháza – the Flextronics, the Electrolux and the Jász-Plasztik, in Debrecen – the National Instruments (producing computer parts), the TEVA-Biogal (pharmaceutical industry) and the Daewoo-MGM (engineering industry), in Jászárokszállás – the Carrier CR and Bundy (both producing refrigerators) and the ArvinMeritor Emissions Technologies (producing car-spares) [21].

Other important industrial centres in the Northern Great Plain region are Jászberény (Electrolux – production of refrigerators and vacuum cleaners), Mátészalka (Zeiss – production of optical instruments), Tiszavasvári (ICN-Alkaloida – pharmaceutical industry), Ebes (Curver-Rubbermaid – plastic industry), Hajdúböszörmény (GE Lightning Tungsram – electronics), Hajdúhadház (Hajdúsági Iparművek – engineering industry), Vásárosnamény (INTERSPAN – wood industry), Martfű (Brau AG – brewing industry, Unilever – food industry) etc.

The productivity of the industry, of course, is higher in the Northern Great Plain region than in Transcarpathia. In the former it has been constantly increasing since 1993 by more than 10 per cent yearly and nowadays often reaches the Western European standards. Another important thing in favour of the Northern Great Plain region's industry is that more than 40 per cent of the industrial production (and much more as in Transcarpathia) is exported to foreign countries.

As a conclusion, we can state that in the last one and a half decades the increase of the industry of the Northern Great Plain region was less dynamic than that of the whole Hungary or most of other regions. This is also true for the productivity of the industry and its general development. On the other hand, due to the big size of the region it plays an important role in the Hungarian industry. The processing industry is somewhat overrepresented in the economic structure of the region, though it is characterized by branches that produce only low added value. Another problem is, that the engineering industry, which is a leading branch concerning the whole Hungary is well-developed only in the Jász-

[21] Molnár, op. cit., 44-45

Nagykun-Szolnok county. The significance of the industrial parks (that are playing an important role in dynamizing the structural changes in the industry all over the country) is far behind that of in the other regions of Hungary. Only two regional centres (Nyíregyháza and Debrecen) and two smaller towns (Jászfényszaru and Jászárokszállás) are capable of showing outstanding achievements of their industrial parks. The main reason of the region's modest industrial capacity is the smaller interest of the foreign investors towards the region, its situation hasn't changed a lot in the last two decades.

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THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS SLOVENE MINORITIES: RE-INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN BORDER REGIONS

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Abstract: Most of the indigenous ethnic minorities in contemporary Europe still have to fight for their existence because the level of lawful protection does not cover all the aspects of protection. All the states do not implement their own laws that protect the minorities in their territories. They also do not adjust their administrative and territorial reforms to meet the needs and the interests of ethnic minorities. In general, special rights of indigenous ethnic minorities are not respected as they should be in accordance with the signed treaties and the laws passed by the parliaments in the European Union. This is a continuation of the policies towards minorities that began after World War I. These policies did not change after World War II or after the EU expanded. In this paper the author deals with the situations of Slovene indigenous minorities in Austria, Italy, Hungary, and Croatia.

Key-words: indigenous minorities, minority rights, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Croatia

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INTRODUCTION

The situation of Slovenes in neighboring countries of Slovenia represents a classic example of the treatment of indigenous/autochthonous ethnic/national minorities. They are one of the many autochthonous ethnic/national minorities that came into being due to changes in the state borders during the establishment of nation states, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, but also in earlier periods. In these processes state borders were frequently drawn through ethnically mixed areas, and in some cases they also have divided areas settled by people of a single ethnic identity.

Those who were drawing borders had to take into account the interests of the military winners in the conflicts and sometimes, also, the physical geography of the areas in question. Even where attempts were made to redraw boundaries according to ethnic divisions after World War I, some dissatisfied minorities remained. As a result of these factors, no European state that existed in the 19th and 20th centuries, or still exists today, was ethnically homogeneous. Most incorporated into their nation-states parts of the areas inhabited by at least one group in a neighboring country. Some of them, e.g., Russia, Serbia

(especially in Vojvodina), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Spain, etc., are predominantly multinational.

Sections of populations that live on certain territories outside their mother country (by which we mean the country where most of the members of a certain group live), and nations without their own states are called ethnic minorities (or national in the terminology of Central and East European languages; in German: *Nationale Mindeheiten*).

As the term itself implies, the minorities have certain common features: (1) their size is smaller than the number of the majority ethno-nation of which they are citizens; (2) they differ from the majority population of the state by ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and sometimes religious characteristics; (3) they try to retain characteristics that represent the identity of the group and/or their culture, tradition, religion or language; and (4) they maintain long-term and strong relations with their mother country (Heckmann, 1992, 62; Pan, Pfeil, 2000, 263–275).

Some geographers, historians, and sociologists consider the minorities living in their areas of settlement (ethnic territory) since the period before the industrial revolution and subsequent changes of political borders to be autochthonous or indigenous ethnic/national minorities. These differ from so-called allochthonous minorities or immigrant groups, new minorities resulting from migrations after the industrial revolution (Stergar, 2006, 112–120). Some such groups are also termed diasporas; this term, used since ancient times to describe the scattering of Jews, has taken on new meaning in relation to more recent migrations of other groups, especially in its use by modern-day social scientists to describe contemporary migrant groups, their relationship with their areas of settlement and their homelands.

Autochthonous/indigenous ethnic/national minorities in the modern era are, in most cases, the result of changes of political borders; some of them are also the result of older migration movements from the period before the industrial revolution. Exact autochthony, i.e. the development of a certain ethnic group in a certain area, where this group of people created or co-created the cultural landscape, is an important standard for classification of minorities (Harris, Klemenčič, 2009, XI-XXI; Heckmann, 1992, 62; Koter, 1993, 123–138, Pan, Pfeil, 2000; Zupančič, 1999, 29–43; Veiter, 1970). These minorities can be classified in different groups, according to their attachment to the areas where they are settled and the political status of those areas:

- Minorities that are separated from the mother country by state frontiers and that, before border changes, formed part of majority nations of the wider and larger state (e.g., Russians in Baltic States, Austrian Germans in South Tyrol, Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, etc.);
- Minorities that are separated from the mother country by state frontiers and did not have their own state before border changes took place; after their nation achieved statehood, they remained a minority in a neighboring country, e.g., Slovenes in Italy, Austria, and Hungary, as described in this paper;
- Minorities whose areas of settlement are territorially separated from their mother country as a consequence of migrations in the pre-industrial era, e.g., Ruthenians in Vojvodina in today's Serbia, Croatians of Burgenland in Austria, or Germans in Eastern Europe;
- Minority nations that do not have their own states, and whose regions of settlement cross borders between two or more states (Basques in France and Spain; Ruthenians in Ukraine, Romania, Poland, and Slovakia, etc.);

- Minority nations, that do not have their own state, but live in one specific area within one state (e.g. Galicians in Spain, Bretons in France, etc.);
- Ethnic groups that are remnants of previously larger and more widely spread people, e.g.. Siberian indigenous peoples (Harris, Klemenčič, 2009, XII).

The main difference between indigenous or traditional or old minorities and allochthonous or new minorities is that the indigenous minorities usually make their demands on the basis of their belonging to a particular territory of settlement and cultural landscape and they usually demand rights from the state, e.g., the right to bilingual or monolingual education in their mother tongue, the right to bilingual topographical signs, and the right to use their native language in transactions with administrative authorities and with the judicial system. Such rights can be prescribed in international treaties, bilateral treaties, and special treaties or by internal legislatures of the state.

Most EU-states have also ratified the European Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The European Convention on Human Rights, though not specifically directed towards minorities, has also been seen as protection against injustices. Still, indigenous rights are not always recognized, and, in the case of the Slovene minority discussed below, the provisions of the above-mentioned conventions are far from being fully implemented. Nevertheless, the very existence of European conventions and other instruments for the protection of minority rights indicates a substantial shift away from thinking such as Franco's policy of 'hispanicising' the Basque Country by promoting immigration from other parts of the state in the mid-20th century or Mussolini's 'italianization' of South Tyrol.

In this paper the situation of Slovene minorities in countries bordering on Slovenia is discussed. Slovenes today live as an indigenous population in their ethnic territories, which in addition to the Republic of Slovenia, comprise the neighboring frontier regions in Italy (in Friuli-Venetia Giulia), Austria (in southern Carinthia and some areas in Styria), Hungary (in Porabje in southwestern Vas county), and in some small regions on Slovene-Croatian border.

The censuses of population according to different types of ethnic affiliation (mother tongue, language of communication, etc.) in Central and Southeastern Europe do not provide the correct numbers for the size of ethnic minorities. There were always pressures on minority members not to identify themselves as such in the census, especially in Slovenia's bordering countries. This is why I am going to make only approximations of the size of the Slovene communities in neighboring countries. Today, ca. 40,000–45,000 Slovenes live in Austrian Carinthia (Klemenčič, M., Klemenčič, V., 2010, 205–226) and ca. 1,000 Slovenes in southern Styria. In Italy, ca. 90,000 ethnic Slovenes live in the Provinces of Udine [Provinzia di Udine/Videmska pokrajina], Gorizia [Provinzia di Gorizia/Goriška pokrajina] and Trieste [Provincia di Trieste/Tržaška pokrajina] (Bufon, 1992, 68). In Hungary, ca. 1,600 ethnic Slovenes live in Slovensko Porabje, in Hungarian Szlovénvidék or Rábavidék (Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, 2001, 270–271). In Croatia, there are some smaller and geographically separated regions in northern Istria (Rupa, Šapjane, and other smaller hamlets in the region), in Prezid in the north of Gorski Kotar and in the region of Štrigova in Medjimurje, which are home to ca. 600 Slovenes, who were never organized as an ethnic minority. There are ca. 30.000 ethnic Slovenes living in Croatia; most of these are scattered throughout the state and live in Zagreb, Rijeka, Pula,

Split, Karlovac, etc., having emigrated from the Slovene ethnic territories since the end of the 19th century (Josipovič, Kržišnik Bukić, 2010, 46–66).



Figure 1. The Map of the Indigenous Slovenian National Minority in Neighboring Countries and Indigenous National Minorities in Slovenia

This situation is the result of a very long historical process. The last changes in this situation occurred in 1991, when Slovenia became an independent state, and in 2004 when it became part of the European Union (Klemenčič, 2005; Klemenčič, 2008).

Although all Slovene minorities in neighboring countries have one or another form of protection, it is not possible to generalize on their minority protection because each of the states deals with its Slovene minority in its own way and there are also different levels of international recognition and thus also obligations of the states in which minorities live towards them.

SLOVENES IN AUSTRIA

Historically the region of today's Carinthia in Austria was the object of desire of Austrian Germans and Slovenes, and it was also an area where different interests clashed. Many times in history, there were attempts to misuse majority positions, even with violence, especially during World War II, when Nazis ruled in Carinthia (1938–1945). Therefore, after World War II, Yugoslavia demanded the territory of southern Carinthia for itself. Fearful of those demands, Austrian authorities offered concessions to Carinthian Slovenes. On 3 October 1945, the Temporary Carinthian Provincial Government issued a decree mandating the new formation of bilingual Slovene-German schools in sixty-two bilingual mixed communes (Kärntner Nachrichten, 11.11.1945, 2). This did the trick and in 1949 the four powers (France, Soviet Union, Great Britain, and

United States) guaranteed Austria that its pre-1938 borders would not change. Austria, however, had to agree that it would protect its indigenous minorities. In the State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, known also as the Austrian State Treaty (AST) of 1955 (BGBl. 1955, 725–745) Austria's Slovene and Croatian minorities are entitled to special protections as defined in Article 7 of this Treaty:

> 1. *Austrian nationals of the Slovene and Croat minorities in Carinthia, Burgenland and Styria shall enjoy the same rights on equal terms as all other Austrian nationals, including the right to their own organizations, meetings and press in their own language.*
> 2. *They are entitled to elementary instruction in the Slovene or Croat language and to a proportional number of their own secondary schools; in this connection school curricula shall be reviewed and a section of the Inspectorate of Education shall be established for Slovene and Croat schools.*
> 3. *In the administrative and judicial districts of Carinthia, Burgenland and Styria, where there are Slovenes, Croats or mixed populations, the Slovene or Croat language shall be accepted as an official language in addition to German. In such districts topographical terminology and inscriptions shall be in the Slovene or Croat language as well as in German.*
> 4. *Austrian nationals of the Slovene and Croat minorities in Carinthia, Burgenland and Styria shall participate in the cultural, administrative and judicial systems in these territories on equal terms with other Austrian nationals.*
> 5. *The activity of organizations whose aim is to deprive the Croat or Slovene population of their minority character or rights shall be prohibited* (BGBl. 1955, 727).

It is important to mention here that Article 7 does not mention any "large numbers" or "significant percentage" of minority population in one administrative unit as a precondition for recognition of the minority's existence and minority rights (Matscher, 2005). Thus Austrian minority protection laws dealing with bilingual education, usage of minority languages before the courts and other official authorities, and bilingual "topographic" signs should have been valid for all settlements in "*... the administrative and judicial districts of Carinthia ... and Styria, where there are Slovene ... or mixed populations ...*" The so-called territorial principle should be used (Klemenčič, M., Klemenčič, V., 2010: 74–83).

In spite of that, the Austrian authorities all the time after 1955 preconditioned the validity of minority protection on a certain "percentage" of minority members in an administrative unit. Also they manipulated as they carried out the census of population as far as the language of communication. The census-takers retained the praxis of the Nazi census of 1939 and differentiated among German, Slovene, and "Windisch" languages and used all possible combinations among these categories. With this statistical operation which had nothing to do with scholarly criteria, the Austrian authorities divided Slovene speakers in Carinthia who spoke the very same Carinthian dialect of the Slovene language into two linguistic/ethnic categories, "Windisch" and "Slovenes". Because of this and other pressures on the members of Slovene minorities not to identify as Slovene speakers, the censuses after World War II remained part of a general plan for slow Germanization or for systematic "statistical liquidation" of ethnic minorities in Austria. On the basis of these

manipulations, more then half of the territory of settlement of Carinthian Slovenes as defined in the Decree on bilingual education of 1945 was left out of minority protection laws. The leadership of Carinthian Slovenes constantly protested against this usage of census data (Klemenčič, M., Klemenčič, V., 2010: 105–130).

The period after 1955 was marked by the activities of anti-Slovene German-nationalistic organizations as far as (un)fulfillment of the AST obligations is concerned. Austria made it possible for the nationalistic organizations—which would have had to be forbidden in accordance with Paragraph 5 of Article 7 of AST—to cooperate with the state (political parties, law-making bodies) and on the level of the Carinthian "Land" to thwart the treaty when questions have been raised about the use of the Slovene language in contacts with the authorities and in education and in the use of bilingual signage in cities and villages (Stergar, 1976).

After World War II these organizations were dictating some solutions in Carinthia; many of their ideas were then used by political parties in Carinthia and later, through them, by Austrian political parties, the Austrian government, and the Austrian parliament. All the attempts "to solve the situation of the Slovene minority" have provided very good opportunities for politicians to collect popular votes in political elections and are therefore (mis)used by Austrian political parties in their political campaigns. So, Austrian governments did not succeed in providing minority protection laws that would be in accordance with Article 7 of AST.

Bilingual localities signs are important, as they represent a visible sign of the existence of a minority and as such a symbol of the historical presence of the minority in a certain territory. They also mean that the majority population recognizes the minority as an equal partner in creating the culture of a certain region (Jordan, 2004). Therefore it is understandable that the leadership of Carinthian Slovenes is so vehemently fighting for the just solution of this difference.

The two attempts to solve the problem in 1955 (an attempt to install a sign-post in the commune of Moos bei Bleiburg/Blato pri Pliberku) and an attempt to put into effect the law on bilingual topographic signs of 1972 both failed. An attempt by Carinthian Governor Hans Sima and Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky to install 205 bilingual localities signs ended with a "war against bilingual localities signs" (*Ortstafelsturm*). A few days after the installation of the first fifty bilingual localities signs, German nationalists destroyed all of them (Stergar, 2003). The Decree of 1977, on the basis of which bilingual topographic signs would have been posted in 91 of the 800 settlements of bilingual southern Carinthia, was only partially fulfilled.

As of 2000, ca. 70 bilingual signs were erected. Due to the fact that the Decree conditioned the erection of bilingual signs on a minority population of 25 percent, many Carinthian Slovenes complained to the Constitutional Court. On the basis of one of those complaints, the Austrian Constitutional Court in December 2001 decreed 25 percent of minority population as unconstitutional and suggested "ca. 10 percent" of Slovene population "in the longer period of time" as an obligatory condition to erect bilingual locality signs (VfGH, 2001). It became clear that a new solution would have to be found. On the basis of the decision of the Austrian Constitutional Court, the Carinthian Slovene leadership proposed erection of bilingual signs in 394 settlements in southern Carinthia.

The Austrian government attempted to negotiate a solution with representatives of the Slovene minority, the provincial Carinthian government, Carinthian German nationalistic organizations, and representatives of local authorities in southern Carinthia. These attempts of 2006 and 2007 did not end in a solution of bilingual "topographical terminology and inscriptions" in southern Carinthia. Both proposals, one by Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel (Austrian People's Party) and the other one by Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer (Austrian Socialist Party), offered many fewer bilingual inscriptions (141 and 162, respectively). Neither government proposal was accepted, although the minority representatives, under pressure from Austrian politicians, consented to Gusenbauer's because of additional demands from the anti-Slovene-oriented Carinthian governor, Jörg Haider. He demanded also the signatures of the leaders of the Carinthian Slovenes pledging that they would not have any additional demands in regard to fulfillment of Article 7 of AST, etc. (Klemenčič, 2007: 190–193, 199–202).




Figure 2. The Map of the Proposal of Carinthian Slovenes in 2002 for the Placement of Bilingual Localities Signs in Southern Carinthia
(on the Basis of the Decree of the Austrian Constitutional Court, No. G 213/01, V 62, 63/01-18)

After ten years of discussions and attempts to solve the problem by the Austrian authorities, the Carinthian Slovenes were forced to sign off on a "compromise" solution that provides for bilingual inscriptions for only 165 instead of ca. 800 settlements in southern Carinthia that should receive them. This solution also empowers the mayors to provide additional villages or townships where the bilingual signs could be erected. The agreement provides for a minimum of 17.5 percent of Slovene population instead of the 10 percent that the Constitutional Court suggested as a precondition for a bilingual locality

sign to be erected. If the suggestion of the Constitutional Court were followed, there would be almost 400 localities with bilingual signs.

The solution of the problem is still not in sight. Bilingual topography means not only bilingual locality signs but also other topographic signs, e.g., bilingual names of rivers, mountains, streets, official buildings, etc. In some villages in southern Carinthia the local authorities are already putting them up and there is hope that in the future the prejudice of most German Carinthians might also change.




Figure 3. The Map of the Settlements in Southern Carinthia That Were Supposed to Get Bilingual "Topographic Signs" in Accordance with the Memorandum of April 26, 2011

In spite of all the above-mentioned problems, the Slovene minority in Carinthia remains very well organized in cultural and sports groups. Its members are also economically quite strong. Most Carinthian Slovenes are involved in one of their three political/civil society organizations: *Narodni svet koroških Slovencev/Rat der Kärntner Slowenen* [National Council of Carinthian Slovenes], *Zveza slovenskih organizacij/Zentralverband slowenischer Organisationen* [Union of Slovene Organizations] and *Skupnost koroških Slovenk in Slovencev/Gemeinschaft der Kärntner Slowenen und Sloweninnen* [Association of Carinthian Slovenes]. They also have their own political party*Enotna lista/Einheitsliste*, which is quite successful in municipal and city council elections.

Carinthian Slovenes already serve as a bridge between Slovenia and Austria in economic cooperation. Through them and with their help many new mutual cooperation projects were developed when Slovenia was a candidate country to the EU accession. After Slovenia became a full member, the participation of Carinthian Slovenes in economic cooperation between Slovenia and Austria expanded; and not only that, Carinthian Slovenes actively cooperated with Western Balkan candidate countries as well (Jesih, 2007: 74–125).

SLOVENES IN ITALY

The Slovene minority in Italy is well organized and involved in economic, cultural, sports, and political life. Slovenes belong to *Slovenska kulturno gospodarska zveza/Unione Culturale Economica Slovena* [Slovene Cultural and Economic Association], a civil society organization. Ethnic Slovenes participate in all political parties; they have elected their own member to the Italian Senate or to the Lower House of the Italian Parliament since the 1980s. Right-wing Slovenes in Italy are organized also in a political party, *Slovenska skupnost/Unione Slovena* [Slovene Society], which participates mainly in community, provincial, and regional elections. They are quite successful also on the local (communes) and regional (provinces and autonomous region Friuli-Venezia Giulia) fronts.

The legal rights of the Slovene minority in Italy (and the Italian minority in Slovenia and Croatia) after World War II were regulated by the 1947 Paris Treaty of Peace with Italy (UN, 1947), and by the Special Statute that was an annex to the *Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of Italy, The United Kingdom, The United States and Yugoslavia with Regard to the Free Territory of Trieste* (UN, 1954, 100–118). The Special Statute ceased to be valid after implementation of the Treaty between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Italy, the so-called Treaty of Osimo. This treaty also determined, in Article 8, that Italy and Yugoslavia

> "*... shall preserve the validity of internal measures which were adopted during the implementation of the Statute mentioned, and shall, with the framework of its internal legislation, guarantee to the members of the concerned minorities the same level of protection as was provided by the Special Statute which is hereby terminated*" (UN, 1954, 110).

In spite of the fact that the Special Statute was repealed, it remained valid as far as minority rights for both ethnic minorities in neighboring states (Ur.l. SFRJ-MP, 1977).

This provision of Article 8 of the Treaty of Osimo was, throughout the period after it was signed, the subject of different interpretations and also a source of trouble in relations between two neighbors. The Slovenes of Italy, with the help of their protectors, Yugoslavia and, after 1991, the Republic of Slovenia, tried to convince Italy to give them general legal protection. There were many drafts of a protection law, which remained stalled in the bureaucratic process. Therefore, the question of protection of minority rights of Slovenes in Italy (and equalization of rights of Italian minorities in Croatia and Slovenia in Istria) remained after Slovenia's independence one of the most important unfulfilled articles of the Osimo Treaty (Delo, 10.11.1995, 7).

The law on protection of linguistic minorities was passed by the Italian parliament in November 1999 (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 1999), and the law on protection of the Slovene linguistic minority in Friuli-Venetia Giulia/Furlanija-Julijska krajina was passed in February 2001 (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2001). Many questions remained, however. The law itself is questionable on many issues, and many solutions raise questions for the future. In spite of all this, the law represents significant progress in relations between the Slovene minority in Italy and the Italian state and is, after the Memorandum of London, the most important step forward (Brezigar, 2001).

The most significant issue remaining is the implementation of the law, because its implementation would be a precondition for its appraisal. And it was precisely the implementation of the law that became a problem at the very beginning. A special committee (*comitato istituzionale paritetico/paritetni odbor*), comprising representatives of the minority, local authorities, and the Italian state[1] was chosen to oversee the implementation of the law. After it issued a first catalogue of communes in which the law should be implemented and sent it to the Italian government of Silvio Berlusconi in 2003, the government rejected the catalogue. The Italian government sent this catalogue to the State Council, which then ordered the special committee to check whether members of the Slovene minority existed in particular communes. The State Council mentioned, in particular, Muggia/Milje, Trieste/Trst, Gorizzia/Gorica, and Cividale del Friuli/Čedad.[2] In reality this was a demand for the counting of Slovenes, which the law on minority protection had not foreseen.

After the Italian Ministry for Regions also let the special committee know that it would not agree to the catalogue, the special committee sent the government in Rome additional explanations about minority protection implementation in the cities of Muggia/Milje, Trieste/Trst, Gorizzia/Gorica, and Cividale del Friuli/Čedad. The Berlusconi government again rejected the catalogue because, according to the government, the "suggestion for the commune of Trieste to be included would contradict the suggestion of city councillors [of Trieste] ..." As for Gorizzia/Gorica, Muggia/Milje, and Cividale del Friuli/Čedad, the government stated that in those communes "the traditional presence of a Slovene minority was not verified."

This situation was resolved after the 2006 election, when Romano Prodi became prime minister and replaced the right-wing Berlusconi government. In June 2007, the special committee again confirmed the catalogue of 32 communes in which the law on protection of the Slovene minority would be implemented; and in August 2007, the catalogue was confirmed by the Italian government. In September the catalogue was signed by the president of the Italian Republic, Giorgio Napolitano. After six-and-a-half years, the territory on which the Slovene minority in Italy would be protected was confirmed in law, in accordance with state law no. 38 from 2001 (Primorski dnevnik, 04.08.2007, 1, 3).

In the second half of September, representatives of the special committee met representatives of communes in the territory and discussed the question of visible bilingualism, i.e., installation of bilingual topographic signs. Representatives of 23 communes at once accepted bilingual signage (Primorski dnevnik, 25.09.2007, 1–3). In other communes, bilingual signage would not be used, because their administrations had not yet given their consent, or had not yet discussed the issue.

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[1] One-half of the members of the special committee (*comitato istituzionale paritetico/paritetni odbor*) are ethnic Slovenes, while the other half are ethnic Italians. Ethnic Slovene members are nominated by three different bodies: (1) three members are elected by elected representatives of Slovenes in the region of Friuli-Venetia Giulia/Furlanija-Julijska krajina, in provinces and communes; (2) two are elected by the regional parliament of Friuli-Venetia Giulia/Furlanija-Julijska krajina; (3) four members are nominated by the regional government of Friuli-Venetia Giulia/Furlanija-Julijska krajina, and one by the Italian government.

[2] Letter from the Italian Government, Department of Regional Affairs (Dipartimento Affari regionali) to the Special committee No. DAR/2432/86/13.3.5.17.1, 23 March 2006. The author thanks Bojan Brezigar for providing this information.



Figure 4. The Map of the Area of Validity of the Law on Protection of the Slovene Linguistic Minority in Italy

The communes of Tarvisio/Trbiž and Malborghetto/Naborjet are quatrilingual, i.e., they are inhabited by Italians, Friulians, Slovenes, and Germans, and therefore their administrations wanted them to be also officially quatrilingual. A representative of Monfalcone/Tržič commune declared that his commune was ready to give Slovenes within its borders full individual rights, but for now it would not erect bilingual topographic signs (Primorski dnevnik, 16.09.2007, 1, 3). Also, there would be no bilingual topographic signs for the city of Trieste/Trst itself, while the satellite settlements around would erect such signs. Representatives of the commune of Gorizzia/Gorica declared that all settlements in the commune of Gorizzia/Gorica would get the bilingual topographic signs except for one part of the city of Gorizzia/Gorica where there would for now be no visual bilingualism (Primorski dnevnik, 16.09.2007, 1; Primorski dnevnik, 16.09.2007, 3). It is interesting to note that the mayor of commune Resia/Rezija declared that the Resian dialect was not one of the Slovene dialects. According to him it was Slavic.

After discussions with the representatives of most of the concerned communes, the special committee made a decision to erect the bilingual place name signs and other bilingual topographic and other signs in 23 communes. Only one member who is a representative of the middle-right wing Berlusconi's party voted against it. The special committee sent the proposal to the Regional Council of Friuli-Venetia Giulia, which discussed the proposal on 27 September 2007 (Primorski dnevnik, 27.09.2007, 1–3). In general, everyone hoped that the Regional Council would pass the regional law on protection of the Slovene minority on the same day. That did not happen because of discussion provoked by some inhabitants of the Resia/Rezija Valley, who claimed that the Resian dialect was not a Slovene Dialect and argued that the Resians were "Italians of Slavic descent." In the end, the Regional Council included in its law mention of the Resian dialect and dialects of the inhabitants of the Natisone/Nadiža Valley, Torre/Ter Valley, and Val di Canale/Kanalska dolina/Kanaltal. After many hours of discussion on Resia/Rezija, the deputies, due to lack of time, postponed the final discussion (Primorski dnevnik, 18.09.2007, 1, 3). After hours and hours of discussions, the Regional Council of Friuli-Venetia Giulia finally passed the law for protection of the Slovene minority on 23 October (Bullettino ufficiale, 2007). The law received support not only from the representatives of the government parties of the left-middle of the political spectrum but also from the right-middle wing Lega Nord [Northern League], who supported this law because they were interested in passing a regional law on protection of Friaulians (Delo, 24.10.2007, 2).

The Slovene minority in Italy is even stronger than the Slovene minority in Carinthia, as far as economic strength of its members is concerned. The members were really active in economic cooperation already by the end of the 1960s, when various agreements were signed between Italy and Yugoslavia on small issues of cross-border economic cooperation. In accordance with these agreements, they were able to export goods to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavs would not have been able to import these goods without the existence of those agreements. Of course, most of this cooperation benefited Slovenes on both sides of the border. Cooperation continued also after 1991, when Slovenia became an independent state. For example it benefited Slovene farmers from Slovenia, especially in Goriška brda, where they could import seeds for the wineries with the help of Slovene farmers in Italy, which otherwise they would not be able to do. Of course, cooperation expanded still more after Slovenia became a full member of the EU.

SLOVENES IN HUNGARY

During the "Cold War", the situation of the Slovene national minority living in an underdeveloped part of Hungary behind the "Iron Curtain" was much worse than that of the Slovenes in Italy and Austria.




Figure 5. The Map of the Number and Percentage of Slovenes in Slovensko Porabje in 2000

The situation of the Slovene minority started to improve with the gradual liberalization in Hungary in the 1980s. The Hungarian government began to modify its stance toward ethnic minorities. Article 68 of the Hungarian Constitution of 1989 states:

> "*National and ethnic minorities that live in the Republic of Hungary are state-building factors. The Republic of Hungary protects its national and ethnic minorities. It guarantees their participation in public life, nourishing of their own culture, mother tongue, education in the mother tongue and the usage of names in the mother tongue. The laws of the Republic of Hungary also guarantee representation of national and ethnic minorities*" [at the local and national level] (Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, 1989, 47-48).

This had a positive impact on the lives of Slovenes in Hungary, leading to material assistance from the state budget, endeavors to establish good relations with neighboring states, adoption of the "Law on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities", etc. In the 1990s, a bilateral agreement on the protection of national minorities also was signed between Slovenia and Hungary, to the benefit of both Slovenes in Hungary and Hungarians in Slovenia (Munda-Hirnök, 1999).

Slovenes of Porabje organized into a civil society organization, *Zveza Slovencev na Madžarskem/Magyarországi Szlovének Szövetsége* [Federation of Slovenes of Hungary], which includes societies on a local level important for

Slovene identity and a political organization, *Državna slovenska manjšinska samouparva/Országos Szlovén Önkormányzat* [State Slovene Minority Self-Management]. There are eight cultural societies and groups of Slovenes in Porabje (Munda-Hirnök, 1994).

Despite recent positive developments on the global level, the Slovene ethnic community in Hungary faces numerous everyday problems. Many of them are the results of decades of isolation behind the Iron Curtain, in a special zone where the movement of population was strictly curtailed. The whole region is economically, socially, and demographically underprivileged. On the other hand, these circumstances are exactly what contributed to the preservation of the population's ethnic characteristics, particularly language. But assimilation and language loss have rapidly increased. The marginal situation and economic underdevelopment of Slovene Porabje has caused, in comparison with other regions in Hungary, typical negative changes, such as an aging of population and emigration, resulting in a drop in the number of ethnic Slovenes. Even the road that would connect the villages in which the Slovene minority live has not been built yet, although it was promised many times in the last decade, including on the occasions of recent meetings between Slovene and Hungarian presidents and prime ministers. Even the entry of Slovenia and Hungary into the EU did not contribute to improving the situation of both Slovenes in Hungary and Hungarians in Slovenia.

A new situation developed after the parliamentary election of 2010, in which the ultra-conservative FIDESZ party got 68 percent of the popular vote. This meant more than two thirds of the seats in the parliament. This majority enabled the FIDESZ party the possibility to change the Constitution. In the draft of the new Constitution it was written, among other things, that, on the one hand, members of ethnic minorities in Hungary are part of the Hungarian nation; on the other hand, it gave to all members of indigenous Hungarian ethnic minorities in neighboring countries the right to dual citizenship. This proposition as far as ethnic minorities in Hungary was later abandoned. In the new Constitution that was passed by the Hungarian parliament at the end of April 2011 and was put in force on January 1, 2012, the Preamble states that "nationalities living with us [in Hungary] form part of the Hungarian political community and are constituent parts of the State." In article 29 of the part of the Constitution entitled "Freedom and Responsibility" it is written:

1. Nationalities living in Hungary shall be constituent parts of the State. Every Hungarian citizen belonging to any nationality shall have the right to freely express and preserve his or her identity. Nationalities living in Hungary shall have the right to use their native languages and to the individual and collective use of names in their own languages, to promote their own cultures, and to be educated in their native languages;
2. Nationalities living in Hungary shall have the right to establish local and national self-governments;
3. The detailed rules for the rights of nationalities living in Hungary and the rules for the elections of their local and national self-governments shall be defined by a cardinal Act (The Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2011).

Although the recognized ethnic minorities in Hungary expected to get the seats in the Hungarian parliament for each minority automatically, this is not

the case; as members of minorities have to vote for their representative in the parliament in political elections and their representative would have to receive 10,000 or more votes to be elected.

SLOVENES IN CROATIA

Within Croatia the situation is quite complicated as the Slovenes live as both an indigenous minority in border regions and as immigrants in towns inside Croatia. Croatia's legal praxis does not differ between immigrants and so-called traditional/autochthonous minorities. In Croatia the major, most important, and most numerous minority is, of course, the Serbian minority. The Croatian state recognizes 27 minorities.




Figure 6. The Map of the Number of Slovenes in Communes along the Slovene-Croatian Border in Croatia in 2001

Slovenes in Croatia were recognized as a minority in the Constitution of Croatia of 1990, although they started to develop as a minority with their own institutions, etc., when Slovenia and Croatia became independent states in 1991. The situation remained unchanged until 1997 when Slovenes (and Bosniaks) were deleted as formally recognized minorities from the new Croatian Constitution in 1997. This move was politically motivated and it lowered the level of already achieved minority rights and is therefore considered a diminution from the generally recognized standards on minority rights, which are not supposed to be lowered. In spite of that, Croatia started to change its minority protection laws in

2000; it did not recognize Slovenes as an ethnic minority until the constitutional changes of 2010. Now the members of the Slovene minority enjoy at least formally the same rights as other recognized minorities, especially on the local (communes) level and regional level (Josipovič, Kržišnik Bukić, 2010).

CONCLUSION

The status of the Slovene minority differs from country to country. One can say that although the law on global protection of the Slovene minority in Italy of 2001 is not completely implemented yet, the best situation is for the Slovenes of Italy. Slovenes in Austria, even in accordance with the draft of the new law that is in preparation, will not enjoy the protection that they are entitled to under Article 7 of the Austrian State Treaty. The attitude of Austrian authorities towards Slovenes in Austria is best shown in the story of bilingual locality signs. Slovenes in Hungary are worst off because of their poor economic situation and also because of the attitude of the Hungarian government towards minorities, as is evidenced in their new Constitution. Slovenes in Croatia formally enjoy the status of a minority, but it does not help them too much in implementation of their rights.

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C O N T E N T S

THE ABOLITION OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. A GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC PROBLEM IN THE LAST FIVE DECADES
Remus PRĂVĂLIE
(Art#142101-247) 143

DISTRIBUTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND OIL REVENUES INTO THE ARABIC SPACE – GEOGRAPHY OF MANDATORY CORRELATIONS
Cezar TECLEAN
(Art#142102-246) 155

THE MILITARY ROLE OF SOMEŞ GATE
Ioan D. ŢARCĂ
(Art#142103-249) 164

CORRIDORS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS AND THE HUNGARIAN EXIT TO THE SEA
Norbert PAP, Péter REMÉNYI, Andor VÉGH
(Art#142104-254) 176

THE GEOGRAPHICAL ORGANIZATION OF PLAIN BIRDA-MORAVIŢA AS REFLECTED ON THE MAPS FROM THE HABSBURG AND CONTEMPORARY PERIOD
Raluca COVACI
(Art#142105-250) 189

URBAN REGENERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF CURRENT URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES IN ROMANIA. CASE STUDY: ŞTEI CITY (BIHOR COUNTY, ROMANIA)
Luminiţa FILIMON, Valentin NEMEŞ, Paul OLĂU
(Art#142106-252) 200

THE LOBBY ACTIVITY OF LARGE CORPORATIONS
Gheorghe HURDUZEU, Liviu Bogdan VLAD, Raluca HURDUZEU, Gheorghe VLĂSCEANU
(Art#142107-251) 211

THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR OF TRANSCARPATHIA AND ITS COMPARISON WITH THE NORTHERN GREAT PLAIN REGION OF HUNGARY
Gyula FODOR, István D. MOLNÁR, Lajos KURUCZ
(Art#142108-253) 219

THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS SLOVENE MINORITIES: RE-INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN BORDER REGIONS
Matjaž KLEMENČIČ
(Art#142109-255) 232

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