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CROSSREF

THE BANTUSTANS OF APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: TRANSITIONING FROM INDUSTRY TO TOURISM

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Abstract: The Bantustans were created during the apartheid period of South Africa's history and represented one of the key pillars of planning for 'grand apartheid'. A major challenge was the promotion of economic development in these territories in order to give them a facade of economic legitimacy. Four of the ten Bantustan ethno-states eventually acceded to the grant of 'independence' which created a changed environment for territorial economic development. The article explores a transition in economic development planning by the apartheid state from Bantustan industrialization to a focus on tourism and casino resort developments as a potential driver of Bantustan economic progress. In terms of methods and sources the paper applies an historical approach that blends secondary sources with primary documentary material.

Key words: apartheid, South Africa, Bantustans, industrial decentralization, casino tourism

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INTRODUCTION

Research in political geography has been a limited topic of geographical scholarship in South Africa over the past three decades (McCarthy and Wellings, 1989; Christopher, 1994; Lemon, 2000; Christopher, 2002; Knight and Rogerson, 2019). One of the most notable foci for geographical researchers has surrounded the territories of the Bantustans (Lemon, 1991; Ramutsindela, 2001, 2007). The apartheid state in South Africa applied the term 'Homeland' or 'Bantustan' to refer to the mainly rural territories which were designated and

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reserved for Black Africans in terms of the government's policy of racial segregation (Lemon, 1976, 1987; Nyambi and Makombe, 2019). For Jones (1997, p. 31) during the period 1959-1991 "the bantustans were the central pillars of the apartheid edifice, designed to preserve white minority rule in South Africa". According to King and McCusker (2007) the utilization of space by the (white) apartheid state to segregate and control the African population is deeply rooted in South African history. Indeed, the origins of the Bantustans must be situated in the 19th century history of the "native reserves" of the Union of South Africa and of African land dispossession that occurred in South Africa's colonial years (Phillips, 2017; van der Merwe, 2017).

The territory of the Bantustans represented an elaboration of the scattered pockets of land – the native reserves – set aside for Black Africans by the racial partition of land in South Africa which occurred in 1913 and 1936 allocating to them (the majority of the population) only 13 % of the total land area whilst whites had the remainder (Ally and Lissoni, 2012, 2017; Lissoni and Ally, 2018). The making of the bantustans was underpinned by a racist ideology and represented a central plank of the geography of separation which was moulded during the apartheid period (Lemon, 1976; Southall, 1983; Lemon, 1987). It has been described as a "massive project in social engineering" (Beinart, 2012, p. 5). The Bantustans were institutionalised through the demarcation of territorial borders/boundaries to define these apartheid-created ethno-states (Ally and Lissoni, 2017). Arguably, from 1959 these impoverished and fragmented areas were recast as 'less developed countries' under the umbrella of Bantustans (Jones, 1997). According to Beinart (2012, p. 5) homeland or Bantustan policy "shaped the history of South Africa for about 40 years during the apartheid era". Through the repressive Bantustan system, the apartheid state could maintain African labour power as cheap labour for the benefit of white South Africa (Wolpe, 1972). Ally (2015, p. 969) views the leadership of the Bantustans as 'puppet regimes' ruling through the despotism of tradition. Not surprisingly, therefore, certain scholars see these areas as symbols of 'domestic colonialism' in South Africa (Nyambi and Makombe, 2019). The sham 'independence' awarded by the apartheid state to four of the ten Bantustans – Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981) - was rejected universally by the international community in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Southall, 1983; Aerni-Flessner and Twala, 2021).

In terms of the existing geography literature on the apartheid Bantustans major interest has pivoted around land-related issues, reincorporation, border spaces and of the symbolic significance of these spaces (Drummond, 1991a, 1991b; Drummond and Manson, 1991; Jones, 1997; Rumutsindela, 2001; Ramutsindela and Donaldson, 2001; Ramutsindela, 2013). The focus in this discussion turns to the challenges faced by the apartheid state in giving these ethno-states a sense of legitimacy through promoting economic development opportunities in these peripheral underdeveloped spaces. For the ten Bantustans as a whole much government attention initially concentrated on the possibilities for industrial development based on the cheap labour in these areas. With disappointments attached to the government-supported programme for industrial decentralization the opportunities for tourism and most particularly of casino tourism in the four nominally 'independent' Bantustans became a focus of policy attention. The article explores this transition in economic development planning by the apartheid state from Bantustan

industrialization to tourism and casino resort developments as a potential driver of Bantustan economic progress. A chronicle of the transitioning in the Bantustans from industry to tourism has not been presented in extant tourism geographical writings (Rogerson and Visser, 2020). In terms of methods and sources the paper uses an historical approach that blends secondary sources with primary documentary material.

PLANNING FOR BANTUSTAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Prior to 1948 the economic base of the reserves was almost exclusively anchored on agriculture. By the 1970s, however, the agricultural economy largely had collapsed leaving large segments of Bantustan populations impoverished and looking for survival to income from migrant remittances linked to cheap labour on the mines and secondary industry (Phillips, 2017). In terms of addressing issues of economic development, the establishment of the 1951 Bantu Self-Government Act was coupled with the launch of the Tomlinson Commission, which was assembled in 1949 and reported its findings in 1955 (Union of South Africa, 1955). According to Hobart Houghton (1957, p. 14) the commission had been charged with “devising a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native Areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the Native and based upon effective socio-economic planning”.

The Tomlinson Report highlighted the desperate economic conditions of the reserves and set out a ‘comprehensive scheme’ for the development of these areas (Union of South Africa, 1955). These rural areas were shown to be in a state of economic collapse with the consequence that migration was rapidly growing to the country’s major cities. The policy findings were submitted to government in 1954. The leading problem in the reserves was identified as the paucity of non-agricultural wage opportunities. According to the analysis given in the report it was calculated 50 000 employment opportunities would need to be generated annually for the following 25 years to support economically the labour in these areas. The report’s core recommendations related to the need for developing industry and factory employment in these areas as a means for “the productive utilization of labour” (Union of South Africa, 1955, p. 131). The growth of a manufacturing base was therefore promoted for catalysing necessary job creation. It was stated that “industrial development will, therefore, occupy a central position in the general programme of development for the Bantu areas” (Union of South Africa, 1955, p. 131). The report of the Tomlinson Commission is widely considered as providing the geographical blueprint for apartheid planning (Hobart Houghton, 1957; Glaser 1987). By encouraging industrial growth in the reserves, it was hoped to stabilise the populations in these areas and correspondingly curb outmigration to the cities (Union of South Africa, 1955). The Report made a case for the provision of investment incentives in order to support industrial development as part of economic revival in these marginal areas of the space economy.

Although the national government accepted the general arguments of the Tomlinson Commission for supporting the development of the Reserve areas, it rejected the crucial recommendation that incentives be offered to ‘White’ industrial investors to invest inside what was considered a ‘Black area’ (Rogerson, 1988). In 1956 a government White Paper was issued and recommended that to maintain racial purity investment incentives be offered

only at a series of localities which were adjacent to or bordering the Native Reserves. This policy position led to the development of the programme of what was known as 'border area' industrialization which was state supported from 1957-58. Over the ensuing decade, however, the programme of border area industrialization recorded only minimal progress. Accordingly, during the late 1960s when it was apparent that the declared border areas were not attracting large numbers of manufacturing investors another government commission was appointed to review the state of industrial decentralization.

THE PUSH FOR BANTUSTAN INDUSTRIALIZATION

During 1968 important changes were introduced to the planning of industrial decentralization after the 1967 report of the Riekert Commission. The objective of national government in making changes was to accelerate the pace of industrial development away from the country's major cities, and especially from the country's inland economic heartland around Pretoria and Johannesburg (Rogerson, 1982).

In a major policy reversal industrial investor could now qualify for incentives at a broad geographical range of new 'growth points' which were declared inside the former "native Reserves" (now re-titled as the 'Bantu Homelands'). The net effect was that the number of places where incentives were available expanded markedly. Investment incentives now were possible for investors at several growth points within the Bantustans (Rogerson, 1974). Among the most significant were centres such as Dimbaza (Ciskei), Isithebe (KwaZulu), Babelegi (Bophuthatswana), Umtata and Butterworth (Transkei), or Lebowa (Lebowa). Seeking to provide a facade of economic legitimacy to these rural areas from the late 1950s and through to the early 1980s government therefore focused initiatives upon these areas as a central element of regional industrial development programming (Hirsch, 1984, 1987). During 1968 government launched what was popularly styled as 'a carrot and stick' policy in order to further the objectives of apartheid planning (Rogerson, 1982). In terms of the 'carrots', the packages of financial incentives available to investors were increased. The stick involved the introduction of a set of controls on industrial development taking place in certain parts of the country. Under the Physical Planning Act of 1967 (subsequently renamed the Environment Planning Act) coercive controls were applied to new industrial development occurring in certain 'proscribed regions', most notably the country's major metropolitan areas (Rogerson, 1982). Two key controls were introduced on industrial development in the affected areas which limited the zoning of new industrial land and sought to choke off the employment of additional African (Black) labour in factories most particularly in the industrial heartland around Johannesburg. By imposing a freeze on the numbers of workers that companies could hire, government sought to deflect labour-intensive industries away from these urban areas and to encourage them to relocate to the designated and preferred 'growth centres', including those for Bantustan industrialization (Rogerson, 1988).

This carrot and stick policy introduced in 1968 was the driver and basis for industrial decentralization planning for the next decade. Nevertheless, between 1968 and 1979 a number of other developments took place which affected the course of regional development planning and policy in South Africa. First, the slow pace of industrial growth at the majority of decentralized growth points encouraged government to further boost the value of incentives (Hirsch,

1987). The package of incentives included low interest loans for land/factory buildings, provision of leased buildings, income tax concessions, assistance with relocation costs of factories and key workers, railage rebates, rebates on harbour dues and price preference purchases by certain state or parastatal authorities (Hirsch, 1987). Second, during the 1970s a major marketing campaign was launched to attract international investors into South African manufacturing and encourage such foreign investors to take advantage of the multiple incentives on offer at Bantustan locations (Rogerson, 1987). The 'attractiveness' of the Homelands was further enhanced by new labour legislation which made trade union organization difficult and relaxed existing labour legislation affecting workers in these areas (Rogerson, 1991).

Some political analysts, such as Venter (1979), applauded the ongoing progress of factory openings and of industrial development in Bantustans such as Transkei. Nevertheless, it was evident by the late 1970s that the initiatives towards regional development and especially for industrial development were not attaining the desired objectives of apartheid planners including bolstering political structures in the Bantustans (Dewar et al., 1986; Addleson and Tomlinson, 1986). In particular, the numbers of jobs created in manufacturing within decentralized spaces was massively short of the targets which the Tomlinson Commission had set in its master planning for 'grand apartheid'. The total numbers of industrial jobs created through 25 years of incentive policies could not match even the numbers of new labour entrants annually coming onto the labour market in the Bantustans (Rogerson, 1988). In these circumstances of 'failed incentives and pressures for greater legitimacy of Homeland economies, the stage was set at the end of the 1970s for another overhaul of regional policy and of the industrial decentralization scheme (Tomlinson and Hyslop, 1987). A new regional development programme was introduced that included a massive boost to available industrial incentives and becoming perhaps the world's most generous set of industrial incentives at the time. In terms of this latest iteration of a strategy for regional industrial development strategy many observers view it as marking a retreat from the planning of 'grand apartheid' and of the establishment of 'separate' Black and White territorial units (Cobbett et al., 1985; Glaser, 1987).

What was proposed was a set of new planning or 'development regions' for South Africa a patch of economic regions which significantly crossed the divide between so-called 'White South Africa' (or 'common area') and the 'Black Homelands'. Indeed, Cobbett et al. (1985, 1987) argued that the revised 1982 regional programme was intended by state planners to provide the base for the future political and economic map of South Africa. Within this new framework for development planning, national government sought vigorously to further its long-established goals of promoting industrial decentralization and deflect manufacturers away from the existing metropolitan areas towards a set of designated 'growth poles' in peripheral regions of the country including (but not exclusively) the Bantustans (Hirsch, 1984; Dewar et al., 1986; Tomlinson and Addleson, 1987; Wellings and Black, 1987; Addleson, 1990; Platzky, 1995). The number of localities which were designated for support increased greatly, a move that would be one factor in the long-term 'failure' of the programme. Essentially, South Africa was instituting its own apartheid-warped variation of the strategy of 'growth centre' planning (Wellings and Black, 1986b; Rogerson, 1988; Platzky, 1995).

Consensus among international regional planning scholars was that, given the complexities of growth centre planning, it was prudent to concentrate government funding upon only a small number (two to four at most) of localities. From 1982 South Africa began planning for the sustainability of at least 60 localities as growth centres. Importantly, the majority of these 60 potential growth centres were not chosen on economic grounds but their selection was influenced by political considerations (Dewar, 1987). The inevitable consequence was that whatever funding was made available for regional development funding would be spread thinly such that its impact would be insufficient for any one of the selected growth centres (even those with economic potential) to reach a desired state of cumulative or 'self-sustaining' growth. Dewar (1987, p. 164) pinpoints that internationally it was generally recognized that in order to initiate the development of a growth centre "the provision of some form of economic incentive is necessary". The rationale for incentives is "to overcome the initial disadvantages of a new location which exist prior to the build-up of urban agglomeration economies". The international consensus was that incentives should be specifically tailored to attract the leading investors or 'growth pole' industry. In addition, the incentives would be temporary and "removed as soon as growth processes have been initiated" (Dewar, 1987, p. 164). Nevertheless, the South African practice diverged from international 'good practice' in several respects and these departures had important consequences for the track record of the policy as a whole (Wellings and Black, 1986a).

First, incentives were not designed for the specific requirement of particular industries (Dewar, 1987). Rather, they were applied in a generic or blanket fashion to all types of manufacturing and to all aspects of the production process. The international experience shows that a non-discriminatory incentive system will attract mainly industries that are either 'lame ducks' or branch plants (Dewar, 1987). The lame ducks represent industries that have been attracted only based on the incentives on offer. A problem with externally controlled branch plants is often they have a limited catalytic impact on welfare in the recipient location as a result of the fact that most production is in the form of 'routinised processes' which require, at best, low skill (and low paid) workers. In addition, a further problem with branch plants is that during times of economic downturn, these are often the first plants to be closed or to have their production downsized. All these problems were reflected in the experience of the decentralized areas of South Africa which received generous incentives and not least in the Bantustans (Wellings and Black, 1986a; Hirsch, 1987; Wellings and Black, 1987). For example, at Butterworth, most of the industries attracted to this Transkei Bantustan industrial growth point had headquarter offices outside the region with less than one-third being 'independent' enterprises. The linkages of these plants to the rest of the locality were limited such that overall multiplier effects were minimal (Dewar, 1987). A second departure from international good practice with incentive programmes was that in South Africa many of the companies that were pulled to decentralized growth points were, in many respects, dependent upon them.

Using the example of Butterworth Dewar (1987) demonstrated that nearly two-thirds of firms ranked the availability of concessions as the most important reason for selecting Butterworth for their plant location. This finding is indicative of the 'lame duck' syndrome of investors who were mobile, to the

extent that their location choice was based only on incentive availability. Once again, this points to problems in the design of the incentives which were non-discriminatory and simply sought to attract any type of industrial investor irrespective of appropriateness or their short- or long-term multiplier impact for the locality/region (Dewar, 1987). An added problem with the non-discriminatory nature of incentives was that desired cumulative growth processes through inter-industry linkages were not emerging. Although the Bophuthatswana growth point of Babelegi was one of the most successful in terms of attracting a group of factories through the incentive system no evidence was found for inter-industry linkages and the development of agglomeration economies. The explanation was simple. The non-discriminatory nature of the incentive system produced at Babelegi a mixed group of factories which did not link together in any way – the group of factories included printing works, gate manufacturers, producers of baby clothes, military uniforms and wigs.

In an international comparative analysis, the labour incentives (along with other packages of grants and support for subsidized rentals, relocation costs) available in South Africa were viewed as extraordinarily generous (Cobbett et al., 1987; Rogerson, 1987). In many parts of South Africa, given the weak basis for labour organization, the incentives that firms could qualify for were at or even above the level of wages paid to low skilled workers. Incentive packages reached the point at which unscrupulous investors could simply 'farm' labour and thus theoretically make guaranteed profits at growth centres without producing or manufacturing anything at all! In other words, the amount of wages paid out to certain types of workers at growth points was less than the monthly cash payment that enterprises received (and was guaranteed for seven years) from the state. Abuses of the incentive system were increasingly exposed in the 1980s (Hirsch, 1987). Reports appeared of manicured industrial estates in the Ciskei Bantustan at which minimal production was taking place and yet factories employing vast numbers of cleaners and security guards. Worker exploitation, dehumanizing work environments and cheating of the state incentive system were widespread at many Bantustan growth centres. Some of the worst worker abuses were documented at Botshabelo by Cobbett (1987). Women workers, often the most marginalized and readily exploitable category of labour, were particularly vulnerable to the exploitative practices that were opened up for manufacturing capital to take advantage of labour at the Bantustan growth centres during the 1980s.

By the mid-1980s there was growing dissent around the government's industrial decentralization programme and most especially around the application of lavish investment incentives designed to attract industrialists away from the metropolitan regions into the decentralized spaces including peripheral Bantustans (Tomlinson and Addleson, 1986, 1987). Among criticisms were concerns about the escalating costs of the programme to the national fiscus in terms of funding for incentives to industrialists and accompanying arguments that these funds might be better applied to improve conditions (housing, services) in urban townships. The major beneficiaries of the investment incentives increasingly were acknowledged as foreign investors (mainly from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Israel) rather than local South African enterprises (Dewar, 1987; Rogerson, 1987; Pickles and Woods, 1989). In addition, little evidence existed at the majority of growth centres of signs of growth becoming cumulative and thus reaching a point at which government support and leverage

would no longer be required (Addleson, 1990). Indeed, many growth centres showed absolutely no signs of growth at all, especially those that had been selected on political grounds rather than economic considerations and of demonstrated potential. Further, it was forwarded that the incentive programme was designed to prop up the state's failing apartheid project to support and give legitimacy to the 'economic independence' of the so-termed Bantustans (Addleson, 1990).

A chorus of critics made the point that the regional industrial development programme was highly costly, politically motivated, largely unsuccessful and wasteful of scarce development resources (Tomlinson and Addleson, 1987; Addleson, 1990). At the close of the 1980s an official rethink on regional policy was launched. It was led by a panel of experts appointed by the Development Bank of Southern Africa. The findings and recommendations of this study produced another revision of South African regional development policy with a substantial scaling back of the industrial incentive system. Most critically, the revised and much reduced incentive system removed the former favoured treatment which had been accorded to industrialists locating in the Bantustans. The consequence was a phasing-out of incentives which saw the closure of factories in these areas, resulting in 'abandoned industrial spaces', a consequence of the de-industrialization processes that took hold at many of the former privileged Bantustan growth points (Phalatse, 2000, 2001).

THE TURN TO TOURISM

The push for Bantustan industrialisation undoubtedly was the core focus of the apartheid state for most of the period 1948-1991. Arguably, however, there is a longer – albeit minor - history of tourism in the territories of the former Bantustans than for industrial development. In the beginning decades of the 20th century international tourism in South Africa was organized around the country's natural beauty, its wildlife attractions and, fulfilling the desire of many foreign visitors to experience at first hand so-called 'primitive' tribal life. As is shown elsewhere during the 1920s and 1930s the lure of seeing 'the primitive' resulted in small flows of international travellers into two areas of South Africa where 'native life' was offered as an attraction to tourists, namely the rural spaces of Zululand and the Transkei territory (Rogerson, 2019, 2022).

By the 1940s, however, and the beginnings of the apartheid state in 1948 this type of tourism was in decline. During the 1950s with economic development planning for the Bantustans dominated by the findings of the Tomlinson Report, almost no policy focus existed on tourism in these areas. The first policy interest around tourism promotion in the Homelands started to appear in the 1960s, which was the time when the apartheid state was initiating an institutional structure for the promotion of tourism in South Africa as a whole (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2022a). Following the 1963 grant of 'self-government' to Transkei there was recognition in South African parliamentary debates of the potential for developing tourism in the Transkei in order for international tourists to glimpse 'Africa in the raw' (House of Assembly Debates, 30 September, 1966). Moreover, there was also recognition of the urgent need for improving the standards of local hotels in line with quality and grading standards introduced in 1964-65 for South African hotels (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2022a). This was essential as it was noted there as a flow of tour

buses travelling into Transkei as well as tours that included overnight stops within Transkei.

Greater policy interest for tourism development in the Bantustans was provoked during the early 1970s, a time when the limitations and disappointments of planned industrial decentralisation programmes in the Bantustans were becoming clear. In debates conducted in the South African parliament questions began to be posed about what government “is doing or intends doing in the future in regard to the promotion of tourism in the homelands” (House of Assembly Debates, 24 October, 1974: Col. 6255). The apartheid government indicated that one step was to devolve responsibility for tourism promotion to the Homeland governments themselves (House of Assembly Debates, 23 October, 1974). It was considered that such a change of control might “have a material influence on tourism in South Africa” (House of Assembly Debates, 23 October, 1974: Col. 6210). The detailed response given by the Minister of Tourism is revealing in terms of showing the government’s concern for tourism development in the Bantustans during the 1970s. It was stated that in the case of Transkei discussions had been undertaken with the Bantustan leaders. The Minister stated as follows: “Tourism has already been delegated to them as a function. We are prepared to make our knowledge and training facilities available to them for the training of their own officials. We are prepared to cooperate with all the homelands, because I believe that tourism is a very valuable asset to them” (House of Assembly Debates, 24 October, 1974: Col. 6255). Especially optimism was expressed for the development of tourism attractions in the Transkei in particular with its attractive coastal attractions of the Wild Coast which had been a minor focus for domestic (white) South African travellers since the 1940s (Wildman, 2005). The small coastal settlement of Coffee Bay had grown on the basis of this leisure travel by domestic visitors (Wildman, 2005).

The major turn to tourism would not be led, however, by the natural scenic beauty of certain of the Bantustans. Under apartheid, South Africa’s anti-gambling legislation, racist laws and Calvinistic puritanism had created ideal opportunities in the 1960s for the establishment of casinos in the surrounding countries of Southern Africa – Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. In particular, those opportunities had been recognized by the outgoing British colonial government in Swaziland which was cognizant of the potential of gambling tourism and the proximity of the South African market. Indeed, in 1963 (five years before Swaziland independence) the colonial state passed a Casino Act in Swaziland which laid the basis for the monopoly casino operations that would develop there and followed by Lesotho and Botswana (Crush and Wellings, 1983). This was a ‘forbidden fruit’ form of tourism, which came to characterize Lesotho and Swaziland in the 1970s”. With the continued prohibition of casino operations under apartheid South Africa, the emerging “casino states” of Lesotho and Swaziland experienced a phase of considerable tourism expansion which lasted until the mid-1970s (Crush and Wellings, 1987). At its peak in 1975 the tourism inflow to Swaziland, based upon the casinos, was over 150 000 people, mostly South African tourists. Among others the work of Weaver (2000) situates this tourism development as part of a new political geography of tourism in Southern Africa during the 1960s and 1970s.

Further radical changes in the political geography of Southern Africa during the 1970s started to re-cast patterns of casino tourism in the region

(Rogerson, 1990; Weaver, 2000). Van der Merwe (2017: 11) highlights that a critical moment in the history of casino tourism in South Africa was the passage in 1971 of the Self-Governing Territories Constitution Act by the South African parliament. Under this Act “bantustans were given powers to write their own laws, and thus allowing for the legalization of gambling and establishment of casinos” (van der Merwe, 2017: 11). Beyond the legalization of gambling there occurred a raft of other laws which included the sanctioning of interracial relationships and pornography. Haines and Tomaselli (1992) write of the growing importance of ‘vice capital’ in South Africa which was facilitated by the granting of ‘independence’ to several Bantustans. The spaces of these ‘independent’ Bantustans functioned “as pockets of permissiveness within an otherwise rather rigidly administered Calvinist-oriented state” (Haines and Tomaselli, 1992: 156). All the Bantustans were non-viable economic entities and struggled to attain financial independence, surviving only through massive subsidies provided by the (white) South African government. Indeed, with planning for ‘grand apartheid’, the concession of nominal ‘independence’ to several of the Bantustans of South Africa opened new opportunities for South African tourism capital to establish additional gaming-oriented resorts.

The successive award of ‘independence’ to Transkei (1976), Bophuthatswana (1977), Venda (1979) and Ciskei (1981) re-cast the function of these areas within South Africa’s political economy (Rogerson, 2004). The imperative need of the apartheid state both to legitimise Bantustan independence and to wean these impoverished areas from their revenue dependency upon South Africa produced what Crush and Wellings (1983, p. 691) have described as “an alliance of convenience” with tourism capital. By upholding the fiction of independent homelands the apartheid state “conveniently shelved its puritanical views and argued with scarcely concealed sophistry that it was within the jurisdiction of the homeland authorities to formulate their own position on these matters” (Grundlingh, 2006, p. 117). It is against such a backdrop that the leaders of the independent Bantustans entered into a marriage of convenience with South African tourism capital to exploit the loopholes created in gambling legislation which were provided by the bogus ‘independence’ of these territories (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2022b). The apartheid state officials turned a blind eye to substantial corruption malpractices by the rulers of Bantustans in connivance with South African hotel developers (Philipps, 2017). The growth of casino tourism in the four independent Homelands is viewed by Briedenhann and Wickens (2004) as an early form of rural tourism in these areas. This said, Rogerson (2014, p. 25) writes of the Bantustans as a case of rural slumland tourism: “in essence the slumlords, the leaders of the nominally independent Homelands, were to be rewarded with casino developments in exchange for their agreement to sham ‘independence’” (Rogerson, 2014, p. 25).

The opportunities for Bantustan casino development were grasped in particular by Lucas Mangope, Bophuthatswana’s president, and the Southern Sun hotelier, Sol Kerzner, who entered into what has been described as “a mutually beneficial relationship to create casinos within the borders of the bantustans” (van der Merwe, 2017: 2). Indeed, the ‘independent’ state of Bophuthatswana became the major locus for early casino investment by South African capital (Drummond et al., 2022). Following lengthy negotiations with the ‘slumlords’ of Bophuthatswana, Southern Sun concluded an agreement for

exclusive gambling rights in the territory and began investing with promises to boost local tourism (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2022b). The first hotel/casino complex in the Bantustans was constructed at Mmabatho, the capital of Bophuthatswana, and readied for its opening to coincide with 'independence' celebrations in December 1977 (Drummond et al., 2022). The Mmabatho casino was followed by the much larger and more ambitious Sun City complex, which was proclaimed to match Las Vegas in its glitz and glamour (van Eeden, 2007). As is observed by Freeman (2014, p. 6) December 1979 "marked the opening of Sun City to an anticipative and a deeply disapproving world". The Sun City casino was located just a two-hour drive from South Africa's economic heartland and its major cities of Johannesburg and Pretoria (Rogerson, 1990). For the apartheid government Sun City was used "to legitimise the homelands and was a convenient tool to transfer the cost of subsidising the bantustans from state funds over to private investment" (van der Merwe, 2017, p. 21). Sun City served as a tourist magnet catering mainly to white South Africans and a few wealthy Blacks who travelled from the country's major metropolitan centres to indulge in gambling and the other attractions on offer (Freeman, 2014). Sun City was designed in the lavish Las Vegas strip style, becoming the most notorious of all the Bantustan casinos with its roulette, slot machines, pornography, multi-racial sequined show revues and designer golf course (van Eeden, 2007). Grundlingh (2006, p. 117) observes that underpinning the attractions of the luxury casino resorts "was the allure of forbidden fruit – gambling, pornographic films and, more informally, prostitution across the colour line". The political geography was important that the Sun City stood outside the borders of South Africa, which allowed it to circumvent the apartheid regime's conservative social policies (Haines and Tomaselli, 1992; Freeman, 2014).

The decade of the 1980s witnessed a number of new casino openings and resort developments taking root in South Africa's four 'independent' Bantustans. The location of these casino-resorts was influenced by fierce competition between the Southern Sun and Holiday Inn Groups which were seeking to negotiate market access to South Africa's sources of major gambling, namely in the country's largest cities. Following the opening of Sun City, the Holiday Inn chain responded by re-orienting its investments away from Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland and instead into the Bantustans, by developing a parallel casino resort to Sun City along the Wild Coast of Transkei, close to the Durban metropolitan area (Rogerson, 2004). According to Wildman (2005, p. 86) the main appeal of the Transkei casino "was its feeling of unreality – of being a pleasure palace far removed from the reality of apartheid" Indeed, tourism developers and Bantustan governments were facilitated to take advantage of the status of 'independence' as a means to circumvent South African government restrictions towards 'morally dubious' activities and to create 'fantasyscapes' (van der Merwe, 2017). The Transkei, as with other subsequent 'independent' Bantustans, "provided the ideal location for white South Africans to indulge themselves" (Wildman, 2005, p. 86). The corruption surrounding this hotel-casino development is catalogued by Streek and Wicksteed (1981).

The 'casino wars' of the early 1980s was pursued between Southern Sun and Holiday Inn as both hotel enterprises fought to maximise their access to the urban consumer gambling markets of South Africa through establishing competing casino resorts (Rogerson, 1990). The casino wars climaxed with the announcement that the Holiday Inn group had secured monopoly rights on

gambling in the miniscule territory of KwaNdebele, which in 1982 seemed a candidate to become the fifth South African Bantustan agreeing to 'independence' (Rogerson, 2004). The significance of the casino development that was proposed for KwaNdebele was that it threatened to undercut the profitability of the Sun City complex (operated by Southern Sun) because it was favourably located less than one hour's drive from Pretoria, South Africa's capital city. It was this projected casino development that led to negotiations between Southern Sun and Holiday Inn for a rationalization of the casino industry in South Africa and which eventually led to the formation in 1983 of the Sun International group (Rogerson, 1990). The newly established Sun International group obtained control of all casino operations throughout Southern Africa (with the exception of the Hilton Hotel casino in Lesotho, which it took over one year later). The removal of the competitive threat of the KwaNdebele casino (which was never constructed) allowed Sun International to go ahead with renewed investments at Sun City as well as launching new casinos at Thaba 'Nchu (an enclave of Bophuthatswana) seeking to tap the gambling markets of the Free State and particularly of the city of Bloemfontein. The casino gaming economy of apartheid South Africa was under the monopoly control of Sun International; 17 casinos were established and continued to operate into the period of the democratic transition in 1994. These comprised of two different types of casino operations. First, were a small number of hotel-related casinos that followed the model which existed in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (Crush and Wellings, 1987). Examples of these hotel-related casinos were those which opened at the following Bantustan locations, namely Mmabatho, Mdantsane, Umtata or Butterworth. The second – and larger group – were casino resorts that were constructed with complementary hotels and entertainment leisure complexes. These were 'purpose-built' facilities and constructed at locations which offered good access to the lucrative markets of the leading urban centres such as Johannesburg, Pretoria and Durban.

Under apartheid Sun City became a symbol of the opulence that (many) White South Africans enjoyed at the expense of the Black majority (Freeman, 2014). Nevertheless, Drummond et al. (2022) stress that Sun City assumed a critical role in promoting Bophuthatswana as a state 'independent' from South Africa. Van der Merwe (2017) maintains that this was largely achieved through the tourism attractions offered by Sun City and supported further by those of the nearby game reserve of Pilanesberg National Park. Although casino tourism and the entertainment complexes of Sun City (and subsequently Lost City) dominated the tourism economy of Bophuthatswana other 'niche' forms of tourism made an appearance in the Bantustans. One example was heritage tourism based upon the historical significance of Mahikeng with its associations with Robert Baden-Powell and the 217-day siege of Mafeking. (Drummond et al., 2021). A further case was of adventure sky-diving which surfaced as a popular activity in the surrounds of Mmabatho during period of late apartheid (Drummond et al., 2022). Finally, beyond leisure tourism it must be understood that the Bantustans were major recipients of VFR tourism, namely of visits by friends and relatives who were based and working in urban areas making return visits often to second homes and family in rural areas (Rogerson, 2014). Indeed, for the six Bantustans that did not accede to independence the phenomenon of VFR tourism was overwhelmingly the leading segment of the limited tourism that was taking place in these areas during the apartheid period.

CONCLUSION

This paper offers a modest contribution to the literature on the political geography of South Africa's Bantustans. The analysis has used an historical approach to interrogate shifts in economic development planning for these peripheral spaces. It was argued that initially apartheid planners placed great faith in the prospects for industrial development in these areas and offered substantial incentives for both local and international investors to locate their productive facilities in the Bantustans. With minor exceptions this planned strategy for bringing factories to the fields achieved little success and was subsequently jettisoned. Alongside the industrial programme, however, there emerged potential opportunities for leveraging tourism as an economic base for Bantustan development. The opportunities for casino-resort development were limited to the four Bantustans which acceded to 'independence' and thus allowed a changing function of these areas in the political landscape of South Africa. With the end of apartheid and democratic transition in 1994 the Bantustans were re-incorporated into South Africa which shifted once more the competitiveness of these regions for tourism development. Overall, this analysis contributes another chapter to the so far limited writings on tourism during South Africa's troubled apartheid years.

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THE PLANNING CHALLENGES OF EXTENDED METROPOLITAN AREAS: ISSUES FROM SOUTH AFRICA

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Abstract: Territorial administrative restructuring and the redrawing of municipal boundaries was undertaken in South Africa to address the apartheid legacy of major social, economic and spatial inequalities. A significant consequence of territorial administrative restructuring was that the boundaries of certain South African metropolitan areas were expanded such that they incorporate vast rural geographies. These spaces pose particular challenges for metropolitan planning. The aim in this paper is to examine the resultant planning challenges which confront South Africa's extended metropolitan spaces. Among several consequences was the imperative for metropolitan authorities to build new competences in order to plan and manage these added rural spaces as well as the peri-urban spaces. The analysis is contextualised within an international literature on planning in extended metropolitan spaces and of peri-urban spaces.

Key words: extended metropolitan areas, peri-urban spaces, rural spaces, metropolitan planning, South Africa

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INTRODUCTION

In 1994 the new democratically elected government of South Africa inherited the legacy of over four decades of apartheid planning which had produced massive economic, social and spatial inequalities. One aspect of redressing the social and spatial distortions produced under apartheid has been through processes of territorial administrative restructuring and the redrawing of municipal boundaries in South Africa (Visser, 2001; Visser, 2003; Cameron, 2006). As observed by Ramutsindela (1998) the end of apartheid not only occasioned the restructuring of society but also necessitated the restructuring of territorial spaces. Boundary changes and spatial reorganisation of

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administrations was associated with the redistribution of power and resources. During the post-apartheid period several rounds of territorial restructuring and reforms have been undertaken and impacted all tiers of the urban hierarchy (Ramutsindela and Simon, 1999; Giraut and Maharaj, 2004; Cameron, 2006; Marais et al., 2016; Marais and Nel, 2019; Subramanyam and Marais, 2022). Arguably, however, the reforms and territorial restructuring have most deeply impacted the landscape and functioning of several of South Africa's metropolitan areas (Visser, 2001; Houghton, 2013; Sutherland et al., 2018). The process of the spatial reordering of local government boundaries was contested, conflictual and highly controversial as wealthy urban authorities were opposed to the geographical extension of their administrative boundaries because of the costs that would be incurred for provision of services and infrastructure to resource-constrained poorer marginal spaces (Giraut and Maharaj, 2004; Chirisa, 2010; Subramanyam and Marais, 2022).

The context for this investigation is that an important consequence of territorial administrative restructuring was that the boundaries of certain South African metropolitan areas were expanded such that they incorporate vast rural geographies. These spaces pose particular challenges for metropolitan planning. The core aim in this paper is to examine the resultant planning challenges which confront South Africa's extended metropolitan spaces. At the international scale it must be recognised that South African cities are not alone in the Global South in terms of having to govern and plan for changing rural spaces (Follmann, 2022). Indeed, many Asian, African as well as Latin American cities face similar challenges of planning and governance issues because of rapid processes of urbanization and change which are taking place there. Accelerating rates of urbanization are occurring at the rural-urban interface in 'peri-urban' areas of metropolises in the Global South. As shown in several recent works this is one of the critical issues of the past decades which has a range of physical, social, economic and environmental consequences for these areas (Dadashpoor and Ahani, 2019; Dadashpoor and Ahani, 2021; Dadashpoor and Malekzadeh, 2022).

The paper unfolds through three sections of material and discussion. The first focuses on conceptual issues and of the international record – or more particularly Global South experience – of planning challenges around extended metropolitan spaces. Attention then turns to overview the expanded metropolitan areas of South Africa and their planning challenges. The final section narrows to examine in greater detail the planning changes and directions initially followed within one South African metropolitan area as a consequence of administrative reform and territorial restructuring.

INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE CONTEXT

The works of McGregor et al. (2006) and Simon (2008) draw attention to the shortcomings of policy-makers continuing to undertake planning on the basis of a dichotomy between urban and rural areas. Implicit in the urban-rural dichotomization of space is "the idea that urban and rural areas were characterized by very different land-use patterns and human behaviors and that the boundaries between these spaces and places were easily discernible and clear-cut" (Simon, 2008, p. 167). The conventional view was of the 'urban' as dominated by manufacturing and service sector activities whereas the rural economy and livelihoods were based on agriculture (Allen, 2010). The dynamics and complexity of changes taking place at the rural-urban interface compelled a

re-assessment of the validity of this simple dichotomy between urban and rural spaces. Adell (1999) identifies the appearance of new conceptual landscapes in which rural-urban relationships are re-defined. As argued by Ortega (2022) there was a need to move beyond simple dichotomies such as the urban and rural binaries in the categorization of the complex spaces that are formed on the peri-urban fringe in the Global South.

A landmark investigation that challenged fundamentally the rural-urban dichotomy was produced by McGee (1991) and stemmed from his examination of the nature of rapid urbanization processes occurring in Java, Indonesia. McGee (1991, 2022) observed the appearance of what he termed 'extended metropolitan regions' or *desakota* regions of Asia. The term *desakota* was coined by McGee (1991) who identified these morphologies with the Bahasa Indonesian word *desakota* from the words for village (*desa*) and towns (*kota*). *Desakota* a term coined to describe the growth and features of areas with mixed urban and rural characteristics (McGee, 2022). The concept of *desakota* was grounded in the contextual realities of Java and "denotes a spatiality characterized by the interplay of rural and urban ways of living" (Ortega, 2020, p. 668). Through the neologism '*desakota*' McGee (2022) signalled the appearance and consolidation of distinctive settlement system and a space economy transition that impacted large swathes of southeast Asia.

The *desakota* model describes the "unique structure of Asian urbanization" and challenges Western urban development models (Wu and Sui, 2016, p. 320). For Ortega (2022) the *desakota* are hybrid spaces (Ortega, 2020). These areas are characterized by rapid expansion and the spread of urban activities into rural areas (Ginsburg et al., 1991; McGee and Greenberg, 1992). *Desakota* therefore are "regions in between" and a descriptor for "closely interlinked rural/urban livelihoods, communication, transport and economic systems" (Moench and Gyawali, 2008, p. 2). For Xie et al. (2005) *desakota* represents a pattern of settlement characterized by an intensive mixture of agricultural and non-agricultural activities which is reflected in the close interlocking of villages and small towns, the patterns are neither urban or rural but exhibit aspects of both. Usually, the *desakota* regions comprise households in which working members may be engaged in both rural agriculture as well as jobs, services, retail and manufacturing activities "that have historically been seen as more 'urban' occupations" (Moench and Gyawali, 2008, p. 2).

Pelling and Mustafa (2010, p. 1) aver that the growing attention to the phenomenon of *desakota* is "a recognition that the classic conceptual, policy and functional distinction between urban and rural cultural, livelihood and technological complexes is no longer valid for most parts of the world". The *desakota* phenomenon has been observed in several fast-expanding metropolitan areas of Asia, including parts of Thailand, Philippines, Taiwan as well as Indonesia (McGee and Greenberg, 1992; Firman and Dhatmapatni, 1995; Sit, 1996; Ortega, 2012; Shih and Chi, 2012). Most recently, attention has turned to interrogate the Chinese experience of the mixing of agricultural and non-agricultural activities, which has been viewed as *desakota* regions (Sui and Zheng, 2001; Woltjer, 2014; Chen et al., 2017; Zhang, 2018; Veeck et al., 2021).

The *desakota* of Asia point more broadly to the need to understand the complex changes which are reshaping the urban periphery or peri-urban zones in many parts of the Global South. Among others Ortega (2020) points to rapid expansion taking place in the peri-urban fringes of the Global South. Leitner et

al. (2022, p. 1) argue that “peri-urbanization is transforming the urban-rural interface of metropolitan areas across the global south”. Peri-urban communities exhibit a “dual urban-rural orientation” in social and economic terms and predominantly are undergoing rapid social change (Allen et al., 1999, p. 4). According to Carrilho and Trindade (2022, p. 1) research on peri-urbanization gained momentum “in the first quarter of the 20th century, due to the pace it acquired worldwide and the implication that urbanization and overall settlement patterns have on social sustainability and development”. Growing academic attention to peri-urban spaces has been driven by “the recognition that there is no clear or neat division between the urban and the rural and has thus challenged the urban versus rural dichotomy in favour of a continuum approach” (Bartels et al., 2020, p. 1238).

Arguably, little agreement exists among scholars and policy-makers about basic aspects of the peri-urbanisation phenomenon and as a result of its complexity much of what is understood about the peri-urban concept is contested. Adell (1999) views the peri-urban interface as a dynamic zone of rapid change. Follmann (2022, p. 1) states that the term peri-urbanization is widely applied to describe a set of different processes that transform rural areas to a mix of rural and urban spaces. According to some scholars the peri-urban “is characterized by high and often increasing, population density, small landholdings, rich countryside homes, poor slums, diverse sources of income, a lack of regulation, contested land tenure rights, uncoordinated conversion of farmland to housing, pollution, environmental problems, intensified resource exploitation, considerable economic dynamism and a severe lack of service provision” (Marshall et al., 2009, p. 3). Simon (2008, p. 167) views peri-urban zones as transitional zones between distinctly urban and clearly rural areas and argues that their significance lies in the fact that “their dynamic mix of functions and land uses; increasing population densities; growing significance as sources of urban food, construction materials, and other resources; as urban waste disposal or treatment sites; and as recreational zones”. For Wang et al. (2023, p. 1) the urban-rural interface is “the frontier space for rural-urban linkage” and the most intensive space for human-land conflicts. Leitner and Sheppard (2022) assert that distinct peri-urban landscapes are emerging shaped by differences in the social ecology of land and local governance and planning regimes. The role of land property speculators is considered to be critical in moulding the evolution of peri-urban landscapes.

Adell (1999) pinpoints several critical themes in early writings about the peri-urban interface. These include the importance of peri-urban agriculture, the critical role of the informal economy in peri-urban spaces as well as conflicts over land and property ownership. More recently, Follmann (2022) sees peri-urban areas as marked by complex transformations with land conversion and change, high rates of population growth, shifting economic activities and restructuring of resource flows all of which contribute to competing claims on the same space and resources. For McGregor et al. (2006) these peri-urban spaces, home to millions of people globally, confront unique and acute problems and require distinctive innovative planning approaches and solutions to their complex challenges. Indeed, there is broad agreement that peri-urban landscapes present a major challenge for planners. Peri-urban areas are “plagued by land conflicts” and require effective management measures to address these conflicts (Ahani and Dadashpoor, 2021a, p. 1909). One of the core

dilemmas of peri-urban areas relates to poor infrastructure and inadequate service provision which has a negative consequence for living conditions which often deteriorate with population pressure (Mondal, 2021).

Ahani and Dadashpoor (2021b) highlight the need for evolving a special growth framework for the growth guidance and control of peri-urbanization. The peri-urban space is distinctive for the multiple challenges it poses for planning and governance because of its ecological features, socio-economic heterogeneity and fragmented institutional context (McGregor et al., 2006). In socio-economic terms the interface is mixed, fluid and subject to rapid change with the potential co-existence of informal households, industrial entrepreneurs, and new migrants all with different and competing interests/perceptions within an institutional context of the absence of structures capable of addressing the linkages between so-termed urban and rural activities (Allen et al., 2006; Allen, 2010). Agriculture is a vital source of livelihood at the peri-urban interface across the global South (Simon, 2008; Torres-Lima et al., 2010). Peri-urban agriculturalists face several challenges in adapting their production systems to a context of land degradation and environmental deterioration.

EXTENDED METROPOLITAN SPACES IN SOUTH AFRICA

The international debates taking place around planning and governance responses to the challenges of peri-urban interface are highly relevant for the setting of post-apartheid South Africa (Rogerson, 2023). Within the reorganization of local government which occurred after democratic transition there was the designation of eight metropolitan areas in South Africa. These are Cape Town in Western Cape, Johannesburg, Ekurhuleni and Tshwane in South Africa's economic heartland of Gauteng, eThekweni in KwaZulu-Natal, Nelson Mandela Bay and Buffalo City in Eastern Cape and Mangaung in Free State. The location of these eight metropolitan areas is shown on Figure 1.

A central aspect of the process of restructuring local government in the post-apartheid transition was "spatial reorganization through boundary delimitation" (Giraut and Maharaj, 2002, p. 39). One outcome was territorial contestation in particular over the incorporation of rural areas under traditional leadership into urban areas. Of immediate concern was whether metropolitan municipalities could practically supply services to these incorporated areas given sometimes their remoteness and relative inaccessibility as well as questions about the willingness or ability to pay for services of poor communities (Sutherland et al., 2014). In addition, "traditional leaders believed that their territorial jurisdiction and authority were being undermined as the administrative geography was radically redefined by the Municipal Demarcation Board" (Giraut and Maharaj, 2002, p. 46). Further concern was expressed by the metropolitan authorities that national government was using the demarcation system of restructuring as a guise for 'dumping' mismanaged municipalities upon the metropolitan areas.

Several metropolitan areas include extensive so-called 'rural spaces' as a result of the restructuring of local government and of territorial boundaries following the democratic transition. Indeed, the redrawing of boundaries produced a situation that at least four metropolitan authorities in South Africa – eThekweni, Tshwane, Mangaung and Buffalo City – confront multiple governance challenges of planning for an extended metropolitan region which includes expansive rural geographies. It is observed, for example, that eThekweni's spatial

footprint is at least 60 percent 'rural' (Roberts and O'Donoghue, 2013). This area spans 1500 square kilometres with a population of at least 600 000 poses a set of highly distinct challenges for "urban" planning (Sutherland et al., 2014).




Figure 1. The Location of South Africa's Eight Metropolitan Municipal Areas

The cases of Tshwane and Buffalo City are two other South African metropolitan areas that incorporate extended rural spaces. In the example of Tshwane, which centres on South Africa's capital city of Pretoria, approximately 35 percent of its land area is considered as rural. At Buffalo City (with East London the major centre) in Eastern Cape it is estimated by metropolitan stakeholders that almost two-thirds of its spatial area is rural in character. It is within this context of territorial restructuring of administrative spaces in South Africa that the planning challenges of peri-urban spaces are highly significant. Moreover, Smith (2022) maintains that poverty in South Africa increasingly is being geographically relocated from urban townships and (former) rural Bantustans to peri-urban spaces. The production of new peri-urban landscapes is therefore a critical factor in shaping new patterns of uneven development in post-apartheid South Africa.

Notwithstanding the existence of extensive rural spaces in a number of South African metropolitan areas there is so far limited academic writing on

these issues by local planners or urban geographers. Best documented is Mangaung with the recent work by Subramanyam and Marais (2022). This section provides an overview of available research and debates focused on Tshwane, Buffalo City and eThekweni drawing from the handful of published research studies which cover issues around urban-rural interdependencies in these regions and, most importantly from three unpublished reports which were commissioned by the South African Cities Network (SACN) on Tshwane, Buffalo City and eThekweni and mainly deal with infrastructural issues around water and electricity provision. As Abrahams (2016) points out since its establishment in 2002 the SACN has evolved as an organization which plays a significant role in defining and framing the urban policy agenda in South Africa.

The SACN research reports were targeted specifically at identifying and analysing potential challenges relating to the provision of electricity and water from a governance perspective as well as the broader governance issues as they relate to rural and agricultural development. The analysis was based upon a total of 11 detailed interviews which were conducted with senior management in the three metropolitan areas of eThekweni, Buffalo City and Tshwane (Figure 1). Special attention was accorded to the provision of water and electricity services albeit it was acknowledged that local development relating to 'rural spaces' is much broader in scope than simply the provision of these two sets of infrastructural services. This said an important finding in the research is that the so-termed rural-urban divide is undergoing fundamental change as a result of dynamic change occurring at the peri-urban interface. The research investigations disclosed several key issues relating to planning and governance in these three municipalities.

It was disclosed in the case studies that, as a result of the incorporation of rural spaces, the metropolitan authorities necessarily had to establish new departments, and develop skills capacity in areas never previously required in metropolitan municipalities. These include rural development, rural road maintenance, rural fire prevention, rural planning, rural local economic development and most importantly agricultural development. Indeed, a critical challenge is for the metropolitan areas to gain capacity and an understanding of rural and agricultural development, albeit that this was not a traditional skill set found in municipal management. The research revealed that the governance landscape within municipalities is complex. The metropolitan municipalities have to cope with geographic areas that are expanded from time to time by the demarcation board and often include the incorporation of poorly performing municipalities. This situation results in the metropolitan authorities facing ever-growing maintenance and new infrastructure backlogs. The financial implications of these backlogs are of sufficient quantum as to impact the management of the assets under their control.

The metropolitan governments are also faced with insufficient funding and an inability to raise additional capital due to legislative constraints. National and provincial government offer a number of funding opportunities from a variety of sources both within and external to government. Each creates different demands on these municipalities, and correspondingly may complicate the governance issues surrounding municipal finance. Overall, what emerged from the three SACN case studies is that the municipalities can be at times overwhelmed by the complex governance environment within which they are required to operate. In particular the research revealed a number of issues

relating to water provision which need addressing. Some of those issues are unique to each metro while others hold true across all of them. The effective, sustainable, and equitable provision of water and electricity by the metropolitan governments is of paramount importance and forms a priority objective. All three metropolitan authorities include water and sanitation within the same department. It was observed that the service delivery issues related to water and sanitation are more acute as in the case of electricity in respect of rural communities, the responsibility falls to Eskom, South Africa's (mis-managed) national provider of electricity.

It was evidenced that there exists a lack of conformity between municipalities. Although this has both positive and negative connotations, importantly it makes it difficult to undertake impact assessments and carry out benchmarking across municipalities and thereby to identify elements of good practice. Overall, it was shown that despite the complex governance environment and the challenges they face, the three metropolitan municipalities are each carving out their own pathway through the governance jungle and succeeding in certain respects. This said, it is clear that there is still a fair amount of room for interpretation by the management teams. This in itself is not necessarily a bad thing as it allows for innovation. However, when standards are required, it is important that a national standard be set.

One interesting experiment in governance is that of the eThekweni metropolitan government which is centred on the coastal city of Durban. In this extended metropolitan region 40% of the area is considered urban and 60% is rural. Here, the so-termed rural areas include both residential small holdings and commercial farming; importantly of the 60% land which is considered as rural, 51% is tribal owned land. In eThekweni the European Union (EU) became aware of this situation and piloted a new approach to managing the rural component of the eThekweni Metro for an initial three year period which was later extended by a further two years. The new approach, supported by the EU, was the establishment of Area Based Management (ABM) teams. Essentially the ABM teams were to function as local development agencies established for each region. The purpose and key desired outcomes for the ABMs related to the delivery of basic services and the promotion of local economic development (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2007, p. 3).

Administrative problems emerged as the ABMs did not fit into the standard metro organogram and as a consequence confusion arose with a lack of certainty as to the exact role which they were meant to play. One unfortunate consequence was this led to little effort being made by line departments to cooperate with the ABMs. A mixed evaluation is offered of the governance experiment of ABMs. The research revealed that in certain respects the experience of the ABMs in eThekweni is considered positively. Further, it was disclosed that ABMs were viewed successful in the rural areas in which they operated and made a significant impact on these communities. The ABMs commissioned their own research which disclosed the need for assistance to be provided to the agricultural sector. As a result, this led to the preparation and establishment of a Metropolitan Agricultural Policy and the consequent launch of support to the agricultural sector. This included agricultural extension services to the agricultural community in the metropolitan area. The ABMs used a variety of Department of Environmental Affairs programmes and associated funding to assist the rural and agricultural areas. The ABMs also established a

pilot Farmers Support Centre (Agric-Hub). The Rural ABM established a Rural Agricultural Policy which later became the eThekweni Agricultural Policy when it incorporated the urban areas to deal with urban agriculture. In addition, a separate Rural Development Framework Plan was established at the inception of the rural ABM which guided all interventions by the rural ABM. The ABMs thus emerged as a source of many new ideas and innovation.

Overall, the interviews confirmed that the ABMs were a success in terms of making a large impact both on rural communities and the metro itself. Much of their success is attributed to their flexible organizational structure which was outside of normal municipal operational procedures. A key ingredient in the success of the ABMs was their independence in decision-making and their ability to essentially by-pass lengthy procurement processes. This enabled them to respond quickly to needs detected in the rural and agricultural communities. This ability to 'fast track' was a key factor in their initial success. The ABMs, however, did not 'fit' into a traditional municipal organisational structure. They addressed all the non-standard issues that arose within the rural areas in a non-standard manner. They were also structured around a small team of professionals in a flat organisational structure, again unlike any municipal entity. No effort was made to find a way to integrate these different organisational structures. The fact that they were also largely financially independent added a further dimension of difficulty in respect of integrating the two structures. The research considered that these local development agencies effectively functioned in the manner of a private sector business which allowed them to be flexible and to respond immediately with action. This flexibility and nimbleness in terms of policy action is viewed as difficult to attain within the conventional structures of municipal administration.

The ending of the five year period of support for the ABMs exposed a set of issues about the sustainability of municipal attempts to assist and support rural and agricultural development. After 5 years, once EU funding dried up the eThekweni Metro allowed the ABMs to collapse as it standardized Departments. The Deputy City Managers (DCM) to whom the ABMs reported were faced with managing two different budgets; the first was their traditional budgets and the second a separate smaller ABM budget, which was more complex in sourcing and utilization. The DCMs forced traditional municipal standards onto the ABMs which caused their demise. Subsequently, the ABMs were absorbed into the Project Management Unit which manages the Metro's Extended Public Works Programmes and the agricultural projects. ABMs subsequently shifted to a maintenance role or closed down. Correspondingly, several initiatives launched through ABMs either stalled or closed down after the re-organization and reincorporation of the activities of ABMs within the existing municipal administrative structures. For example, it was revealed that forestry efforts collapsed with the demise of ABMs. Moreover, since the closure of ABMs, the agriculture mandate has been divided between two departments. These developments underscore the governance issues for a metropolitan authority in handling issues relating to agriculture. Above all, the research disclosed that agriculture had no formal role in municipal structures and capacity shortages exist for qualified and experienced personnel necessary to manage the agricultural component within the municipality.

In the case of Tshwane different governance trajectories are observed. The Tshwane metropolitan region is distinctive as it was a cross-boundary

municipality, with parts of the city located in North-West Province and other parts in Gauteng. The Tshwane metropolitan area thus has an extraordinarily complex inter-governmental legislative, financial and service delivery situation to manage. One aspect of the new institutional arrangements was the introduction of the 'regional services model' through which the city aimed to bring government closer to the people and to enhance service delivery throughout the different regions. The adoption of the regionalisation model resulted in seven regions and functions devolved to the regional service centres including Agriculture and Rural Development. This said, only four of the seven regions have a rural component. It was this mix of rural and urban that became the rationale for establishing the Agriculture and Rural Development division. The original Agricultural Division was initiated in 2008 and established the Integrated Agricultural Strategy Policy and Implementation Plan. As part of this structure, Tshwane developed four agricultural centres termed Sustainable Agricultural Villages. Further, in Tshwane a comprehensive rural development programme was established and based upon the Gauteng provincial rural development programme. The focus of this programme is the development of economic opportunities. The Tshwane metropolitan area is further distinguished by the establishment within its boundaries of a 'big five' game reserve within its extended metropolitan region. The evolution of the Dinokeng Game Reserve and its contribution to the urban tourism economy is traced by Burton et al. (2020).

In terms of governance as a whole it was disclosed that rural spaces present several specific sets of problems. First, rural communities expect the same services as urban areas. A problem emerges, however, that in order for those services to be delivered in a sustainable way necessarily they have to be at a lower level than that of urban services. For example, in Buffalo City it was revealed that access to waterborne sewerage is limited to the formal settlements in the urban centres and to some of the larger peri-urban settlements. Here the metropolitan authority separates rural and urban areas in their Spatial Development Framework with the 'dividing line' known as the rural-urban divide. Rural communities either have access to a basic sanitation service (limited coverage), a sub-basic service, or no service at all. Another set of issues surrounded the agricultural communities which overlap across the urban-rural boundaries into the urban and peri urban areas and had different sets of support needs. Finally, particular issues arose in circumstances where land was held under customary forms of tenure. In particular, the role of traditional leaders was viewed as problematic in terms of requests for accessing land for developmental purposes.

RESPONSES IN ETHEKWINI

This section turns to examine in greater depth the immediate response to the establishment of an extended metropolitan area in eThekweni in KwaZulu-Natal. The discussion draws upon detailed (unpublished) planning and consultancy reports which were prepared for the municipality and interviews with key municipal stakeholders. The approach is historical as it is confined essentially to the first decade response to the creation of an extended metropolitan space. The validity of using historical approaches to inform present-day planning, however, is stressed by many authors (Saarinen et al, 2017). The research was conducted in the pre-COVID-19 era.

For eThekweni the administrative restructuring which occurred in 2000 resulted in the addition of 67 percent more land to the city “most of which consisted of underdeveloped rural; and peri-urban areas under Traditional Authority” (Sutherland et al., 2014, p. 476). In total it is estimated that the reconfiguration of municipal boundaries resulted in the addition to the city of 75 000 rural households of which 60 000 did not have access to basic services (Sutherland et al., 2014). The changing boundaries and expansion of the eThekweni metropolitan area is given on Figure 2. It shows the extension of the metropolitan boundary after 2000 which resulted in the inclusion into the metropolitan area of peri-urban zones as well as an extensive rural hinterland (Sutherland et al., 2018). The incorporation into the eThekweni metropolitan municipality of land areas of adjacent local municipalities occurred on both the city’s northern and southern periphery.




Figure 2. The Post-2000 Expansion of the eThekweni Metropolitan Region

The character of the newly incorporated areas was described variously as ‘semi-rural’ and ‘rural’ with significant portions consisting of areas of traditional settlement areas (Sutherland et al., 2014). Importantly it was recognized that the inclusion of these rural spaces into eThekweni “poses a serious challenge to the Municipality that has a history and expertise limited to the management and development of urban areas” and thereby requiring that “skills and expertise relating to rural development still need to be developed within the council” (Linda Masinga Iyer Rothaug Project Team, 2003, p. 108). The municipality recognized the immediate need to establish a better knowledge base of these areas and produced the Rural Development Framework which provided the essential framework which guided planning in these areas (Linda Masinga Iyer Rothaug Project Team, 2003).

The baseline document acknowledged the key immediate issues of limited access to physical and economic services and the minimal level of economic development. These themes are reiterated in other planning documentation. It was recognized, for example, that distinguishing features of these areas are that much land falls under traditional authorities with the consequence that it is characterized by dual systems of governance – both traditional and democratic. Other issues are the high disease burden, paucity of basic services (roads, water, electricity), fragmented service delivery by different spheres of government, and overall chronic poverty as a result of limited economic opportunities with high levels of dependence by households on social grants (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2007, p. 3). In one studied area of the cohort population of working age (15 to 64 years) only 22.1 percent were formally employed, 35.2 percent were unemployed and the rest were not working (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2005, p. 20). Poverty levels are extreme with only 26 percent of households recorded as obtaining a basic income sufficient for “an average family to maintain a reasonable level of health and hygiene” (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2005, p. 20). Agricultural livelihoods were typical but in some areas such as the Southern region where the largest share of formal employment was outside agriculture and recorded in manufacturing as well as wholesale and retail trade (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2005, p. 21). This finding indicates significantly that the rural geographies of metropolitan areas incorporate a diverse mix of economic activities beyond agriculture.

A critical issue for municipal planning remains the inadequacy of the knowledge base concerning these ‘rural spaces’. It was admitted clearly in the Rural Development Framework that a “limited understanding exists of the economic situation of the people residing in the rural and peri-urban areas of eThekweni” (Linda Masinga Iyer Rothaug Project Team, 2003, p. 33). Further, it was conceded that this poor knowledge base “includes a lack of understanding of the sources of income and the migration patterns of rural people, both issues which substantially impact on future economic development strategies to be adopted” (Linda Masinga Iyer Rothaug Project Team, 2003, p. 29). The major early planning challenges relate to a cluster of poverty-related issues around the provision of basic services, the promotion of local economic development opportunities and the need to address environmental management concerns because of the degradation of the natural environment. The problems of a deteriorating environmental base and threats to sustainability were flagged as far back as the early 2000s. It was recognized that in terms of ecosystem services

that the “declining status of natural resources in rural areas is generating undesirable effects, and constrains the potential to achieve equity, efficiency and sustainability” (Linda Masinga Iyer Rothaug Project Team, 2003, p. 146).

Essentially these three clusters of poverty-related issues moved to dominate the policy agenda in eThekweni. Agriculture development is one core and obvious focus for policymakers in these rural spaces as household survival is often dependent on agricultural production (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2004). Within the Rural Development Framework, however, it was observed that “the Municipality has no specific programme to promote agricultural development as an income generator for communities” (Linda Masinga Iyer Rothaug Project Team, 2003, p. 29). Indeed, problems relating to municipal planning for agriculture have been a consistent policy challenge. Policy development has occurred for agricultural development with proposals for supporting in particular the emerging agricultural economy which ranges “from subsistence farming to commercial production” (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2004, p. 2). In particular the policy focus in agricultural development policy was weighted towards “previously disadvantaged communities” often mainly living in traditional settlement areas with customary forms of tenure (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2005, p. 50). Promoting food security was another strong policy focus (eThekweni Municipality, 2010; McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2010).

Among select key planning issues are, *inter alia*, issues of land redistribution, the development of agricultural support services, the establishment of rural agricultural service or marketing hubs, promoting organized farmers groups, enhancing access to credit for emerging farmers and building the potential of special events such as farmers days for promoting awareness of agricultural opportunities (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2004, 2005; Institute of Natural Resources et al., 2007). Other critical support measures relate to improving agricultural-specific infrastructure such as soil conservation works, storm water drainage, provision of storage facilities, irrigation and agricultural roads to assist in expanding access opportunities to markets (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2005; Gabhisa Planning and Investments, 2012). The issue of building market linkages was of special importance for existing and potential commercial rather than subsistence producers (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2005). Overall, it was argued that in a metropolitan area such as eThekweni agriculture had an important role to fulfil in the development of the municipality as a whole not least for rural livelihoods, economic development and food security (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2004).

As is the case in the experience of peri-urbanization in other parts of the world (Leitner and Sheppard, 2022; Leitner et al., 2022), land conversion represented a major challenge for maximizing the opportunities for economic development. It was conceded that there is continued erosion of the agricultural potential within eThekweni “due to the conversion of agricultural land to primarily, higher income residential estates and other urban uses” (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2004, p. 1). It was observed “large tracts of high potential agricultural land are lost on a daily basis to alternative uses (most notably upmarket residential development, commercial development, industrial development and leisure developments serving a

particular sector of society) (Institute of Natural Resources & Iyer Rothaug Collaborative, 2004, p. 5). In addition, in other of these rural spaces the absence of land use and planning guidelines results in housing developments occurring within environmentally sensitive areas (Gabhisa Planning and Investments, 2012, p. 3). Indeed, it was apparent that unplanned dense settlement caused problems for infrastructure provision with the consequence that hygiene and sanitation issues become another key planning challenge (Gabhisa Planning and Investments, 2012, p. 4).

The mixed character of livelihoods in these areas raises the issue of the dichotomization between urban versus rural spaces. It was acknowledged by key municipal officials that “we always had definitional issues with these areas” (Interview, Senior Project Manager, Economic Development Unit, eThekweni Municipality). A particular problem exists with the classification of these rural spaces in terms of funding for upgrading and improvement. It was observed that eThekweni’s rural areas are ineligible for grants “that are designated as urban” (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2007, p. 15). Moreover, “neither are they eligible for rural grants through the Integrated Sustainable Development Programme or the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism because these programmes and departments classify eThekweni’s rural areas as metropolitan” (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2007, p. 15). Accordingly, it remains that eThekweni’s rural areas are “in a limbo when it comes to access to funding”, including even from development assistance agencies (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2007, p. 15). Overall, there is a policy dilemma with respect to funding for projects as these rural spaces “are classified as neither rural nor urban either by Government Departments or other donors and agencies” (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2007, p. 16). Once again, this situation underlines the problematic nature of the dichotomization of space simply between the urban and the rural.

It is evident that planning for these ‘rural spaces’ was not confined simply to issues relating to the natural environment and to agricultural planning in particular. The Rural Development Framework made clear that planning necessarily had to encompass other economic sectors. For example, tourism promotion was identified as a potential significant issue and that “establishing linkages between rural tourism opportunities and established tourism attractions/activities in the urban core must receive priority” (Linda Masinga Iyer Rothaug Project Team, 2003, p. 35). The coastal city of Durban is historically South Africa’s leading domestic tourism destination (Rogerson, 2015; Rogerson and Rogerson, 2014; Rogerson and Rogerson, 2017; Rogerson and Rogerson, 2020; Rogerson and Rogerson, 2021a). The strategy was seeking to leverage new opportunities to spread tourism benefits away from the coastal zone into the rural hinterland areas, which are essentially ‘in-between’ rural tourism spaces (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2021b). The territory of these rural areas formed part of the former Bantustan of KwaZulu which was a creation of apartheid planning (Rogerson and Rogerson, 2023). As a traditional labour reservoir the existing tourism base of these rural spaces would be dominated not by leisure travel but instead only by visits from friends and relatives who were working in other parts of South Africa (Rogerson, 2017; Rogerson and Rogerson, 2021a).

Beyond rural tourism other sectors under scrutiny for diversifying the economic base include services with the view that “the development of commercial nodes in close proximity to the rural population should be

encouraged and promoted” (Linda Masinga Iyer Rothaug Project Team, 2003, p. 35). Construction was flagged as another sector of potential opportunity for diversifying the local economic base. Finally, it was acknowledged that manufacturing was a critical activity which impacted upon these rural spaces as a large percentage of the rural workforce was active in this sector. Indeed, whilst it was maintained that key resources for economic development in these ostensible rural spaces relate to land and natural environment, a consistent planning focus has been upon seeking to secure the active diversification of local economies beyond natural resource-based activities (Linda Masinga Iyer Rothaug Project Team, 2003).

This shift towards planning for economic diversification beyond a natural resource-based economy found expression also in the planning proposals for a revised rural economic development strategy (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2010). The goal of this strategy was “to provide a set of approaches aimed at encouraging the development of the rural economy and improving the quality of life and economic prospects of the communities in the rural areas” (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2010, p. iii). This particular document was a response to a situation analysis that had isolated the following development challenges that needed to be addressed:

- Dual systems of governance;
- Pressure on land for settlement/urban development;
- Pressure on land for property development;
- Threats to commercial agriculture;
- Underutilisation of good agricultural land in communal areas;
- Economic leakages;
- Reliance on government investment;
- Dependence on social transfers/grants;
- Poverty and inequality; and
- Absence of a coordinated approach to development and service delivery.

The strategy document was a response to these multiple challenges. In addition, it sought to align the municipal strategy with that of national government’s Comprehensive Rural Development Programme which sought to combat poverty, hunger, unemployment and the absence of development in the country’s rural areas (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2010). Among its recommendations were that the essential comparative advantage of the rural areas lay within tourism and agriculture. Proposed projects were to extend tourism potential through developing new tourism products and linking rural tourism assets to those in Durban; to encourage commercial agriculture and agro-processing through a stepped approach by supporting value-added activities; and to enhance food security (through community gardens) in areas of lesser agricultural potential. Other potential economic development opportunities related to outsourcing from close by manufacturing activities and stimulating local small enterprises in construction and housing in order to maximize opportunities around new public investment in infrastructure.

Complex issues of governance necessarily had to be addressed by the eThekweni authorities following the incorporation of the new rural spaces most of which were dominated by traditional leaders. The rural development strategy accorded particular significance to resolving tensions in governance and to “encourage constructive communication between ward councilors and traditional leadership” (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2010, p. 31). It

acknowledged that a major hindrance to the progress of rural economic development has been the “breakdown of communication and a conflict in priorities between the traditional leadership and ward councillors” (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2010, p. 31). It was observed that initial relationships were characterized by suspicion and trust and little evidence exists that “either previous or current structures have helped to improve communication between the incumbents of the formal and traditional systems of governance” (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2010, p. 31).

In addressing this critical governance issue it was proposed to move towards an agreed institution for joint decision-making. Such an institution or platform would be geared to enhancing communication and encouraging stakeholders to engage freely with one another in a constructive manner. The essential purposes were as follows: (1) to enhance communication between the traditional leadership, ward councilors and other key local stakeholders; (2) to enable stakeholders to engage with each other so as to strive for consensus about ways of improving communication; and (3) to search for ways of enabling the current traditional authority structures (clerks and traditional councils) to assume a more meaningful role in communication and participatory development (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2010). Further the objective was to “facilitate participatory planning with ward councilors and traditional leadership” with the long-term goal “to ensure that the AmaKhosi (Zulu traditional clan chiefs) and ward councilors engage with Municipal line departments in achieving service delivery goals” (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2010, p. 32). The rationale for an institution of engagement was “the need for the AmaKhosi to play a more focused role in driving socio-economic development” by drawing them into the formal planning ambit (McIntosh Xaba and Associates, 2010, p. 32).

CONCLUSION

One contemporary trend observed in parts of sub-Saharan Africa is for the restructuring of the boundaries of local governments in order to better address the development challenges associated with accelerating urbanization (Resnick, 2021; Subramanyam and Marais, 2022). This paper has examined one of the outcomes of territorial restructuring in South Africa, namely the planning challenges which have emerged with the creation of an extended metropolitan region incorporating significant rural geographies. Among several consequences was the imperative for metropolitan authorities to build new competences in order to plan and manage these added rural spaces as well as the peri-urban spaces.

Arguably, the international literature reveals the validity of the terminology of the peri-urban interface as a useful starting point for unpacking the dynamics of change in the ‘transitional’ spaces where urban and rural features are interwoven. The peri-urban interface is distinctive for the multiple challenges that it offers to planners because of its rapid pace of change, ecological and socio-economic features and usually fragmented institutional context. The planning of peri-urban zones requires a regional approach in order to address complex poverty and environmental challenges especially within the context of objectives of sustainability and a search for social justice. In understanding the complexities of peri-urban spaces in South Africa there is an obvious need to transcend the urban-rural dichotomy which is clearly

inadequate for interpreting and planning the dynamics of change in the country's extended metropolitan areas.

The available descriptions of the planning challenges facing the 'rural' spaces in South Africa's extended metropolitan areas appear to exhibit close parallels to those described as peri-urban in the international scholarship (Ortega, 2020; Follmann, 2022). Accordingly, in starting a dialogue on planning and governance issues for South Africa's extended metropolitan spaces it is useful to learn from the scholarship about peri-urbanisation and the challenges of the peri-urban interface as has been documented in several Asian, Latin American and African contexts. This said, what is observed is that the initial planning responses and documentation which has informed policy development for 'rural development' in South African metropolitan areas makes no reference at all to policy and practices of planning in any other part of the world. Breaking out of this isolated and blinkered view of planning and governance by drawing upon international debates (if not best practice) can be an important start point for evolving fresh planning insights. In addition, in planning scholarship these areas are relatively neglected in extant literature on South Africa which points to the urgent need for comprehensive research investigations to comprehend the dynamics of change in these areas.

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UNITED STATES OF EUROPE GEOPOLITICAL RECOVERY PLAN OF A MEGA-POWER IN ADRIFT

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Abstract: For 500 years, geopolitical Europe captured almost the entire planet, then after the Second World War it gradually retreated until it saw itself on the verge of extinction, dividing itself between the American West (the new Europe) and the Russian East (Eurasia). After 1990, slowly and with difficulty the core of Europe is being reformed, territorially and numerically reduced, but still a financial and cultural force swinging between the abyss and brilliance. A 9-point plan put into practice could make this continent the core of the world again, based on diversity, multiculturalism, peace and prosperity.

Key words: decline, expansion, demographic, financial, economic

* * * * *

INTRODUCTION

The fascinating continent of Europe, with a surface similar to countries such as China, the United States or Canada, disputed as being only a peninsula of the huge continent of Asia, was for almost five centuries the center of the world, being able to extend the period to over 20 centuries if we also include the rule of the Roman Empire. Mega and the only power of the world after 1500, several states in Europe expanded their territory until they came to dictate world politics in the most detailed decisions. The other continents: America, Africa, Asia, Australia and Oceania as well as Antarctica were traversed by the armies and researchers/scientists of Europe who, hurried by the metropolises left on the Old Continent, tried to poke the flag of the mother state everywhere.

These 10 million km² that Europe owns, they directly conquered at least 135 million km². The less than 5 million km² that were not direct colonists of Europe, represented points of no interest such as the Japanese islands, or were semi-colonies such as inland China, Siam (Thailand) or the high plateaus of Ethiopia.

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Including European economic momentum and technology were ahead of the rest of the world, and demographic strength was surpassed only by Asia. Everything was Europe, the entire planet had changed its geopolitical name to Europe, the languages spoken, the dominant religion, the lifestyle and the European white race, all were the head of the world and all that mattered on Earth.

But at one point, the Europeans who emigrated overseas, managed to form nations that began to accumulate wealth, appearing as small powers such as: Argentina, Greater Colombia, the United States, South Africa or Australia (Baker and Andrews, 2020). The United States began to self-govern, and the local tribes in constant struggle in the Japanese islands, together with the European danger appearing on their coast, led them to reassess the real enemies, merging and establishing a new local power (Friedman, 2020). But European dominance was still stable until the division of the world between the multitude of European mega-powers, led them to the First World War which ruined the continent. But World War II was downright terrifying, shrinking geopolitical Europe until it had no core (O'Neill, 2017). The loss of the colonies, with a territory devastated by the great wars and with two semi-European powers that drew the "Iron Curtain" through the center of the continent, geopolitical Europe ceased to exist.

From the west, the United States, which represented Euramerica, and from the east, Russia, which had become more Eurasian than European, annulled/confiscated through their presence and policy, everything that the European powers had done for so many centuries. The unprecedented development of the United States of America, Australia, Japan and the Asian Tigers, the states and the Persian Gulf, the reconstruction of Central-Eastern Europe according to completely different models than the Western ones, the growth of the population in the warm zone of the world - former European colonies, but also Islamist immigration, have made the return of Europe as a great power almost an impossible idea.

But then came the period 1960-1990, when France, Great Britain, the amazing economic recovery of part of Germany (FRG) and more recently Spain, as well as their consolidation within the small and tenuous slightly consolidated core called the European Economic Community (now the Union European), lit the light of hope (Dinan, 2014). The revolution that included the communist system and the disintegration of the USSR without a clear, stable and strong successor, Russia being too weak economically and demographically for this role, the failure of the Arab states south of the Mediterranean to gather into a united state, the decline Japanese economy after 1997 and the waters of the Atlantic Ocean that somewhat keep US influence at a distance, made Europe - an island of stability, in a world of chaos, with a large vacuum of influence around it.

But once again, similar to World War I and World War II, states began to assert primacy or mistrust. Germany is convinced that it will be the European economic engine, France wants the army and the administration at all costs, Great Britain seeing itself again in the situation of dictating its policy from the continent, leaves the European Union, Poland out of desperation not to repeat the mistakes of the last European conflagrations, allies with Great Britain and the USA against the economic rapprochement between Germany and Russia, Italy left to speculation - economic decay, and Turkey, still considered barbaric, waits increasingly frustrated at the borders of the union for over 50 years. It

seems that the power vacuum around Europe has been filled, but not by the countries of the continent. Russia with Chinese support dominates the east, Turkey is becoming more and more influential in North Africa, the US and China divide the Middle East and the US with the help of the three seas in central Europe to whom it promises military stability against Russia, as well as with the help of Great Britain in a re-formation of the Anglo-Saxon world, completes the picture of the centrifugal world in which the continent is located.




Figure 1. Geopolitical Europe, between world domination (1500-1945 period) and the decay after World War II (1945-1990)
Source: Adapted from: Darwin, 2009

Economically, Western Europe has US\$22 trillion nominal GDP, similar to China or the US, but divided between at least four major powers (Germany, France, UK, Italy) and over 20 other smaller powers, making external economic struggle difficult, against centralized and stable Chinese and American leaderships.

The demographic situation is even more difficult, of the 8 billion people on the planet at the end of 2022, the continent has only 0.7 billion, and without Russia and non-Western states even 0.5 billion, a population that has stopped growing for at least three decades, during which time Africa's population grew from 0.6 to 1.4 billion (data processed from: World Population Review, 2022).

RESULTS, DISCUSSIONS AND SCENARIOS EUROPE'S MEGA-POWER GEOPOLITICAL PLAN, IN 9 STEPS:

Step 1. Schengen visa and euro currency

Although it seems a minor problem for the states integrated in 2004, 2007 and 2013, in the process of completion, the fact that an obligation of accession, that the integrated states receive the status of the Schengen area within a maximum of 5 years after accession, in the meantime passing over 10, shows the lack of will for unity, which leads to the facilitation of the emergence of foreign interests within the Union. Similar to the situation of Turkey, which is still negotiating and renegotiating the accession file, a negotiation that spanned five decades, they put the attractiveness of Europe in a bad light (Redmond, 2007). The interests of the states already integrated within the European structures, against the states that request certain degrees of integration, the fear of Germany or France not to lose the reins of domination, the calculation of all policies only in the immediate economic interest of a small group of states, brings Europe into frustration, similar failure and discontent existing before World War I or World War II.

What chance does Ukraine or Serbia, not to mention Russia, have for European integration, as long as pro-European countries, numerically and territorially reduced, sufficiently developed and with an economy dominated by Western European influence, do not manage to overcome imaginary but immovable barriers imposed by the states already in the core of Europe? If the entire union is economically weaker than the powers of China and the USA, which are increasingly dividing the entire planet into two large spheres of influence, with what power can Europe emerge if it is run chaotically and fiercely, anti-expansion and anti-development? The consequences are already visible and are becoming more evident. Russia attaches itself economically to China, Great Britain to the USA and Turkey is barely reaching for the bell at the gates of the Union.

Step 2. The capitals of the European Union, from Brussels-Strasbourg-Luxembourg to Brussels-Prague-Bucharest

The current capitals of the Union are more Atlantic than European. Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg were established as the capitals of United Europe while the continent was fragmented. Then they represented the center. They were between Rome, Berlin, Amsterdam and Paris, but now they are far into the west, unable to represent the real Europe as it is perceived as far as the island of Crete and the Ural Mountains.

Brussels is and can remain one of the three capitals. That is, the first, unchanged from the current situation. Here it is an amalgam, half German, but with greater influence, with a Dutch (Flemish) population and a language family it belongs to: Holland, Germany, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden or Norway. That is, industrial Europe. The southern part of the city, Latin, with a French (Walloon) population from the same extended family from which it is also: Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian (Ginsburgh et al., 2017). Here is traditional, agricultural and touristic Europe. Brussels is also at the intersection of the great religions of the west, Catholic Christians in the south and Protestant Christians in the north (Delumeau, 2014). Most of the states of the union are of Germanic or Latin languages, with Christian, Catholic or Protestant religion. The

choice of the city as the European capital is special, pleasing to everyone, nothing to complain about. But the other two cities can no longer fulfill their given role for a long time, being in fact a replica also of the city of Brussels, but not-representative of the center and east of the Union where it has expanded in the last two decades and where are most of the states that aspire to this status.

The city of Strasbourg is the second capital of the Union, where the European Parliament is located (most plenary sessions are held here) (European Commission, 2023). When she was elected, she represented the peace between France and Germany. Imagining the spirit of those times, in a Europe still haunted by the disaster of Franco-German hatred, it seemed that the peace of the two represented the tranquility of the continent. Strategically chosen, slightly to the east, also between Latin and Germanic populations, on the banks of the most important river of the Union at the time, represented by the Rhine (the Danube taking its place in the meantime), but on the left bank, in France, close to the Germans, but still in the state that won the war. It is also a deeply Catholic city, with 70% of the Alsace population having this religion (southern Germany also being Christian-Catholic), representing including Italy's share of the new European core, but without any English interest. With over 900,000 inhabitants, the urban agglomeration, the city reached the western European periphery, with the exit from the Union of Great Britain and the expansion to the east, being visibly biased in the distribution of decision-making power. Thus, to increase the European attractiveness, in the effort to spread the magnetism of the Union outside the integration area, the institutions in this city must be moved further east, representative in the new context but also what is hoped to follow. One could say that cities like Milan, Munich or Vienna would be auspicious, calculating their cultural past, but we would be perpetuating the current situation. Budapest has a somewhat singular status, while Warsaw would push another injustice, of the Poles on small territories that surround them, a phenomenon that is increasingly present with the economic momentum of this state and with the increasingly decisive role within NATO.

The city of Prague, the current capital of the Czech Republic, populated by Slavs, a family of Indo-European languages that also includes: Ukrainian, Russian, Serbian, Bulgarian and so on, and the Catholic Christian religion, located in the center of Europe on the same parallel as London or Brussels, with 1,3 million people (over 2 million urban agglomeration) and so much cultural potential, would be the ideal capital, making the Union the possibility of the Lisbon-Vladivostok dream. The very history of the provinces of Bohemia and Moravia that today make up the Czech Republic, the first with power that in the 16th century, under the leadership of King Podiebrad, still under the Austro-Hungarian Empire (the Austrian side) and often attacked by Prussia (another German province) made steps for what would have been the European Council (Artur, 2015). That approach would perhaps have saved Europe from the two wars and automatically, from the world decline that followed, the city can still be considered the peacemaker of Europe, most likely quickly receiving a large number of emigrants from Germans, Poles, Ukrainians, Serbs, Russians or Hungarians, once it would be called the capital.




Figure 2. Expansion of the European core and administrative centers
 Source: data processed according to: Rusu, 2020; Buchsteiner, 2018

The third European capital is Luxembourg, a small town of only 0.15 million people, located in a state with 0.6 million inhabitants, populated, again, with French and Germans, automatically mainly Catholic Christians, but also Protestants. Same with Brussels, a Franco-German capital, but neither in

France (as Strasbourg is) nor in Germany. Again, Great Britain without any input, understanding the long English reluctance until this state ended up leaving the European Union in 2017, which, quite rightly, is only a Franco-German Union.

The institutions of this city must be moved. The landmarks being the same, a city to serve the interests of an extended, much extended Union. It could be Helsinki, but the city is too far north, and like Budapest, too singular in representation. In the south, Rome already has representation in Brussels, Athens, like Rome too south, would be a constant problem in expanding the union between Islamic states like Turkey. Kyiv, Lvov and even Minsk would be considered a continuation of Slavic domination, although all three are Christian-Orthodox (perhaps less Lvov which is somewhat Catholic). Between these, between Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and perhaps further south, Israel, Egypt on one side and north, with Ukraine and Russia, between Cape Roca (Portugal) and the Ural Mountains (Russia), the city of Bucharest, also located on the side Central European, Latin-speaking like the French, Spanish and Italians, Latin alphabet like the rest of the West, but Eastern European religion (Christian Orthodox), this city of over 2 million people would be ideal to take over the institutions of the third capitals of the European Union. Luxembourg's institutions are reduced in importance at the level of the union (the Court of Auditors, the Court of Justice, the European Commission - certain Directorates-General) (European Commission, 2023), but their relocation to the east, south-east of Europe, to the lower Danube basin, near the Great Black and at the end of the extended East-European Plain (which includes European Russia, Ukraine and the plains north and west of the Black Sea), there would be a wave of hope towards the entire east and south-east side (Georgia, Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Syria, Israel and so on), making United Europe much more attractive.

Step 3. Real economic plan to save the south: Spain, Italy, Portugal - where the core of Europe conducts its major activities.

The states in the south, the southwest of the continent, represented the core of Europe for almost two millennia. Here existed the Roman Empire, Venice and Genoa and later, Portugal and Spain territorially divided the entire planet through the Treaty of Tordesillas, in the year 1494 (Luraghi, 1971). After this triumph, the problems continued, the central place returning to Western and Central Europe. At present, although economically integrated into the Franco-German financial life, the states of the southwest suffer from the loan policy so promoted by Paris and Berlin. The crisis of the identity of a United Europe has made the powers that make it up to start the fight for dominance, although in its entirety it is a boat that sinks easily. It's like the richer US state of New York trying to borrow the state of Texas or Florida, hoping that they will fight together against Chinese economic expansion. Within Europe, a fight was launched "which of the states should be pushed first to the abyss", without considering that from the start it is a losing method. French and German banks in particular (often with branches in Switzerland or other tax havens), although they got rich with fictitious loans and unnecessarily granted to Southern or Eastern Europe (example: Greece, Italy, Romania and so on) failed to save the parent economies where they come from. Similar was the crisis of health loans, which led in 2021 to the indebtedness of a part of Europe (same as in 2008) for expensive and unnecessary vaccines, in the order of billions, which would have been sufficient

for the entire planet. Imagine a pool table on which the balls are evenly distributed, and someone (in our case Germany and France in particular) lifts the table, tilting it, so that all the balls are only on one side of it. But their number remains the same. This is the case of the European Union in the two crises, from 2008-2012 and 2019-2023, when inside there were huge redistributions of wealth, but in its totality, the Union is the same.

The calculation of interests strictly at the European level, similar to the period of the great world wars, led to the neglect of the international situation. A weak Europe also makes Germany or France weak, even if they have more power within the union. Only with the Union in full economic momentum and the enlargement process, does it give weight to the global negotiations pursued by the states that make it up. The real economic growth of Romania, Italy or Spain automatically helps the Western European multinationals and Europe as a whole, the real economic union being mandatory.

A first measure is financial stability and the launch of economic growth. A clear plan of real loans, money going into infrastructure, industry, manufacturing centers and supply chains, with local patrons. It would be done with little effort, far below the value of the useless loans from the pandemic period, so the pro-European feeling would be at its peak in this space, involving all the states of the Mediterranean Sea and with waves of interest and aspirations towards the Latin states from all over the world, including a rapid increase in the interest of Latin American and Maghreb workers in the southern European labor market.

Step 4. The demographic problem

After restoring confidence in the Union, achieved by implementing the first three steps, comes the moment of demographic organization. The Union is declining demographically, but like debt, it is states within the same area that are being emptied of population to fill the need for workers from elsewhere in the same area. Workers from Eastern Europe migrate to the center, west, north and southwest, and more recently, migration has also taken the route from the southwest to the west. Generally, the labor requirement averages from one to five million people, depending on the periods. Only the nearby states from which residents migrate to Europe have a cumulative annual increase of over 50 million people. Egypt and the Maghreb are growing by 3.5 million people annually, the Levant (Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon) by one million, while the populations of Turkey and Iraq are growing by 2 million annually. If we digress a bit, South Asia, which is an increasingly preferred flow, is growing by 22 million, while Sub-Saharan Africa is growing by 28 million, with an annual increase of at least 40 million by 2050 (data processed according to: Worldometers, 2022).

The problem of Europe is serious, the aging of the population and the decline have made this continent, which was a demographic nucleus, now only a space specialized at the highest level, but with few and elderly inhabitants. If in 1900 Europe had 28% of the world's population, today it has less than 10% and in 2050 it will decrease to 7%. Also, in 1900 it had four times more population than the continent of Africa, but it demographically reached Europe in 1995 (700 million people), currently having almost double that is 1.4 billion people, and in 2050 it will have 2.5 billion and in 2100 maybe over 5 billion, reaching seven or eight times more population. It is understood that Europe's great

chance is to preserve and increase the number of specialists and the high quality among workers, to survive as a great power in the new demographic context. Immigration is already underway; it remains for the states forming the Union to develop a clear plan of the reception criteria.

Table 1. Population evolution in Europe and in the countries from which immigrants arrive
Source: data processed from: Worldometers, 2022

No	Continents and States:	Population 2023 (million inhabitants)	Population growth / decline 2020-2030	Immigrants (+) / Emigrants (-) 2020-2030
1	Europe	749	- 6	+ 12
	E.U.	447	- 3	+ 8
	Germany	84	- 1	+ 4
	France	65	+ 1	+ 2
	Italy	60	- 1	- 1
	Romania	19	- 1	- 0,5
2	Africa	1.425	+345	- 5
	Egypt	107	+ 18	- 0,4
	Algeria, Marocco, Libya and Tunisia	103	+ 13	- 1
	Nigeria	220	+ 58	- 0,6
3	Asia	4.740	+ 333	- 17
	India	1.415	+ 124	- 5
	Pakistan	232	+ 42	- 2
	Bangladesh	169	+ 15	- 3,7
	Nepal and Sri Lanka	52	+ 5	- 0,5
	Vietnam and Philippines	215	+ 21	- 1,7
	Iraq, Afghanistan and Yemen	115	+ 27	- 1
	Turkey	86	+ 4	- 2,5
4	Latin America and the Caribbean	668	+ 52	- 4

Among Europe's obligations is to maintain the number of workers on the market, to increase the incoming population, skilled and specialized workers as well as certain ethnic and religious preferences in order not to endanger the current structure and avoid chaos. The states around the Mediterranean tend to receive emigrants from South-Saharan Africa, Latin America and South and Southeast Asia, avoiding the Arab-Islamist population from North Africa and the Middle East, but this is preferred in Central Europe and North.

After establishing the criteria for the reception of immigrants, the number can be increased, the European Union being obliged to host at least 2.5 million more people every year, generally double what the United States receives, while a union extended to all of Europe, would be able to receive over 4 million annually, strictly from outside the continent, avoiding the current practice of walking the same European workers.

Step 5. First Expansion: The Old Western World

We are in a financially consolidated Europe, with economic growth, full workforce, economic return of all developed states in the west, north and economically revived south, with three capitals stretched far to the east, between the Atlantic and the Black Sea, the Union becoming attractive. For each step, between one and three years are required for completion, with the possibility of overlapping. In such a situation, Russia would court Germany and France to export more raw materials, Turkey would want more integration, the US would want more economic relations, and China would work unhindered to prove that it deserves to enter the dynamic market of the new relaunched Europe, thus the Franco-German dream of domination would be realized, without the current strategy of deindustrialization, depopulation or borrowing of certain states within the great European family.

In this context, the inhabitants of the developed states of the West, who looked reluctantly at Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg, will now have a different approach. Thus, the Union as a whole sends an offer to reintegrate Great Britain, as a whole state (England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), receiving rights equal to those of France and Germany, receiving the role of main maritime defender of the continent and directing the fleet maritime EU worldwide, with the states of the union relying on its influence for the stable, maritime reception of raw materials and immigrants from all over the planet, a tactic that would benefit everyone. In the same wave of Western integration, Norway and Iceland should be included, the adoption of the Schengen visa for Ireland and the euro currency for Denmark and Sweden, canceling their reluctance, strictly through the power of the dynamic Union example.

Step 6. Real economic plan to save the East: 10 (states integrated in 2004) +2 (Romania and Bulgaria) +1 (Croatia) + Greece.

We have Europe with healthy economic growth, without the demographic problem, the problems of the supply of raw materials, the embarrassing influence of the USA through Great Britain or China through Italy. Europe no longer has second-rate states, with the second speed or the various names received over time, states that sought relief in external economic and military partners.

After the expansion of the euro currency and the Schengen visa to the east, as well as the two (more symbolic) capitals, now an economic measure is also needed. A concrete, stable and peaceful plan to build nuclear power plants and highways, mainly with cheap energy and fast infrastructure (Badar and Kozma, 2020). The European advantage is total economic growth itself, the possibility of putting more euros on the market without causing inflation and even the growth of Western, Italian, English or Dutch companies for ports, French for nuclear power plants or German for highways, measures that will strengthen the core and make the more Europeanized periphery. This plan would include the 10 states integrated in 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus), the states of Romania and Bulgaria integrated in 2007, Croatia integrated in 2013, but also Greece.

Step 7. Second Expansion: Christianity

We have the picture of an increasingly powerful Europe, which in less than a decade is on its feet, negotiating on an equal footing with the US,

geopolitically attracting the Islamic world and peacefully influencing Russia, which increasingly prefers to send its diplomats to Prague or Bucharest in the place of Beijing, which aims to seize Siberia. Diplomatic seriousness and economic dynamism, pouring over the borders of the union an increasing attraction, becoming a mild variant in an increasingly fierce fight for Sino-American world domination.

The large number of Hindu Indians, South-Saharan Christians and Muslims or Islamist Arabs, all of whom arrived by the millions, are accustoming the big cities of Europe to multiculturalism. But until there is a greater general acceptance of the foreign population, as well as its integration, there is naturally a first expansion to the east, also in a Christian and slightly semi-Christian spirit, targeting two areas. The Western Balkans in their entirety: Serbia, North Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, while Kosovo will probably have a special status with a multi-ethnic Serb-Albanian leadership of stability, in "exile", perhaps in Prague . The second area covering the former USSR states, including: Ukraine (what remains of it), Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and offers for Armenia and Belarus. In the same way, leaderships of stability, multi-ethnic for the semi-independent territories such as: Transnistria, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Lugansk, Donetsk, Abkhazia, Adjara, South Ossetia and so on, the center being most likely also in Prague, to the detriment of Bucharest.




Figure 3. Extension I and II Scenario proposed by the author

Step 8. The Third Expansion: Islam and Arabia

In total after no more than 15 years from the start of the plan's implementation, the world being in a dizzying dynamic in which Europe does not

want to lose its place at the table of mega-powers, it would be one of the strategic leaders with cultural appeal, calm and gentleness, between the belligerent USA, an overly aggressive China and an excessively slow India.

Providing a major influx of Christian immigrants arriving from Africa and Latin America, Buddhists and Hindus from Southeast and South Asia, and with a strong Islamist minority in major Western cities and Balkan states, the union may now become interested in Islamist countries, with an increasingly stable population and from which emigration is no longer a defining problem.

Completing the idea of Eurabia, the influence of France, Spain and Italy, the waters of the Mediterranean that unite commercial and reaching the natural border of geopolitical Europe which is represented by the Sahara Desert, the union can extend to any territory with an outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. The third expansion would be appropriate to finally include Turkey, but also Azerbaijan, having for Nagorno-Karabakh an Armenian-Azeri leadership in Prague, the state of Morocco (so attached to European ideas, with 5 million emigrants on the northern continent), Tunisia with its citadel Carthage and the holy land of Christendom - Israel. Depending on the situation at the time, similar status is given to Northern Cyprus, but Lebanon and Palestine could also be included.




Figure 4. Extension III
Scenario proposed by the author

Brussels' reluctance and fear of failure have kept Serbia or Turkey at a distance from integration, resulting in external powers such as the US, China or

Russia having support right on the coast and inside the union, all of which culminates in the current geopolitical decline. Tens of millions of Europeans travel annually to: Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon, Israel or Palestine. Workers from these countries traverse Europe returning home to implement what they saw on the Old Continent. The endless discussions in which Turkey has nothing to do in Europe, but Israel must be defended at all costs, in which Italy should give up the poor south that endangers European wealth, not even Romania or Poland they have something to do at the table with the Franco-Germans, the Nordics to govern themselves, and the English have never been convinced Europeans, all this shows that Europe from the mega and the only world power, expanded geopolitically to the level of the entire planet for more than four and a half centuries, has now come to wonder if the real Europe should not be declared only in the city of Brussels and its outskirts.

According to the new forecasts, India will quickly surpass the economy of Europe, and Africa will have several times more population, the USA is growing much faster economically and China with its 1.4 billion people (3 times the population of the EU) has proven its primacy in the world, the claims of the Europeans to plow imaginary demarcations of the most European of the Europeans, seem that they can no longer continue. The risk is imminent, and peace with Great Britain and implicitly with its influence in the commonwealth (Grimal, 2003), the inclusion the fertile fields and specialized population of the east, and the riches of hydrocarbons and solar energy around the Mediterranean, are the great saving grace of maintaining the Union as a mega-power.

Step 9. Fourth extension – optional: Leaving Europe: Eurasia, Euro-Mediterranean or Eur-Atlantic

Like a balloon that we inflate and can get bigger and bigger, but with the same amount of rubber, so Europe could expand, with roughly the same population, but with bigger and bigger areas. That depends a lot on the steps implemented so far, on the possible ethnic tensions following the migration to the continent of a number of 40-80 million non-Europeans, the expansion from the Slavic world of the eastern steppes and the Islamic South Mediterranean world. If it will cope, if it rejects the influence of external powers and if it can become an attraction for the other states.

There are three possibilities depending on the way of development since that date. An extension would be Atlantic, perhaps English Belize increasingly squeezed between the Spanish states on the Isthmus of Panama, perhaps English and Dutch Guyana and Suriname, if they feel the heavy breath of Brazil and Venezuela making territorial claims. It can also be about Canada, so extensive and rich in resources, but still insufficiently populated (the area comparable to the USA but with a population of only 10% of that of its only neighbor), which has close plans to unite with Great Britain and in present. The list could go on, especially resource-rich states that prefer the protection of a world leader like the enlarged Europe, which does not dominate with multinationals and militarily as the US does, nor drains resources by needing it for its own industry, as it does: China, India, Japan, Vietnam, Nigeria and so on.

The second possibility is Eurasian expansion, including Russia, perhaps Kazakhstan, which see themselves threatened by the growing Chinese takeover. Russia has always dreamed of this, there are leaders on both sides of Europe (Eastern and Western) who see the whole Union, necessarily extending between

Lisbon and Vladivostok. This action would suddenly triple the area of the Union, with a territory almost unpopulated but rich in resources. If Great Britain loses its influence within the Union, if the integrated Islamist states already bring serious instabilities and, instead, Slavic Prague and Orthodox Bucharest increasingly influence the policy of the community bloc, together with the outbreak of mutual Russian Chinese mistrust regarding dominance in Siberia, may bring this plan to fruition faster than we imagine.




Figure 5. Extension IV
Scenario proposed by the author

A third possibility, not to be neglected, is the restoration of the Roman Mediterranean or Eur-Abia, increasingly present on the lips of French and Italian diplomats. North African states have declining population growth rates, while the sub-Saharan black population is experiencing a massive population explosion, putting pressure on the north. A recovery of the US within the Americas, or at least North America and the Caribbean, the growing influence of China and India in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, as well as an increasing aggressiveness of Russia, could push the Union southward, bordering on the Desert Sahara. Algeria and Libya are very large and desert states, with many opportunities, with a natural border to the south, but sparsely populated and with the beginning of demographic decline. Also Syria, and this sparsely populated one would connect Israel and Jordan (implicitly also the Red Sea-Indian Ocean) and Turkey, and from here to all of Europe.

They seem phantasmagorical, but you can try. Egypt, with 108 million inhabitants, so stable in migration and great civilization of the world, always with a beneficial influence on European culture, but never trying to conquer the continent, gave an example of constant superiority. Currently in exceptional relations with the Islamic world, but also with: Israel, the USA, Russia, France or China, it did not cause large migrations even during the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011, although the country was in total chaos, and the population of this state grows annually by 2.0 million inhabitants. It is a good example, of the one that really represents the "scarecrow of the states in northern Africa", which, approached differently, can behave differently, and this state with a wide outlet to the Red Sea and from here to the Indian Ocean (what will become the coastline his, the new world demographic center), this, once integrated, would bring together the great cultures since the formation of modern humanity, completing the ring of states surrounding the Mediterranean.

CONCLUSIONS

It is certain that Europe has potential, being a cultural territory of great proportions, considered "the open-air museum of the world". Its economic power equals that of the US or China, but its lack of military endowment, lack of typically American aggressiveness and hard-line approach, or increasingly Chinese-style greed, make it an attractive force for all of Europe, Africa, Atlantic Latin America, or the western half of Asia.

With a stability and enlargement plan, Europe can curb the process of decline and mistrust triggered especially after the crisis of 2008, the increasingly pronounced demographic decline after 1990 and the territorial reduction after 1950.

Although they wanted a constructive plan presentable to the entire European community, the 9 steps are transformed into a plea for the Franco-German tandem so dominant in the current European context, being those who, with some calculations on small areas, wanted primacy in a world restricted strictly to central and south-western Europe, without taking into account the current economic, military, decision-making and financial expansion of the USA, the military return and pool of vital resources - role held by Russia, the emergence of what we could call the Islamic sisters or tigers of the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Egypt (perhaps Pakistan) increasingly powerful economically, the African demographic explosion and the economic boom in East and perhaps South and Southeast Asia (China, South Korea, India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia).

They are increasingly stronger economically and demographically, which does not leave too much room for maneuver to the current form of Europe, Russia controlling Ukraine and easily also the economy of Serbia, Hungary, Austria and Germany, China increasingly settling in Greece or Italy, the USA breaking the west (UK) and even the center of the continent (Poland, Romania and so on) while Islamist and African states are poised to dominate the labor market and soon politics in the big cities. The problem of migration, demographic decline, external influences, the debt crisis and enlargement are solvable problems of the Union. Following the nine steps, Europe will have economic growth, demographic growth, will be expanded in the spirit of a great Eurasian power (if it will include Russia), Euratlantic (if it will include Canada), Euro-Mediterranean (if it will include the southern and eastern littoral of Mediterranean Sea), being a natural protected territory, with borders such as: the Atlantic Ocean, the Arctic Ocean, the Sahara Desert, frozen Siberia, the Caspian Sea and the Arabian Desert.

It would include a habitable surface of approximately 10 million km² (as much as the USA or China) plus unpopulated territories, represented by: northern Scandinavia, perhaps Greenland and Canada, or the Sahara or Siberia, with a population of 800 million, with access to three oceans and a mild, tolerable climate for the most part. Not a desert like America or Oceania, no extremes like hurricanes or earthquakes, but not in a space crisis similar to South, Southeast and East Asia, with a slight population increase, but not a demographic explosion similar to sub-Saharan Africa. A civilizational, cultural, gentle and multi-ethnic power, as it has been defined since its formation.

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C O N T E N T S**THE BANTUSTANS OF APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA: TRANSITIONING FROM INDUSTRY TO TOURISM**

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